Empires that never were

[The_Persian_Cat]

The Empire of Nader Shah. The Afsharid Dynasty barely outlasted the death of Nader Shah's immediate heir -- even though Nader Shah was not just a great conqueror, but also a great administrator and state-builder. His administrative and military reforms endured long after his dynasty did. In another timeline, his dynasty might have even converted Persia back to Sunni Islam, or at least reconciled with Sunni Muslims on certain doctrines; he was born a Sunni Afghan, and he wanted Persia -- isolated as it was in the Ummah -- to participate in diplomacy with other Muslim nations on equal footing, even going so far as to recognise the Ottoman Caliphate.

Also, various Anatolian cultures and nations. Anatolia was home to a lot of great empires (Hittite, Persian, Macedonian, Roman, Byzantine, Seljuk, Ottoman), but it was also home to various "second-place" empires that could have been a lot more influential if things had gone differently. Lydia comes to mind; so do the Armenians, at various points in their history; various early Islamic frontier dynasties, like the Marwanids; any of the Anatolian Beyliks which weren't the Seljuks or the Ottomans, such as the much-celebrated Danishmendids or the Smyrna-based maritime state of Chaka Bey, who pioneered the corsair tradition which the Ottomans would later take up.

Most interesting, however, might be the republican Ahi Beylik of Ankara, organised around the network of Sufi orders, ghazi warriors, and guilds known as Akhiya ("Brotherhoods"). Though the Ahi state did not control much territory, Ahi brotherhoods held influence over trade, religion, and law across Anatolia and beyond, rather like Venice or Genoa. Emerging after the Seljuks were defeated by the Mongols in 1243, it's not impossible to imagine a scenario where -- in the power vacuum left by the Seljuk collapse -- Ahi guilds/holy orders take charge of things instead of regional princes.

In a similar vein, the Ikko-Ikki of Sengoku Japan; the Knights Hospitaller of the Levant, Rhodes, Malta, and the Caribbean; and the Assassins of the Levant and Persia were all fairly insular military societies, dedicated to religion, who controlled states in their own right. If the Teutonic Knights could become Prussia, how could these orders turn themselves into hegemonic, territorial states? Arguably, the Qizilbash pulled a "Prussia" when they formed Safavid Persia; and likewise for the Tijaniyya Sufi Order during the Fulani Jihads (forming states like the Sokoto Caliphate or the Imamate of Futa Jallon), or the Senoussi Sufi Order in Libya, or the aptly-named Dervish State in Somalia.

 

[Lothal]

In a similar vein, the Ikko-Ikki of Sengoku Japan; the Knights Hospitaller of the Levant, Rhodes, Malta, and the Caribbean; and the Assassins of the Levant and Persia were all fairly insular military societies, dedicated to religion, who controlled states in their own right. If the Teutonic Knights could become Prussia, how could these orders turn themselves into hegemonic, territorial states? Arguably, the Qizilbash pulled a "Prussia" when they formed Safavid Persia; and likewise for the Tijaniyya Sufi Order during the Fulani Jihads (forming states like the Sokoto Caliphate or the Imamate of Futa Jallon), or the Senoussi Sufi Order in Libya, or the aptly-named Dervish State in Somalia.

Regarding the Knights of Malta, a Knight of the order did go and conquer + rule Moldavia for 2 years and was also interestingly Unitarian of all things.

 

[Fulano]

Bohemia under the Přemyslids had two separate chances at greatness, but in both cases the momentum petered out when the king died prematurely.

Ottokar II's Empire sure had some beautiful borders. I wish it could have consolidated as the Habsburgs did with their lands.

 

[John7755 يوحنا]

Ismail doesn't lose at Chaldiran and goes on to take chunks out of the Ottomans. Without the defeat at Chaldiran, his messianic cult of personality survives and future Safavid shahs don't pull away from relying on the qizilbash for their power base. Twelver Shi'a Islam develops differently, possibly in a Mahdist direction.

That being said the Safavid did maintain this kind of view in their government, just a bit less than Ism'ail I. General trends in the Islamic world (and to a degree in Eurasia as a whole) in the 16th and 17th century trended towards deification of monarchs and universal empire.

