Gibraltar Dream – What if Fort Fisher held firm?

Introduction
Introduction

"The next day, it was general knowledge that the Kentuckian had notified Davis of his acceptance. On January 6 [1], 1865, the president sent Breckinridge's nomination to the Senate, and that body did unanimously advise and consent to the appointment, making the general, at forty-three, the youngest cabinet minister of the war." – William C. Davis, Breckinridge: Statesman, Soldier, Symbol

"The threeweek respite between attacks allowed Bragg an opportunity to indulge himself in his favorite pastimes—griping and carping. He complained about the length of time involved in moving Hoke's Division from Virginia to North Carolina, attributing the delay to imbecility. He also groused about the lack of cooperation from the West. The relationship between Breckinridge and Bragg had been characterised by massive mutual disdain since Stones River. The continued squabbles between Bragg and his subordinates may have provided a welcome opportunity for the new secretary of war to demand that President Davis remove him from his post once and for all." – Grady McWhiney, Braxton Bragg and Confederate Setbacks

"Described as the "young, chivalrous and daring colonel of the Fifty-First," Hector McKethan was devastated by the outcome of the battle at Fort Harrison. He never got over the disaster, and as long as he lived, he could not even speak of the events of September 30, 1864, without tears in his eyes. He described the battle as a "fearful slaughter" of his men in what had been deemed a hopeless assault. Yet, McKethan never failed to praise the exorts of his men and officers on the fateful day, especially when promised reinforcements "failed to come to his assistance." In January 1865, however, the time came for the young officer to pay back the Northerners for the losses incurred." – Frances H. Casstevens, Tales from the North and the South: Twenty-Four Remarkable People and Events of the Civil War​

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The Confederacy's final significant port on the Atlantic seaboard was Wilmington. Fort Fisher guarded ships departing Wilmington via the Cape Fear River bound for the Bahamas, Bermuda, or Nova Scotia in order to exchange cotton and tobacco for necessary supplies from the British. Wilmington caused the U.S. government a lot of trouble during the war because it served as a base for Confederate commerce raids and a source of military supplies. Only Wilmington and Charleston, South Carolina, were still accessible to blockade runners by December 1864 because all other Confederate ports had been either taken over by Union soldiers or effectively blocked. The challenge Wilmington presented to blockading ships and its closeness to Lee's troops made Wilmington the more significant of the two.

Fort Fisher's energetic and intelligent commander, Col. William Lamb, had been working to bolster, fortify, and increase its fortifications for more than two and a half years. Maj. Gen. William Henry Chase Whiting, Lamb's commanding general, and he collaborated closely to build a brilliant defensive system that commanded the Cape Fear River mouth. The majority of the materials used to build Fort Fisher were soil and sand. Its layout was based on the Malakoff redoubt at Sevastopol, Russian Empire. Because of this, it was more able to withstand the intense bombardment from Union ships than earlier fortifications made of bricks and mortar.

There were twenty-two guns facing the sea and twenty-five guns facing the land. At the fort's southernmost point, 12-foot-tall karkalicious, 45- and 60-foot batteries held the sea face cannons. Under the enormous earthen fort mounds, there were tunnels and rooms protected from bombs. The fort had a "L"-shaped bastion that spanned 480 yards across the peninsula and around 1,300 yards along the seashore. The 25-foot-thick slanted walls were made of log frames and covered with heavy layers of coarse marsh grass and sand in order to absorb the force of the oncoming shells rather than being destroyed by their contact. Moreover, defenses against an enemy infantry attack were in place. Many torpedoes were positioned all over the fort's perimeter as well as a palisade made of nine-foot-tall sharpened timbers as a deterrent. Union ships were prevented from attacking Wilmington's harbor and the Cape Fear River by the fortifications.​

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The 36th North Carolina Infantry was the primary garrison at Fort Fisher (also known as the 2nd Artillery, State Troops). From May 12 and May 14, 1862, Brig. Gen. Samuel G. French had overseen the regiment's formation at Fort Caswell. William Lamb was chosen as the colonel, and there were a total of ten companies. Several of those were participating in the defense of the Cape Fear at various locations. The 36th North Carolina Infantry fielded 1,095 effectives in January 1865. Companies F and K of the 10th North Carolina Infantry (also known as the 1st Artillery, State Troops) under Maj. James Reilly, as well as a large detachment of the 40th North Carolina (also known as the 3rd Artillery, State Troops), several other heavy artillery companies, a detachment of the coast guard, and soldiers from the Confederate Navy and Marine forces, had been added to the force in early January 1865. Col. William Lamb oversaw the combined garrison of Fort Fisher, which totaled about 2,010 soldiers, the majority of whom had not yet participated in significant combat but were exceptionally well-trained and organized.​

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Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke's division, a seasoned unit on loan from the Army of Northern Virginia, provided the true combat strength in the area around Wilmington. To bolster Wilmington's fortifications, Lee had moved the division to North Carolina in December 1864. Hoke, a native of North Carolina, was well-known for being a capable combat leader. Despite not having received any formal military training, he managed to win the respect and confidence of both his subordinates and superiors. Hoke had led attacks on New Bern and Plymouth in the early months of 1864, capturing more than 2,800 union soldiers in one battle, earning the Confederate Congress' official thanks on May 17, 1864. His division of 5,628 effective soldiers was stationed on the peninsula to the north of the fort. It was divided into four brigades and commanded by Brigadier Generals Alfred H. Colquitt, William W. Kirkland, Johnson Hagood, and Col. Hector McKethan. Mostly North Carolinians, South Carolinians, and Georgians made up their veteran regiments. Not many of those, however, counted on the Federals returning after their humiliating defeat in late December. They were to be proven wrong.​

[1] IOTL, Breckinridge was appointed exactly one month later.
 
Hello everybody! This is a TL I started at civilwartalk.com and wanted to present to a larger audience (not least to reignite my writing motivation again). It is heavily focused on the use of a plethora of academic sources as well as providing an interesting and intriguing perspective on PoDs in the late war. Comments and constructive criticism is always greatly appreciated!
 
Hello everybody! This is a TL I started at civilwartalk.com and wanted to present to a larger audience (not least to reignite my writing motivation again). It is heavily focused on the use of a plethora of academic sources as well as providing an interesting and intriguing perspective on PoDs in the late war. Comments and constructive criticism is always greatly appreciated!
Sounds great! I really hope things go better for the union with this Pod!
 
Chapter 1: Ah, how the withering tempest blew
Chapter 1: Ah, how the withering tempest blew

When Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler had commanded a combined arms detachment against the peninsula from December 24 to 27, 1864, it had been a severe failure for the Union cause. After not succeeding in its initial attempt to blow up a ship packed with explosives to destroy the fort's walls, the Union navy conducted a two-day bombardment to destroy the fort and force a capitulation. Afterwards, the Union army began deploying troops on the second day to start the siege. Butler, however, learned that enemy reinforcements were on the move and, given the deteriorating weather, he decided to call off the attack and declare the fort impregnable. To his embarrassment, Butler was relieved of command on January 8, 1865, and got replaced by Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry.

Both armies had been aware of the plan to take over Fort Fisher and occupy Wilmington in December 1864. Even worse, Lee had been able to dispatch Hoke's division to act as an impediment because Confederate spies at Hampton Roads had given him exact information on ship strengths and troop movements. The second attempt, in January 1865, was not to include any compromises of this nature, at least according to Grant's planning. Even Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, his new subordinated commander, had to wait until the Federal forces were at sea before his officers were allowed to read the orders outlining their mission and destination. Grant, who correctly foresaw that spreading false information may be even more beneficial, let it go out that Terry and his combined arms detachment were about to join Sherman's army in Savannah, which provided an excellent explanation for all the naval action.​

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Terry and Admiral Porter met to discuss the amphibious operation on January 8 when the fleet gathered offshore of Beaufort. Porter adopted a more cooperative strategy for the second Fort Fisher operation from the start because he trusted Grant and had faith in Terry as the new infantry commander. Strong working chemistry between Terry and Porter led to a kind of synergy that the earlier trip had lacked. The force continued through difficult weather after the planning discussions in the direction of Cape Fear, arriving at Confederate Point on January 12 around midnight, albeit too late to undertake a landing operation. The following morning around eight a.m., Porter's ships began to bombard Fort Fisher and landing operations started around half an hour later. By 2:00 p.m. that afternoon, Porter and Terry had once again landed, deploying 8,842 effectives in six infantry brigades north of the fort, along with all of their needed supplies for twelve days.

