for WW3 stories: the Soviet dilemna about... French nuclear weapon or "Why the Rhine was the limit"

[cracou]

I've been able to read many threads about WW3s and I would like to provide some context to allow readers and writers to get a much better understanding of the complex situation that French nuclear weapons generated in Europe.

Just to give some context: we all know that France left NATO in 1966... Well... not really. French President Charles de Gaulle took his country out of NATO's integrated military command structure and that's it. France remained in NATO as an independent power. It means that NATO bases left France but French officers remained at NATO's political headquarters in Brussels and in liaison offices at the other military headquarters. A secret agreement was signed at the same time. This agreement, that was more or less known by the soviets said "in case of war, business as usual and full French support". Something expected by everybody as a full French army was deployed at any time in Germany.

The article is cut into three parts for clarity

1. Stucture of the French army in the 80s (non nuclear)
2. French Nuclear policy
3. The dilemna

Stucture of the French army in the 80s (non nuclear)
In the 80s the main expectation of French leaders was a western-europe war but the country had many post colonial commitments. It means that conscription was active and that most young French spend one year in the army. A significant number of them in Germany. Conscripts, per law, could not be used outside war. And many actions in Africa and other areas were not "wars". As a consequence there were basically two French armies: one with mostly conscripts and a core of pro NCOs and officers. One with only volunteers and "under contract" NCOs and officers. This smaller pro-army was designed to be deployable without notice and thus did not include any heavy armoured units.

Conscript based army

• 1st French Army --> 3 corps --> 9 medium size divisions plus a large bunch of NBC, logistic units and so on. One corp always deployed at full capacity in Germany. About 1200 tanks, 150 helos, 420 155mm plus 5 PLUTON regiments (keep that in mind, it's important, I will explain later)
• - Division du Rhin: not a division. A large unit whose only mission is to defend bridges along the Rhine and to keep at hand a massive quantity of bridging capacity, just in case.
• 22 Divisions militaires territoriales: basically rear units designed to manage mobilization, training and so on in 22 areas on France. They are NOT combat capable. Think of that as all rear echelon personnel in all commands + Regional forces (static rear guard...), 75.000 before mobilisation. Each is supposed to create 1 infantry regiment and 1 armor regiment.
• Some pro specialist units designed for WW3 such as stay-behind.

"Force d'action Rapide" or Rapid action force Professional army (and it includes the foreign legion)

• 11th paratrooper division: classic paratroopers. For WW" they were expected to be used in counter attacks (but no massive drop was planned as it would have been stupid in center-europe).
• 9 marine infantry division: like "marines".
• 27th alpine division: mountain infantry, for alps and basically secure anything with mountains
• 4th airmobile division: a unique unit with... 180 helos. Designed to break a soviet armoured thrust. Deployed in eastern France. Most helicopters were equipped with HOT. Those with a 20mm gun were trained to fight the Mi24. Transport helicopters were supposed to deploy AT units on flanks to target AA and to do "helo arty raids". A very unique idea where 2 Pumas helos were sent to prepared spots in Germany. One with a 120mm mortar team and the other with ammunition. Each spot was designed to be just in range of a high value target (bridge, airbase, supply depot...) but protected by hills or a city and ingress routes were planned years in advance.
• 6th light armoured division: very light but mobile force. Like US cavalry regiments.

French Nuclear policy
In one sentence: " We are small, you have many more weapons than us. you can kill 300m French but there are only 50m of them. At the same time we can kill 100m Russians so don't even try".
More seriously basic ideas are:
1) France will defend "vital interests / critical assets to maintain the state"
2) Critical assets are never clearly defined but homeland is critical asset and French forces in Germany have nuclear weapons, just in case, you know.
3) No first fire policy
4 )Full independence: technology is French, no use of critical foreign technology.
5) Strategic components with 5 SLMB with 16 MIRV each. 18 land based missiles (MIRV IIRW) with range sufficient to hit Russia (but not China), nuclear equipped planes (first Mirage 4 + US made tankers)
6) Pre strategic component. Notice that I have NOT said tactical nuclear force. They do not exist. They are pre-strategic units. Ok, you are going to say that I'm nit-picking but it's very different. Those five regiments are called PLUTON and are equipped with pluton mobile missile (on tracked carriers). They have a 20 to 120km range. Thus they are not "middle range missiles" with a 300-2000km range. They have been designed for only one mission: send a last warning to say "now this is a vital interest". Independently from NATO. Notice that Germany noticed the range very fast.

French policymakers were fully aware of consequences: those nuclear missiles could only land in west Germany (and maybe in East Germany). Such a shame... Well, it was not seen as a problem as the whole idea was to say "you are too close to France, stop now".

