Gough, Fifth Army in Spring 1918

[Colonel Grubb]

I've been reading some articles and online content about the performance of General Hubert Gough, the commander of the BEF's Fifth Army and his command and actions in the led and up and through the German Spring 1918 offensive.

If Gough was removed from Fifth Army command by January 1918 in the fallout after Third Ypers and replaced, and assuming the Germans still launch Operation Michael relatively as OTL, barring minor tactical changes taking into account a changed Fifth Army commander, could the German offensive have been less successful in the amount of territory lost/casualties taken/equipment lost (inc. the OTL significant loss of light railway and logistical equipment)?

I'm assuming the larger structural issues (both positive and negative) of both the German and BEF forces of early 1918 remain largely unchanged.

Gough was the made scapegoat, led by Lloyd-George in OTL for Fifth Army's performance and was criticized by contemporary histories such as Bean as well as modern writings on the matter and clouding the different sources and histories so I'm trying to gauge the influence of the man himself on Fifth Army's performance.

 

[Ian_W]

You might want to look at the Sheffield paper in this

https://www.army.gov.au/sites/g/files/net1846/f/1998_1918_defining_victory_0.pdf

I've got a fair amount of sympathy for Gough - he's trying to hold against the enemy main effort, which has seen them concentrate much more heavy artillery than he has, while dealing with units that have been worn away during a national manpower crisis. Oh yes, and he's holding a much longer front than the divisions he has should be, as well.

And he still manages to keep his command intact, trading space until the enemy outruns their supply lines, and then is able to counter-attack.

It could have been done worse.

 

[Colonel Grubb]

You might want to look at the Sheffield paper in this

https://www.army.gov.au/sites/g/files/net1846/f/1998_1918_defining_victory_0.pdf

I've got a fair amount of sympathy for Gough - he's trying to hold against the enemy main effort, which has seen them concentrate much more heavy artillery than he has, while dealing with units that have been worn away during a national manpower crisis. Oh yes, and he's holding a much longer front than the divisions he has should be, as well.

And he still manages to keep his command intact, trading space until the enemy outruns their supply lines, and then is able to counter-attack.

It could have been done worse.

That paper was actually what prompted me to post this when you posted in that other about 1919. I was reading through it today and was struck by the points and issues it raised, particularly from some of the other history I’ve read about the man and the situation the BEF found itself in early-mid 1918.

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

IMHO Gough should have been sacked at the end of 1917. He didn't deserve the boot for Fifth Army's performance during Operation Michael.

I don't believe that any other British Army commander could have done anything other than slightly better - more likely worse - given the position, unless they could screw out of Haig more troops redeployed to the Somme from the North. Lack of numbers, taking over unprepared positions, the length of frontage, the German preparations & tactics that proved so successful at first.. none of this changes and had more effect on the battle's outcome than Hubert Gough.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

A better change for 5th Army would be Lloyd George removed from No 10

Poisionous little power grabbing troll

Without him their is likely no manpower crisis or at least a smaller one.

 

[Colonel Grubb]

Is there any credence to the argument put forth:

Farrar-Hockley argues that Lawrence and Davidson were personally unsympathetic to Gough and in early 1918 effectively starved him of reinforcements which Haig might, if asked, have agreed to send. He argues that Gough ought to have demanded to speak to Haig personally, which was his right but not the etiquette of the time.[365] On the evening of Tuesday 19 March Lawrence ("purring on the telephone like a damned pussycat") once again refused permission to move up the 20th and 50th Divisions

- I know its Wikipedia, but it is sourced from Farrar-Hockley, General Sir Anthony (1975). Goughie: the Life of General Sir Hubert Gough CBG, GCMG, KCVO. London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon.

Not that the injection of the 20th and 50th might have made much difference especially given the time frames and other factors involved.

IMHO Gough should have been sacked at the end of 1917. He didn't deserve the boot for Fifth Army's performance during Operation Michael.

I don't believe that any other British Army commander could have done anything other than slightly better - more likely worse - given the position, unless they could screw out of Haig more troops redeployed to the Somme from the North. Lack of numbers, taking over unprepared positions, the length of frontage, the German preparations & tactics that proved so successful at first.. none of this changes and had more effect on the battle's outcome than Hubert Gough.

That's what I've come into thinking in my recent readings.