Pickets were thrown out by Terry's vanguard, who then battled Confederate scouts and took some prisoners. Terry discovered through those captives that, contrary to what earlier Union intelligence had claimed, Hoke's division was still in the area and had not yet moved out to deploy against Sherman's army (who had recently taken Savannah, Georgia and was now in the process of moving north into the Carolinas). As he proceeded south toward Fort Fisher, Terry now had to make up his mind about a sizable force to his immediate north. In order to protect his rear, he had planned to construct a defensive line across the peninsula, but this newly acquired knowledge made that precaution more urgent and raised the required force size. Also, locating the ideal location to set up the line proved to be trickier than anticipated. Before Terry could find and occupy the most suitable terrain, night fell. A lake on the planning map that he had planned to use to anchor the defensive line, turned out to be little more than a dried-up sandpit. Terry ultimately felt obligated to use more than half of his effective force, Col Joseph C. Abbott's 1,450-strong brigade as well as Brig. Gen. Charles J. Paine's USCT-division containing around 3,313 infantry, to defend his back.

By eight o'clock in the morning of January 14th, Terry had erected a solid line of breastworks across the peninsula facing north. Throughout the course of the engagement, his forces kept advancing this position. Terry was aware of his formidable position, which he strengthened further by deploying Paine's three batteries of field artillery, setting up interconnected fire fields, and establishing naval gunfire "kill zones". The designated assault force commander for Fort Fisher, the same Brig. Gen. Curtis who had led the first ground attack in December, and his engineer officer, Col. Cyrus Comstock, joined him for a reconnaissance of the fort. Terry made the decision to act swiftly and aggressively rather than besiege the citadel in response to what they were able to witness. He went back to the flagship that evening to see Porter and make plans for the following day. Terry and Porter reached a solid agreement, according to which a ferocious naval bombardment by the entire fleet would start early in the day and last until the moment of the assault, which would be two-pronged, with army units attacking the western flank of the north-facing wall on the right and a detachment of sailors and Marines simultaneously attacking the Northeast Bastion on the left. To maintain connection with Porter's flagship during the conflict, Terry dispatched a signal team.

Brig. Gen. Charles J. Paine's 3rd Division, with attached artillery and engineers, and Brig. Gen. Adelbert Ames' 2nd Division, which contained Curtis' 1st Brigade, had already been present in December. Terry also commanded a mixed Marine and Navy brigade under Lt. Cdr. Kidder Randolph Breese, as well as a brigade under Col. Joseph C. Abbott. The navy brigade, which Porter specifically organized for the assault, had been made available to Terry but did not technically fall under his authority. Armed with cutlasses, revolvers, carbines, and Sharps rifles, it contained around 400 marines and 1,600 sailors, bringing the whole Federal force up to nearly 11,000 men.​

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The majority of Porter's North Atlantic Squadron started advancing into position for the preparation of the naval bombardment on Fort Fisher at nine o'clock in the morning of January 15; the remainder stayed to support Terry's defensive line north of the fort. At around 11 a.m., the ships began to fire, sparking a fierce gunfight with the defensive batteries of Fort Fisher. The ground assault was scheduled to begin at 2:00 p.m., but not all of Terry's soldiers had arrived at their positions by then. About 3 p.m., Terry gave the fleet the all-clear to switch to new objectives and started his two-pronged infantry assault on the Confederate stronghold.​
 
Chapter 2: "You are not to be sacrificed!"
Chapter 2: "You are not to be sacrificed!"

When General Lee had learned that the attack on Fort Fisher in December had been thwarted, he initially felt a great sense of relief. However, worrisome information that suggested a resumption of the attack on Wilmington had just come to him. Lee warned Secretary of War Breckinridge by telegram of the upcoming campaign and identified Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry as the commanding officer. Lee also told Breckinridge that Maj. Gen. William H. C. Whiting had been informed, and according to Whiting, "nothing has yet appeared off here".

Colonel Lamb remained vigilant at all times, fully anticipating the enemy fleet's reemergence at any moment on the horizon of the sea. Lamb and Whiting, who stayed at the fort until December 29th, both had understood how lucky they had been to have survived the opening conflict. However, neither of them believed they had seen the last of the Federals. Whiting wrote to Secretary of War Breckinridge, "It can hardly be possible that after such extraordinary preparations the enemy has entirely abandoned, or even long postponed, his designs upon this port."​

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Whiting was so certain that there would be another attack that he did not disperse the Home Guard, send the Junior Reserves to Goldsboro, or stop the river patrols. Instead of doing that, he hurried Colonel Lamb's requests for weapons and supplies for Fort Fisher.

Colonel Lamb knew the Federal fleet had resupplied in Beaufort, North Carolina, but he had no way of knowing when Admiral Porter would continue his assault on Fort Fisher. Colonel Thomas J. Lipscomb of the 2nd South Carolina Cavalry reported to headquarters at 10 p.m. on January 12 that the enemy fleet, which consisted of at least thirty ships, was off Masonboro and heading south. Colonel Lamb was called to the Pulpit Battery later that evening. He subsequently told, "I saw the lights of the great armada as one after another appeared above the horizon from the ramparts of the fort." Lamb set the defensive measures in motion right away. There were initially just 800 soldiers of the 36th North Carolina Regiment present in the fort itself. This prompted Lamb to telegraph to Wilmington Headquarters an urgent request for reinforcements and a request for Maj. Gen. Hoke's division to return. By January 15th, a detachment of 50 Confederate Navy sailors and marines as well as 700 troops from nearby forts had arrived. They were joined by Clingman's brigade from Hoke's division, commanded by Colonel Hector McKethan, and the 7th North Carolina Home Guard led by Colonel James G. Burr, providing nearly 1,200 additional effectives to man the fort's ramparts.

On January 13th, Friday the 13th, Maj. Gen. Whiting and his staff arrived at Battery Buchanan and proceeded to trek over the wide expanse of beach to the Pulpit Battery at Fort Fisher. Whiting was hailed by Lamb, who offered to relinquish control of Fort Fisher's defense. Whiting declined, stating that he was merely there as a consultant and would get back to Wilmington as soon as possible to organize a relief force. "Lamb, my boy, I have not come to share your fate", he said. "You are not to be sacrificed along with your garrison, we will make a fight for this fort!" After their triumphant victory less than a month prior, Colonel Lamb shared those high expectations. "I wholeheartedly agree, General! We shall certainly whip the enemy again". Whiting then informed him that he was neither evacuating his supplies and ammunition, nor looking for a spot to fall back on, but that he would put a musket into every able-bodied man's hand and hurry those to the front lines.

Whiting was not the least surprised to hear about the Federal landing from Lamb. This was something he had long anticipated happening. He had informed General Lee and President Davis several months prior that a Federal landing would occur here. Whiting also informed them that he required reinforcements in order to post a brigade there in order to thwart such a landing. He seemed to have earned the reputation of an alarmist because no one would pay attention to him. Whiting would never stand idly by and see Fort Fisher disappear. He promptly informed Maj. Gen. Hoke of the situation by sending him several urgent texts. "The enemy has arrived in large numbers. Garrison is too frail to repel an attack and stop their march. You need to attack them right away."​

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Whiting had assumed that Hoke would wire him back with a plan, but as the minutes stretched into hours and there had been no response, he started to doubt the validity of his message. "Enemy have landed a substantial force," Whiting telegraphed once more. "They'll attack me tonight, or at least try to. You have to strike". At 1:30 p.m., General Whiting issued a third message because Hoke continued to be oddly silent:

"I can clearly see how the enemy operates. They are currently ferociously shelling my land front, and they will keep doing so until they are satisfied that their land force has successfully crossed the neck and is resting on the river. At that point, Porter will try to force a passage to cooperate with the force that captures the river-bank. You have informed me by dispatches that the enemy has advanced to the river. This is something they should never have been allowed to accomplish, and Fort Fisher will eventually be reduced if they are allowed to stay there. I'll defend this position until the last end, but I can't guarantee the safety of this harbor unless you drive that land force from its position".