The dilemna
First soviet plans planned a full was invasion of Western Europe. French was in NATO and it was supposed to be attacked like other countries. After 1966 everything changed. Soviet (who were explained French strategy during official meetings) changed all their plans: the absolute limit was the Rhine. The risk of involving a new power with nuclear weapons was seen as far too high to justify any further advance.
The problem was that capturing Germany and stopping at the Rhine might not be sufficient to obtain anything substantial...

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

The problem was that capturing Germany and stopping at the Rhine might not be sufficient to obtain anything substantial...

If the Soviets were to try to get something "substantial" they would risk nuclear apocalypse with the US. Most of West Germany is more than enough to get a favorable peace deal, which is all you can hope for in WW3.

 

[Crueldwarf]

Again, the idea of conventional World War 3 is a popular chimera that never actually planned for by either side. So French posturing about 'if the Soviet come close to our border we will use nukes' was utterly irrelevant back then and it is still now.

Soviets were planning to use nuclear weapons from the day 1 of the operations. Non-nuclear scenarios that you see that pop out now and then from various former Warsaw Pact nations archives are training exercises and not actual war planning and even then if you look at these plans in detail, the usage of nuclear weapons maybe not mentioned directly, but it is implicit.

So why Soviets were planning to go nuclear from the get go? Because the only scenario in which Soviets were considering to go to war with NATO in Europe is 'we discovered NATO preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union and we need to break these preparations swiftly and decisively' and therefore the assumption was that the NATO force is already mostly deployed and mobilized and would be impossible to break in a conventional manner. So it was tactical nukes from the start.

And nuclear weapon usage would involve stuff like glassing Rotterdam port and various German port facilities to prevent Americans from easily resupplying by sea.

So there was no limits imposed on the advance. Rhine or the Channel were never ever seriously considered as objectives because people who were involved in actual planning understood that by the time reaching the Rhine would be a realistic possibility, the war would be waged by the twice reconstituted second echelon formations with smattering of the third echelon units that were spared from the civil defense/disaster relief functions back home.

The idea that somebody seriously considered the plan along the lines of 'we just overrun Germany conventionally only to be stopped by scary French with their nukes' is ridiculous case of probably French self-aggrandizement.

 

[TheKutKu]

Again, the idea of conventional World War 3 is a popular chimera that never actually planned for by either side. So French posturing about 'if the Soviet come close to our border we will use nukes' was utterly irrelevant back then and it is still now.

Soviets were planning to use nuclear weapons from the day 1 of the operations. Non-nuclear scenarios that you see that pop out now and then from various former Warsaw Pact nations archives are training exercises and not actual war planning and even then if you look at these plans in detail, the usage of nuclear weapons maybe not mentioned directly, but it is implicit.

So why Soviets were planning to go nuclear from the get go? Because the only scenario in which Soviets were considering to go to war with NATO in Europe is 'we discovered NATO preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union and we need to break these preparations swiftly and decisively' and therefore the assumption was that the NATO force is already mostly deployed and mobilized and would be impossible to break in a conventional manner. So it was tactical nukes from the start.

And nuclear weapon usage would involve stuff like glassing Rotterdam port and various German port facilities to prevent Americans from easily resupplying by sea.

So there was no limits imposed on the advance. Rhine or the Channel were never ever seriously considered as objectives because people who were involved in actual planning understood that by the time reaching the Rhine would be a realistic possibility, the war would be waged by the twice reconstituted second echelon formations with smattering of the third echelon units that were spared from the civil defense/disaster relief functions back home.

The idea that somebody seriously considered the plan along the lines of 'we just overrun Germany conventionally only to be stopped by scary French with their nukes' is ridiculous case of probably French self-aggrandizement.

Sure, but "we just overrun Germany using nukes only to be stopped by scary French with their nukes" was a possibility.
Nobody wants a strategic nuclear war, even after nukes are already flying.

 

[Crueldwarf]

Sure, but "we just overrun Germany using nukes only to be stopped by scary French with their nukes" was a possibility.
Nobody wants a strategic nuclear war, even after nukes are already flying.

There was only one way for the Soviet tactical nuclear weapons usage in Germany wouldn't escalate to at least limited strategic exchange. It is if NATO would throw West Germany under the bus and essentially give up. Because Netherlands will be nuked within the first week. Denmark will be nuked. North German coast will be nuked. Soviets didn't envision tactical nuclear weapons used against frontline formations much because their exercises on the matter showed that you need to use a whole lot of nukes to make an armored division combat ineffective. So primary purpose for the nuclear arm was battlefield isolation and it would involve a whole lot of nuking densely populated urban areas in Germany, Denmark and Netherlands.

