German Logistic Ability

[white crowe]

A common criticism of the German military in the second world war on these boards is their extremely poor state of their logistics. Now the German logistical situation was often pretty dire, so I don't think it's an unfair comment on Germany's overall situation. However, I'm curious as to how bad the German logistical ability was, given the "ambitious" nature of their various campaigns.

Was it a case that the weakness stemmed from the strategic overestimation of their abilities/neglect for concern over logistics, or was there some underlying weakness in the German military's approach to the issue that led them to perform worse than they otherwise might have given their limitations.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

A common criticism of the German military in the second world war on these boards is their extremely poor state of their logistics. Now the German logistical situation was often pretty dire, so I don't think it's an unfair comment on Germany's overall situation. However, I'm curious as to how bad the German logistical ability was, given the "ambitious" nature of their various campaigns.

Was it a case that the weakness stemmed from the strategic overestimation of their abilities/neglect for concern over logistics, or was there some underlying weakness in the German military's approach to the issue that led them to perform worse than they otherwise might have given their limitations.

The problem was material weakness. They had a very strong tradition of logistical planning, but in the war their logistics forces kept getting combed out for troops for the infantry and were chronically short of resources to actually do their jobs (not enough horses, trucks, fuel, etc.). The US gets praised for its excellent logistics, but that was a function of the other major powers always doing the fighting so they were able to maintain a strong logistics organization due to being undermobilized in terms of manpower, while having a virtually unlimited resource base to draw from, so could simply throw material at a logistics issue until it went away. That's not to say the US military does not deserve praise for innovation and achievement, but it has always had more resources in terms of material and manpower to make those things happen in every war since the US Civil War, especially in the World Wars. Germany's strategists (if you can even call them that in WW2) always demanded the impossible from the logistics branch , but that was also due to the lack of resources available, very poor infrastructure on some fronts (Libya, USSR), and overstrained war effort. Hitler's insistence on fighting all the major world powers at the same time, plus fighting deep in some of Europe's worst developed territory, while having a blockaded economy without enough oil or material for developing logistics meant Germany was always going to have chronic issues with logistics in WW2. WW1 is another story and though overuse of rail lines and the lack of horses and replacement materials due to economic problems was again a factor there.

 

[pattersonautobody]

I think it ultimately became a war of logisitics. The Germans loss too many motorized vehicles due to Operation Tyfun and then Stalingrad, they were no longer able in the position to have large scale offensives. Further, this prevented them from exploiting opportunities on the defensive as well.

 

[Perfidious Albion]

I'm far from expert, but to some extent, so far as I know, it was simply a matter of choices. Hitler wanted lots of things but had a finite amount of money. One of the things that he didn't spend enough on was improving his army's motorisation; in spite of the blitzkrieg idea, a sizeable portion of the German Army relied on horses. It's not just that the Nazis didn't have as good trucks as the Americans did, it's that they literally didn't have enough trucks for the size of the army that they wanted to have.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I'm far from expert, but to some extent, so far as I know, it was simply a matter of choices. Hitler wanted lots of things but had a finite amount of money. One of the things that he didn't spend enough on was improving his army's motorisation; in spite of the blitzkrieg idea, a sizeable portion of the German Army relied on horses. It's not just that the Nazis didn't have as good trucks as the Americans did, it's that they literally didn't have enough trucks for the size of the army that they wanted to have.

Or the oil to drive them, the industry to build them, or the structure to maintain them. German society was one of the least motorized the western world, so lacked the experienced drivers or mechanics to handle all of the trucks but again fuel was a major constraint, as was rubber. Buna wasn't good enough to replace natural rubber altogether, something the US wasn't even able to do, nor the Soviets, despite both relying heavily on synthetic rubber.

 

[profxyz]

Well I've been reading a bit of Van Creveld on the issue and he makes a couple of points regarding German logistics:

1) Automobiles vs. trains. Hitler's predeliction for the automobile (Volkswagens, autobahns, etc.) meant that, for the most part, Germany focused more on developing motor transport than its train network. While this was acceptable up to a point, the fact was that motor transport catered to Germany's weaknesses (rubber, oil etc.) while train transport catered more to Germany's strengths (steel & coal).

