East Germany without communism

Authors and editors of Der Spiegel still have the disaster in their minds that befell the magazine Stern ("Star") when it bought the infamous 'Hitler diary' fakes. They quietly contact a number of active and retired officers of the Bundesnachrichtendienst, the West German Federal Intelligence Service, and ask their opinion on the 'Schoelzgen papers'. None of them can provide a definite judgement on their genuineness. It is true that they are on the right kind of paper and they have all the outward marks of protocolls of Stasi informants. But could a private citizen who claims to have had no Stasi contacts himself find these incriminating documents so quickly? It is true that Teterow has an administrative job where he might have learnt how archives are structured, but still his "findings" came rather quickly and they might indeed benefit the old ruling elite, including the Stasi who might have forged them rather easily. There seems to be no paper trail connecting the Stasi and Teterow. (In fact early Stasi documents praising Teterow's idealism and recommending him as a potential informer have been carefully removed, and the actual contact with him came even after the official dissolution of the Stasi and was not documented.)

Teterow never mentions the possibility of being paid by Der Spiegel. Because he has been carefully briefed on what to say, his story about how he found the papers has some plausibility and remains consistent, an impression that is reinforced by his friendly, open and candid manner. But, after all is said and done, what decides the matter is that the potential scoop is just too big to let it go unpublished. So Der Spiegel publishes Teterow's story and a number of quotations from the papers, however without giving a final judgement on their authenticity. The turmoil caused by the publication is understandably great, just as in the case of Ibrahim Boehme.

For the East German chancellor Markus Meckel it is of course out of the question to have a Neonazi in his government. The fact that Schoelzgen protests his innocence counts for little, however, the unusual circumstances about the supposed finding of the documents leave some suspicion in Meckel's mind. Furthermore, he does not want to lose the NDPD as a coalition partner, so he gives his minister of agriculture the benefit of the doubt and publicly expresses his confidence in Schoelzgen's honesty and democratic convictions.
 
An embarrassing incident occurs when the chairman of the West German right wing radical party Die Republikaner, Franz Schoenhuber, declares his solidarity with Walther Schoelzgen. He calls the coverage of the Teterow - Schoelzgen controversy in the West and East German media "a disgusting manhunt" that is "only too typical of the treatment the Bonn system metes out to any upright patriot." Schoelzgen has his press spokesman declare curtly that "there are no contacts with Herr Schoenhuber or his party, nor will there be any in the future" and that apart from that "Herr Schoenhuber is free to say what he likes." It is clear to most politicians and to the great majority of the people that Schoelzgen is not to blame for this "help" from an unexpected quarter. At first, they do not know whether the papers incriminating him are genuine or not, but tales of the machinations of the Stasi have become so deeply rooted in the German national consciousness that there is a slowly emerging majority that is willing to accept Chancellor Meckel's judgement as final.

There is, however, one man who wants to capitalize on the whole affair and who may have greatly helped - albeit unintentionally - a more intelligent person than Schoelzgen. This man is Gregor Gysi. He is well aware of the fact that Franz Schoenhuber is a former Stormtrooper, that xenophobia is one of the raisons d' etre of his party and that one of his demands is a "decriminalisation of German history", which in plain language amounts to saying that the Nazis were no criminals.
As for the 'Schoelzgen papers', there are several passages that could be interpreted as a call for a new Holocaust, and three passages that are aimed against him and his supposed Jewishness. (He does have Jewish as well as non-Jewish ancestors, but as a dedicated Marxist he does not adhere to any kind of religion.)
 
It will have taken a few years to give impose the new alphabet with an earliest start in 1949, most likely we will not have seen the new alphabet before 1953. The new alphabet will be seen as the alphabet of the opressors and will have little sentimental value just after the fall of the wall. Plus the Latin Alphabet is the status alphabet in todays world, the alphabet of freedom;)


That must be about the only tactic the US didn't use in the Cold War: claiming the Cyrillic alphabet was outdated and hidebound, and that the Latin alphabet was "the alphabet of freedom!"

Imagine that on a poster...
:)

PS: actually, I don't know if anyone in the US seriously used this argument. Maybe they did.
 
