Formosa instead of the Philippines

[Vingilótë]

I recently read in the Japanese thread, courtesy of Calbear, that apparently, a campaign in Formosa during WWII was considered a serious alternative to the OTL Philippines Campaign. Formosa seems to have had a number of advantages over the Philippines, such as being close enough to provide air cover over Okinawa, while still being reasonably well-placed to interdict the Home Islands from the DEI. From what I can see, if Formosa is captured, America is also well-placed to interdict Japanese operations in China as well, and I have a suspicion that it might be less strongly defended as well.

What would be the effects on the war if America chose to target Formosa instead of the Philippines, and, in addition, on the post-war situation in the Philippines, Taiwan, China, and Japan as a result of fighting on Formosa?

 

[mcdo]

It's an interesting idea. I agree with you, I think Formosa made more strategic sense than the PI, which was in large part motivated by MacArthur's political sensibilities (he wanted to return ). For the post-war... all I can say is that if the US is already occupying it, they may well not want to allow huge numbers of KMT refugees to come there. Maybe that means they help the KMT hold on in China (somebody has to take that UNSC seat, after all), maybe it means they let them establish a government-in-exile on an island still under US military control. But I don't see the US allowing Taiwan to fall under KMT rule, which frankly is probably good for the Taiwanese.

 

[Vingilótë]

It's an interesting idea. I agree with you, I think Formosa made more strategic sense than the PI, which was in large part motivated by MacArthur's political sensibilities (he wanted to return ). For the post-war... all I can say is that if the US is already occupying it, they may well not want to allow huge numbers of KMT refugees to come there. Maybe that means they help the KMT hold on in China (somebody has to take that UNSC seat, after all), maybe it means they let them establish a government-in-exile on an island still under US military control. But I don't see the US allowing Taiwan to fall under KMT rule, which frankly is probably good for the Taiwanese.

I'm not entirely certain about that tbh. The closest OTL parallel would probably be the Ryukyu Islands, but that was essentially territory from an enemy nation with no outstanding alternate claims on it, whereas the KMT did have a claim to Taiwan, and the retrocession thereof formally was part of the Cairo declaration as well. Certainly, given that before the fall of China, the US post-war plan saw KMT China as her principal ally in Asia, I think that that would be counter-productive, to say the least.

 

[mcdo]

I'm not entirely certain about that tbh. The closest OTL parallel would probably be the Ryukyu Islands, but that was essentially territory from an enemy nation with no outstanding alternate claims on it, whereas the KMT did have a claim to Taiwan, and the retrocession thereof formally was part of the Cairo declaration as well. Certainly, given that before the fall of China, the US post-war plan saw KMT China as her principal ally in Asia, I think that that would be counter-productive, to say the least.

What use is an ally that has disappeared? Why turn over territory controlled by the US to the KMT, when the only thing you need them to do is exist as a government-in-exile? They can do that in a Taiwan "temporarily" controlled by the US.

 

[Vingilótë]

What use is an ally that has disappeared? Why turn over territory controlled by the US to the KMT, when the only thing you need them to do is exist as a government-in-exile? They can do that in a Taiwan "temporarily" controlled by the US.

What I mean is that the retrocession would probably occur some time before the KMT's total defeat (though if it was planned to occur after the war ended, that could potentially have interesting consequences) by the CCP, as happened OTL (if not faster, since the KMT won't need to fly in after the ceasefire to accept the surrender), until the KMT disappears, it becomes less holding territory, and more honoring ones commitments to one's allies. If it's after, then things could easily change: this is mostly because with US troops already on the island, it would be politically impossible to abandon it, but what actually happens officially and legally is another, thornier question. I personally think, that while the US still nurses hopes of restoring the ROC to China (which, to be sure, is far from certain, given how they had basically given up the ROC for lost OTL), that Taiwan would officially be under ROC administration (but not necessarily in reality), if for no other reason than because so far as the US was concerned, that was the case already. But, it does become possible, I think, that the US would show considerably more sympathy earlier to proponents of Taiwanese independence.

