Dongfeng is also the name used OTL for China's various ballistic missiles (DF-2,DF-21,DF-41, etc.)
Dongfeng is also the name used OTL for China's various ballistic missiles (DF-2,DF-21,DF-41, etc.)
can i title Post 27 on Wiki like this
"China or: how i keep up with west and love the Space program" ?
"China or: how i keep up with west and love the Space program" ?
some Notes on China Space Program
the Atomic Bomb run under Project 596
1963 Mao order develop of a missile defence system, they label it project 640 (what happen to that program is a mystery, victim of cultural Revolution ?).
under Deng Xiaoping rule, the Long March rocket series was developed for a commercial launch program in 1985.
about Chinese names
Shenzhou mean literally "Divine Land", but is translate in west as "Divine Vessel".
Tiangong mean literally "Heavenly Palace"
Taikonaut is not Chinese official term for there Astronauts !, but term was coined by Chiew Lee Yih who is from Malaysia. it based on Mandarin tàikōng, what means "space".
and now for something completely different:
i found this movie prop picture of Classic movie "Maroonned", dam at what it remind me that again ?....
the Atomic Bomb run under Project 596
1963 Mao order develop of a missile defence system, they label it project 640 (what happen to that program is a mystery, victim of cultural Revolution ?).
under Deng Xiaoping rule, the Long March rocket series was developed for a commercial launch program in 1985.
about Chinese names
Shenzhou mean literally "Divine Land", but is translate in west as "Divine Vessel".
Tiangong mean literally "Heavenly Palace"
Taikonaut is not Chinese official term for there Astronauts !, but term was coined by Chiew Lee Yih who is from Malaysia. it based on Mandarin tàikōng, what means "space".
and now for something completely different:
i found this movie prop picture of Classic movie "Maroonned", dam at what it remind me that again ?....
Part II: Post 28: Birth of Project Constellation
Greetings all! Last week, we caught up on what China (the final major space power we'll be examining in Part III) was up to, with their Project 827 capsule and space station plans. However, this week, we're looking at something I know a lot of you are even more excited for--the plans of the United States for the 1990s. This will be a three-part series, but the first one arrives...now! Enjoy. 1246 replies, 154249 views
Eyes Turned Skyward, Part II: Post #28
"...In 1961 it took a crisis--the space race--to speed things up. Today we don't have a crisis; we have an opportunity. To seize this opportunity, I'm not proposing a 10-year plan like Apollo; I'm proposing a long-range, continuing commitment. First, for the coming decade, for the 1990s: Space Station Freedom, our critical next step in all our space endeavors. And next, for the new century: Back to the Moon; back to the future. And this time, back to stay. And then a journey into tomorrow, a journey to another planet: a manned mission to Mars...."
--George H.W. Bush, Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon Landing
From the very beginning of his presidential term, Bush had sought to remake NASA. As Reagan's Vice President, he had been heavily involved in the space policy making of that administration, and had become, if not really a true believer then at least willing to support relatively ambitious space programs. With Freedom construction well underway and scheduled to be wrapped up close to the end of his first term in office, Bush believed that he not only had a signal opportunity to give NASA a new direction for a new era, but also a responsibility to do so. After all, the last time NASA had been left to drift without direction from the White House the Soviets had developed Vulkan and Mir, overtaking the United States in space. Freedom would merely bring NASA back up to the Soviet's level, but would not again prove American space superiority. A new, more ambitious program was needed to do that, one which would also ensure that the United States never again fell behind in space exploration. This would mean a longer, slower program, rather than an Apollo-style crash program, which not incidentally would also mean a relatively cheap program, at least in terms of year-to-year budgets. No great investments, no huge infusion of political capital would be needed for Bush's imagined future; instead, a slow but steady progression, ensuring America was always abreast of the state of the art. Already during Reagan's presidency, several steps had been taken in this direction under the then Vice President Bush's influence. Throughout the 80s, pathfinder technology development programs had studied the advanced artificial intelligence, aerobraking capabilities, reusable vehicle technologies, cryogenic storage and transfer abilities, space-based nuclear reactors, and other key advancements that NASA had determined would be needed for future space activities, whether by humans or robots, while several studies had begun to outline the possibilities inherent in the Saturn Multibody configuration for operations beyond merely building and operating Space Station Freedom. Now, however, Bush had a far greater scope for reinterpreting the space program towards his vision of the future, even if that vision was as yet largely inchoate and unformed.