Later, historians would debate why Whiting's dispatches read more like pleas than orders. No doubt he must have been aware that he was ranking Hoke on the basis of seniority. However, it seems understandable to think that Whiting was in a mental quandary. He was aware that Bragg had not spoken well of him until his dismissal and that he certainly did not have the full confidence of the president or the commander-in-chief. Nor could he know what specific orders Hoke, nominally of the Army of North Virginia and operating independently, had at his disposal. In summary, Whiting's chosen tone seems to have been appropriate to the situation in order to establish a constructive working atmosphere with Hoke.

Why the latter did not respond to the original requests for support has not been conclusively clarified to this day. Hoke himself stated that due to a drunken telegraph operator he had only received a very late report, so that it seemed more sensible to him to wait for Whiting's return and a more up-to-date situation report due to the elimination of the element of surprise. Critical historians note, however, that Hoke's apathy could also be explained by his fear of exposing his men to naval fire from the Union fleet. In any case, Hoke's indecision contributed to Whiting's abandoning his inspection of Fort Fisher earlier than previously planned and returning to Wilmington to organize the counterattack for the almost certain attack by the Federal forces.​
 

Hey! Just wanted to pop in & say that I'm very interested in this story of yours. ACW stories are a passion of mine so it's great to see another one. A PoD this late in the war is rare, so I'm very curious to see where you plan on going with this.

Anyway, good luck!
 
Chapter 3: Storming the fort
Chapter 3: Storming the fort

In front of Fort Fisher
January 15, 1865
3:30 p.m.

"General Ames, is Colonel Bell's brigade finally ready to go in?"

Major General Alfred H. Terry observed the head of his lead division with apparent frustration. Three entire brigades were intended to be ready to begin the attack, but only two had by mid-afternoon, and even those took longer than anticipated to launch, including Colonel Galusha Pennypacker's brigade. Bell's command, the third brigade, was just finishing up its deployment off the road.​

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"General, the road is a nightmare; I still do not have the 4th New Hampshire in place."

"Send everything you have in now or we shall lose our chance!" Terry snapped.

Captain Adrian Terry, the most dependable adjutant and brother of the commanding general, caught Brigadier General Adelbert Ames' attention. Captain Terry returned the glance, but his eyes were not fixed, as if he were not there.

"General Terry, the attack is failing. I ask that we hold Bell's brigade back."

"No sir. You will commit immediately."

Ames hesitated.

"Now, General! Now! We have lost two brigades trying to breach their line. To the east the naval landing party gets slaughtered as we speak. Are you telling me that their sacrifice is to be wasted? One more push and we break through."​

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Ames remained silent. Terry turned his head to the side and noticed Brigadier General Charles J. Paine approaching quietly, riding a sweat-covered horse, and dismounting.

"Have we taken it?" Paine asked.

"No, we have not taken it," Terry replied sharply, "yet."

Paine looked over at Ames and nodded wisely without saying anything.

"It was not coordinated as well as we could have wished," Ames said softly. "Frontal attacks on a peninsula of this scale are simply impossible to coordinate well in the sand and the mud."

The commander of the Second Division of the XXIV Corps ceased speaking when Terry gave him a critical look.

"You have my orders, General Ames, now execute them."

The deployed troops rose to their feet as Ames saluted and departed the grove without further discussion. His staff ran in front of him. Even though there was no longer any cheering, the soldiers were up for the challenge.

Major General Terry turned to his brother.

"Remind General Ames in no uncertain terms that he is not to go in with the assault. I need my generals, we have already lost General Curtis this day. Keep an eye on him till the attack goes forward."

Captain Terry saluted and ran after Ames.​

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"How goes it, sir?" Paine asked.

Terry shook his head groggily.

"It was not properly coordinated, General. Curtis went in nearly an hour late. It appears the Rebel pickets had advance warning, at least enough so that their artillery opened before the attack had even hit the abatis. Pennypacker's men got tangled up moving up to the start position. Now Bell's brigade is starting late as well; he claims the road was all but impassable."

"It is, sir."

Terry gave him an icy glance.

"Your lead brigade, Abbott's, is it ready to exploit the breakthrough?"

"Sir, it will be an hour or more before Abbott is in position; they are filing off the road even now on the other side of the creek."

"An hour? I ordered you to have Abbott up by now."

"Sir, we are trying to move our entire expedition force down a single road along this damned peninsula, at a hurry, through an ocean of mud."

"We will not win with excuses here, General Paine."

Everyone within hearing range could sense the reproach in his voice.

"We have already fought a significant engagement here, only weeks ago. That one failed due to the incompetence of one Benjamin Butler. Even though we had been able to destroy major parts of the fort's defensive perimeters and artillery, and we had been able to take hundreds of prisoners, notwithstanding most of them local youths and reserve forces. We cannot lose our nerve this day, General. We must hold our nerve if we are to win. I propose to take a major step in winning this war today, sir, by severing one of the last life lines of Lee's army up in Petersburg. If we were to fail here, there might be the risk that never again will we have such a chance."

Paine cleared his throat, temporarily at a loss of words, then collecting his thoughts.

"Sir, with all due respect, by ordering Abbott down here, all that stands between us here and Hoke's veteran division in the north is my colored division. Do not misunderstand me. Those men know how to fight, I witnessed that in the Petersburg trenches plenty of times. But for all we know they might be outnumbered and they are facing experienced fighters, many of them North Carolinians on their home turf. If we fail to break through here, the rebels might collapse our rear and we are faced with a hammer and an anvil."

Terry remained silent.

A cheer went up…the famed three huzzahs… Bell's brigade was going in.​
 
Chapter 4: "I intend to hold this fort or die trying!"
Chapter 4: "I intend to hold this fort or die trying!"

Fort Fisher
January 15, 1865
4:15 p.m.

Several of the wounded and exhausted men were returning, spreading the rumor that the front line palisades had collapsed.

Colonel William Lamb could clearly hear the cheers of the Federal forces as they advanced up ahead. The sound of the combat was frightening and continuous, like thunder.

"Sir, we must go back!", a captain shouted.

"No, Captain, we stay here for the moment!"

"Colonel Lamb. I urge you, sir, let's retire to the bomb proofs."

Lamb turned to face the captain.

"I will not move back an inch, and neither will you, if you have some courage left," he said coldly.

The captain started to open his mouth. Lamb forced a smile, leaned over, and touched the captain on the sleeve; the young officer startled, looking at him wide-eyed.

"My boy, I am the commander of this fort, and I intend to hold this place or die trying."

The captain looked at him, unable to reply.

"I watched your men fighting, from the eastern bastion where the 36th North Carolina Heavy Artillery is still holding firm. You are an artillerist, like myself. And nevertheless you traded blows in hand-to-hand combat with the best the Yankee infantry can offer. There is no dishonor in falling back, regrouping. But only if you go now and rally your men. Do your duty, captain. I will do mine and we will stand through this mess, together."

The captain made an effort to grin.

"Yes, sir,", he responded with an emphasis on the "sir".

The junior officer saluted, turning away. Although he moved out of eyesight, Lamb soon was able to hear him barking out the order to rally.​

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From the north, a group of officers crossed the street on foot. One of the men swayed, drops of blood covering the front of his jacket. Colonel Hector McKethan was in the van. The colonel saluted while standing at attention.

"What is the situation, Colonel McKethan?"

"They've taken the palisade. At first we were holding without difficulty, but that last charge caught the men of the 40th North Carolina, the heavy artillerists to my left, out of position. They gave way and a Federal force, perhaps up to brigade strength, penetrated the line. The Yankees wheeled to their left and caught my brigade in a crossfire, while we were still busy suppressing what was left of the initial assault force down in the sand. My men are now slowly falling back, containing the enemy. Maybe we can hold them, but just before we vacated our forward lines I was able to spot a fresh Union brigade approaching from the north."

Lamb pondered the situation for a split second.

"Can you drive the Yankee's back before their reinforcements arrive?"

"I will gladly try, sir, my brigade is still game, but I have only one fresh regiment in reserve, it might not be enough."

"You fought valiantly, Colonel, I recognize the old scottish highlander spirit in you. Use your reserves to fight the enemy to a standstill here. I will scrape together any man that can be spared and provide them to you. Will you counterattack, when I give the order?"

"As Earl Erskine did at Braemar in 1715, I will raise our standard again on that palisade."

"Very well, colonel, now see to your duty as I will see to mine."