A lot of this depends on the immediate postwar circumstances of course. Frex, if events butterfly away the 228 incident (which if Taiwan is under effective American administration, is quite possible), then a lot of the ill will between Taiwan and the KMT could be butterflied.

 

[katchen]

Because Taiwan is a Japanese colony, the US could find itself obliged to make it a United Nations Trust Territory with the right to self-determination, the same as Micronesia. In that case, the US could find itself either guaranteeing Taiwan's complete independence (and Taiwan would be much more strategically useful to the US than even Okinawa) or even, if sentiment was overwhelming on the part of Taiwanese, considering Taiwan for US commonwealth status or even statehood, especially if the Taiwanese all learn English, which they likely would.

 

[WhatIsAUserName]

What use is an ally that has disappeared? Why turn over territory controlled by the US to the KMT, when the only thing you need them to do is exist as a government-in-exile? They can do that in a Taiwan "temporarily" controlled by the US.

FDR already told Jiang that Formosa would go over to the Republic of China in 1943's Cairo Declaration, a year before the Philippines were retaken by the US.

So while the US can certainly go back on that assurance if it wants to do so, it would require FDR or Truman to be a bit more prescient about the Nationalists, thus allowing for the US to change plans. Otherwise I'd just think it'd be a recap of history.

 

[adamu_kun]

I agree with Mcdo here, it's likely that the US would have allowed the KMT to camp out in Taiwan in limited numbers and without a military, but would not have allowed Taiwan to pass over to KMT governance.

Any KMT 'government in exile' points to the fact that the KMT still loses the Chinese Civil War and the US is unlikely to give up an important strategic asset in its containment of the spread of communism (its occupation of Taiwan).

It does raise some interesting questions though. Firstly, it's unlikely that the CCP would start demanding eventual reunification because having US military permanently based on Taiwan is a bigger threat than having an aircraft carrier sail through the Taiwan Straits. Effectively, Taiwan would be the world's largest aircraft carrier here. Secondly, would the US choose to occupy Taiwan permanently? It occupied Okinawa until 1972, when it was returned to Japan as Okinawa prefecture. There's not a cat's chance in hell that the US would willingly concede Taiwan to the CCP and mainland China, so we would see a scenario in which Taiwan is either made a US protectorate (or State) or handed back to Japan. The latter option would make the current dispute over the Senkaku islands even more tense (but would probably give Japan even greater claim due to geographical proximity).

Away from the political / military considerations, it's highly likely that Taiwan would develop modern industry at about the same time as Japan and become democratic much quicker than OTL. There would be no white terror or martial law until 1987 allowing much greater freedom of speech as well and because of no KMT influence politically, probably fewer internal divisions than there are OTL. Infrastructure would probably be a lot better here too, as the Japanese built up a lot of roads, railways and public buildings prior to 1945 and other than prestige government buildings, the KMT did not really bother maintaining them or even building new, permanent infrastructure as until relatively recently, it viewed itself as only being on Taiwan temporarily, so many buildings are shoddily constructed, as they were only intended to be used for 5 or 10 years. Under an American occupation, there would be none of this I would guess.

So I guess on the whole, an American occupation would have actually had more of a stabilizing influence East Asian politics a lot better than in our timeline. Better for Taiwan, better for the region (unless it handed Taiwan back to Japan in 1972 or afterwards).

That's my 2NT anyway

 

[TFSmith121]

Taiwan would be Okinawa writ large; terrible idea

In the Philippines, the Filipinos could and did help liberate themselves, as well as provide the lines of communications, security, and labor force that was necessary to sustain the US forces interdicting the South China Sea, which was the military point of the campaign.

None of which was going to be provided by the Taiwanese, which had been part of the Japanese Empire for a half century by 1944-45.