Bush's point man in figuring out what form this program would take would be his Vice President, Dan Quayle. While often mocked in the press due to his propensity for gaffes, he quickly became even more enthusiastic about the possibility of reshaping the space program than Bush ever was. As Chair of the National Space Council, he decided to carry out a series of one-on-one meetings with leading scientists, engineers, astronauts, aerospace executives, and other key space program figures to get a sense of what the possibilities were, what could NASA do. One of those meetings was with Harrison Schmitt, the only geologist to have ever walked on the Moon, Senator from New Mexico between 1976 and 1982, and a strong proponent of space exploration and development. Although most associated with the Moon, Schmitt had become a strong advocate for Mars, arguing that the attitude that the United States had "done" the Moon meant that any further lunar exploration would attract little support from Congress or the public, and therefore be vulnerable to neglect and future budget cuts. Although aware and supportive of the possibility of lunar resources, including lava tube colonies, helium-3 extraction, the production of lunar oxygen to use in life support and propellant roles throughout cislunar and Earth orbital space, and even the more advanced concepts of O'Neill, Schmitt believed that under current conditions these were impractical and uneconomical schemes, requiring more technological development. Quayle, increasingly interested in space for its own sake, was entranced by Schmitt's description of the value of a Mars expedition to the United States, and invited the astronaut back several times for further discussion. For his part, Schmitt was surprised and pleased with the attention Quayle was giving him, happy to have found someone in the upper echelons of the government who was willing to listen and learn about his views on what was needed for the space program. When the time came for Bush to select his NASA administrator, Quayle argued forcefully for Schmitt's appointment, securing his new friend the position easily.
Prompted by the suggestion by several former administrators and NASA managers that the 20th anniversary of the Apollo 11 landing--July 20th 1989--might be a good time to announce a new space initiative, the National Space Council, including Vice President Quayle and Administrator Schmitt, met several times over the preceding months to try to define a practical and achievable set of goals that Bush could announce. Interactions between the Council, NASA's newly-formed Exploration Working Group, and selected members of Congress played a key role in shaping what "practical" and "achievable" meant, as political leaders informed the engineers and mission planners of the budget and political constraints they would likely face, while the engineers in turn informed the politicians of the technical limits any plan would run up against. While truly detailed planning was not possible given the limited time available, the preliminary studies indicated that ambitious exploration was available at an affordable price by reusing existing systems, such as Freedom-derived habitation modules, Saturn launch vehicles, and the new Advanced Crew Vehicle for an Apollo-type crew transport role. For a return to the Moon, only one new major system, the lander, needed to be developed from scratch, although funding would also be needed to design and build the surface hardware that would make any missions scientifically productive. Flights to Mars would require more work, but would still fundamentally depend on existing systems for much of the required hardware, drastically reducing development costs relative to analyses from the 1960s. With the groundwork having been laid already, a series of presentations made to industrial, scientific, and Congressional leaders over the week leading up to the 20th went exceptionally well. While few were startled by the content, equally few had seen the integrated, if sketchy, plans that NASA had internally developed, and most were surprised by how sensitive NASA had been to outside concerns. Rather than simply presenting a single extremely ambitious approach, perhaps with some minor variations for a pretense at "economy," the Working Group had developed five highly distinctive mission scenarios. Three involved ventures to only Mars or the Moon, while the other two combined aspects of both into more ambitious plans. This meant that rather than having to say yes or no to a single plan, Congress and the Administration could pick and choose from several, selecting the one that seemed to have the best balance between ambition and cost.