Bigger Soviet occupation zone. If you increase the size of East Germany, at a certain point it becomes enormously against the interests of the West to seek reunification. Plus if it is really big it might even be able to hold itself in one piece instead of collapsing even more thoroughly than most of the others.

The East German leadership tried this to a degree. Didnt quite work. As what else could they identify? Prussia? Yeah, Im sure the Saxons would just love that...

Here's a thought: rather than a bigger Soviet occupation zone, why not simply a different one? If the Soviets somehow ended up with just Saxony, for example, we might start to see some Saxon nationalism...
 
Last edited:
An embarrassing incident occurs when the chairman of the West German right wing radical party Die Republikaner, Franz Schoenhuber, declares his solidarity with Walther Schoelzgen. He calls the coverage of the Teterow - Schoelzgen controversy in the West and East German media "a disgusting manhunt" that is "only too typical of the treatment the Bonn system metes out to any upright patriot." Schoelzgen has his press spokesman declare curtly that "there are no contacts with Herr Schoenhuber or his party, nor will there be any in the future" and that apart from that "Herr Schoenhuber is free to say what he likes." It is clear to most politicians and to the great majority of the people that Schoelzgen is not to blame for this "help" from an unexpected quarter. At first, they do not know whether the papers incriminating him are genuine or not, but tales of the machinations of the Stasi have become so deeply rooted in the German national consciousness that there is a slowly emerging majority that is willing to accept Chancellor Meckel's judgement as final.

There is, however, one man who wants to capitalize on the whole affair and who may have greatly helped - albeit unintentionally - a more intelligent person than Schoelzgen. This man is Gregor Gysi. He is well aware of the fact that Franz Schoenhuber is a former Stormtrooper, that xenophobia is one of the raisons d' etre of his party and that one of his demands is a "decriminalisation of German history", which in plain language amounts to saying that the Nazis were no criminals.
As for the 'Schoelzgen papers', there are several passages that could be interpreted as a call for a new Holocaust, and three passages that are aimed against him and his supposed Jewishness. (He does have Jewish as well as non-Jewish ancestors, but as a dedicated Marxist he does not adhere to any kind of religion.)


Good JOB!!!
 
An embarrassing incident occurs when the chairman of the West German right wing radical party Die Republikaner, Franz Schoenhuber, declares his solidarity with Walther Schoelzgen. He calls the coverage of the Teterow - Schoelzgen controversy in the West and East German media "a disgusting manhunt" that is "only too typical of the treatment the Bonn system metes out to any upright patriot." Schoelzgen has his press spokesman declare curtly that "there are no contacts with Herr Schoenhuber or his party, nor will there be any in the future" and that apart from that "Herr Schoenhuber is free to say what he likes." It is clear to most politicians and to the great majority of the people that Schoelzgen is not to blame for this "help" from an unexpected quarter. At first, they do not know whether the papers incriminating him are genuine or not, but tales of the machinations of the Stasi have become so deeply rooted in the German national consciousness that there is a slowly emerging majority that is willing to accept Chancellor Meckel's judgement as final.

There is, however, one man who wants to capitalize on the whole affair and who may have greatly helped - albeit unintentionally - a more intelligent person than Schoelzgen. This man is Gregor Gysi. He is well aware of the fact that Franz Schoenhuber is a former Stormtrooper, that xenophobia is one of the raisons d' etre of his party and that one of his demands is a "decriminalisation of German history", which in plain language amounts to saying that the Nazis were no criminals.
As for the 'Schoelzgen papers', there are several passages that could be interpreted as a call for a new Holocaust, and three passages that are aimed against him and his supposed Jewishness. (He does have Jewish as well as non-Jewish ancestors, but as a dedicated Marxist he does not adhere to any kind of religion.)