Best,

 

[Vingilótë]

I agree with Mcdo here, it's likely that the US would have allowed the KMT to camp out in Taiwan in limited numbers and without a military, but would not have allowed Taiwan to pass over to KMT governance.

Any KMT 'government in exile' points to the fact that the KMT still loses the Chinese Civil War and the US is unlikely to give up an important strategic asset in its containment of the spread of communism (its occupation of Taiwan).

It does raise some interesting questions though. Firstly, it's unlikely that the CCP would start demanding eventual reunification because having US military permanently based on Taiwan is a bigger threat than having an aircraft carrier sail through the Taiwan Straits. Effectively, Taiwan would be the world's largest aircraft carrier here. Secondly, would the US choose to occupy Taiwan permanently? It occupied Okinawa until 1972, when it was returned to Japan as Okinawa prefecture. There's not a cat's chance in hell that the US would willingly concede Taiwan to the CCP and mainland China, so we would see a scenario in which Taiwan is either made a US protectorate (or State) or handed back to Japan. The latter option would make the current dispute over the Senkaku islands even more tense (but would probably give Japan even greater claim due to geographical proximity).

Away from the political / military considerations, it's highly likely that Taiwan would develop modern industry at about the same time as Japan and become democratic much quicker than OTL. There would be no white terror or martial law until 1987 allowing much greater freedom of speech as well and because of no KMT influence politically, probably fewer internal divisions than there are OTL. Infrastructure would probably be a lot better here too, as the Japanese built up a lot of roads, railways and public buildings prior to 1945 and other than prestige government buildings, the KMT did not really bother maintaining them or even building new, permanent infrastructure as until relatively recently, it viewed itself as only being on Taiwan temporarily, so many buildings are shoddily constructed, as they were only intended to be used for 5 or 10 years. Under an American occupation, there would be none of this I would guess.

So I guess on the whole, an American occupation would have actually had more of a stabilizing influence East Asian politics a lot better than in our timeline. Better for Taiwan, better for the region (unless it handed Taiwan back to Japan in 1972 or afterwards).

That's my 2NT anyway

The more I think about it, the more likely it seems to me, really, that ultimately, this scenario makes it more likely that Taiwanese independence will be a real option (the first ten postwar years are going to be crucial in this regard: If the KMT gets Taiwan, it probably will keep it, but a trust territory effectively formalizes the independence process).

However, I think I should note that handing Taiwan back to Japan is basically completely ASB; the idea, AFAIK, is pretty much non-existent even among Japanophile Taiwanese (and even more so by 1972, probably), and then, there is the fact that Okinawa essentially was and is integral Japanese territory, whereas Taiwan has never been such (if the US for whatever reason really badly wanted to divest itself of Taiwan, and for some reason wouldn't just give the KMT full control, independent Taiwan is far more likely IMO). In point of fact, I dunno if even the Japanese want millions of people who don't speak a word of Japanese or have even a semblance of Japanese national feeling (shaky already in 1948, completely gone by 1972).

 

[mcdo]

What I mean is that the retrocession would probably occur some time before the KMT's total defeat (though if it was planned to occur after the war ended, that could potentially have interesting consequences) by the CCP, as happened OTL (if not faster, since the KMT won't need to fly in after the ceasefire to accept the surrender), until the KMT disappears, it becomes less holding territory, and more honoring ones commitments to one's allies. If it's after, then things could easily change: this is mostly because with US troops already on the island, it would be politically impossible to abandon it, but what actually happens officially and legally is another, thornier question. I personally think, that while the US still nurses hopes of restoring the ROC to China (which, to be sure, is far from certain, given how they had basically given up the ROC for lost OTL), that Taiwan would officially be under ROC administration (but not necessarily in reality), if for no other reason than because so far as the US was concerned, that was the case already. But, it does become possible, I think, that the US would show considerably more sympathy earlier to proponents of Taiwanese independence.