At which point if NATO doesn't respond in kind, the whole Alliance structure would collapse politically and Soviets would win before even being close to a French border. And if NATO responds, the Rhine red line will become immediately hypothetical because Soviet staging areas and logistical hubs are now also nuked and the rear echelon forces are busy doing relief work combined with population suppression in Eastern Europe plus even more of the same in Western USSR proper.

And if there was a full-blown strategic exchange then whatever survivors of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany would still be operational will be definitely not deterred by French threats anymore. Even if just because French will be nuked anyway as a part of that strategic exchange and so would have to use their nukes in response anyway.

 

[cracou]

There was only one way for the Soviet tactical nuclear weapons usage in Germany wouldn't escalate to at least limited strategic exchange. It is if NATO would throw West Germany under the bus and essentially give up. Because Netherlands will be nuked within the first week. Denmark will be nuked. North German coast will be nuked. S

This is a total nonsense... So the solution to avoid strategic nuclear exchange is to begin a strategic nuclear war. You seem to think that "as long as it does not hit USA, it's not strategic". If you hit harbours, you are in full strategic / counter values (as it does happen that those places are capitals and/or most densely populated areas).

So French posturing about 'if the Soviet come close to our border we will use nukes' was utterly irrelevant back then and it is still now.

Facts show that soviet plans were modified as a consequence.

Your assumption is completely over the top as its "to avoid a nuclear war, let's begin one". Nobody is that stupid. The whole point on massive soviet formations if that they could not loose on the field. So why nukes?

 

[Crueldwarf]

This is a total nonsense... So the solution to avoid strategic nuclear exchange is to begin a strategic nuclear war.

There was no solution to avoid strategic exchange in the scenario of all-out Soviet-NATO war in Europe. The only ones are unrealistic ones like NATO essentially surrendering after initial engagement.

Facts show that soviet plans were modified as a consequence.

No, they weren't. It is some sort of Cold War mythology that was never confirmed by any Soviet internal documentation.

Your assumption is completely over the top as its "to avoid a nuclear war, let's begin one". Nobody is that stupid. The whole point on massive soviet formations if that they could not loose on the field. So why nukes?

Soviets were never optimistic about their chances of winning a conventional war in Europe. The point of massive Soviet formations in Europe was deterrence and not an expectation of winning a conventional engagement somehow.

And because of that Soviets never planned to avoid nuclear war in any big war against NATO. They didn't consider it possible to win one without going nuclear.

 

[Karelian]

Soviets were planning to use nuclear weapons from the day 1 of the operations. Non-nuclear scenarios that you see that pop out now and then from various former Warsaw Pact nations archives are training exercises and not actual war planning and even then if you look at these plans in detail, the usage of nuclear weapons maybe not mentioned directly, but it is implicit.

This was true until the 1970s, until it no longer wasn't.

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/doc02_I_ch3.pdf

By 1981 the Soviet General staff had concluded that nuclear use would be both catastrophic and counterproductive to combat operations in the European theater. The employment of nuclear weapons had to be avoided if at all possible, asserted the late Chief of the General Staff Akhromeev.

 

[cracou]

There was no solution to avoid strategic exchange in the scenario of all-out Soviet-NATO war in Europe. The only ones are unrealistic ones like NATO essentially surrendering after initial engagement.

This is an opinion, not a fact, I'm afraid.

And because of that Soviets never planned to avoid nuclear war in any big war against NATO. They didn't consider it possible to win one without going nuclear.

My point is that French nuclear forces had a very significant effect of soviet planning. Until early 60s there were no French nuclear forces. After they existed.
All sources (see just above) just say the same thing. Of course you might have access to other ones so you can share them here.

The bibliography in this article is a good beginning: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/108642/warplan_dossier.pdf

 

[Matt Wiser]

The Soviets under Marshal Grechko as Defense Minister planned a nuclear-first warfighting strategy from the mid ‘60s until his death in 1974. His successor, Marshal Ustinov, shifted from a short (nuclear) to a long (conventional) strategy in the following years, and interviews with former Soviet General Officers in the 1990s bore this out, along with documents in East German archives. The Soviets emphasized conventional warfighting as a result, while modernizing their tactical and theater nuclear forces.

The French might issue an ultimatum to the Soviets, reminding them of the unilateral French nuclear force and the willingness to use it if France’s territorial integrity is threatened.