This focus also manifested itself in other ways - for Barbarossa, for example, Germany didn't have enough Eisenbahntruppe nor did it train them enough (they could only do 1 rail per army group) in the details of conversion from Russian to German gauge, which meant that motor transport sometimes had to cover around 600 miles for supply (twice its intended range), which posed problems in terms of building up supply depots in Russian territory e.g. Smolensk and the Dnieper, and also forced use of the Grosstransportraum's motor assets over terrible roads. October 1941 saw only c.200 trains out of a scheduled 700 reach Army Group South.

2) Over-diversification. While in Russia, Germany used more than 2,000 types of vehicles for war. This is partly because Germany used both civilian and military vehicles to make up for its transport shortage, and also because it used captured French/British equipment. This meant that there were way too many spare parts that the Germans needed to sustain their transport machines - around 1m for Army Group Center. The problem was not helped by Hitler's preference for creating new divisions rather than bolstering old ones.

3) Bad organizational structure. WWII Germany, in practice, relied on several organizations for logistics. Supplies and their distribution at the front was the responsibility of the quartermaster-general (Wagner), while their transport by rail was the responsibility of the Chief of Transport (Gercke). Transport by naval and air assets were the responsibility of other organizations as well. However, field armies were generally able to sustain some of their needs by local improvisation/plunder, though the lack of magazines in Russia didn't help matters.

4) Blitzkrieg itself demanded short, sharp victories and the German plans for battle inevitably depended on this. Barbarossa's assumptions were predicated (like Napoleon's) on the idea that the Red Army would be destroyed in the zone of 'supply-ability' i.e. c. 500 miles from the front, which was why the panzer spearheads in 1941 were expected to carry enough supply for around 400 miles. When that happened and with a bit of luck (like in France, where spare stocks were found), Germany's did reasonably well. When that didn't happen, that's when the logistics problems became troublesome - at Alamein, Rommel was using up c.20% of his fuel supply just to transport supplies to his army, and in 1941 the railhead for AG North supply was in Latvia when the panzers were at the gates of Leningrad.

 

[Otis R. Needleman]

Or the oil to drive them, the industry to build them, or the structure to maintain them. German society was one of the least motorized the western world, so lacked the experienced drivers or mechanics to handle all of the trucks but again fuel was a major constraint, as was rubber. Buna wasn't good enough to replace natural rubber altogether, something the US wasn't even able to do, nor the Soviets, despite both relying heavily on synthetic rubber.

Not only that, but since the Germans grabbed and bought all the trucks they could from occupied countries, supporting those vehicles was a nightmare. Same things with tanks and other weapons - real supportability problems, but no way could Germany build enough trucks, tanks, and weapons for their war machine.

If interested in how the Germans fed their troops, check out both volumes of Rations of the German Wehrmacht in World War II, by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Jim Pool, US Army. A wealth of information about the German ration supply system, foods supplied, and troop feeding doctrine and practice. Lavishly illustrated. Available on Amazon. Have both volumes. Fascinating.

 

[MattII]

As others have said, over-diversification of equipment, lack of fuel, lack of organisation etc really hobbled them in theatres with long distances between the railheads/ports and soldiers.

Wasn't there also an issue where soldiers in Russia were ordered to send foraged food back to Germany and live on army rations brought out from Germany?

 

[CalBear]

The Reich lacked the capacity to produce enough trucks to handle the support of motorized columns and the manpower to run them. Without sufficient high speed transport the armored columns were always right on the edge of fatal supply shortages. This was especially the case in the East as the Heer advanced farther away from its home base.

Heer policy was to build supply depots every 100 km or so, usually starting near a rail line. A truck on paved road, or dry ground, can do a round trip a day over that distance. Horse drawn wagons will take at least six days for the same round trip (and that pace will kill the horses in fairly short order). Couple that with the fact that a truck can, in most cases, transport more material per trip than a wagon and the problems multiply.

Fodder for the horses is also bulky and uses more space in rail cars than fuel, although fuel is heavier (weight is less of an issue, especially with rail cars than cube space). It was impossible for the Heer horse herds to "live off the land" since each division deployed between 2,500 and 6,500 horses at any single time (the Wehrmacht, including both the Heer and Luftwaffe ground element, ran through an astounding 2,750,000 horses during the war, most of these had to be transported by rail to the combat zones). A German infantry division would have around 4,000 men dedicated to the task of teamster or otherwise supporting the livestock according to its TOE.