A lot of this depends on the immediate postwar circumstances of course. Frex, if events butterfly away the 228 incident (which if Taiwan is under effective American administration, is quite possible), then a lot of the ill will between Taiwan and the KMT could be butterflied.

The retrocession was promised during the war, but it wasn't official until the peace treaty, and by then the KMT will have lost. I just don't see what the US gains in giving Taiwan to the KMT (to actually govern) if they are already there, particularly if they are being their showy incompetent selves in China during the meantime.

I agree that with no 228 a lot of ordinary Taiwanese will not loath the KMT, but it doesn't follow that they will be arguing for Taiwan to join China.

 

[Vingilótë]

The retrocession was promised during the war, but it wasn't official until the peace treaty, and by then the KMT will have lost. I just don't see what the US gains in giving Taiwan to the KMT (to actually govern) if they are already there, particularly if they are being their showy incompetent selves in China during the meantime.

I agree that with no 228 a lot of ordinary Taiwanese will not loath the KMT, but it doesn't follow that they will be arguing for Taiwan to join China.

Basically, this I agree with. Again, I think a lot of this depends heavily on post-war circumstances. If the GLP and the Cultural Revolution-like events occur with similar OTL effects, that could just as easily sour Taiwanese on joining China, as the 228 incident did, in a different way.

 

[katchen]

FDR already told Jiang that Formosa would go over to the Republic of China in 1943's Cairo Declaration, a year before the Philippines were retaken by the US.

So while the US can certainly go back on that assurance if it wants to do so, it would require FDR or Truman to be a bit more prescient about the Nationalists, thus allowing for the US to change plans. Otherwise I'd just think it'd be a recap of history.

What OTHER assurances had the US made to OTHER powers that they could have colonies back or territory that it wound up having to go back on because the promises made under the UN Charter may have trumped those promises?
Were there any?
And how would President Truman react if after the US had fought long and hard to liberate Taiwan from the Japanese, the Taiwanese, calling themselves Formosans, attempted to form a democratic self-government and made it clear to reporters that they wanted no part of China and considered themselves no more a part of China than Ireland is a part of Britain even if they do speak the same language and are 200 miles away from China (farther from China than Ireland is from the UK)?
I can see the headlines now, as soon as censorship is lifted:
Taiwanese to Americans: Are you English? You speak English! You're not? Then why are we Chinese?

How will President Truman spin that one?

 

[mcdo]

Basically, this I agree with. Again, I think a lot of this depends heavily on post-war circumstances. If the GLP and the Cultural Revolution-like events occur with similar OTL effects, that could just as easily sour Taiwanese on joining China, as the 228 incident did, in a different way.

I shouldn't push too hard when we are basically in agreement, but I do want to say one thing: Taiwanese don't need to be "soured" on joining China. If you want it to happen, they need to be given a reason. I know some people had relatively high hopes for KMT rule in OTL (largely because they thought the KMT would treat them as "fellow Chinese", when in reality they treated them as a colonized underclass that was suspected of disloyalty), but that was because they knew actual independence was impossible. Here, with US administration, I think a lot of people will be happy enough with that in the short term. If you want Taiwan to join China, you don't need to prevent Taiwan from being soured on China, you need to give them a reason to want that. It's a bigger task, I think.

 

[Kou Gakei]

From where would they actually land forces on Taiwan? It's always been a problem I see.

 

[Ariosto]

If I remember correctly (and forgive me if I'm wrong, its 11:57 P.M. here) MacArthur managed to outmaneuver Nimitz on the question due to how it was politically untenable to bypass the Philippines when they were now in a position to liberate them.​

 

[HeavyWeaponsGuy]

Because Taiwan is a Japanese colony, the US could find itself obliged to make it a United Nations Trust Territory with the right to self-determination, the same as Micronesia. In that case, the US could find itself either guaranteeing Taiwan's complete independence (and Taiwan would be much more strategically useful to the US than even Okinawa) or even, if sentiment was overwhelming on the part of Taiwanese, considering Taiwan for US commonwealth status or even statehood, especially if the Taiwanese all learn English, which they likely would.