The Twelve-Pointed Sun: A Ṣafavid TL Development Thread

By the time of the rise of the Safavid Empire, the Iranian Plateau's population had been decimated by the invasions of the Mongols in the 1200s and subsequently the invasion of the Uzbek conqueror, Timur, in the late 1300s. In the wake of Timur's destruction (and his descendants' subsequent...

www.alternatehistory.com

This is so fascinating, not least because a victorious, successful and long-lasting Safavid Empire has the potential to recreate the sheer territorial extent (or even larger) of the Achaemenid Empire at its height, prevent European imperialism from making inroads into the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa, and could actually make (messianic) Shias the dominant Muslim sect in the Islamic world.

The Safavid would still have had significant troubles to its east regardless of what happens against the Ottoman Empire. Uzbek raids consistently were a problem and the Safavid state really never developed a good method to suppress the nomadic threats aside for 'chasing them away.' Safavid victory at Chaldiran would however lead to Safavid conquest of eastern and possibly central Anatolia and pushing the Ottoman empire to its limit. However, the Ottoman empire could very well rebound against the Safavid when Ismail perishes as a succession crisis is likely in Iran and the threats of the Uzbek and other nomads will resurface. Ultimately, the Ottoman empire was an Islamic European empire and it can possibly sustain the damage and return with even more fearsome strikes with a new European army that will most likely deal significant blows against the Safavid.

Based Assyrians.

Speaking of which, they managed to revive their Empire 2 times over, why no third?.

The Akkadian speaking Assyrian populace that upheld the former Assyrian kingdom essentially became extinct or moribund after the capture of Nineveh in 611 BCE and then only survived in a remnant population in Haran which would survive for some time afterwards. No revival could occur since the Assyrian kingdom's underpinning population and ideals were crushed and destroyed and hence the empire could not and had no reason to ever reappear. Aspects of it were inherited by the Imperium developed by Cyrus and Darius I in the Achaemenid empire, but the Assyrian kingdom as a unique imperial mission, disappeared. I also do intend to say extinct, every evidence we have suggests that what can only be described as a genocide against the Assyrian population in the Assyrian Triangle occurred at the hands of the Scythians and Medians who alongside their allies that occupied Assyria in 611-609 BCE.

 

[Quinkana]

This requires Morocco to have a deep sea navy capable of defeating the Spanish and Portuguese in wars, which I do not think is possible. The Canaries maybe, a big maybe if Ibeira has a situation 3 or 4 times worse than in OTL. Now considering part of the colony of Brazil is basically ABS without something seriously different from the otl situation in Morocco.

I defo think the Moroccans could take the Azores and the forts around western Africa which aren't the most important but still substantial.

this is one that i think if i change a few simple things it would be very likely

Tbf I could see a different Ming dynasty break up have the jin/qing hold the northern Chinese plain while the south goes off by itself (with xichuan being its own thing for a bit) and things would already be very interesting. An SEA that has purposeful Chinese immigration could become majority Chinese I think. Same with any other nation around sea doing it really.

Another thing that I think that isn't often thought of is other German states forming the nucleus of the HRE. I think the area that is the Netherlands stretching to the Rhinelands would work at least.

 

[PecuTheGreat]

The Akkadian speaking Assyrian populace that upheld the former Assyrian kingdom essentially became extinct or moribund after the capture of Nineveh in 611 BCE and then only survived in a remnant population in Haran which would survive for some time afterwards. No revival could occur since the Assyrian kingdom's underpinning population and ideals were crushed and destroyed and hence the empire could not and had no reason to ever reappear.

I mean, through the Neo-Assyrian period, the Arameans were absorbed and were similarly warlike. Why didn't an Aramean speaking Neo-Neo-Assyrian Empire then emerge?.

Aspects of it were inherited by the Imperium developed by Cyrus and Darius I in the Achaemenid empire, but the Assyrian kingdom as a unique imperial mission, disappeared.

In the good timeline, Assyria conquered Parsa and Media.

I also do intend to say extinct, every evidence we have suggests that what can only be described as a genocide against the Assyrian population in the Assyrian Triangle occurred at the hands of the Scythians and Medians who alongside their allies that occupied Assyria in 611-609 BCE.

I haven't heard about that impressive that they still survived that but I guess the Jews kinda survived theirs and elamite probably survived its for a while.(Yeah, the Elamites definitely survived. Maybe up till the middle ages).

 

[Quinkana]

I mean, through the Neo-Assyrian period, the Arameans were absorbed and were similarly warlike. Why didn't an Aramean speaking Neo-Neo-Assyrian Empire then emerge?.