In a speech on March 12, 1990 Gysi declares his fears, that "West Germany and East Germany are going to give up a form of consensus, the only real political consensus they have ever had, the consensus of antifascism". "I will not deny that there is a need for sweeping reforms in the German Democratic Republic, an urgent need to leave behind the Stalinist elements in its political system, but if there is one thing we must not leave behind, one thing we must indeed be proud of and defend with all the energy we have, this one thing is the German Democratic Republic's heritage of anti-fascism and internationalist solidarity. Will we be forced to give up this heritage for a united nationalist and racist Greater Germany? Will I be forced to hide my Jewish heritage, a heritage of which I am proud, out of fear?"
The speech does not, to put it mildly, meet with great approval in the German public. Heinz Galinski, chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany is one of the more cautious critics with his remark, "that it is certainly an astonishing piece of news that Gregor Gysi has discovered his Jewish roots. Somehow he seems to have been unaware of them, when in the country he lived in Israeli politicians were routinely depicted as Nazis." The daily taz remarks that the way West Germany treats its immigrant workers is not necessarily something this country should be proud of, but it is far, far better than the way immigrants are treated in East Germany. In a sarcastic editorial in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung Gysi is blamed for claiming "military victory over the Nazis for the East German 'People's Army'." The daily Die Welt and the weekly Die Zeit put on learned airs and elucidate the ethymology and the development of the term "Totalitarianism" in great and elaborate detail. On a side note, they do not fail to point out that the term "Greater Germany" cannot possibly be applied to a reunification of the two existing Germanies, since a "Greater Germany" would include Austria. Express' and Stern'sline of argument is less complex, but probably more effective. By comparing a number of picture's from the Nazi and SED dictatorships side by side, they show that in several respects East Germany's "anti-fascism" looked quite a lot like fascism. Worshipping of leaders, uniformed mass demonstrations, militarisation of society, suppression of civil liberties look surprising alike in both regimes. The tabloid Bild is, as usual, most strident in its expressions, but in this case one of its headlines expresses the sentiments of many Germans, including those who would not want to be caught reading it. Probably for legal reasons, one of Bild's best remembered headlines is couched in the form of a question "Ist er ein Heuchler?" - "Is he a Hypocrite?" - with the word "hypocrite" printed about ten times as large as the rest of the sentence. The accompanying photograph of Gregor Gysi has been carefully selected from many, many meters of film footage of Gysi, with the aim of finding the least likeable expression on his face.

Unsurprisingly, Walther Schoelzgen feels that he is finally off the hook and on the winning side, where he thinks he ought to be.

 
Well, I remember in particular Italy was opposed to the reunification.

If I remember right... th most extreme and absurd example, in the hilarious "Twilight War" RPG scenario, where a cabal of East German and West German military officers stages a coup against the Soviets, which in turn causes Italy occupy Austria (out of the fear of a renewed Anschluss as well as South Tyrol potential falling into the hands of the Germans), eventually culminating into fighting between the Germans and the Italians in southern Bavaria.... :rolleyes:

However, regardless of that, the Italians really were unhappy with it.

I really don't remember this. for what I can recall I remember a good climate about this, and it was not unexpected.

maybe someone could have been concerned about an EU member already stronger than us becoming even stronger from one day to another, but these were not the sentiments of the people. maybe only of those concerned about the importance of being the 6th, no, the 7h, no the 6th again etc. economical power of the world.

maybe also that some politician would have make trouble just for the sake of this, like let's see if we can obtain something from Germany by just inventing problems.

about Italy occuping militarly something... I'll be silent as an act of charity toward homeland, as we say.

maybe you read something about occupying Austria just before nazi anschluss, when it was still not clear we would have sided with nazi Germany.
 
Max Sinister, Chris S, CCA thank you for your compliments.

I have to correct two of my own mistakes:
In my post from September 28, I have called Markus Meckel "the East German chancellor" and on October 4 simply "chancellor". However, neither in OTL nor in this TL is there an "East German chancellor" and Markus Meckel's title in this TL is "prime minister" (and foreign minister in OTL).

The "anti-fascism" speech by Gregor Gysi quoted below must have been given at a later date than the I gave in my last post, March 12, because March 12 would even predate OTL's and this alternate TL's Volkskammer elections. Let's say it's April 30.

