In short, the UoE is suffering from similar problems to the United States (well, the more recent, IOTL, United States, not quite so much the United States of this time period). Being inconsistent and "pragmatic," it only encourages inconsistent and "pragmatic" behavior in those who interact with it.
That analogy makes sense to me!
OK, as promised, here are a few small comments about minority policies and constitutional reform projects in Romania IOTL and ITTL:
Romania has already undergone a constitutional change, like IOTL, with the introduction of universal male suffrage. But the constitutional reform goals of the various parties which make up the current Centre-Left coalition government are not limited to that, they want more. (They wanted more IOTL, too. ITTL, they have much better chances to push for them.) Agrarian reform has been mentioned: it has been legislated and begun to be implemented, but the Peasant Party also wants to enshrine its principles in the constitution so it can't be reversed. Likewise, they want to codify labour and social rights constitutionally. All of that faces stiff liberal and conservative opposition, but it's basically just about adding new words to the constitution since the reform facts on the ground have been created already, and King Ferdinand, while not supportive, has not been as outraged by them as the liberals and conservatives are who want him as the spearhead of their attempt to prevent or roll back these changes.
But the next constitutional reform project really antagonises not only the parliamentary opposition and the old elites who compose them, but also the King: Political decentralisation and cultural autonomy. These ideas are not just imposed by the UoE (although the UoE does hint in that direction, see Dobrogea) or mirroring the purely TTL EFP Charter. They have OTL roots in the manifesto of the National Party of Romanians in Transilvania, Banat and Crisana unified in 1881. The National Party, its name notwithstanding, was an outspoken supporter of regionalism and national autonomy not just for the Romanians in A-H but for all minorities. In their 1881 manifesto, they call for civil servants drawn from the groups which inhabit a region, instead of appointed governors from far away; for the languages spoken in a region to be the administrative and judicial languages there, too; for education on all levels to be available in the native languages of its speakers on equal quality, self-organised by the members of these communities etc. The party's OTL and TTL's post-Great War leader, Iuliu Maniu, has advocated decentralisation and regional autonomy - IOTL probably also in resistance against the domination of a cartel of "Old Kingdom" political elites tied to the PNL, and in vain. ITTL, things look different. His Peasantist, Popular Socialist and Labour coalition partners support the "Russian model" (good neo-poporanisti, i.e. Romanian neo-Nardoniks that some of them are) of local autonomy and a federal outlook of the state, too. Maniu and the National Party have a different model in mind, though, one which has more tradition in Transilvania: the "universitates", which do not refer to institutions of higher learning and research, but are the names of the traditional privileges of self-government and preservation of their own legal traditions awarded by the medieval Hungarian Kingdom to the Saxons and the Szekely (and initially also the Vlachs, i.e. Romanians). Maniu has proposed a revival and modernisation of this concept along the lines of the Western Yugoslav "personal nationality" model. In the end, the Coalition has come up with a mix of both, but one which has already drawn the first lessons from the failures and dysfunctionalities of the personal statehood model in Western Yugoslavia in the face of Serbian aggression.
The plan is as follows:
All recognised national minorities (i.e. in contrast to WYug, no self-chosen denomination like the "Toilers of Greater Yugoslavia" can form) can incorporate themselves / form "national councils" and enrol in these. The internal constitution of these national corporations is chosen by themselves, but it must follow a number of principles laid out in the constitution, which include the principle of internal democracy, equality before the law etc.
In addition to this, Regional Assemblies (Sfaturi) are to be established for Transilvania, Banat-Crisana, the two former principalities of the Old Kingdom Moldova (to which newly-Romanian Southern Bucovina was added) and Wallachia, and - here comes the compromise with Kerensky - also Dobrogea. For these Regional Assemblies, people can either vote for general candidates in local constituencies, or they can vote for minority representatives in the incorporated nations they have enrolled into. The general constituencies would be drawn up in accordance with how many non-minority-enrolled voters live in which region by the Regional Assemblies. The Regional Assemblies would organise and oversee administration on the county level (and according to the Coalition draft, these administrative divisions would continue to be called "megiesii" in Transilvania and Banat-Crisana and remain the way they are instead of streamlined into Judete like in the Old Kingdom; Dobrogea has as its two "ocruguri" Durostor and Caliacra. The national councils would organise possible sub-divisions on their own. Together, Regional Assemblies and National Councils would oversee and organize education, religio-cultural matters (like public holidays and a few other laws, too) etc.
But regionalisation would not stop there: Iuliu Maniu and the Peasantist Constantin Stere also hammered out a compromise among each other for yet another re-organisation of the only recently reformed parliamentary chambers and electoral provisions for them: While Stere wanted a unicameral parliament with proportional representation, Maniu and other decentralisers managed to combine a proportional representation-based Chamber of Deputies with a reformed Senate, into which the Regional Assemblies / Sfaturi and the National Councils / Sfaturi Nationalitatilor Minoritare would send a number of delegates in accordance with their numerical strength (but minium 1) in a voting manner determined by themselves.
This checkerboard of regional traditions, autonomous minorities, a strengthening of smaller nation-wide parties etc. was too much for King Ferdinand, who looked enviously to the Unitarist regime in Serbia which, to him, provided the - maybe not ideal, but way superior - counter-example of a strong, united, centralised state rallied behind the king. So far, Ferdinand has announced that such a draft would never be signed by him.
And so, while the Coronation Cathedral in Alba Iulia is almost finished, on OTL schedule, Ferdinand probably will not yet be crowned anew King of Greater Romania with all the pomp and circumstances because his government has drawn up a plan for the makeup of this Greater Romania which he finds unacceptable. We'll see how this turns out.
Take Ionescu's coalition government has, in the meantime, held plebiscites, not just in Dobrogea, but everywhere in Romania, in order to provide the new constitution with greater legitimacy than just a narrow parliamentary vote. PNL and Conservatives and the press associated with them have conducted a very aggressive campaign against the new constitution. But the excellent territorial organisation and strength of the Peasant Party, the National Party's strength in Transilvania, the support of the German and a few other minorities, and pro-constitutional marches organised by the labour unions together have provided the draft with a majority of 61.3 % Romania-wide, with support margins highest in Transilvania, Banat-Crisana, and (albeit with, as mentioned, very low voter turnout) Dobrogea, while support in Moldova and Wallachia was very narrow, and the capital of Bucharest voted narrowly against it.