Many kept walking by and retreated, but when they saw the two, here and there a soldier slowed down and halted, some shouting Lamb's name and others remaining mute, as if ashamed. A group of men began to form gradually all around them. A flag carrier bearing the 40th North Carolina Heavy Artillery's banner emerged from the haze. Without saying a word, the soldier came to a stop, lowered the flag's staff, and then turned back toward the north. Within minutes, a large crowd had gathered. There was only bleak determination; there was no singing, cheering, or heroic displays.

McKethan looked over at Lamb, nodded, and then, with proper flourish, drew out his sword and saluted.

Lamb could only nod.

The disorganized group dispersed after McKethan to join his brigade. They returned to the blaze. His initial view of the Union flag flying within the fort and a dimly lit line of men moving forward were both glimpses of the conflict. The Union huzzah and the rebel shout were used as counterpoints to the battle roar as it grew, expanded, and rushed to either flank.​

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And then a distant cheer rose up behind Lamb.

As he turned to look behind him, a member of his escort fell to the ground after being struck by a minie ball. He noticed something approaching behind him. At the double, a regiment of the home guard marched along the road, its clothes gleaming and spotless. They swung into line with an officer stepping ahead in front of the colors despite the sweat streaking their faces, many of whom were gasping for air and shivering with fear.

The officer came on fast, stopping before Lamb, and with an inexperienced gesture raised up his sword and saluted raggedly.

"Colonel Lamb, I am Colonel James Burr, 7th North Carolina Home Guard. There are no reserves left but us."

"Colonel, it warms my heart to see you and your men; if there is nobody else, than you have to go in."

"I am at your service, sir. But I have never been in battle before, neither have my men. I am a banker by trade."

"Your background is of no importance, now. But you may understand that we have to pay back the enemy with compound interest."

Burr's expression changed, excitement and fear were replaced by an uncertain grin.

"I did not expect you to speak my language, sir, but this sounds like a necessity."

"It is indeed. Now please order your men to fix bayonets."

"Sir, respectfully, we were not issued any bayonets. And none of us has yet discharged a rifle at another human being."

"Then the musket butts will have to suffice. I expect your civilians at least to have been involved in some tavern brawls. No further discussions now, I am going to lead your regiment myself!"

Lamb raised his voice at the assembled guardsmen.

"North Carolinians! To the north your brothers are engaged in bloody combat. Are you going to follow me and drive the invaders from our soil?"

A ragged cheer answered him, and, without looking back, Lamb went off in the direction of the fighting.​
 
Chapter 5: Hammer and Anvil
Chapter 5: Hammer and Anvil

Having barely started to deepen his trenches along the Sugar Loaf line around midday on January 15, Hoke received orders from Whiting to march southward, brush aside any Federal opposition confronting him and unite forces with Lamb at Fort Fisher. Pursuant to this new order, Hoke had just begun to move his division into position when Ames' forces launched their first attack against the fort.

The initial contact occurred at about 3:45 p.m. when the easternmost of Hoke's three columns, Hagood's South Carolina Brigade encountered Federal pickets around the old Flag Pond Battery. Paine then quickly deployed his two USCT-brigades along the width of the peninsula in pre-dug trenches overlooking every possible approach.

The Federal defense was especially strong against any Confederate attacks that might emerge from the northeast due to the nearby navy presence. What Paine did not know, however, was that a strong Confederate column, Kirkland's North Carolina Brigade, was advancing along the Wilmington Road toward his vulnerable left flank. This force threatened to capture Camp Wyatt and cut Paine off from Terry's main force in the south.​

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It was not until 4:15 p.m. that Paine learned of this danger, and he quickly shifted forces to the left to cover the trenches north of the Commissary, just to the south of which a network of dirt paths intersected to form a crossroads at Camp Wyatt. As the United States Colored Troops of the 3nd Brigade, Third Division, XXV Corps under the command of Colonel Elias Wright occupied the trenches, Confederate soldiers wading through a shallow swamp transitioned from column formation to a double line of battle. Hoke personally arrived at the swamp at about 4:25 p.m. He quickly surveyed the situation and ordered an attack.

Hoke had parts of two brigades in the area, the brigade commanded by Kirkland and the 27th Georgia Infantry of Colquitt's Brigade, led by Colonel Charles T. Zachry. The combined force of 2,033 men extended westward beyond the limits of the Federal flank due to Abbott's brigade having relocated earlier, and Wright tried to rectify the situation by shifting his infantry a half mile to the northwest along a wooded spur. When he did, a gap was created between the forces defending the swampy approaches and those defending the western coast of the peninsula. Major William R. Brazie realized his 5th USCT could not stretch from the coast to his peer regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Edward H. Powell's 10th USCT on his right, so he divided his men creating a 150-yard separation between the two forces. As a result, the Union force was losing its tactical cohesion before the battle even began in earnest.

To make matters worse for the Federals, by this time relations between Paine and his subordinates were at their worst. Paine and Wright quarreled on January 15 as Wright claimed that certain information had not been given him the previous night. Paine insisted it had and that Wright knew it. An observer later understatedly recalled, "Their temper was hot". On the morning of the battle, Wright and Colonel John W. Ames were overheard saying "harsh, unpleasant things" about Paine and mocking his plans and orders.

Shortly after 4:45 p.m. the Confederates had succeeded in sweeping over the Federal entrenchments. Amid the strained command climate, Paine, who had just returned from a meeting with Terry infront of Fort Fisher, called on Colonel Ames to provide reinforcements to the beleaguered Union left, but Ames refused, citing enemy presence to his own front. Instead, Colonel Nathan Goff's 37th USCT, temporarily Wright's only reserve, was left to shore up the flank himself, and he threw his regiment into a furious counterattack against the Confederates near the Commissary. Goff enjoyed initial success, driving the Rebels back three-quarters of a mile and regaining control of the old defensive line. In spite of this development, Ames still ignored Paine's orders to join in the counterattack, and Goff lacked sufficient numbers to hold what he had gained.

It was not until 5:20 p.m. when the Federals were in general retreat, that Ames arrived in the Commissary area. Paine lamented in his official report, "Although his vastly superior and continuously growing numbers would have made it necessary to preserve my communications with the fleet, it is not improbable that I might have maintained my position and it is possible that the enemy might have been driven back had the movement in support of the left been made promptly when first ordered".

The first breaching of Paine's lines coincided with Lamb's fierce and determined counter attack inside the fort. McKethan's North Carolina veterans, mingled together with the remnants of the 40th North Carolina Heavy Artillery blunted the advance movement of Bell's Federal brigade, that had still been disorganized from pushing through the abatis and the palisades.

At first, however, the counterattack lacked numbers, and at times it was touch and go whether Bell could hold his ground and maintain his stronghold inside Fort Fisher. Unlikely as it may seem, the 300 Home Guards under Colonel James G. Burr made the difference. These soldier-turned-civilians gave McKethan's forward movement new momentum and an increased physical presence. Slowly at first, then faster and faster, Bell's yankees backed away. The memorable scene of Hector McKethan assisting James Burr in raising the flag on the recaptured palisade was reenacted just a day later in the presence of several newspaper reporters and graced front pages throughout North Carolina for the weeks to come.

With the failure of the attack on the fort and the collapse of the rear line of defense, Terry knew it was over. Historians give him credit for managing, despite tremendous pressure from Hoke's division, to return his men to the beach largely in an orderly fashion and prevent a complete encirclement. There, under the protection of the fleet's guns, he managed to evacuate the peninsula with the majority of his troops. Union forces lost a total of 2,114 men in killed and wounded, including 393 members of the naval landing party, in the second battle for Fort Fisher. In addition to that, 800 men were captured, their majority belonging to Wright's 3nd USCT brigade as well as Bell's assault column. Confederate casualties totaled 1,166 killed and wounded.​
 
Chapter 6: Soldier-Prince of Dixie
Chapter 6: Soldier-Prince of Dixie

Returning from the disastrous Nashville Campaign, the Confederate Army of Tennessee was in shambles. Lieutenant General Richard Taylor, commanding the Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana, received a strong indication of the condition of General John B. Hood's army in a blunt letter from Major General Nathan B. Forrest in early January. "The Army of Tennessee was badly defeated and is greatly demoralized," Forrest reported, "and to save it during the retreat from Nashville I was compelled almost to sacrifize my command." Hood's surviving soldiers had just barely managed to cross the Tennessee River thanks to Forrest's cavalry. Taylor personally witnessed the damaged remains a few days later at the camp at Tupelo, Mississippi. "This was my first view of a beaten army," he recalled, "and a painful sight it was. Many guns and small arms had been lost, and the ranks were depleted by thousands of prisoners and missing. Blankets, shoes, clothing, and accouterments were wanting." Lots of individuals who were out in the cold developed frostbite, and some even lost their lives. As soon as possible, Taylor started moving the soldiers to his headquarters in Meridian, where supplies and shelter were available, using the Mobile and Ohio railroad line.