In a speech on April 30, 1990 Gysi declares his fears, that "West Germany and East Germany are going to give up a form of consensus, the only real political consensus they have ever had, the consensus of antifascism". "I will not deny that there is a need for sweeping reforms in the German Democratic Republic, an urgent need to leave behind the Stalinist elements in its political system, but if there is one thing we must not leave behind, one thing we must indeed be proud of and defend with all the energy we have, this one thing is the German Democratic Republic's heritage of anti-fascism and internationalist solidarity. Will we be forced to give up this heritage for a united nationalist and racist Greater Germany? Will I be forced to hide my Jewish heritage, a heritage of which I am proud, out of fear?"
The speech does not, to put it mildly, meet with great approval in the German public. Heinz Galinski, chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany is one of the more cautious critics with his remark, "that it is certainly an astonishing piece of news that Gregor Gysi has discovered his Jewish roots. Somehow he seems to have been unaware of them, when in the country he lived in Israeli politicians were routinely depicted as Nazis." The daily taz remarks that the way West Germany treats its immigrant workers is not necessarily something this country should be proud of, but it is far, far better than the way immigrants are treated in East Germany. In a sarcastic editorial in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung Gysi is blamed for claiming "military victory over the Nazis for the East German 'People's Army'." The daily Die Welt and the weekly Die Zeit put on learned airs and elucidate the ethymology and the development of the term "Totalitarianism" in great and elaborate detail. On a side note, they do not fail to point out that the term "Greater Germany" cannot possibly be applied to a reunification of the two existing Germanies, since a "Greater Germany" would include Austria. Express' and Stern'sline of argument is less complex, but probably more effective. By comparing a number of picture's from the Nazi and SED dictatorships side by side, they show that in several respects East Germany's "anti-fascism" looked quite a lot like fascism. Worshipping of leaders, uniformed mass demonstrations, militarisation of society, suppression of civil liberties look surprising alike in both regimes. The tabloid Bild is, as usual, most strident in its expressions, but in this case one of its headlines expresses the sentiments of many Germans, including those who would not want to be caught reading it. Probably for legal reasons, one of Bild's best remembered headlines is couched in the form of a question "Ist er ein Heuchler?" - "Is he a Hypocrite?" - with the word "hypocrite" printed about ten times as large as the rest of the sentence. The accompanying photograph of Gregor Gysi has been carefully selected from many, many meters of film footage of Gysi, with the aim of finding the least likeable expression on his face.

Unsurprisingly, Walther Schoelzgen feels that he is finally off the hook and on the winning side, where he thinks he ought to be.

So far, Schoelzgen has not been a figure of great importance. Before the Berlin Wall fell, his party was a puppet of the SED, now it is only the smallest, by far, in a coalition government in a small country that is very likely to become a part of a larger country. But gradually he realizes that the scandal that had surrounded him might have been a blessing in disguise. First, people begin to see him as an innocent victim of an organisation that both East and West Germans hate and despise. Secondly, there has been a strong backlash against Gysi, who did not name him personally, but whose "anti-fascism" speech could be seen as based on the assumtion that the charges against him are justified. Thirdly, he sees the backlash against the Gysi speech not only as anti-communist, but as a general resurgence of nationalist or rightist sentiments in German public opinion, a trend he would not hesitate to exploit. His observation of the West German political scene has showed him that the end of the chancellorship of Franz Joseph Strauss has left an unoccupied niche, so to speak in the political system.
There are quite a number of people who want a "Germany first"-type of rightist politician who nevertheless abhorr the crimes of Hitler and the Neonazis. They had voted for Strauss for this very reason, but at this moment, there is no politician of stature they can identify with. This is a situation he thinks he can exploit.The theme which can be most easily exploited is not hard to find, indeed it has been filling the West German media for some time: the subject of political asylum.
 