The resulting positive response from scientists to Congressional aides provided the final impetus necessary for an official announcement on the 20th. After a brief ceremony honoring the Apollo 11 astronauts, Bush unveiled the plan with a great deal of rhetorical flourish. Beginning with a paean to the possibilities of space, including a reference to a future of "constellations of human activity--American activity--in space," he quickly asserted that, with the imminent completion of Space Station Freedom, the time to seize those possibilities and begin work on the future was now. And how to do so? A return to the Moon, followed by a voyage to Mars early in the next century would provide achievable yet impressive goals for the American space program, again cementing the leadership of the United States in space exploration. Although he avoided describing specific details, leaving it up to NASA and the National Space Council to come up with actual plans, budgets, and timelines for the new project, he certainly tried as hard as possible to make a new space initiative sound attractive and important to the nation, whatever form it might take. With the end of his speech came the near-simultaneous start of Administrator Schmitt's press conference. By dynamically addressing questions about the expected costs, schedules, foreign partners, and more, Schmitt managed to somewhat weaken the skepticism of the press corps towards the size and expense of the new venture. More importantly, in the course of the press conference he improvised a proper name for the new program, which had previously been known generically as "the space initiative" or "the space exploration initiative". Seizing on the line referring to "constellations of human activity," Schmitt called the new program "Project Constellation," deliberately calling back to Project Apollo.
Now with an official Presidential mandate backing them up, the Exploration Working Group was reworked into the Office of Exploration and charged with turning the preliminary reports of the Working Group into a detailed set of possible alternatives for politicians to decide on, while also considering the possibilities of advanced Pathfinder technologies or management changes in reducing costs or accelerating schedules. As they pored through NASA studies dating back to the 1960s, a flood of private analyses began pour in from all over the country, with sources ranging from space cadets with too much time on their hands to major organizations such as the National Space Organization, all hoping to influence the direction of America's space program. Everything from ignoring Bush's directions altogether for ventures to the asteroids or other locations to ambitious colonization proposals involving the construction of vast amounts of infrastructure in circumearth and cislunar space to support flotillas of vessels carrying scientists, engineers, technicians, even farmers and janitors to Mars hit NASA's mailboxes, forcing them to take special measures just to handle the influx. The last time NASA had had anything like a Presidential mandate, private space policy groups and space advocacy organizations simply didn't exist, leaving the government and contractors to do all of the work, but this time over a decade of work by private organizations had primed them to regard such a mandate as an opportunity to make their voice heard by NASA. While some of these reports, particularly from industry contractors, space advocacy organizations, and other groups with the technical and historical background to make reasonable and developed plans were seriously considered, most were rejected without being read, if for no other reason than a lack of time on the part of the Office of Exploration's staff to read them all. Over the next six months, the Office's staff considered new options, fleshed out old plans, and developed the definitive NASA response to Project Constellation.
1246 replies, 154249 viewsEyes Turned Skyward, Part II: Post #28
"...In 1961 it took a crisis--the space race--to speed things up. Today we don't have a crisis; we have an opportunity. To seize this opportunity, I'm not proposing a 10-year plan like Apollo; I'm proposing a long-range, continuing commitment. First, for the coming decade, for the 1990s: Space Station Freedom, our critical next step in all our space endeavors. And next, for the new century: Back to the Moon; back to the future. And this time, back to stay. And then a journey into tomorrow, a journey to another planet: a manned mission to Mars...."
--George H.W. Bush, Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon Landing
From the very beginning of his presidential term, Bush had sought to remake NASA. As Reagan's Vice President, he had been heavily involved in the space policy making of that administration, and had become, if not really a true believer then at least willing to support relatively ambitious space programs. With Freedom construction well underway and scheduled to be wrapped up close to the end of his first term in office, Bush believed that he not only had a signal opportunity to give NASA a new direction for a new era, but also a responsibility to do so. After all, the last time NASA had been left to drift without direction from the White House the Soviets had developed Vulkan and Mir, overtaking the United States in space. Freedom would merely bring NASA back up to the Soviet's level, but would not again prove American space superiority. A new, more ambitious program was needed to do that, one which would also ensure that the United States never again fell behind in space exploration. This would mean a longer, slower program, rather than an Apollo-style crash program, which not incidentally would also mean a relatively cheap program, at least in terms of year-to-year budgets. No great investments, no huge infusion of political capital would be needed for Bush's imagined future; instead, a slow but steady progression, ensuring America was always abreast of the state of the art. Already during Reagan's presidency, several steps had been taken in this direction under the then Vice President Bush's influence. Throughout the 80s, pathfinder technology development programs had studied the advanced artificial intelligence, aerobraking capabilities, reusable vehicle technologies, cryogenic storage and transfer abilities, space-based nuclear reactors, and other key advancements that NASA had determined would be needed for future space activities, whether by humans or robots, while several studies had begun to outline the possibilities inherent in the Saturn Multibody configuration for operations beyond merely building and operating Space Station Freedom. Now, however, Bush had a far greater scope for reinterpreting the space program towards his vision of the future, even if that vision was as yet largely inchoate and unformed.