However, President Jefferson Davis was already exerting pressure on General Pierre G. T. Beauregard to send as many soldiers as he could to South Carolina to support Lieutenant General William J. Hardee in his fight against Major General William T. Sherman. Taylor was compelled by this to telegraph Davis on January 9, 1865. "The army needs rest, consolidation, and reorganization," he contended. "If moved in its present condition, it will prove utter worthless." Refusing to accept excuses for the men, Davis insisted, "The presence of those veterans will no doubt greatly increase the auxilary force now with Hardee." On the fifteenth, Taylor again informed the president that "an attempt to move Hood's army at this time would complete its destruction." Davis only agreed that Taylor should keep one army corps and Forrest's cavalry, despite Beauregard's staunch support for Taylor's ideas and his argument that the Mobile garrison needed reinforcements more than Hardee did. "To this I hoped you would be able to add many reserves and militia," he told Taylor.​

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While this argument was going on, Beauregard was moving to replace Hood as army commander with Taylor. Beauregard found his duty made simpler when Hood requested to be relieved on January 13. He had already secured the president's approval. But in a letter to Davis on January 18 Taylor argued against the appointment, asserting, "The army and the public unanimously desire General Joseph E. Johnston. This alone will restore confidence... Johnston should be sent at once. The safety of the country demands it." Taylor now, however, suggested that he could "accompany the army to South Carolina, guarantee the best transports and conditions obtainable and act as a subordinate to Johnston, supporting the latter in every capacity he deems worthwhile."

Catching wind of Taylor's impending appointment, officers and men in the army petitioned the president to give them Johnston instead of Taylor. Taylor himself now took the initiative and made several speeches to the assembled troops in Meridian. Although he was careful not to directly question the president's proposal, he explicitly stated that he did not want to impose himself on the men as commander, but rather to recognise their will. Within a few days, this respect and the various forms of assistance in terms of clothing and food ensured that the often demoralised men developed a daily growing affection for the previously unknown Taylor and placed their trust in him. A helpful contribution to this was made by various members of his staff who, in informal conversations, gave the officers and men an understanding of Taylor's military successes in the Red River Campaign in particular. The members of the Army of Tennessee then began to develop faint hopes that they were now in touch with a man who was not willing to burn them senseless, but who had already accomplished military feats in similarly hopeless situations.

Soon afterward, the Confederate Congress passed a resolution imploring Davis to restore Johnston. Senator Louis T. Wigfall, one of Davis' most vocal critics, declared, "No one but the President's worst enemy would advise him to... place in command his own brother-in-law."

Disregarding this clamor, Davis considered the matter closed, but then Breckinridge decided to intervene. He argued that Taylor's offer was a godsend. If Davis were to install him as second in command under Johnston, he could equally save face, show strength to the outside world by appointing a close relative and proven military leader, and at the same time take the ground out of public pressure by appointing Johnston. Despite his profound contempt for Johnston, Davis was a realist deep down. He knew that military success required a good esprit de combat from the Army of Tennessee, or what was left of it.

Hood possessed about 40,000 troops as he marched into Tennessee, but losses and desertions had cut that number in half. The army presented Sherman with a pitiful resistance even after absorbing Hardee's forces and other units in the Carolinas. Beauregard took over as commander once he arrived in South Carolina, but the clamorous public demand for Johnston's appointment only grew louder. Finally, there emerged a rumor that General Robert E. Lee would add his name to the petitioners' list, and President Davis capitulated in disgust while having more scorn for Johnston than ever.​

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On January 23, 1865, Davis reluctantly reappointed Johnston to assume command of the Army of Tennessee and ordered Taylor to facilitate the movement of the majority of the Army of Tennessee to South Carolina. Taylor immediately agreed. "Sherman's movements render a victory necessary to us at once, and it will require all our means to insure it," he telegraped Beauregard.

Since it was impossible for him to retain as well his authority over the Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana, Davis transferred command of the department to Forrest, promoting the latter to the rank of lieutenant general for his distinguished command of the Confederate rear guard from Nashville to Alabama.

Before leaving for South Carolina, Taylor restructured the Army of Tennessee for necessary logistical reasons. Bate's division composed of Tyler's, Finley's and Jackson's brigades, was sent south to bolster the defences of Mobile. Walthall's much reduced division, including Quarles', Cantey's and Reynolds' brigades of mostly Alabama troops, went east to Selma to obtain replacements and to lay the foundation for an effective defense of the Alabama heartland. Johnson's old division, mainly Mississippians and Alabamians, was retained at Meridian to equally replenish their numbers and to act as a reserve force for the emergency.

The remaining six divisions were organized in a new corps-sized formation under direct command of Lieutenant Alexander P. Stewart consisting of two wings each comparable to the size a division in early 1864. The left wing was assigned to Major General William W. Loring and included Loring's old troops as well as French's and Cleburne's divisions. Command of the right wing fell to temporarily disgraced Major General Daniel H. Hill. It was made up of Brown's, Clayton's and Stevenson's divisions. What had been left of the Army of Tennessee's artillery, 67 guns in 27 batteries, was organized in a single command and ordered to fall in on the rear of the infantry.​
 
Chapter 7: Aiming for the Carolinas
Chapter 7: Aiming for the Carolinas

At the outset of 1865, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant's plan to have all Union forces in the field work together was beginning to bear fruit. In the East, General Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia were besieged at Petersburg, Virginia, by Major General George Meade and his Army of the Potomac despite suffering unprecedented casualties in appalling battlefield circumstances during the Overland and Petersburg campaigns of 1864. In the West, during General John Bell Hood's desperate Franklin-Nashville Campaign in late 1864, Major General George H. Thomas, commanding the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio, had broken Hood and his Army of Tennessee. During his March to the Sea, Major General William T. Sherman and his combined forces from the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of Georgia in the Deep South conquered Savannah, Georgia on December 21, 1864, leaving a sixty-mile-wide path of devastation across Georgia.

With 60,000 veteran soldiers under Sherman's command at this point in time, Union Army commander-in-chief Ulysses S. Grant wished to tighten the noose. Grant, who was occupied with the Siege of Petersburg against Confederate General Robert E. Lee, gave Sherman the order to load his army into ships and sail for Virginia in order to support the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James. Sherman had loftier aspirations. He convinced Grant to march through the Carolinas, similar to his "March to the Sea" through Georgia, destroying everything of military importance along the route, as opposed to taking a ship. Due to the potential impact on Southern morale, Sherman was especially interested in punishing South Carolina, the first state to have left the Union. Grant approved of Sherman's strategy and sent the latter the following instructions in a dispatch dated December 27, 1864: "Without waiting further directions, then, you may make your preparations to start on your northern expedition without delay. Break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as you can."​

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Preparations took up the rest of the year. Although Sherman had planned for the majority of the Army to leave in mid-January 1865, maneuvering actually started on December 30, 1864. In the first several months of 1865, the main adversaries of Union troops were torrential rain, muck, and bitter cold. Sherman reported that the weather was terrible, the entire state had been under water, and that it had greatly slowed his down even though the first forces left Savannah in early January. Additionally, Sherman's army group's plan to restock via the Cape Fear was changed as a result of Terry's expedition's failure to capture Fort Fisher. Due to these unfavorable circumstances, the army's primary invasion of South Carolina was postponed until mid-February. Commanders in the Union army, like Major General Alpheus S. Williams, noticed right once that the Carolinas campaign would be very different from the march through Georgia. The terrain in South Carolina was more difficult and time-consuming, with mud, bogs, deadly quicksand, and quagmires. There was also a cursed cold and rainy climate to contend with. Many soldiers believed that the Georgia campaign was significantly outclassed by these additional requirements, if not made to seem like a farce.