Tbf a neo neo Assyrian empire created by the aramean assyrians in a more successful crusades TL would be interesting as hell.

 

[John7755 يوحنا]

I mean, through the Neo-Assyrian period, the Arameans were absorbed and were similarly warlike. Why didn't an Aramean speaking Neo-Neo-Assyrian Empire then emerge?.




In the good timeline, Assyria conquered Parsa and Media.



I haven't heard about that impressive that they still survived that but I guess the Jews kinda survived theirs and elamite probably survived its for a while.

The Aramaen populace never became the 'elites' of the Assyrian kingdom, which was what maintained the high Akkadian culture that induced its warlike diplomacy via the concept of restoring Duranki and 'bringing about silence.' After the Akkadian speaking nobles and their retainers were eradicated in warfare and the rapid genocide of Akkadian cities and urban areas, that left only the Aramaic speaking deportee ethnic groups, pastoralist Aramaen communities and the slaves/serfs that abounded the land. None of which had the martial will to do what the Assyrian nobility could do, which were famously ancient.

Assyrian royal culture revolved around a centralized state with a king and his bureaucrats supported by a collection of 100 Ancient families, which were truly ancient nobles whose land ownership in Assyria and other provinces preceded the reign of Assur-Dan II (934-911 BCE). These nobles were, alongside the Akkadian speaking merchants in the Assyrian triangle cities of Arbela, Nineveh, Kalhu, and Assur and the priests of the Great Gods, the driving forces in expansionism of the Assyrian kingdom. Evidence suggests that the common non-noble, non-merchant and non-priestly classes in Assyria by the year 720 BCE were almost entirely slaves, either non-Assyrian ethnic groups or Akkadian speakers who had been impressed into various kinds of slavery and a large percentage of this population simply did not have much stake in expansion in any direction. Meanwhile, the aforementioned elites had huge gains from expansion, namely the nobles gained more slaves and domains, the merchants gained new monopolies and the priests gained the adherence to the religious mission of expansion and of course, more slaves for the duties of the temple estates. Once these upper castes were eradicated, the population of Assyria simply was not of the makeup or willpower for a new imperial vision.

Further, it should be mentioned that assimilation of Aramaens is tentative at best otl. The Assyrians indeed talked heavily of assimilation, of 'making humans and killing ibex,' but these talks often were limited by the realities of governmental restrictions. Assyrian state officials ultimately had much more pressing matters than fully implementing an assimilation process and therefore, the Assyrian kingdom simply 'half-way' assimilated subject peoples and or slave castes, which amounted to these peoples 'learning submission to autocracy.' Assyrian adoption too of Aramaic was not like other peoples who adopted languages in an appreciative or mixing of cultural expressions, but as a communication method. Assyrian cultural expression remained solidly Akkadian and Aramaic served as the language for which the Assyrian spoke to those whom they saw as their slaves and subjugates; it served as an intermediary between the veil of the Akkadian language, the language of the divine and the non-Assyrian peoples within the kingdom or its many tributaries and clients. Ultimately, the Assyrian kingdom was a universal empire (in its claims to rule all humans and creatures, the entire universe), but not so much so in the manner of molding and mixing its cultural expression which would remain so overwhelmingly Sumero-Akkadian as to be ultra-conservative.

 

[Aluma]

Speaking of which, they managed to revive their Empire 2 times over, why no third?.

Because then we'd get Nergal
I guess if they pulled that off they'd be like Persia and China?
Its also kind of a meme that if that happened they'd be called "Neo-Neo Assyrian Empire" and I guess if it happened now it'd be pretty much a christian empire funnily enough

 

[PecuTheGreat]

The Aramaen populace never became the 'elites' of the Assyrian kingdom, which was what maintained the high Akkadian culture that induced its warlike diplomacy via the concept of restoring Duranki and 'bringing about silence.' After the Akkadian speaking nobles and their retainers were eradicated in warfare and the rapid genocide of Akkadian cities and urban areas, that left only the Aramaic speaking deportee ethnic groups, pastoralist Aramaen communities and the slaves/serfs that abounded the land. None of which had the martial will to do what the Assyrian nobility could do, which were famously ancient.