The best "tale of the tape" is military truck production during the war (Note that WAllies figures include vehicles provided to the USSR under various "Lend Lease" efforts by both the Commonwealth and U.S.):

Canada - 815,000
Britain - ~740,000 (figures vary)
USSR - 195,000
USA - 2,382,000
Total - 4,080,000

Nazi Germany - 346,000

To put the Reich's figures into perspective, the U.S. provided ~240,000 medium/heavy trucks as well as ~160,000 other motor vehicles, or ~ 400,000 vehicles just to the USSR. I wasn't able to find a figure for Commonwealth contributions.

In summary, the Heer was either pressing the offensive (which always uses far more supply than defending) or was retreating against an enemy with air superiority (in the East) or Air Supremacy (in the West and in the East starting in mid 1944), which results in massive losses in logistical resources, from June 1941 to the end of the war. In a way its a miracle that the entire Nazi war effort didn't simply flip over onto its back like a bug and die by late 1943.

 

[CalBear]

Not only that, but since the Germans grabbed and bought all the trucks they could from occupied countries, supporting those vehicles was a nightmare. Same things with tanks and other weapons - real supportability problems, but no way could Germany build enough trucks, tanks, and weapons for their war machine.

If interested in how the Germans fed their troops, check out both volumes of Rations of the German Wehrmacht in World War II, by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Jim Pool, US Army. A wealth of information about the German ration supply system, foods supplied, and troop feeding doctrine and practice. Lavishly illustrated. Available on Amazon. Have both volumes. Fascinating.

Every time I convince myself that I am the biggest logistical geek here. I am proven wrong.

Ave Frater!

 

[MattII]

Hyup, the Reich relied on a postponed collapse to keep their forces going.

 

[Otis R. Needleman]

Every time I convince myself that I am the biggest logistical geek here. I am proven wrong.

Ave Frater!

While I was a signals intelligence officer by trade, I learned a lot about logistics, especially when doing systems acquisition management. If you can't fix or support a system you can't use it.

 

[Otis R. Needleman]

Hyup, the Reich relied on a postponed collapse to keep their forces going.

And the systematic looting of everything possible from occupied territories kept those forces and Germany going much longer than one would think. The Germans even, I have read, took black topsoil from the Ukraine, for example.

Not only did the Germans loot occupied territories of resources, they also impressed millions of slave laborers and prisoners of war into German industry and agriculture. Again, this kept Germany going longer.

Some very good information regarding Germany's export of hunger to occupied countries, as well as WWII food policies and practices in the major combatant countries, is contained in The Taste of War, by Lizzie Collingham. Came out in 2011. Available on Amazon, which is where I got it. A very good work.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The Reich lacked the capacity to produce enough trucks to handle the support of motorized columns and the manpower to run them. Without sufficient high speed transport the armored columns were always right on the edge of fatal supply shortages. This was especially the case in the East as the Heer advanced farther away from its home base.

Heer policy was to build supply depots every 100 km or so, usually starting near a rail line. A truck on paved road, or dry ground, can do a round trip a day over that distance. Horse drawn wagons will take at least six days for the same round trip (and that pace will kill the horses in fairly short order). Couple that with the fact that a truck can, in most cases, transport more material per trip than a wagon and the problems multiply.

Fodder for the horses is also bulky and uses more space in rail cars than fuel, although fuel is heavier (weight is less of an issue, especially with rail cars than cube space). It was impossible for the Heer horse herds to "live off the land" since each division deployed between 2,500 and 6,500 horses at any single time (the Wehrmacht, including both the Heer and Luftwaffe ground element, ran through an astounding 2,750,000 horses during the war, most of these had to be transported by rail to the combat zones). A German infantry division would have around 4,000 men dedicated to the task of teamster or otherwise supporting the livestock according to its TOE.

The best "tale of the tape" is military truck production during the war (Note that WAllies figures include vehicles provided to the USSR under various "Lend Lease" efforts by both the Commonwealth and U.S.):

Canada - 815,000
Britain - ~740,000 (figures vary)
USSR - 195,000
USA - 2,382,000
Total - 4,080,000

Nazi Germany - 346,000

To put the Reich's figures into perspective, the U.S. provided ~240,000 medium/heavy trucks as well as ~160,000 other motor vehicles, or ~ 400,000 vehicles just to the USSR. I wasn't able to find a figure for Commonwealth contributions.