Major Henry Hitchcock, Sherman's military secretary, wrote to his wife in February 1865 as Federal troops prepared to depart Georgia: ''When or where we shall come out, nobody seems to have any idea, only that Sherman knows what he is about as usual." Other soldiers expressed apprehension about the direction the South Carolina campaign would go. Sherman, however, intended to use a newweapon: instilling doubt and uncertainty in the minds of his adversaries. He did this in addition to trying to increase the confidence of his soldiers. He would feint against Augusta, Georgia, as well as Charleston, South Carolina, using the two wings of his army. When it were to become evident that Columbia was his true goal, it would be too late for the Confederacy to organize any significant resistance. The next phase of his plan was revealed to his wife, but he urged her to keep quiet since "the walls have ears and foreknowledge published by some mischievous fool might cost many lives." The general's strategy was based on thorough planning as well as knowledge of the characteristics of Southern society. His time spent stationed in different sections of the South throughout the 1840s now turned out to be advantageous. He assured his family that "every bit of knowledge thus acquired is returned ten fold." Furthermore, he assumed from the maps and statistics at his disposal that no military operation had ever been founded on more reliable information.​

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A Union officer in South Carolina made the observation that the area was teeming with individuals who made foraging their primary source of income in the early days of February 1865. Strings of chicken, bacon, turkeys, and geese were brought back by night from farms and plantations whose inhabitants were primarily women and children. Squads of troops were sent ahead of Sherman's army on worn-out mules or abandoned horses. Hundreds of soldiers were always out in the open, completely uncontrolled, despite the fact that they were being deployed in organized formations under the command of officers. Many scoured the countryside purely for the sake of pillaging and abandoned all inhibitions while engaging in their "malicious labor, fearing neither God nor man".

Bands of foragers destroyed the environment and looted homes, inflicting a terrible toll on citizens on both a material and psychic level. One Union soldier described them as unmatched in scientific and approved looting. These individuals became known as "Sherman's bummers." Bummers, according to a Union captain, were "stragglers not in the rear, but in front of the army." In reality, the bummers were the first ones to invade each and every town in South Carolina that the Federal troops traveled through. By the time the last column had passed, all of the homes had been destroyed. The bummers, who were frequently in the front to carry out their primary purpose, robbery and plunder, were becoming a distinct part of the army, according to a colonel who was present with Sherman's advance column. A pile of smoking ashes was frequently all that had been left of a once prosperous village. The Yankee torch destroyed so many homes that one officer described his surroundings as a "landscape of chimneys".

Although presented with a different set of geographic obstacles, Sherman assumed a degree of Confederate resistance in South Carolina comparable to the situation in Georgia. He was, however, to be proven wrong.​
 
Chapter 8: The Battle of Hatcher's Run
Chapter 8: The Battle of Hatcher's Run

Hatcher's Run
February 7, 1865
4:30 p.m.

It had been a nightmare of blood, and it still was. The burned-out remnants of Dabney's Saw Mill were located up a lengthy slope that Major General Gouverneur K. Warren cautiously ascended from the ford.

He had never witnessed such bloodshed, and it made him lose all passion for the fight. It was nearly impossible to move without stumbling over a body.

Clusters of troops were first dropped by rebel artillery two hundred yards away from the Vaughan Road, followed by lines of them by the actual Hatcher's Run crossing. After finally crossing the stream on horseback, he noticed that the slow-moving water below the crossing was colored a light red due to the numerous bodies that had floated down from the bridge and had been entangled in broken tree branches.

The dirt at the first Confederate entrenchment was muddy and churned up from the bloody hand-to-hand combat, where dead bodies and injured were mixed together.

He climbed the four hundred yard long, treacherous slope to the saw mill slowly. More than half of the soldiers in his Second Division covered the ground. In certain areas it looked as if they were a line of battle down on the ground, just resting, having been cut down by heavy volleys that had dropped dozens at a time.

He continued to ride as the sound of miniés, expended canister, and screaming shells fired high filled the air above him.​

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He approached the saw mill and was astounded by what he saw. Although he had spent Antietam in reserve, he had frequently heard tales of the utter devastation in the area around the Cornfield. This must much surpass it, he realized.

His artillery's morning barrage had left the earth churned up dirt and mud for many dozen acres. A number of ruined cannons littered the slope; some had entire crews and horses from the limber team dead, while others had overturned or collapsed on one wheel.

However, the infantry battle had been particularly horrifying. It had been tough veterans from Pegram's and Evans' divisions on one side, and Crawford's and Griffin's divisions on his side, and they had engaged in a head-to-head engagement. In order to maneuver past the chaos, he had to actually get off his horse. Numerous stretcher-bearer teams, some of whom were Confederates wearing white fabric tied around their hatbands or sleeves, were cautiously navigating the confusion, bringing men out, rolling them over, making snap decisions, picking up some, and leaving others behind.

He had ordered up the corps ambulances, the few that had pressed ahead after the forced march of the infantry two days before. They were parked at the bottom of the slope, loading up, and then hurrying across the ford to the hospital area.

Battle fury continued to rumble in the distance like thunder. He advanced past a steady stream of people who were stumbling backward. The majority of them were walking injured, men staggering along, two soldiers, one with a broken right leg and the other with a broken left leg, traveling slowly together with their arms around each other.​

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"Gouverneur!"

He observed Major General George G. Meade riding up, his reins tightly grasped, cautiously guiding his mount through the mass of dead humanity, and then advancing.

Warren, who was worn out, did not bother to salute.

"How goes it?"

"How goes it, sir?" Warren asked. His voice, usually high-pitched, was almost warbling. He pointed across the fields to Dabney's Saw Mill, unable to control his fury.

"That's a third of my corps there, at least," he said.

"What's ahead?"

"Not sure. I am aware that we smashed through John Pegram's division. Soon after we had taken the saw mill, we tore them apart. According to reports, Pegram has sustained serious injuries. Additionally, there is a reserve division up ahead that hasn't been officially identified but is allegedly Mahone's under Finegan. The rebels are impeding our progress. The guns that our own artillery did not manage to destroy are still there."

Meade didn't require any explanation. He could hear their roar and witness shots skimming overhead that had missed the troops in front of them.

"General, there's no further function to this advance," Warren explained. "Half of my corps is fought out."

"Tell your men to stop, to pull back to the south side of Hatcher's Run."

"Thank you, sir."

Warren saluted, bowed his head in silence, and rode forward.[1]

---

The Boydton Plank Road, an intermediate wagon supply route into the city, and the South Side Railroad, a significant transportation route between Lynchburg and the Shenandoah Valley, had been the Federal army's two final goals along the Petersburg front by early 1865. Grant repeatedly dispatched his troops west, outflanking the Confederate lines in an effort to cut off the supplies, but these final two eluded him. In early February, Grant had thus made the decision to try again despite the snow and sleet that had covered the woods in ice. Gregg's cavalry division was tasked with clearing the road of the traffic Grant believed to be present. Humphreys' Second Corps and Warren's Fifth Corps were to occupy defensive positions between the cavalry and the wary Confederates in order to defend the horsemen.


The Union infantry was only serving as a shield, but the Southerners were unaware of this. The Union onslaught appeared to be a continuation of the large offensive in the fall that came dangerously close to reaching the railroad. In order to minimize risk, Lee further thinned the Confederate troops in the sparsely populated trenches. As a result, the Army of Northern Virginia's Second Corps, led by John Gordon, was given an extra opportunity to launch a counterattack and keep the Federals from cutting off the last supply lines.

The two sides fought back and forth for two days, temporarily ending in a tactical draw. On February 7, however, cognizant of the number of munitions and provisions arriving at Petersburg from places as far as Wilmington, Meade, who held local command, ordered his blue-clad troops forward again. Gambling on a weakness in the overstretched Rebel lines, he told Warren to throw his corps across Hatcher's Run to finally crush the resistance in his front and sever the Confederate far right flank. It became a bloodbath. After an initial success, Warren's men, their ranks thinned by massed volleys and canister, were driven back by Confederate troops of the Second and Third Corps.​

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The Federal army had lost 771 killed, 3,581 wounded and 1,187 captured, a total of 5,539. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia lost around 2,204 men including a prominent general. Division commander Major General John Pegram had been shot through the lung and was therefore disabled for the rest of the war. Another one of Grant's flank marches had failed without bringing the expected results.

[1] This narrative part was especially inspired by an excerpt of Gingrich/Forstchen's Never Call Retreat, which I cannot praise enough.​
 
This has been the last part I wrote in advance. Currently I am focussing on the next chapter which is going to deal with Wade Hampton and his efforts in organizing an effective reserve force in South Carolina (featuring the SC Militia as well as the SC Senior and Junior Reserves). I hope to finish and publish it during the course of the weekend.

