German Plan for an Eastward Offensive c. 1913?

[ChaoticBrilliance]

While reading Barbara Tuchman's classic on the first days of the Great War, The Guns of August, I came across mention of a plan that Germany had archived in the year of 1913 by the OHL regarding a German offensive focusing on the Russian behemoth rather than its smaller but nimbler French counterpart, which intrigued me deeply.

However, after copious amounts of research and searching, I cannot find any definitive or comprehensive compilation of what this plan may have looked like in its authentic form (e.g. army positions, offensive goals, etc.) and thus have been forced, albeit not reluctantly, to turn to AH.com.

Is there any source in which the original form, or at least a form that most closely resembles it, of the Eastern War Plan of the German armies can be found, can be found, and if so, where? If there is not, I encourage the imaginative members of AH.com to use their speculative minds to conceive the most probable plan of action.

I, myself, imagined a mirrored Schlieffen Plan (following a securing of Poland and thus by extension a securing of East Prussia, a massive offensive along the Baltic coast aimed at forcing the destabilization, if not capitulation, of the Russian Empire), although I quickly dismissed it as logistically and strategically improbable.

I hope that you will be beneficiary of better luck than I in developing a largely unheard of war plan for one of the most powerful nations in Europe.

Thank you in advance,
CB

 

[naraic]

First you have to understand that 1913 was way too late to consider an East first plan. Historically Germany said they were going France first but deployed almost many troops as they could logistically support in the east. The incompatibilities between German track and Russia track meant you needed either to relay track or unload and reload at the border. If you chose to unload and reload you needed a stock of Russian rolling stock and breaking bulk delays things. If you choose to relay track you are likely tied to the speed that you can relay track and possibly you are stuck on a single axis of advance. If you want quick movement in the east on a single axis of advance you need additional rolling stock, additional military railwaymen and track ready to deploy

I honestly think you need to expand Germany's historical railway engineers by 3 to 4 times and have a few dozen locomotives ready (captured locomotives won't work on your lines) if you double the forces the east. As you further kncrease the forces you need similar expansion of the railway units. These units had practically no conscripts and were professional educated units. You probably need 5-6 years in peacetime to build up the railway units to support a fast easterly push against Russia.

Belgian and French lines were the same gauge so captured locomotives worked and the only lines that needed to be repaid were those damaged in the fighting or expansion lines from a main line to the front.

If you want a war plan against Russia you need to build the requirements. I say 5-6 years.

 

[ChaoticBrilliance]

First you have to understand that 1913 was way too late to consider an East first plan. Historically Germany said they were going France first but deployed almost many troops as they could logistically support in the east. The incompatibilities between German track and Russia track meant you needed either to relay track or unload and reload at the border. If you chose to unload and reload you needed a stock of Russian rolling stock and breaking bulk delays things. If you choose to relay track you are likely tied to the speed that you can relay track and possibly you are stuck on a single axis of advance. If you want quick movement in the east on a single axis of advance you need additional rolling stock, additional military railwaymen and track ready to deploy

I honestly think you need to expand Germany's historical railway engineers by 3 to 4 times and have a few dozen locomotives ready (captured locomotives won't work on your lines) if you double the forces the east. As you further kncrease the forces you need similar expansion of the railway units. These units had practically no conscripts and were professional educated units. You probably need 5-6 years in peacetime to build up the railway units to support a fast easterly push against Russia.

Belgian and French lines were the same gauge so captured locomotives worked and the only lines that needed to be repaid were those damaged in the fighting or expansion lines from a main line to the front.

If you want a war plan against Russia you need to build the requirements. I say 5-6 years.

While I agree that an ideal situation for a war plan to be decided upon is within the period you give, "5 to 6 years" before 1914, I read in either Tuchman's The Guns of August or Hastings' catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War that Gen. von Staab, Chief of the Railway Division of the OHL, wrote in his memoirs that given notice on August the 1st, he could have transported four of the seven armies meant for the Western Theatre to be transported to the Eastern Theatre by August 15th.

Does that not denote the possibility of such an operation to be conducted within a limited time period?

 

[naraic]

While I agree that an ideal situation for a war plan to be decided upon is within the period you give, "5 to 6 years" before 1914, I read in either Tuchman's The Guns of August or Hastings' catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War that Gen. von Staab, Chief of the Railway Division of the OHL, wrote in his memoirs that given notice on August the 1st, he could have transported four of the seven armies meant for the Western Theatre to be transported to the Eastern Theatre by August 15th.

Does that not denote the possibility of such an operation to be conducted within a limited time period?

He could have transported the armies to the east and operated them defensively with the German rail net or at a slow advance but they wouldn't have been able to operate offensively outside a single axis of advance that moved slowly for logistical reasons.

At least this is my understanding of the logistics in place. They could get lucky and capture a Russian railway yard with a stock of russian gauge locomotives and rail cars and operate on the Russian gauge rail (dedicate a Corp for manual handling and transferring from German rail to Russian rail) but its going to be hard to supply men forward offensively.

 

[ChaoticBrilliance]

He could have transported the armies to the east and operated them defensively with the German rail net or at a slow advance but they wouldn't have been able to operate offensively outside a single axis of advance that moved slowly for logistical reasons.

