I have given my views on the Iranian Revolution in a second Ford Term in numerous threads but I once again offer my analyses
To begin with the Iranian Revolution will happen because Revolutions are vast historical process. The question is how would Kissinger or Bush respond to the Iran Revolution? It would likely be Bush as Kissinger would likely have left the Ford Administration in 1977 even if Ford had been re-elected.
In the first instance they would have been just as blindsided by the Iranian Revolution as the Carter administration was. You would need some pretty major changes, which a second Ford Term would not bring, to prevent the CIA writing in August of 1978 that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation". The US was simply not aware of how unstable the Shah was, or how sick he was as the Shah of Iran was dying of cancer during the critical 1978 period. Iran's economy had spun out of control by then, with runaway inflation and high unemployment in Iranian cities. On this front the Ford Administration is unlikely to be of help, in later 1976 after the election Ford put pressure on the Shah to lower oil prices through the OPEC summit, an act which hurt the wounded Iranian economy. Lower energy prices would be a priority for the Ford Administration, which would mean further pressure by the Americans on Iran and other oil producers not to raise prices.
Perhaps the Ford Administration could realise how weak the Shah's position was and would try to repeat the 1953 coup. The failure of the Army to implement such as coup OTL shows that this is far from the likeliest outcome, as was Henry Kissinger's prediction of “a sort of Bonapartist counterrevolution that rallies the pro-Western elements together with what was left of the army".
Another option would be the Ford Administration doing something similar to what the Carter Administration did, opening up back channels with the Ayatollah Khomeini in France to see if he could be brought into power in coalition with the army and more moderate politicians. Khomeini was very effective at giving the impression to the US that he was pliable, telling the US that an Islamic Iran would have more in common with the Christian U.S. than the Atheistic USSR. The neo-conservative and anti-communist members of the Ford Administration may see these signs and think they have the new ally against communism, and help him into power. However this is unlikely to make the Islamic Republic of Iran, or whoever takes power in the tumult of Revolutionary Iran, a loyal US Ally.
Considering what we know now about David Rockefeller's lobbying of the Carter Administration to admit the Shah of Iran, it is probable that Ford admits the Shah to the United States earlier in 1979, possible justifying it as not wanting to be seen abandoning another US ally after the fall of Saigon and Cambodia. This would have turned much of the populace against the US and weakened the US position further, threatening not only the US Embassy but thousands of other Americans, including the "civilian" and military contractors in the country. This is likely to strain the relationship, and possible force Khomeini into being a firm opponent of the U.S. while in power.