Assyrian royal culture revolved around a centralized state with a king and his bureaucrats supported by a collection of 100 Ancient families, which were truly ancient nobles whose land ownership in Assyria and other provinces preceded the reign of Assur-Dan II (934-911 BCE). These nobles were, alongside the Akkadian speaking merchants in the Assyrian triangle cities of Arbela, Nineveh, Kalhu, and Assur and the priests of the Great Gods, the driving forces in expansionism of the Assyrian kingdom. Evidence suggests that the common non-noble, non-merchant and non-priestly classes in Assyria by the year 720 BCE were almost entirely slaves, either non-Assyrian ethnic groups or Akkadian speakers who had been impressed into various kinds of slavery and a large percentage of this population simply did not have much stake in expansion in any direction. Meanwhile, the aforementioned elites had huge gains from expansion, namely the nobles gained more slaves and domains, the merchants gained new monopolies and the priests gained the adherence to the religious mission of expansion and of course, more slaves for the duties of the temple estates. Once these upper castes were eradicated, the population of Assyria simply was not of the makeup or willpower for a new imperial vision.

Further, it should be mentioned that assimilation of Aramaens is tentative at best otl. The Assyrians indeed talked heavily of assimilation, of 'making humans and killing ibex,' but these talks often were limited by the realities of governmental restrictions. Assyrian state officials ultimately had much more pressing matters than fully implementing an assimilation process and therefore, the Assyrian kingdom simply 'half-way' assimilated subject peoples and or slave castes, which amounted to these peoples 'learning submission to autocracy.' Assyrian adoption too of Aramaic was not like other peoples who adopted languages in an appreciative or mixing of cultural expressions, but as a communication method. Assyrian cultural expression remained solidly Akkadian and Aramaic served as the language for which the Assyrian spoke to those whom they saw as their slaves and subjugates; it served as an intermediary between the veil of the Akkadian language, the language of the divine and the non-Assyrian peoples within the kingdom or its many tributaries and clients. Ultimately, the Assyrian kingdom was a universal empire (in its claims to rule all humans and creatures, the entire universe), but not so much so in the manner of molding and mixing its cultural expression which would remain so overwhelmingly Sumero-Akkadian as to be ultra-conservative.

This seems to indicate lack of Assyrian continuity.

I'll have to check my stuff later since there is city and art, continuity. As in, after the Persians conquered the Babylonians and Medes we see Assyrian art and some cities appear again. So I assume continuity.

Also, would have expected the Arameans to be more warlike, given they did conquer a bunch of Mesopotamia and we're recruited into the Assyrian army.

 

[John7755 يوحنا]

This seems to indicate lack of Assyrian continuity.

I'll have to check my stuff later since there is city and art, continuity. As in, after the Persians conquered the Babylonians and Medes we see Assyrian art and some cities appear again. So I assume continuity.

Also, would have expected the Arameans to be more warlike, given they did conquer a bunch of Mesopotamia and we're recruited into the Assyrian army.

There is continuity in Haran, and a few other places through the priestly class. The principle nobility however were eradicated and this group was at the heart of Assyrian expansionism. Assyrian continuity, in the sense of Akkadian imperialism, indeed had no continuity. Aramaic speakers in the region assumed the moniker of Assyrian and there is continuity in this way. However, the populations that bayed for imperial developments were not continued at all. Without those populations present in Assyria, there was little willpower for continued Assyrian empire.

 

[HumptyDumpty]

Which one in particular?

The Zanj state or realm. Would it be different or unique in structure compared to its contemporaries? Would it also be more economically prosperous?

 

[John7755 يوحنا]

The Zanj state or realm. Would it be different or unique in structure compared to its contemporaries? Would it also be more economically prosperous?

Unfortunately, a lot of information that was written about the inner workings of the Zanj state led by Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj has been lost, presumably in the 13th or 14th century during the Ilkhanate, so nothing can be said definitively. However, I could expect some different points.

The first matter to mention is Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj was an incredible figure with immense creativity and guile. As a rebellion, the Zanj rebellion was a creation almost entirely from his charisma, which manipulated many different factions into a broad movement towards upturning the Abbasid order. Key in his program was several contradicting points that ultimately contributed to his movements defeat in the years of 879-883.

Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj is a curious figure in that he seems to have been an imposter Alid whose claims to Alid lineage was generally refuted and refused by most of the Shi'a communities for whom he had communication with. Nevertheless, al-Dibaj began travelling around the region in attempt to found a sect and start a rebellion, utilizing kitman, or an offensive deception technique. Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj claimed to be the 'Shumayt' a reference to Yahya ibn Abi'l Shumayt, a supposed younger son of the Prophet Muhammad who was worshipped as a reincarnation of the prophet and possessor of divine powers. Followers of this Shumayt believed that this secondary prophet communed with them and an older man in Mecca who led the sect, declared a young member of their sect as the incarnation of the Shumayt in the year 814 and a rebellion rose up in the Hijaz to overturn the Abbasid Caliphate. The Abbasid crushed the rebellion, but the rebellion had a profound impact on many people, and acted as a catalyst for further Shi'a solidifcations across the region and by the time of the life of Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj, he declared in 858 that he was the Shumayt, a Prophet-God who controlled the weather and held miraculous powers over the world.

He created a small vanguard of followers who believed that he was a divine being of sorts and he began a mission of rebellion. Fixing himself in an old Sassanid fort, he began to seek out warriors and supplies for his grand vision. Using the poor condition and decentralization of slaves in southern Iraq, he began to manipulate leaders of slave groups (slaves were divided into bands who served in the fields, each band with a slave who received privileges and hence got to command other slaves on behalf of the masters) into rebellion and submission to him as a divine being. Additionally, he rose flags proclaiming the destruction of the Abbasid who were according to him slayers of the Alid and the Holy Household. According to records we have, his movement burned Qurans, attacked Islamic figures where possible and promoted a radical Shi'a belief with him at the top of the religion with an implicit Qiyama upheld (as in the abolition of Islamic laws). His loyal clique of followers at the top were devout and thousands of his new freedmen were fanatically loyal to him as the 'Shumay' and Divine Prophet.

Contrary to the Shi'ite perception of the movement, Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj held very little support from the traditional Arab Shi'ite elite or populace and in many cases they outright rejected them. Twelver Shi'a communities ignored and avoided the movement, preferring to wait upon the Twelfth Imam who in 874 entered into occultation and disappeared and the Ismaili community despised the Zanj rebellion, both in the Haasa and in Mesopotamia. Therefore, the Imam al-Dibaj aligned himself with the Kharijite movement and molded this group into his fanatical sect of followers, creating a sort of broad rebellion against the Abbasid court based both on religion and class resentment (for many).

The broad coalition of different sects and groups led to the Zanj rebellion including the followers of the Imam, former slaves who followed the Great Imam, Bedouin resenting Abbasid centralization, Kharijites and otherwise unscrupulous bandits seeking profit, made the Zanj become a powerful force. Yet, the Zanj state or as we should say, the Imam of Mukhtara, became very decentralized and rife with division when it came to important situations. For instance, Kharijites and Shi'ite Zanj soldiers went to blows in Basra over sectarian issues, which allowed a smaller defeated Abbasid army the ability to retake the city while the two factions battled in the city. Further, the haphazard recruitment of thousands of bandits, slaves of various loyalty, and so forth led to the successful policy of the Abbasid regent al-Muwaffaq in counteracting the rebels by offering them money to defect.

Therefore, I believe that the Imam of Mukhtara would be a kind of deified monarchy with a strong centralized state in al-Mukhatara, but a decentralized system of governates led by military generals. There would be some kind of struggle between these elements over power, especially if the Imam wishes to gain greater control. Long term, the Imamate would be a kind of monarchy with a king or ruler with similar deified representation as the Safavid empire or the semi-divine monarchs of the Fatimid-Nizari Imamates. Internal government would be through a central court based in Mukhtara commanding a slew of vassals called emirs/governors who would be military generals given permission to operate on behalf of the central court.

 

[WhatSantayanaSaid]

Maybe they should have tried south?. Somewhere where China wouldn't interfer?.

Japan had a hard enough time keeping the home islands united for quite a long time. With how autonomous the daimyo could be and how often the central government was at best weak and at worst not actually in control of the islands, Japanese colonies in SE Asia likely would've been de facto independent nations or conquered. Plus, the logistics and defense would've been a nightmare until Japan adopted better naval technology. Japan didn't invade Okinawa until the 1600s and that was about 900 km. Kyushu to Taiwan is almost 1400 km, to Luzon is about 2000 km across typhoon prone oceans and would've led to wars against China/the Netherlands/Spain, all of which had longer histories of overseas colonization and warfare and were able to exert more control over/retain the loyalty of their regional governors than the Japanese central government tended to be able to.