Depending on the timing (either before or after the Communist takeover, and before or after Roosevelt's death), the US policy taken could vary wildly.

Certainly the idea of Taiwan being a Trust Territory (which was effectively a remnant of the LoN wherein certain areas were considered unfit for self-government) is a bit absurd. Taiwan isn't by any stretch of the term an uncivilized place, and by the 1940's had an extensive history of being part of Chinese-centric states, Japanese rule was a brief, and violent interruption of that. There isn't any precedent for an independent Taiwan by that point in time (the Taiwan situation as it has developed today is hardly the only possible or even the most likely historical outcome).

What has to be understood about FDR is that he fundamentally saw WWII as one that had been caused by (particularly European) imperialism. He detested secret treaties and colonial arrangements even to the point of considering giving Hong Kong to China rather than returning it to British colonial rule. If the US had occupied Taiwan at a time where the Nationalists were still in control of China and Franklin Roosevelt was still President, it's almost a given that FDR is going to return Formosa/Taiwan to the Chinese government. China was one of the Allied powers, not to mention a nation that was regarded as a direct ally of the United States. The Roosevelt administration isn't going to throw out Japanese imperialism in Formosa just so it can engage in some of its own.

Formosa is really too culturally different for it to be annexed by the United States, it isn't merely some small territory with a modest amount of people, by 1945 (the most likely year for the territorial status of Taiwan to be resolved in such a case), it has 6.9 million people, most of whom would probably regard the idea of being part of the US, a country separated from them by an entire ocean, with either confusion or outright disdain.

By 1945 it's extremely improbable that the GMD are going to hold out against the Communists, and even if there is a Communist takeover, Taiwan surviving as a bastion of Nationalist rule against the Communists on the mainland is by no means guaranteed.

 

[WhatIsAUserName]

What OTHER assurances had the US made to OTHER powers that they could have colonies back or territory that it wound up having to go back on because the promises made under the UN Charter may have trumped those promises?
Were there any?
And how would President Truman react if after the US had fought long and hard to liberate Taiwan from the Japanese, the Taiwanese, calling themselves Formosans, attempted to form a democratic self-government and made it clear to reporters that they wanted no part of China and considered themselves no more a part of China than Ireland is a part of Britain even if they do speak the same language and are 200 miles away from China (farther from China than Ireland is from the UK)?
I can see the headlines now, as soon as censorship is lifted:
Taiwanese to Americans: Are you English? You speak English! You're not? Then why are we Chinese?

How will President Truman spin that one?

Presumably the US would spin it the same way it spun the reestablishment of the French in Indochina, or the Dutch in the East Indies.

With no major sense of Taiwanese identity in 1945, why would they be agitating for self-determination?

 

[mcdo]

With no major sense of Taiwanese identity in 1945, why would they be agitating for self-determination?

But there was a sense of Taiwanese self-identity in 1945. There was one since the 1920s, same time the first Taiwanese independence political organizations developed. We've discussed this recently. I even recommended you a book on the subject. Why do you say there was none?

 

[HeavyWeaponsGuy]

Presumably the US would spin it the same way it spun the reestablishment of the French in Indochina, or the Dutch in the East Indies.

With no major sense of Taiwanese identity in 1945, why would they be agitating for self-determination?

The Chinese presence in Taiwan was *not* the same as the French in Indochina or the East Indies. The people there considered themselves Chinese (well, aside from the indigenous peoples of Taiwan, though they hadn't been a major factor in Taiwan's politics for centuries by that point).

The question of whether the residents of Taiwan are Chinese or something distinctly different today is still a rather open one, let alone back then when the majority of the population had been separated from China by force and didn't have much in the way of a separate identity. Taiwan winding up as anything other than a part of China (whether Nationalist or Communist) was quite surprising as a historical event.