 

[Nelson Mikeson]

There was no solution to avoid strategic exchange in the scenario of all-out Soviet-NATO war in Europe. The only ones are unrealistic ones like NATO essentially surrendering after initial engagement.


No, they weren't. It is some sort of Cold War mythology that was never confirmed by any Soviet internal documentation.


Soviets were never optimistic about their chances of winning a conventional war in Europe. The point of massive Soviet formations in Europe was deterrence and not an expectation of winning a conventional engagement somehow.

And because of that Soviets never planned to avoid nuclear war in any big war against NATO. They didn't consider it possible to win one without going nuclear.

I have a feeling the French nuclear doctrine was just jingoistic deterrence typical to De Gaulle to prevent the Soviets from starting a conventional war. NATO was likely to use nuclear weapons once the Soviets reached the Rhine, but mostly on Vistula bridges and on the frontlines, to basically turn the war into nuclear trench warfare and prevent any further Soviet advances. The French may have used Pluto tactical nukes on Soviet positions, but I doubt they would personally launch a strategic strike on Soviet cities. I mean, yes, you kill 40 million Soviets and really hurt the Soviet willingness to continue the war, but does any French President want to be remembered as the one which caused the obliteration of 90% of French cities, likely destroyed any semblance of French statehood and likely also caused a full US-Soviet nuclear exchange, which caused a nuclear winter(when one strategic nuke flies, likely all will start flying)?

I mean, there's a reason the Soviet didn't actually implement the Seven Days to the Rhine plan, they knew they wouldn't advance past it and the likely result would either be a return to status quo ante bellum(which would likely also cause an earlier collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the USSR, once it's peoples oppose the Soviets bringing them to the edge of nuclear annihilation) or full nuclear holocaust.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

I mean, there's a reason the Soviet didn't actually implement the Seven Days to the Rhine plan, they knew they wouldn't advance past it and the likely result would either be a return to status quo ante bellum(which would likely also cause an earlier collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the USSR, once it's peoples oppose the Soviets bringing them to the edge of nuclear annihilation) or full nuclear holocaust.

I disagree with the bolded part, if anything it's going to be the Western countries that are going to have a though time, their leaders just brought them on the verge of nuclear apocalypse, meanwhile the Eastern Europeans are convinced that it was a defensive war. And even if they were to think it was the leader of their nation's fault, the communist countries were not going to collapse for as long as the Soviet leadership wanted them to remain in their sphere, and the USSR ain't going to collapse anytime soon for as long as Gorbachev isn't in power.

 

[Ramontxo]

I disagree with the bolded part, if anything it's going to be the Western countries that are going to have a though time, their leaders just brought them on the verge of nuclear apocalypse, meanwhile the Eastern Europeans are convinced that it was a defensive war. And even if they were to think it was the leader of their nation's fault, the communist countries were not going to collapse for as long as the Soviet leadership wanted them to remain in their sphere, and the USSR ain't going to collapse anytime soon for as long as Gorbachev isn't in power.

So your take is that the people of Checoslovaquia, Hungary, East Germany or Poland would be convinced that the USSR was defending itself while invading Western Europe? And that after 1956 Budapest or 1968 Praga?

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

So your take is that the people of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany or Poland would be convinced that the USSR was defending itself while invading Western Europe? And that after 1956 Budapest or 1968 Praga?

What the population of the Eastern puppets thinks is completely irrelevant, as long as the Soviets care about keeping them in their sphere they will remain their puppets. Even more important the leadership of these countries are loyal to the Soviets. And a war erupting between West and East likely isn't the Soviets invading them.

 

[Sasza]

First of all, the communist authorities are not as loyal to the Soviets as it seems. Polish leader Gomułka in 1956 threatened to bomb the Soviet Army if it continued its march on Warsaw.

After exchanging nuclear blows, Moscow will either lose influence first in the Balkans and then over its own country.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

After exchanging nuclear blows, Moscow will either lose influence first in the Balkans and then over its own country.

After exchanging nuclear blows all of what you described is now a nuclear wasteland.

 

[Captain Homicide]

only scenario in which Soviets were considering to go to war with NATO in Europe is 'we discovered NATO preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union and we need to break these preparations swiftly and decisively' and therefore the assumption was that the NATO force is already mostly deployed and mobilized and would be impossible to break in a conventional manner.

So you’re saying the USSR never planned an offensive conventional war against NATO for a reason other than preemptive?

Can the same be said for NATO in regards to an offensive war against the Warsaw Pact?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

After 1966 everything changed. Soviet (who were explained French strategy during official meetings) changed all their plans: the absolute limit was the Rhine.