 

[Quinkana]

Japan had a hard enough time keeping the home islands united for quite a long time. With how autonomous the daimyo could be and how often the central government was at best weak and at worst not actually in control of the islands, Japanese colonies in SE Asia likely would've been de facto independent nations or conquered. Plus, the logistics and defense would've been a nightmare until Japan adopted better naval technology. Japan didn't invade Okinawa until the 1600s and that was about 900 km. Kyushu to Taiwan is almost 1400 km, to Luzon is about 2000 km across typhoon prone oceans and would've led to wars against China/the Netherlands/Spain, all of which had longer histories of overseas colonization and warfare and were able to exert more control over/retain the loyalty of their regional governors than the Japanese central government tended to be able to.

Nobunaga’s Ambition Realized: Dawn of a New Rising Sun

When you make comments about Chinese being arrogant and xenophobic at the same time you give that impression But I am Chinese. Those are things I've heard from my relatives in mainland china (I'm from Hong Kong), and I don't think I can be racist to my own ppl. Also aren't I proving my point...

www.alternatehistory.com

I think this tl is quite good in illustrating how a Japan with a different end to the sengoky jidai could take. Basically they centralise a bit while not fighting the imijin war and incorporate the warships of the Europeans. I'd say China wouldn't really go beyond the islands ringing it's shore unless it's expansionist so China shouldn't be a problem.

 

[Tibi088]

continuing on the subject of hungary, if the luxemburg dynasty hadn't died out, they could have replaced the Hapsburgs as "that german family that owns half a dozen random places across europe. the last Luxemburg, Sigismund I, ruled bohemia, hungary and luxemburg proper, with a couple of nice marriages and an heir, his descendants could have probably gotten Poland-Lithuania and austria as well, creating a massive power in central europe.

Actually I would say that Central Europe in the late Middle Ages was primed to form some kind of Empire, lets take a look at the kings of Hungary of the period:
1. The already mentioned Anjou's: Lajos I of Hungary (1342-1382) ruled over Hungary and Poland and had a big chunk of the Balkan states as vassals. He died without a male heir.
2. Sigismund, his successor ruled ower Hungary, Bohemia, the HRE and even Brandenburg for a while I think. Died without a male heir.
3. Albert II ruled the HRE, Hungary, Bohemia, and Austria. Had a posthomus son
4. Vladislaus III ruled Poland and Lithuania, Hungary, died at Varna without a male heir
5. Ladislaus the posthumus, ruled Bohemia, Hungary and Austria, died without a male heir
6. Matthias, ruled "only" Hungary, but managed to conquer by force of arms most of Austria and Bohemia. Died without a male heir.

If any single one of the above people / families could have produced male heirs / stable line of succession an Empire encompassing most of Central Europe would have been created. OTL the ones who finally managed it were the Habsburgs, and only after Hungary had its back broken by the Ottomans.

 

[HumptyDumpty]

Unfortunately, a lot of information that was written about the inner workings of the Zanj state led by Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj has been lost, presumably in the 13th or 14th century during the Ilkhanate, so nothing can be said definitively. However, I could expect some different points.

The first matter to mention is Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj was an incredible figure with immense creativity and guile. As a rebellion, the Zanj rebellion was a creation almost entirely from his charisma, which manipulated many different factions into a broad movement towards upturning the Abbasid order. Key in his program was several contradicting points that ultimately contributed to his movements defeat in the years of 879-883.

Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj is a curious figure in that he seems to have been an imposter Alid whose claims to Alid lineage was generally refuted and refused by most of the Shi'a communities for whom he had communication with. Nevertheless, al-Dibaj began travelling around the region in attempt to found a sect and start a rebellion, utilizing kitman, or an offensive deception technique. Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj claimed to be the 'Shumayt' a reference to Yahya ibn Abi'l Shumayt, a supposed younger son of the Prophet Muhammad who was worshipped as a reincarnation of the prophet and possessor of divine powers. Followers of this Shumayt believed that this secondary prophet communed with them and an older man in Mecca who led the sect, declared a young member of their sect as the incarnation of the Shumayt in the year 814 and a rebellion rose up in the Hijaz to overturn the Abbasid Caliphate. The Abbasid crushed the rebellion, but the rebellion had a profound impact on many people, and acted as a catalyst for further Shi'a solidifcations across the region and by the time of the life of Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj, he declared in 858 that he was the Shumayt, a Prophet-God who controlled the weather and held miraculous powers over the world.