Bush's point man in figuring out what form this program would take would be his Vice President, Dan Quayle. While often mocked in the press due to his propensity for gaffes, he quickly became even more enthusiastic about the possibility of reshaping the space program than Bush ever was. As Chair of the National Space Council, he decided to carry out a series of one-on-one meetings with leading scientists, engineers, astronauts, aerospace executives, and other key space program figures to get a sense of what the possibilities were, what could NASA do. One of those meetings was with Harrison Schmitt, the only geologist to have ever walked on the Moon, Senator from New Mexico between 1976 and 1982, and a strong proponent of space exploration and development. Although most associated with the Moon, Schmitt had become a strong advocate for Mars, arguing that the attitude that the United States had "done" the Moon meant that any further lunar exploration would attract little support from Congress or the public, and therefore be vulnerable to neglect and future budget cuts. Although aware and supportive of the possibility of lunar resources, including lava tube colonies, helium-3 extraction, the production of lunar oxygen to use in life support and propellant roles throughout cislunar and Earth orbital space, and even the more advanced concepts of O'Neill, Schmitt believed that under current conditions these were impractical and uneconomical schemes, requiring more technological development. Quayle, increasingly interested in space for its own sake, was entranced by Schmitt's description of the value of a Mars expedition to the United States, and invited the astronaut back several times for further discussion. For his part, Schmitt was surprised and pleased with the attention Quayle was giving him, happy to have found someone in the upper echelons of the government who was willing to listen and learn about his views on what was needed for the space program. When the time came for Bush to select his NASA administrator, Quayle argued forcefully for Schmitt's appointment, securing his new friend the position easily.
Prompted by the suggestion by several former administrators and NASA managers that the 20th anniversary of the Apollo 11 landing--July 20th 1989--might be a good time to announce a new space initiative, the National Space Council, including Vice President Quayle and Administrator Schmitt, met several times over the preceding months to try to define a practical and achievable set of goals that Bush could announce. Interactions between the Council, NASA's newly-formed Exploration Working Group, and selected members of Congress played a key role in shaping what "practical" and "achievable" meant, as political leaders informed the engineers and mission planners of the budget and political constraints they would likely face, while the engineers in turn informed the politicians of the technical limits any plan would run up against. While truly detailed planning was not possible given the limited time available, the preliminary studies indicated that ambitious exploration was available at an affordable price by reusing existing systems, such as Freedom-derived habitation modules, Saturn launch vehicles, and the new Advanced Crew Vehicle for an Apollo-type crew transport role. For a return to the Moon, only one new major system, the lander, needed to be developed from scratch, although funding would also be needed to design and build the surface hardware that would make any missions scientifically productive. Flights to Mars would require more work, but would still fundamentally depend on existing systems for much of the required hardware, drastically reducing development costs relative to analyses from the 1960s. With the groundwork having been laid already, a series of presentations made to industrial, scientific, and Congressional leaders over the week leading up to the 20th went exceptionally well. While few were startled by the content, equally few had seen the integrated, if sketchy, plans that NASA had internally developed, and most were surprised by how sensitive NASA had been to outside concerns. Rather than simply presenting a single extremely ambitious approach, perhaps with some minor variations for a pretense at "economy," the Working Group had developed five highly distinctive mission scenarios. Three involved ventures to only Mars or the Moon, while the other two combined aspects of both into more ambitious plans. This meant that rather than having to say yes or no to a single plan, Congress and the Administration could pick and choose from several, selecting the one that seemed to have the best balance between ambition and cost.