Last edited:
Both in OTL and in this timeline, East Germany adopted the federal structure and most parts of the legal and administrative structure of West Germany even before the two countries reunited.
Even before unification was considered, Markus Meckel had held a speech, also in both timelines, in which he not only demanded democratic reforms, but also the right of politically persecuted persons to asylum in East Germany, a right that a persecuted person could sue for in court. This right is also part of the West German constitution, but many West German politicians of the late Eighties and early Nineties from various parties claim that this right is being abused. They say that the vast majority of asylum-seekers have never been politically persecuted and come to Germany only to exploit its welfare system. At the time, this is the favorite theme of the radical right, which often enough backs up its words with violent attacks on foreigners, but many politicians from democratic parties make the same claims that most asylum-seekers are not persecuted and that Germany cannot afford to support them.
When Walther Schoelzgen adds his voice to the chorus of "anti-asylum" politicians, he does not contribute new arguments to the debate about the merits of granting asylum, but he is certainly more radical in the degree to which he wants to curtail this right. His argument is that the West German constitution has always been considered as provisional.
(In theory, it was indeed considered as provisional and valid only until the day on which "the unity and freedom of Germany was completed" - this was indeed the reason why it was never even called a "constitution" ("Verfassung" in German) but a "basic law" ("Grundgesetz"). In practice, the Grundgesetz had proven its worth and practicability in West Germany, and there were so many other economic and administrative problems that the opportunity to write a new constitution was never taken and the Grundgesetz was applied more or less wholesale in the reunited Germany.)
Then why bother - this is the gist of an interview Schoelzgen gives to the West German Bild - with inventing new laws controlling the number of asylum seekers, laws which were bound to contain any number of loopholes? Why not abolish the article of the Grundgesetz concerning asylum alltogether, since re-unification affords the possibility of writing it anew? He knows that the votes of his party, small as it is, are neccessary if there is to be any majority for re-unification in the East German Volkskammer.
 
IIRC, most of the social democrats were in favour of a slow unification, first "westernising" the GDR, than uniting - in a similar step by step approach as the European Union expansion. Only a charismatic social democrat veteran and the dynamics of the reunification kept that from becoming their official position.

I propose two small and not very difficult POD's: The SPD wins the elections under a not very pragmatic left winger (Vogel, for instance) long before the fall of the Berlin Wall. The SED decides to let Hans Modrow instead of Egon Krenz become Honecker's successor, thus creating a more popular and pragmatic government more able to survive some time.

The SPD government in the West would do less than the Kohl government to undermine the left parties and strengthen the right parties in the GDR, while Hans Modrow might be pragmatic and reformist enough to win enough votes to form an alliance with eastern social democrats and a few other parties. The narrow election leaves the social democrats only a coalition involving far right parties as an alternative.

The two now democratically elected left wing governments decide on a step by step unification.

At the same time, some bad economic decisions of the social democrats and payments/credits to Russia for releasing the GDR from the Warsaw Pact cause jobless rates to rise, while Modrow's pragmatism and western aid leads to increased economic growth in the East. Thus, with two more or less social democrat countries as a choice, and the West with high joblessness, less people move to the West - eastern Germany stays stable, people develop pride in their country.

When a few members of parliament decide to switch parties in favour of the opposition, Hans Modrow has to call an election. Unexpectedly, shortly before the election, the opposition manages to gain a lot in popularity. Right wing parties consisting of a CDU pendant and similarily strong right wing parties win in a landslide and form a government, including very far right wing parties, justified by the eastern social democrats working together with the former SED. They don't really want to unite with a social democrat West Germany with rising joblessness. Neither does the West want a state which includes perceived right wing extremists. The reunification process slows down even more - kind of like the problems concerning the EU extension to the east atm.

A charismatic conservative leader, who, for personal greed, prefers being the boss of a country of 17 million over being the head of a state of maybe 5 million, makes the Saxon derived eastern German slang an official spoken language. He also deliberately makes unfounded demands and passes laws which are pretty much incompatible with EU and western German rules - against foreigners, against the sell-off of important companies, against criminals, and so on. The one or other economic reforms are very positive for eastern Germany, but not very popular with the left western German government.

Eventually, unification talks are more or less cancelled, under a popular wave of resentment against each other on both sides. A later conservative government in western Germany is not able to turn things around. The window of opportunity closes.
 