-Is there any input or criticism of any kind up to now?

-Any suggestions how Grant might react to the recent setbacks and plan his spring campaign for 1865?

-Which commanders, districts and departments do you want to know about next?

-Which would be the Confederate best case scenario at that point (prolong the inevitable surrender to mid/end of 1865 or mutual exhaustion after a major federal army is destroyed deep in Rebel territory or survival of a deep south "core" Confederacy or Kirby Smith's Trans-Mississippi-Department somehow ending up as a french protectorate)?
 
This has been the last part I wrote in advance. Currently I am focussing on the next chapter which is going to deal with Wade Hampton and his efforts in organizing an effective reserve force in South Carolina (featuring the SC Militia as well as the SC Senior and Junior Reserves). I hope to finish and publish it during the course of the weekend.

-Is there any input or criticism of any kind up to now?

-Any suggestions how Grant might react to the recent setbacks and plan his spring campaign for 1865?

-Which commanders, districts and departments do you want to know about next?

-Which would be the Confederate best case scenario at that point (prolong the inevitable surrender to mid/end of 1865 or mutual exhaustion after a major federal army is destroyed deep in Rebel territory or survival of a deep south "core" Confederacy or Kirby Smith's Trans-Mississippi-Department somehow ending up as a french protectorate)?
I'd love to see Lee or Davis and what plans they may have. It would be a massive long shot, but the best case scenario in my opinion would be mutual exhaustion after inflicting a heavy defeat on the federals. It would be nothing short of a miracle for the south. They would basically be forced to accept the bare minimum in terms of states in the CSA. Tennessee, Arkansas, Indian Territory, & probably Mississippi and Louisiana are lost, along with large chunks of Virginia. Maybe they could see Louisiana and Mississippi returned, but there would be a HEAVY price in exchange.

Grant himself believed that if the war went on for much longer, the copperheads would have regained their momentum and the anti-war feeling would have returned even stronger. It only died off because of the sudden rapid success. If the CSA can somehow hold on and inflict defeats, maybe, maybe, they can somehow achieve independence minus several states. It would be like almost rolling straight 6s from here on out. Not impossible, but it would be one of history's greatest miracles. Sherman's march to the sea was full of risks that didn't happen. Perhaps Sherman wouldn't be remembered so fondly if those risks came to fruition. I believe Halleck was convinced that Sherman had doomed himself when he began the march through Georgia and into the Carolinas.

So, there's potential for Confederate success, but the most likely "best case scenario" in my opinion is that the CSA surrenders late '65.

One interesting thing to think about is that if the war is prolonged, we could see the black soldiers that the Confederates were planning to use actually see combat. That would be a huge can of worms to handle. Again, if the CSA is smart and lucky, it could end well for them. Or, it could be a complete disaster.


Ultimately, there's a lot to play around with here depending on what you want to do. Personally I like to see CSA victories because they're more rare and, in my opinion, more interesting than the same Union victorious TLs. Hopefully my ramblings have at least given you some food for thought.

I look forward to where this goes next!​
 
I'd love to see Lee or Davis and what plans they may have. It would be a massive long shot, but the best case scenario in my opinion would be mutual exhaustion after inflicting a heavy defeat on the federals. It would be nothing short of a miracle for the south. They would basically be forced to accept the bare minimum in terms of states in the CSA. Tennessee, Arkansas, Indian Territory, & probably Mississippi and Louisiana are lost, along with large chunks of Virginia. Maybe they could see Louisiana and Mississippi returned, but there would be a HEAVY price in exchange.

Grant himself believed that if the war went on for much longer, the copperheads would have regained their momentum and the anti-war feeling would have returned even stronger. It only died off because of the sudden rapid success. If the CSA can somehow hold on and inflict defeats, maybe, maybe, they can somehow achieve independence minus several states. It would be like almost rolling straight 6s from here on out. Not impossible, but it would be one of history's greatest miracles. Sherman's march to the sea was full of risks that didn't happen. Perhaps Sherman wouldn't be remembered so fondly if those risks came to fruition. I believe Halleck was convinced that Sherman had doomed himself when he began the march through Georgia and into the Carolinas.

So, there's potential for Confederate success, but the most likely "best case scenario" in my opinion is that the CSA surrenders late '65.

One interesting thing to think about is that if the war is prolonged, we could see the black soldiers that the Confederates were planning to use actually see combat. That would be a huge can of worms to handle. Again, if the CSA is smart and lucky, it could end well for them. Or, it could be a complete disaster.


Ultimately, there's a lot to play around with here depending on what you want to do. Personally I like to see CSA victories because they're more rare and, in my opinion, more interesting than the same Union victorious TLs. Hopefully my ramblings have at least given you some food for thought.

I look forward to where this goes next!​
Thanks a lot for your input! Davis will have a role to play, although the TL focusses mostly on the military side of things. Tensions between Davis and certain state governors will be on the rise due to local commanders (especially Forrest and Johnston) starting to place state troops under their direct control (essentially federalizing them). Regarding black troops: Those are going to appears, although only locally, in small numbers and not officially endorsed by the government. Due to their questionable loyalty (at least from the point of view of their white commanders), I plan for them not to be employed in open field battles but rather in static defense (starting with the Mobile Campaign of 1865). The black troops will, however, not constitute a major turning point (compared to TLs where the usage of Black Confederates grants the Rebels an easy victory).
 
Chapter 9: Organizing the resistance
Chapter 9: Organizing the resistance

In December 1864, Major General Wade Hampton III had already requested that Calbraith Butler's division be sent to South Carolina to remount and to help stop Sherman. Although there was no command for him, he had also asked Lee to deploy him and was about to do so. With the premise that Butler and Hampton would both return to him in time for the spring campaign, Lee tentatively agreed. Furthermore, Butler's force had to return to Virginia right away if South Carolina governor Andrew Magrath was unable to supply horses or hay. Butler and Hampton received their wish by January 19. Hampton was instructed to follow Butler's command to South Carolina a few days later because Lee believed Hampton's presence would ''inspire the spirit & vigor of the State & otherwise do good.''

A short time before the end of January 1865, Hampton arrived in South Carolina. Confederate defense plans for the state were under the authority of General Joseph E. Johnston, and they required the well-known and admired local South Carolinian Hampton. The Confederate forces Sherman was up against were dispersed and disorganized, in contrast to Sherman's about 60,000 men waiting along the Georgia-South Carolina line. Before Johnston had returned, Lieutenant General William J. Hardee was in command of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. He counted 13,700 effectives, the majority of whom were at Charleston. Small state militia units, recently arrived survivors of the disbanded Army of Tennessee previously commanded by John B. Hood, and 6,700 cavalry under Major General Joseph B. "Fighting Joe" Wheeler were among the additional forces. Butler's division of 1,500 cavalrymen had just entered South Carolina but was short of horses and equipment.

What to do with Hampton was one of the issues the Confederate high command was addressing as it established new command arrangements. Despite being eighteen years younger than Hampton, Wheeler was senior to him in terms of date of rank. Wheeler, a West Point alum, was well-known for his fierce combat. He was also regarded as a loose disciplinarian, and only Sherman's men had a worse reputation for lawlessness and robbing innocent southerners. In fact, a lot of people in Georgia and South Carolina argued that Wheeler's troops were just as nasty as or perhaps worse than Sherman's.​

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Hampton had no desire to serve under a West Pointer who was even younger than Jeb Stuart since he was used to leading his own corps. He bragged that before reporting to Wheeler, he would ask for a transfer to the infantry. Upon his arrival, Johnston gave Hampton command of Butler's division, his former brigade, which was lately called back from Georgia under the leadership of Pierce Young, as well as all Confederate forces in the neighborhood of Columbia. Johnston also advised Hampton that he should lobby Governor Magrath to give him supreme command of all the militia troops and reserves in the state.

The militia had last been called up in September 1864 and had been organized as follows:

1st Brigade: The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 42nd Regiments gathered at Belton in Anderson District under the command of Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Harrison.

2nd Brigade: The 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th Regiments met at the Ninety Six Depot under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William P. Butler.

3rd Brigade: The 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 43rd Regiments massed at Branchville under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A. P. Aldrich.

4th Brigade: The 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th Regiments rendezvoused at Charleston under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Wilmot G. DeSaussure.