He created a small vanguard of followers who believed that he was a divine being of sorts and he began a mission of rebellion. Fixing himself in an old Sassanid fort, he began to seek out warriors and supplies for his grand vision. Using the poor condition and decentralization of slaves in southern Iraq, he began to manipulate leaders of slave groups (slaves were divided into bands who served in the fields, each band with a slave who received privileges and hence got to command other slaves on behalf of the masters) into rebellion and submission to him as a divine being. Additionally, he rose flags proclaiming the destruction of the Abbasid who were according to him slayers of the Alid and the Holy Household. According to records we have, his movement burned Qurans, attacked Islamic figures where possible and promoted a radical Shi'a belief with him at the top of the religion with an implicit Qiyama upheld (as in the abolition of Islamic laws). His loyal clique of followers at the top were devout and thousands of his new freedmen were fanatically loyal to him as the 'Shumay' and Divine Prophet.

Contrary to the Shi'ite perception of the movement, Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj held very little support from the traditional Arab Shi'ite elite or populace and in many cases they outright rejected them. Twelver Shi'a communities ignored and avoided the movement, preferring to wait upon the Twelfth Imam who in 874 entered into occultation and disappeared and the Ismaili community despised the Zanj rebellion, both in the Haasa and in Mesopotamia. Therefore, the Imam al-Dibaj aligned himself with the Kharijite movement and molded this group into his fanatical sect of followers, creating a sort of broad rebellion against the Abbasid court based both on religion and class resentment (for many).

The broad coalition of different sects and groups led to the Zanj rebellion including the followers of the Imam, former slaves who followed the Great Imam, Bedouin resenting Abbasid centralization, Kharijites and otherwise unscrupulous bandits seeking profit, made the Zanj become a powerful force. Yet, the Zanj state or as we should say, the Imam of Mukhtara, became very decentralized and rife with division when it came to important situations. For instance, Kharijites and Shi'ite Zanj soldiers went to blows in Basra over sectarian issues, which allowed a smaller defeated Abbasid army the ability to retake the city while the two factions battled in the city. Further, the haphazard recruitment of thousands of bandits, slaves of various loyalty, and so forth led to the successful policy of the Abbasid regent al-Muwaffaq in counteracting the rebels by offering them money to defect.

Therefore, I believe that the Imam of Mukhtara would be a kind of deified monarchy with a strong centralized state in al-Mukhatara, but a decentralized system of governates led by military generals. There would be some kind of struggle between these elements over power, especially if the Imam wishes to gain greater control. Long term, the Imamate would be a kind of monarchy with a king or ruler with similar deified representation as the Safavid empire or the semi-divine monarchs of the Fatimid-Nizari Imamates. Internal government would be through a central court based in Mukhtara commanding a slew of vassals called emirs/governors who would be military generals given permission to operate on behalf of the central court.

Something like a feudalism where the monarch, who is a deity, delegates authority to lords or generals who in turn swear to defend the king and the realm in times of trouble?

Furthermore, what would be the effect of such a successful rebellion in other parts of the Islamic world? Might we see more slave rebellions? Could the Imamate sponsor rebellions in neighboring territories? The Imamate seems far less insular in comparison to the Fatimids so that might be a possibility.

Could others imitate its structure or pursue vassalhood?

 

[John7755 يوحنا]

Something like a feudalism where the monarch, who is a deity, delegates authority to lords or generals who in turn swear to defend the king and the realm in times of trouble?

Furthermore, what would be the effect of such a successful rebellion in other parts of the Islamic world? Might we see more slave rebellions? Could the Imamate sponsor rebellions in neighboring territories? The Imamate seems far less insular in comparison to the Fatimids so that might be a possibility.

Could others imitate its structure or pursue vassalhood?

The Imamate never was against slavery, only freeing slaves who would pledge allegiance to the divine Imam and then enslaving those who refused and of course, enslaving the Arab slave owners in southern Iraq that refused to submit to the Imam. According to al-Tabari, Mukhtara had a massive slave market, seemingly larger than the one in Baghdad, specifically because the Imamate was raiding across Iraq and they had control over much of central and western Arabia and as such had gained control over the slave trade routes from Abyssinia through Arabia. Slave rebellions in other areas would thus likely not be possible, both because the Imamate was not interested in actually liberating slaves aside for the initial movement in southern Iraq, after which the subsequent ruling cliques in the Imamate had to be rewarded for their loyalty and success with slaves. Likewise, as a result of the Zanj rebellion, Islamic slave owners in other lands and afterwards in Iraq, developed more efficient methods of controlling slaves, similar to the United States. Previously, slaves were generally unassimilated to Islamic culture and ideals (not taught submission within the Islamic order) and packed into large groups without supervision, with thousands of slaves working in the same fields collecting from the soil. Such a system meant that slaves had less reason to remain loyal to their masters and also masters in other areas began to space out their slaves into smaller groups and at wider distances, hence making a plot such as what occurred in the Zanj rebellion less plausible.