Both in OTL and in this timeline, East Germany adopted the federal structure and most parts of the legal and administrative structure of West Germany even before the two countries reunited.
Even before unification was considered, Markus Meckel had held a speech, also in both timelines, in which he not only demanded democratic reforms, but also the right of politically persecuted persons to asylum in East Germany, a right that a persecuted person could sue for in court. This right is also part of the West German constitution, but many West German politicians of the late Eighties and early Nineties from various parties claim that this right is being abused. They say that the vast majority of asylum-seekers have never been politically persecuted and come to Germany only to exploit its welfare system. At the time, this is the favorite theme of the radical right, which often enough backs up its words with violent attacks on foreigners, but many politicians from democratic parties make the same claims that most asylum-seekers are not persecuted and that Germany cannot afford to support them.
When Walther Schoelzgen adds his voice to the chorus of "anti-asylum" politicians, he does not contribute new arguments to the debate about the merits of granting asylum, but he is certainly more radical in the degree to which he wants to curtail this right. His argument is that the West German constitution has always been considered as provisional.
(In theory, it was indeed considered as provisional and valid only until the day on which "the unity and freedom of Germany was completed" - this was indeed the reason why it was never even called a "constitution" ("Verfassung" in German) but a "basic law" ("Grundgesetz"). In practice, the Grundgesetz had proven its worth and practicability in West Germany, and there were so many other economic and administrative problems that the opportunity to write a new constitution was never taken and the Grundgesetz was applied more or less wholesale in the reunited Germany.)
Then why bother - this is the gist of an interview Schoelzgen gives to the West German Bild - with inventing new laws controlling the number of asylum seekers, laws which were bound to contain any number of loopholes? Why not abolish the article of the Grundgesetz concerning asylum alltogether, since re-unification affords the possibility of writing it anew? He knows that the votes of his party, small as it is, are neccessary if there is to be any majority for re-unification in the East German Volkskammer.
A week later, Schoelzgen gives another interview, this time to the conservative Die Welt, in which he repeats his demand that the article guaranteeing political asylum should be deleted from the German Grundgesetz, although he does not directly threaten to leave the governing coalition if his demands are not met. He also has a well publicized meeting with the prime minister of Bavaria, Max Streibl, of the CSU, the party which is furthest to the right in the spectrum of democratic parties in West Germany. After that he meets Joerg Haider, the right-wing governor of the Austrian state of Carinthia.

Schoelzgen's demands can hardly be overheard by anyone, least of all East German prime minister Markus Meckel. As pointed out above, he had already demanded that East Germany grants asylum to political refugees even before reunification was considered a real possibility. In our timeline, he voted against the majority of his own party (the SPD) when the article of the Grundgesetz concerning political asylum was amended in 1993. Therefore, it is unthinkable for him to support Schoelzgen's demand. He understandably fears that Schoelzgen will back up his demands with threats to leave the coalition. In order to be prepared for that eventuality he starts talks with the Demokratische Aufbruch (DA) (=Democratic Awakening), about a possible participation in the coalition. One good thing about this potential coalition partner is the fact that DA has grown out of the opposition to the formerly ruling SED and is not their creature. Another good thing is that its members by now are very largely pro-market. The trouble is that (in this timeline) DA is against reunification and that no other pro-unification partner is in sight to replace the votes of Schoelzgen's NDPD if it drops out.

Meckel tries to keep the talks with DA secret, but there are just too many people, with too many varying agendas, so there are leaks very soon. West German chancellor Lothar Spaeth is of course one of the first people to be informed.
 
On May 2, 1990 in our timeline, an agreement was reached between the West and East German governments on a monetary union. This agreement was formally ratified in a treaty between the two countries on May 18, 1990 OTL. The treaty was to come into effect on July 1, 1990. According to the treaty, the Deutsche Mark West was to become legal tender in East Germany. In wages, salaries, scholarships, rents and pensions one Deutsche Mark West was paid for one Mark of the old East German currency. This was the official exchange rate of the old socialist regime. An exchange rate that was based on the purchasing power of the two currencies, however, might have been 4.2 Eastern Marks (possibly even more) for one Western Deutsche Mark.

Both the OTL West German government led by Helmut Kohl, and supported by the CDU, CSU and FDP parties, and the West German opposition, the SPD and Green parties, agreed that German re-unification was not to be financed with tax rises. Nevertheless it was clear from the start that the financial burden was to be enormous. Old loans to the East German government had to be written off, the East German pensions system, which is said to have been on the brink of collapse, had to be financed by the government of a united Germany, as well as the modernisation of the decrepit East German infrastructure. A sceptical observer might also already have foreseen the massive unemployment in East Germany, where de-nationalised firms with antiquated equipment were unable to compete with their West German or international rivals.