The resulting positive response from scientists to Congressional aides provided the final impetus necessary for an official announcement on the 20th. After a brief ceremony honoring the Apollo 11 astronauts, Bush unveiled the plan with a great deal of rhetorical flourish. Beginning with a paean to the possibilities of space, including a reference to a future of "constellations of human activity--American activity--in space," he quickly asserted that, with the imminent completion of Space Station Freedom, the time to seize those possibilities and begin work on the future was now. And how to do so? A return to the Moon, followed by a voyage to Mars early in the next century would provide achievable yet impressive goals for the American space program, again cementing the leadership of the United States in space exploration. Although he avoided describing specific details, leaving it up to NASA and the National Space Council to come up with actual plans, budgets, and timelines for the new project, he certainly tried as hard as possible to make a new space initiative sound attractive and important to the nation, whatever form it might take. With the end of his speech came the near-simultaneous start of Administrator Schmitt's press conference. By dynamically addressing questions about the expected costs, schedules, foreign partners, and more, Schmitt managed to somewhat weaken the skepticism of the press corps towards the size and expense of the new venture. More importantly, in the course of the press conference he improvised a proper name for the new program, which had previously been known generically as "the space initiative" or "the space exploration initiative". Seizing on the line referring to "constellations of human activity," Schmitt called the new program "Project Constellation," deliberately calling back to Project Apollo.
Now with an official Presidential mandate backing them up, the Exploration Working Group was reworked into the Office of Exploration and charged with turning the preliminary reports of the Working Group into a detailed set of possible alternatives for politicians to decide on, while also considering the possibilities of advanced Pathfinder technologies or management changes in reducing costs or accelerating schedules. As they pored through NASA studies dating back to the 1960s, a flood of private analyses began pour in from all over the country, with sources ranging from space cadets with too much time on their hands to major organizations such as the National Space Organization, all hoping to influence the direction of America's space program. Everything from ignoring Bush's directions altogether for ventures to the asteroids or other locations to ambitious colonization proposals involving the construction of vast amounts of infrastructure in circumearth and cislunar space to support flotillas of vessels carrying scientists, engineers, technicians, even farmers and janitors to Mars hit NASA's mailboxes, forcing them to take special measures just to handle the influx. The last time NASA had had anything like a Presidential mandate, private space policy groups and space advocacy organizations simply didn't exist, leaving the government and contractors to do all of the work, but this time over a decade of work by private organizations had primed them to regard such a mandate as an opportunity to make their voice heard by NASA. While some of these reports, particularly from industry contractors, space advocacy organizations, and other groups with the technical and historical background to make reasonable and developed plans were seriously considered, most were rejected without being read, if for no other reason than a lack of time on the part of the Office of Exploration's staff to read them all. Over the next six months, the Office's staff considered new options, fleshed out old plans, and developed the definitive NASA response to Project Constellation.
Six Months to develop the plan as opposed to just Three? Already things are looking up with an additional 90 days to work it out, on top of the preliminary work already conducted.
More to the point, while a former astronaut is leading NASA here - as per OTL - it's not Richard Trudy - if I got the name right - so I already see things being better managed.
Furthermore, Freedom is already partially built, quite operational, and is expected to be finished before the end of 1992, so there's less that needs doing ITTL depending on your perspective. While significant portions of the tech and hardware needed is already in use. All of which combines to form a far better starting base than what we got IOTL.
And thanks in no small measure to the above, the odds of at least getting back to the Moon - which should be the easier option - are significantly raised, if not in the 90's, then perhaps in the 00's. While Mars is still perfectly possible with the available LV's if you're willing to do it in a particular way.
All in all. Makes you realise just how screwed over we got IOTL.
More to the point, while a former astronaut is leading NASA here - as per OTL - it's not Richard Trudy - if I got the name right - so I already see things being better managed.
Furthermore, Freedom is already partially built, quite operational, and is expected to be finished before the end of 1992, so there's less that needs doing ITTL depending on your perspective. While significant portions of the tech and hardware needed is already in use. All of which combines to form a far better starting base than what we got IOTL.
And thanks in no small measure to the above, the odds of at least getting back to the Moon - which should be the easier option - are significantly raised, if not in the 90's, then perhaps in the 00's. While Mars is still perfectly possible with the available LV's if you're willing to do it in a particular way.
All in all. Makes you realise just how screwed over we got IOTL.