Except… no. Not all plans debarked the Rhine as an absolute limit. We have a number of post-1966 operational plans which called for pushes as far as the Pyrennees. It’s just there are ALSO operational plans which more sought to restrain the envisioned offensive. More than was the case beforehand, admittedly. So while we can say French nuclear ascension had some impact on Soviet operational military planning, it wasn’t as comprehensive as you are claiming here. Which ones the Soviets would have implemented if they ever had decided to attack is fundamentally unknowable.

I mean, there's a reason the Soviet didn't actually implement the Seven Days to the Rhine plan, they knew they wouldn't advance past it and the likely result would either be a return to status quo ante bellum(which would likely also cause an earlier collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the USSR, once it's peoples oppose the Soviets bringing them to the edge of nuclear annihilation) or full nuclear holocaust.

Well, first off, the “7-Days to the Rhine Plan” already mentioned isn’t really germaine to the discussion, as it was drafted in 1964.
Secondly, even if it were germaine it’d be a very poor example, as it called for France to be overrun by Day-35. “35 days to the Pyrennees” just isn’t as catchy as a title.

It’s a bit besides the point. Even if the strategic intention to attack never manifested - and we know that the strategic intention was never there or even seriously contemplated - the Soviet military did have plans it could use if it did. It was their job to have those plans.

So you’re saying the USSR never planned an offensive conventional war against NATO for a reason other than preemptive?

Can the same be said for NATO in regards to an offensive war against the Warsaw Pact?

The general fear on the NATO side was that the Soviets might one day take one of their pre-emptive strike plans and use them as a base to modify them into a genuine attack plan. An operationally offensive oriented plan can always be used for an offensive after all, regardless of what precisely the reasons for said operational offensive are.

Never panned out in the end, of course. But given the limited information NATO had and the way judging enemy intentions (which are naturally subject to change much more rapidly than capabilities) is always a difficult and tricky problem, it was an understandable enough one.

First of all, the communist authorities are not as loyal to the Soviets as it seems. Polish leader Gomułka in 1956 threatened to bomb the Soviet Army if it continued its march on Warsaw.

Gomulka only dissuaded the Soviets from attacking him when he made clear his reforms in no way compromised Communist control over the country or any change from following the Soviet foreign policy line. Not exactly a show of disloyalty…

After exchanging nuclear blows, Moscow will either lose influence first in the Balkans and then over its own country.

I mean, yeah. But then one could say the same of the US and NATO. That’s just the reality of strategic nuclear war after the mid-60s.

 

[Nelson Mikeson]

I disagree with the bolded part, if anything it's going to be the Western countries that are going to have a though time, their leaders just brought them on the verge of nuclear apocalypse, meanwhile the Eastern Europeans are convinced that it was a defensive war. And even if they were to think it was the leader of their nation's fault, the communist countries were not going to collapse for as long as the Soviet leadership wanted them to remain in their sphere, and the USSR ain't going to collapse anytime soon for as long as Gorbachev isn't in power.

Why Eastern European countries would view a Soviet invasion of Western Europe as defensive? Propaganda won't be enough to hide it's clearly offensive nature, especially after the West launching nuclear strikes is seen as a response to Soviet provocation which, since direct strikes on the USSR are to be avoided to prevent a MAD situation, would directly affect only non-nuclear Eastern Bloc countries, so they would forego loyalty to Communism and the USSR and try to reach an understanding with the West to save their countries.

Also, once the nukes start flying, the USSR would not be as committed to causing global MAD as painted. Apart from some hardliners there were many Politburo members who were just opportunists interested in holding power at any cost and ruling over a nuclear wasteland is not an option. They would eventually prevail, remove the hardliners and try to reach an understanding with the West.

After exchanging nuclear blows all of what you described is now a nuclear wasteland.

Yeah and I think the Polish people and most likely it's Communist leadership wouldn't be too happy it's Vistula shorelines are a radioactive wasteland thanks to a Soviet offensive war with the West.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Also, once the nukes start flying, the USSR would not be as committed to causing global MAD as painted.

Frankly, once the nukes start flying it's probably not gonna matter who is committed to what. Once the first nuclear weapon goes off, you're past the last clear hurdle towards the apocalypse and everything beyond that is a fuzzy mess. Nuclear theorists love to talk about the logic of deterrence and retaliation, but these are not robots making decisions on wholly rational or logical basis with all factors taken into account. They are human beings, with all the emotional and impulsive foibles that come with it. When you have a handful of highly stressed individuals making snap decisions on incomplete information, all the pretty theory goes out the window. It can take mere moments for a handful of people to decide the fate of nations. It takes FAR longer for a revolt to build up and break loose.