Faster Soviet ballistic missile development

Romulus Augustulus

Apparently the Soviets lost some time in the 1940s, because they waffled a little when it came to producing their V-2 clone and analyzing German technology. Let's say, however, that Stalin is much more eager to copy German ballistic missile technology and orders a go-ahead much earlier; the order to conduct a Soviet test program and reverse-engineer the V-2 is given in late 1945. First, is such an alternate decision plausible; next, how much could this decision have accelerated the Soviet strategic missile program?

Also, could it have led to the Soviets investigating storable propellants earlier, and in particular deciding on the UDMH/N2O4 combination (or just N2O4 in general over IRFNA) by the early 1950s? I want to see how early they could have had a fairly large force of more practical ICBMs.
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wolfstar

Rockets where pretty pointless as delivery devices before they where able to shrink the warheads. Do you happen to know what year that was?
 
Michel Van

Michel Van

already in september 1944 the Red army got they hands on V-2 Hardware
(the A4 research unit at Dembidze in Poland)

Later they got in Peenemuende 1945 and found
V-2, Rheintochter, Rheinbote, Wasserfall, and Taifun missiles !!!
(jep the SAM Ancestors are german WW2 anti aircraft rockets )

and alot German 'volunteer' technicians

in deep story here
http://www.astronautix.com/lvfam/earsiles.htm
 

Bill Garvin

Romulus Augustulus said:
Apparently the Soviets lost some time in the 1940s, because they waffled a little when it came to producing their V-2 clone and analyzing German technology. Let's say, however, that Stalin is much more eager to copy German ballistic missile technology and orders a go-ahead much earlier; the order to conduct a Soviet test program and reverse-engineer the V-2 is given in late 1945. First, is such an alternate decision plausible; next, how much could this decision have accelerated the Soviet strategic missile program? Also, could it have led to the Soviets investigating storable propellants earlier, and in particular deciding on the UDMH/N2O4 combination (or just N2O4 in general over IRFNA) by the early 1950s? I want to see how early they could have had a fairly large force of more practical ICBMs. ​
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I don't think its practical for anybody to develop ballistic missiles much faster than was done historically. There are too many things that have to come together (for example guidance otherwise the CEP gets to be continent-sized, stage separation -which still gives countries problems, the early Agni and Nodong trials both failed due to stage seperation issues, reduced-size warheads, missile reliability, metallury, re-entry problems). I think ICBMs came just about as fast as anybody could reasonably expect

However, if, by an ASB intervention, the ICBMs did arrive a couple of years earlier I doubt if it would have made much difference. The U-2 missions were in place, they picked up deployment and would have done of any accelerated deployment. So no real change.​
 

Romulus Augustulus

Bill Garvin said:
I don't think its practical for anybody to develop ballistic missiles much faster than was done historically. There are too many things that have to come together (for example guidance otherwise the CEP gets to be continent-sized, stage separation -which still gives countries problems, the early Agni and Nodong trials both failed due to stage seperation issues, reduced-size warheads, missile reliability, metallury, re-entry problems). I think ICBMs came just about as fast as anybody could reasonably expect. However, if, by an ASB intervention, the ICBMs did arrive a couple of years earlier I doubt if it would have made much difference. The U-2 missions were in place, they picked up deployment and would have done of any accelerated deployment. So no real change.
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Oh, just somewhat faster vehicle development. The goal is to have a really viable Soviet deterrent force by 1961 or 1962 or so, so that if something like the Cuban Missile Crisis really did lead to war, the US wouldn't "emerge as the battered victor," but rather be destroyed outright, like the USSR would.
Maybe not to as great a degree, though.

Again, if Astronautix.com is to be trusted (which is is) apparently after the Soviets got their hands on the V-2s, it took some time for the decision to be made for a test program to be conducted and for the V-2s to be reverse-engineered and so on. If the decree to begin production had been issued earlier (what I'm wondering is how much difference that could have made...) the program would definitely have been accelerated somewhat. I just wonder by how much...just a few weeks or months, or even by a year or two?

Potential complications might be allocation conflicts with other major programs, for instance.

Again, I want to see if by 1962, the Soviets might have about a hundred or so ICBMs...it'd only be a fraction of the size of the US ICBM force, but a larger fraction than historically, and they'd be more practical missiles.
 

Grimm Reaper

No Cuban missle crisis. The Soviet goal in 1962 was to do an end run around the massive US advantage in nuclear delivery systems and had to choose between taking many years to develop and deploy large numbers of ICBMs or sending a more modest number of already existing IRBMs to Cuba.

If the ICBMs already exist...
 

Romulus Augustulus

Grimm Reaper said:
No Cuban missle crisis. The Soviet goal in 1962 was to do an end run around the massive US advantage in nuclear delivery systems and had to choose between taking many years to develop and deploy large numbers of ICBMs or sending a more modest number of already existing IRBMs to Cuba.

If the ICBMs already exist...
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Yeah, I was actually thinking that, too...note the "something like."

Funny, actually...faster Soviet weapons development at least postpones a potentially world-badly-damaging crisis.

Anyway, though, let's say that a decision is made even while the war is being fought; Stalin (although admittedly I don't know enough about his personality or anything to really predict his actions in various situations...then again, who the hell did?) takes a liking to ballistic missile technology, and even as the Soviets are overrunning Germany, they transfer German ballistic-missile related specialists and materials to the USSR, if they didn't already. I wonder if this is plausible, though...perhaps the transport networks might not allow it.

Then, very shortly after the end of the war in Europe, a decision to apply German rocket technology in the USSR is made much sooner than was historically. Those things are probably the POD...now, how likely are those things to occur, and by how much could the program have been accelerated? Also assume somewhat better luck for the USSR...they make good design decisions, the leaders listen to the right people somewhat more, the tests are more successful, etc.

This is planned to be more complex than just the missiles, though...uh, could Mikoyan have somehow become General Secretary in the early 1950s, and would he have been competent?

(Anastas, not Artem.)
 

pacifichistorian

Banned
Grimm Reaper said:
No Cuban missle crisis.
Click to expand...
That's got serious ongoing consequences, tho. Without IRBMs in Cuba, would the U.S. have been so reticent about invading? Or does the Sov ICBM threat hang over that? And does it wipe a U.S. promise not to have tactical nukes in Turkey, which can then be upgraded as new systems are developed?
 
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