In summary, the Heer was either pressing the offensive (which always uses far more supply than defending) or was retreating against an enemy with air superiority (in the East) or Air Supremacy (in the West and in the East starting in mid 1944), which results in massive losses in logistical resources, from June 1941 to the end of the war. In a way its a miracle that the entire Nazi war effort didn't simply flip over onto its back like a bug and die by late 1943.

Keep in mind to that Germany's truck production was heavily bombed from 1943 on and suffered very serious delays; that's something that does need to be factored into production numbers as well.

 

[CalBear]

Keep in mind to that Germany's truck production was heavily bombed from 1943 on and suffered very serious delays; that's something that does need to be factored into production numbers as well.

No doubt.

The Combined Bombing Offensive was a huge factor in the Reich's logistical issues. Nonetheless the figures very much still illustrate the massive gap between what Reich had available to support a two front (and eventually 3 front since there were separate defensive fronts in the East, West and in Italy) war.

My post was less about production in & of itself and more about what was available. When you realize that, during the entire war the Reich produced fewer trucks than the number of vehicles provided via Lend Lease to just the USSR it goes a long way to explaining why the Reich was in such a bad position (well, for most of the war, maybe not as bad as 2.75 million horses the Heer used up, but...).

Actually the production number that sort of startled me was the 815,000 trucks (along with 15K aircraft and 56K+ armored vehicles) produced by Canada. Even considering U.S. brand factories (like Ford's Windsor facility) as part of the Canadian total, which the figures seem to indicate, the number is still staggering. The total population of Canada at the time was just over 11 million (with about 8% of the total in uniform). Absolutely remarkable.

 

[alfredtuomi]

No doubt.



Actually the production number that sort of startled me was the 815,000 trucks (along with 15K aircraft and 56K+ armored vehicles) produced by Canada. Even considering U.S. brand factories (like Ford's Windsor facility) as part of the Canadian total, which the figures seem to indicate, the number is still staggering. The total population of Canada at the time was just over 11 million (with about 8% of the total in uniform). Absolutely remarkable.

here's something that also stands in stark contrast to axis logistics.
over 400,000 of the military trucks built in Canada were to the same basic design for a british military spec for a range from 1/2 ton to 3 ton.....and Ford and GM collaborated on the design with numerous interchangeable parts .
makes the store's ppl happy.

 

[Otis R. Needleman]

Keep in mind to that Germany's truck production was heavily bombed from 1943 on and suffered very serious delays; that's something that does need to be factored into production numbers as well.

True, but we should also factor in the number of trucks obtained, one way or another, from occupied countries and captured from enemy forces. Unfortunately, don't know of anywhere to get those figures.

 

[Otis R. Needleman]

here's something that also stands in stark contrast to axis logistics.
over 400,000 of the military trucks built in Canada were to the same basic design for a british military spec for a range from 1/2 ton to 3 ton.....and Ford and GM collaborated on the design with numerous interchangeable parts .
makes the store's ppl happy.

Kind of like the Jeep. Willys won the large-scale production contract but couldn't build all the vehicles needed, so Ford built about 45%, or about 278,000, of all the Jeeps built during the war.

 

[alfredtuomi]

Kind of like the Jeep. Willys won the large-scale production contract but couldn't build all the vehicles needed, so Ford built about 45%, or about 278,000, of all the Jeeps built during the war.

not really

the British spec was very flexible....basically length ,capacity
2 wheels per axle and right hand drive.........then ford and gm engineers designed the series of trucks digging into their respective parts bins,but the basic frames/bodies were all the same....you have to know what to look for to tell them apart.

in contrast even the trucks made in Germany were a multitude of types and manufacturers.........

 

[MattII]

Keep in mind to that Germany's truck production was heavily bombed from 1943 on and suffered very serious delays; that's something that does need to be factored into production numbers as well.

Yes, and? Germany now is ~44% bigger than the UK by land area, and was bigger still then (~160% bigger), with a population about half as big again, not counting slave labour, and yet they still managed to mismanage it that badly.

in contrast even the trucks made in Germany were a multitude of types and manufacturers.........

Which was one reason they ran into issues, twice as many designs means running two separate supply lines to the Allies' one. As they say, quantity is quality in its own way.