Whoa what a Post, George H.W. Bush get what he wants.
to my surprise is the new NASA Administrator Schmitt, what was wrong with Daniel Goldin ?
or give Harrison Schmitt a better one, because he know better the Political hell in Washington D.C. ?
Project Constellation this sound better as the real (death) program, because it use Saturn Hardware
by the way
I working for moment on Part 9 on Ronald Reagan's Space Exploration Initiative
were George H.W. Bush try to push Phase 2&3 in 1989...
to my surprise is the new NASA Administrator Schmitt, what was wrong with Daniel Goldin ?
or give Harrison Schmitt a better one, because he know better the Political hell in Washington D.C. ?
Project Constellation this sound better as the real (death) program, because it use Saturn Hardware
by the way
I working for moment on Part 9 on Ronald Reagan's Space Exploration Initiative
were George H.W. Bush try to push Phase 2&3 in 1989...
Just a note, but Schmitt is replacing Truly, not Goldin. Goldin was appointed in '92 after SEI failed, with his new notion of "faster, better, cheaper." Truly was the one appointed in '89.
so Schmitt will have same fait like Truly, replaced by Goldin ?
dam i have to erase Bush quote from Part 9, because it's already use in post 28
but there more on that 1989 speech to use from:
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Remarks_on_the_20th_Anniversary_of_the_Apollo_11_Moon_Landing
So I did get the name wrong.
Doubt it. From the looks of things, Harrisson 'Jack' Schmitt has a better handle on the political situation than Truly did. More to the point, IIRC, Truly was never that interested in the Moon and Mars, having stated - apparently - that so long as NASA got STS and the Station, the rest was fair game to Congress. His lacklustre leadership, combined with Political Apathy, IOTL killed off S.E.I. as well as it's $450bn Price Tag.
ITTL, things are looking a lot better.
In 1989, Goldin is just some low-level guy at (IIRC) TRW, so he's not very likely to show up on anyone's radar...
Actually, he was likely the Vice-President of TRW by end of the 80's according to the wiki on him.
Something that occurred to me as I was looking it up, however. By this point ITTL, the surviving Voyagers have completed their primary missions and are now drifting into Interstellar Space. So will the famous Pale Blue Dot Photograph be taken ITTL as well. While the scientific value was tiny at best, the sentimental value was too great to be measured IMHO.
Yes, one will be taken. Can't say by which Voyager (except not Voyager 3, because that one broke), but one will be taking a similar image. As long as Carl Sagan has anything to say about it, it's pretty much a sure thing.
TheLoneAmigo
Donor
I don't have a lot to add, just wanted to say that I'm enjoying this timeline a lot and I hope to see it continue!
Eh, VP in a big corporation like TRW isn't that important a position (there are usually a lot...VP of Sales, VP of R&D, VP of...etc. etc.). In any event, his appointment OTL was the effect of special circumstances connected to how very poor Truly was as a choice for Administrator given the Bush administration's agenda. Since Schmitt doesn't have the problems of Truly OTL, Bush isn't going to be looking for a replacement early, and hence Goldin's position of being a Democrat isn't going to be particularly interesting.
@TheLoneAmigo: Thanks! I can promise you that we're still working on this--right now we're roughly in the same position we were at the end of Part I in terms of knowing where we're going for the next part, so you can expect updates at least through 2000 or so barring any extremely major life events on our parts.
i turned the question around:
how became Truly NASA Administrator under Bush and how he failed and why go Goldin succeed him ?
how became Truly NASA Administrator under Bush and how he failed and why go Goldin succeed him ?
Last edited:
Archibald
Banned
Truly become administrator in the wake of Challenger. An astronaut veteran of early shuttle flights looked like an obvious choice at the time of Return To Flight (late 1988).
As for his firing it is explained in this document
"Mars Wars - the rise and fall of Bush SEI"
As for Goldin he was picked up courtesy of his excellent work done at TRW on the Brilliant Pebbles.
When planning a fleet of 4000 satellites one has to ensure they will be cheap. That's where FBC origins laid.
As for his firing it is explained in this document
"Mars Wars - the rise and fall of Bush SEI"
As for Goldin he was picked up courtesy of his excellent work done at TRW on the Brilliant Pebbles.
When planning a fleet of 4000 satellites one has to ensure they will be cheap. That's where FBC origins laid.