At least this is my understanding of the logistics in place. They could get lucky and capture a Russian railway yard with a stock of russian gauge locomotives and rail cars and operate on the Russian gauge rail (dedicate a Corp for manual handling and transferring from German rail to Russian rail) but its going to be hard to supply men forward offensively.

I completely agree, that is the conclusion I reached when I envisioned the speculative Eastern offensive.

In your opinion, then, when is the soonest time that the German military could recover from such a sudden movement of personnel and materiel, in a manner that would provide the capabilities of mounting an offensive, and, when said offensive begins, how do you think it would be operated?

 

[NoMommsen]

Try this one : Terence Zuber, The Real German War Plan, 1904-1914.

And here is something depicting what you're asking from an older thread.

This is from the 1912 eastern deployment. You'll need a map with the old German names to understand it.

1st to 4th army will deploy behind fortified lake line northwest of Bischofstein - Rössel.
2nd army: deploys in line Ortelsburg - Rhein for advance on Lomza, Wizna and Osowiec.
1st army: deploys in line Mlawa - Willenberg for advance on Narew between Pultusk and Ostrolenka.
3rd army: deploys in line Lötzen - Angerburg - Darkehmen for advance on Augustow - Wisztymiec.
4th army: deploys in line Insterburg - Ragnit for advance on southern Njemen behind 3rd army.


Aufmarsch II 1911/12

1.Armee : 6 aktive Corps und 1 Reserve corps

2., 3., 4. Armee zusammen 8 aktive Corps und 6 Reserve Corps

Aufmarsch Ost II von 1912/13

4.Armee : 8 Inf.Div.

2.Armee : 10 Inf.Div. (ca. 2 Wochen Anmarsch bis Ortelsburg

Composition was different:
1st army: II, V, X, III, VI, VR, VIR.
2nd army: XVII, XX, IV, XI, IVR.
3rd army: XII, XIX, I, IR, XIIR.
4th army: G, GR, XR, IIIR.

 

[Riain]

https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/germanys-1914-eastern-plan.385711/

The plans were picked apart in great detail in this thread from last year. Not just the German plan, but also the Russian plan and the OTL German plan and what the intel lead the French and Russians to believe the German plan was and how they reacted to this.

 

[Detlef]

Well, it was called "Grosser Ostaufmarsch" in German.
"Big (or Great) deployment East" might be a valid translation?

I´m going from memory here...

Moltke the Elder developed that plan as Chief of the General Staff in the 1870s or 1880s.
In case of a threat of war by both France and Russia roughly half of the army was to be deployed to the West, mostly Alsace-Lorraine with its fortresses.
The German government would then have time ask for a declaration of neutrality from France.
In case of a war against France they would stay on the defensive initially.
(Moltke warned that any attempt to attack or occupy Paris would be counterproductive.)
The other half of the army would be deployed in the East.
They would defeat any initial Russian attacks and then counterattack.
With the goal to occupy strategic targets in Russia.
After these initial operations troops could then moved from one front to the other as needed.
And according to the political goals of the government (remember the Chancellor was Bismarck then).

That was only changed gradually by his successor Count von Waldersee.
He initiated discussions with the Austrian-Hungarian army to to develop a common military strategy in case of war against Russia.
Around 7 active army corps were to be deployed in the East. Defeat a Russian attack and then counterattack if the weather permits. In case of bad weather stay on the defensive.
9-12 or so active army corps were to be deployed in the West. Defeat a French attack and then start limited counter attacks with the goal to destroy as much of the French army before they could retreat to the French fortresses Verdun to Belfort).
After these initial operations see the Moltke plan above.

That was changed by Schlieffen in the 1890s in his "Aufmarschplan variant 1".
Russia was improving its railway system and was constructing new fortresses in Russian Poland. Schlieffen therefore didn´t believe in a quick victory against Russia any more.
In the West there was the French fortress belt from Verdun to Belfort. So he came up with the idea of attacking through neutral Belgium. That was supposed to guarantee a quick victory against France and the troops could then be transported East. 75% of the army would be deployed in the West.
There would be sufficient time for that because Germany believed that Russia would need quite some time to finish their mobilization.
(The military problem with that plan is that even Schlieffen admitted that the current German army in the late 1890s / early 1900s was too weak for his plan. Only with lots of luck could it succeed. His latest plan from 1905 needed 25 active army corps in the West alone. Plus reserve divisions. The entire active Germany army in 1914 consisted of only 25 army corps. Not to mention the political consequences of his plan.)

Although perhaps as re-insurance (and maybe because the Schlieffen plan hadn´t been approved as THE war plan) the Ostaufmarsch ("Aufmarschplan variant 2") plan was updated too during his time as Chief of the general Staff. It essentially followed Moltke with half the army in the West, half in the East. Roughly 44 divisions.

The Chief of the General Staff Moltke the Younger in 1913 stopped updating the Eastern Deployment plan.
Perhaps the result of a German Imperial War Council in late 1912.
And changed the Schlieffen plan too.

The result was that the only updated war plan in 1914 was the (Moltke-) Schlieffen plan.
And when Wilhelm II just days before the outbreak of the war demanded a deployment of the army in the East, Moltke the Younger almost had a nervous breakdown. And told Wilhelm II that this was impossible.
Although the Commander of the railway section in the General Staff said after the war that - if ordered - it would have been possible.

 

[Karelian]

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