The outward foreign policy of the Imamate would be up to chance. Eventually, the Imamate will come into conflict with the Saffarid and Tulunids and possibly have concurrent disputes with the Byzantine empire. More than likely, the Imam will attempt and continually try to engage with uniting Shi'a communities into his realm and aligning himself with important Alids. In my view, the Imamate would have a great chance at uniting most of Arabia into its system of indirect rule and would act as a state raiding and attacking its Islamic neighbors for slaves and for the service of religious jihad. however, other areas may be difficult to maintain and or conquer and ultimately it would be left to chance in some ways. Generally speaking the Zanj lost their most major battles against Mamluk-led cavalry armies utilized by the Abbasid. At their height, the Zanj pursued al-Muwaffaq, the Caliphal regent towards Baghdad and had preparations for a siege on the city, but a feigned retreat and extremely high morale yet low discilpine from the Zanj army led them to a vain pursuit, ending in calamity and defeat as the Abbasid cavalry from the east turned and charged into the then disorganized Zanj army.

 

[HumptyDumpty]

The Imamate never was against slavery, only freeing slaves who would pledge allegiance to the divine Imam and then enslaving those who refused and of course, enslaving the Arab slave owners in southern Iraq that refused to submit to the Imam. According to al-Tabari, Mukhtara had a massive slave market, seemingly larger than the one in Baghdad, specifically because the Imamate was raiding across Iraq and they had control over much of central and western Arabia and as such had gained control over the slave trade routes from Abyssinia through Arabia. Slave rebellions in other areas would thus likely not be possible, both because the Imamate was not interested in actually liberating slaves aside for the initial movement in southern Iraq, after which the subsequent ruling cliques in the Imamate had to be rewarded for their loyalty and success with slaves. Likewise, as a result of the Zanj rebellion, Islamic slave owners in other lands and afterwards in Iraq, developed more efficient methods of controlling slaves, similar to the United States. Previously, slaves were generally unassimilated to Islamic culture and ideals (not taught submission within the Islamic order) and packed into large groups without supervision, with thousands of slaves working in the same fields collecting from the soil. Such a system meant that slaves had less reason to remain loyal to their masters and also masters in other areas began to space out their slaves into smaller groups and at wider distances, hence making a plot such as what occurred in the Zanj rebellion less plausible.

The outward foreign policy of the Imamate would be up to chance. Eventually, the Imamate will come into conflict with the Saffarid and Tulunids and possibly have concurrent disputes with the Byzantine empire. More than likely, the Imam will attempt and continually try to engage with uniting Shi'a communities into his realm and aligning himself with important Alids. In my view, the Imamate would have a great chance at uniting most of Arabia into its system of indirect rule and would act as a state raiding and attacking its Islamic neighbors for slaves and for the service of religious jihad. however, other areas may be difficult to maintain and or conquer and ultimately it would be left to chance in some ways. Generally speaking the Zanj lost their most major battles against Mamluk-led cavalry armies utilized by the Abbasid. At their height, the Zanj pursued al-Muwaffaq, the Caliphal regent towards Baghdad and had preparations for a siege on the city, but a feigned retreat and extremely high morale yet low discilpine from the Zanj army led them to a vain pursuit, ending in calamity and defeat as the Abbasid cavalry from the east turned and charged into the then disorganized Zanj army.

I recall reading that criminals in the Islamic world pioneered a rudimentary printing press. Would a Zanj Imamate better patron such endeavors or be more economically decentralized than their peers or contemporaries? Or would the reliance on slavery deter capitalism even more?

As for rebellions, I meant religious rebellions not slave rebellions. And would a Zanj state seek to unite non-Shi’a communities such as Khawarij communities and others oppositional to the Caliphate?

 

[Unkown00]

Not sure if anyone mentioned this in the thread but a surviving Scottish colonial empire. They had colonies in Nova Scotia and Panama but those two were both abandoned very quickly. Perhaps both of those colonies survive and the Scottish are able to form a colonial empire, that could possibly rival the English.