At the same time in OTL, West Germany (and slightly later a united Germany) was to give large credits to the Soviet Union (and later Russia). On June 22, 1990 OTL, a loan of five thousand million Marks was granted to the Soviet Union. Germany became by far the most important creditor of the Soviet Union and later Russia. By 1995 the amount of loans to Russia from the German government plus the amount of private loans covered by Hermesbuergschaften (export credit guarantees by the German government) was just under fifty thousand million Marks. It has not been explicitly stated, but it stands to reason that these amounts of money were needed to buy the goodwill of the Soviet government and its assent to unification. On top of these amounts, Germany had to buy back the real estate used by the Soviet armed forces for barracks, airfields and training grounds etc.. Furthermore, the German government had to finance new barracks in Russia for the troops that were withdrawn from Germany.

In this alternate timeline, West German chancellor Lothar Spaeth has to deal with the same amounts of money. As scandal-prone as ATL chancellor Strauss was, the economic reforms that he initiated have put the German economy in a slightly better shape than OTL, so there is no actual reason why Germany could not shoulder the same kind of burdens as in OTL. The psychological obstacles for the chancellor, however, that stand in the way of incurring these obligations are higher. In this ATL, the chairman of the SPD, the main opposition party, Oskar Lafontaine, gets better ratings in opinion polls than Spaeth. The fact that Spaeth and his two predecessors Kohl (from the same party as Spaeth, the CDU) and Strauss (from the CSU, the sister party of the CDU), have had quite a number of scandals, while Lafontaine has not, should be explanation enough (the scandal concerning Lafontaine's pension from his time as lord-mayor of Saarbruecken does not occur before 1992 in both timelines). Nevertheless, Spaeth is wondering all the time whether it is not really Lafontaine's attitude towards re-unification that is the reason for his relative popularity. Before the Iron Curtain started to crumble, the SPD considered demands for re-unification as utopian at best, if not as actual war-mongering. When the wall actually fell, Lafontaine made demands to support East Germany financially, even without any agenda of re-unification, at first even without making this support contingent on reforming the East German economy. Lafontaine also warned of "national intoxication" and the "historical imbecility" of re-unification (both in OTL and ATL). The tenuous majority that the pro-unification parties enjoy in the East German parliament, the Volkskammer, in this ATL, gives Spaeth the added worry that West Germany might incurr large financial obligations to East Germany or the Soviet Union without ever reaping the benefit of having a united Germany. Another worry that he has from time to time is that re-unification will come about, eventually, but that it will take so long that it will not be complete before his potential rival and successor Lafontaine has taken over his post and Lafontaine goes down in history as the chancellor of unification - despite all his rhetoric. While in OTL, chancellor Helmut Kohl of the West German CDU could negotiate with a prime minister from the Eastern CDU, Spaeth's counterpart in East Germany, Markus Meckel is from the SPD. Finally, Spaeth's attitude towards East Germany is still shaped by the public-relation disaster that befell him during a talk show, when he gave the impression that he thought that East Germans have only themselves to blame for their problems, and for which he blames, at least subconsciously, the East Germans and not his own inattention.

As a result of all this, negotiations, both between the West German government and the East German one, and between West Germany and the Soviet Union are drawn out much longer than in OTL. West German Minister of Finance Theo Waigel gives assurances that a united Germany will pay the East German pensions - but only if the amounts to be paid are based on a conversion rate that is much more realistic - that is disadvantagous to Easterners - than parity. Assurances that a united Germany will buy back the Soviet military bases are given - depending on the condition that the Soviet Union defrays the cost of removing scattered ammunitions and the cleanup of any chemical leaks.

When Lothar Spaeth hears of the talks between Meckel's SPD and the DA, he is rightly afraid of the possibility of the loss of any pro-unification majority in the Volkskammer. As a result the assurances of help to East Germany and the concessions made to the Soviet Union become even more cautious.

to be continued
 
I haven't had the opportunity to read all this, AMF, but it seems to be a really intelligently-crafted TL. Keep it up.
 
bump. Still looking forward to more. Please continue it AMF.

Thank you very much for the compliments. I have a bad conscience already, but it will take some time before I can continue. For one thing, I have to prepare for an exam. Then I will have to read at least a little about the internal situation of the Soviet Union at the time before I can continue. But I certainly do want to continue.
 
Top