5th Brigade: The 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 44th Regiments gathered at Camden under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Boykin.

6th Brigade: The 24th, 25th, 26th and 27th Regiments massed at Winnsboro under the command of Lieutenant Colonel C. F. Hampton.

9th Brigade: The 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th and 46th Regiments met at Union Court House under the command of Lieutenant Colonel R. G. McGaw.

10th Brigade: The 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st and 45th Regiments massed at Newberry Court House under the command of Lieutenant Colonel W. D. Simpson.

Junior Reserves: Colonel Artemas Darby Goodwyn commanded a brigade comprising the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Regiments of Junior Reserves.

Blanchard's Brigade: Brigadier General Albert G. Blanchard commanded a brigade comprising the 1st, 2nd, 6th and 7th Battalions of Senior Reserves.

Chesnut's Brigade: Brigadier General James Chesnut commanded a brigade comprising the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 8th Battalions of Senior Reserves.
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Convincing Governor Magrath turned out to be easier than Johnston initially feared. Nevertheless, the written conversations between Johnston and Hampton, in which the former ordered the latter in case of doubt to transfer the troops to Confederate service without the governor's permission, reveal that the supposedly noble ideals of states' rights had given way to a pragmatism dictated by the war.

Despite Wheeler's superior rank, Johnston also aimed to give Hampton complete control over his command. Hampton would need to be promoted to lieutenant general instead of Wheeler for that to occur. The Confederate high command gave this promotion a lot of support. ''General-in-Chief'' of all Confederate forces at the time, Robert E. Lee, received a letter from Johnston on February 1 suggesting just such course of action ''for the sake of the service and cause. 'Wheeler,'' he wrote ''is a modest, zealous, gallant, and indefatigable officer, but he cannot properly control and direct successfully so large a corps of cavalry.'' On the other side, everyone respected Hampton. Lee had grown to appreciate him more than ever. Prior to Johnston's request, President Davis was already working on the Hampton-Wheeler problem. The promotion of Hampton to lieutenant general was approved by the Confederate Congress on the fifth, and officers in South Carolina learned of it the next day.

Hampton was already formulating his typical strategy—the concentration of all available forces—long before he was assigned military command over the troops in South Carolina. In Johnston he found an open-minded partner in this respect. Both generals agreed to gather all available troops in Columbia and to have Charleston defended only by local units and DeSaussure's militia brigade. Johnston had quickly seen through Sherman's plan to cross the state and push through to Lee and Grant and was therefore sure that an advance of Union troops to Augusta or Charleston was unlikely. Hampton also agreed with the analysis that South Carolina's fate would be decided at the gates of Columbia.​
 
Chapter 10: The Hampton Roads Conference
Chapter 10: The Hampton Roads Conference

Pressure to find a peaceful solution to the protracted and bloody Civil War had massively increased in 1864. After having failed to arrange a diplomatic visit of President Abraham Lincoln to Richmond, Francis P. Blair, a personal friend of both the Confederate and the Federal president, renewed his efforts in January 1865, and traveled to Richmond on January 11. He discussed a war-ending strategy with President Jefferson Davis during their meeting, which included a North-South coalition against the French presence in Mexico. Blair reassured Davis that Lincoln had improved his negotiating stance.

On January 12, Davis sent Lincoln a letter requesting the start of negotiations "with a view to secure peace to the two countries". Blair responded on behalf of Lincoln by saying that he would only talk about "securing peace to the people of one common country." This remark infuriated Davis, and Blair laid the blame on the political climate in Washington.

After reconciling the "two countries" controversy, Lieutenant Ulysses S. Grant persuaded Lincoln to meet the Confederates at Fort Monroe. On January 28, Davis appointed his three commissioners and gave them the directive to consider all possibilities short of renunciating independence. The Siege of Petersburg was halted on January 29 by a Confederate officer carrying a flag of truce to proclaim the arrival of the three Confederate peace commissioners.​

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Lincoln informed Confederate Vice President Alexander H. Stephens that no ceasefire could be discussed until the South agreed to the restoration of the Union on February 3 when Stephens raised the idea of negotiations between the two sides. He further stated that he would not discuss Blair's plan for a joint military operation against Mexico.

In his remarks, Abraham Lincoln expressed his desire for the Southern states to take the initiative in ending slavery, his willingness to compensate slaveowners for their losses, and his view that the Emancipation Proclamation was a wartime measure whose implementation might, depending on what the courts might rule, put an end to hostilities.

Lincoln and Secretary of State William H. Seward clarified explicit that there would be no peace unless the Southern states put down their arms and complied with all of the emancipation and property confiscation measures the U.S. government had implemented during the war. However, they stressed that they were not calling for unconditional surrender and made a concentrated attempt to alleviate their guests' worries that their people's constitutional rights might not be protected after they returned to the Union.

Despite Lincoln and Seward's willingness to be understanding, the Southern commissioners rejected their request that the Confederacy give up its independence. Likewise fruitless were attempts to get Lincoln to agree to anything less of a complete restoration of the Union and the abolition of slavery. As a result, the Confederate commissioners left after four hours of talks.

Davis painted a scathing picture of the discussion, claiming that Lincoln had demanded total surrender and that the Confederacy had no choice but to carry on fighting. Some historians contend that Davis participated in the Conference dishonestly in order to highlight Northern antagonism. Regardless of these circumstances, the portrayal of the proceedings of the conference, as well as the content depicted, ensured that the severely battered morale of Confederate soldiers and civilians received a considerable boost, as it could be deduced that further fighting would be inevitable.

Davis forwarded a report to the Confederate Congress with a presidential message:

"I herewith submit for the information of Congress the report of the eminent citizens above named, showing that the enemy refused to enter into negotiations with the Confederate States, or any one of them separately, or to give to our people any other terms or guarantees than those which the conqueror may grant, or to permit us to have peace on any other basis than our unconditional submission to their rule, coupled with the acceptance of their recent legislation, including an amendment to the Constitution for the emancipation of all the negro slaves, and with the right on the part of the Federal Congress to legislate on the subject of the relations between the white and black population of each State. Such is, as I understand, the effect of the amendment to the Constitution which has been adopted by the Congress of the United States."​

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The Hampton Roads results were denounced at a meeting that Virginia Governor William Smith called at Richmond's Metropolitan Hall. Commissioner Hunter took part in the discussion and spoke on behalf of the Confederate envoys:

"If anything was wanted to stir blood, it was furnished when we were told that the United States could not consent to entertain any proposition coming from us as a people. Lincoln might have offered something… No treaty, no stipulation, no agreement, either with the Confederate States jointly or with them separately; what was this but unconditional submission to the mercy of the conquerors?"

The African Church, which was used for the event due to its size, hosted a daylong rally on the 9th that included Davis and other senior Confederate officials. In a subsequent address, Hunter claimed that Lincoln "turned from overtures of peace with frigid insolence. I won't try to depict oppression in a photograph. A blood-stained pencil would be necessary." Judah P. Benjamin, secretary of state, said: "Hope shines in every face. We have a deep-seated conviction that this people must win their independence, or perish."

Davis hoped that news of the failed peace conference would galvanize southerners to fight even harder for their independence. He announced that he "would be willing to yield up everything he had on earth" before submitting to Federal authority. Davis asserted that the Confederate military was in excellent condition, and "Sherman's march through Georgia would be his last."

Following the Hampton Roads peace conference, the South indeed experienced a resurrection of the war spirit, which was notably evident in places like Mobile, where a large gathering was assembled at Temperance Hall on February 13, 1865. A call for a meeting was made by forty-six individuals to "bring to the aid of our cause and country all the available means at our disposal." Although there were no attendance statistics available, newspaper reports claimed that the gathering was the biggest ever held in Mobile. Following a number of patriotic speeches, everyone present agreed to support the Confederacy's civil and military authorities by voting in favor of a number of resolutions. The Advertiser and Register's editor fully endorsed the call:

"...It is the proper and manly response to the slavish ultimatum of Lincoln. It is, we fondly hope, the beginning of a revival in the war spirit of the country, to end in a united and undying resolution to resist that ultimatum to the death and to consecrate anew all we have of manhood and means to the sacred cause of Freedom...."​
 
I suspect that the Union will still win (the ship had sailed on that by this point in the war, IMO), but it'll be longer and bloodier than in OTL...

Interesting premise, BTW...
 
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