Earlier V Weapons

[DMA]

Considering the V1 isn't all that advanced, as these things go, what if, after the German defeat in the Battle of Britain, they immediately start sending the V1s over Britain, in late 1940, whilst the Luftwaffe recovered for its full commitment to Operation Operation Barbarossa.

So how does Britain react in late 1940-early 1941 to having the V1s reign death from the sky?

Do the Germans rush forward the development & deployment of the V2?

And do the Germans do any better against the Russians, by not having the Luftwaffe distracted by operations against Britain (eg the OTL Blitz)?

Anything else?

 

[fhaessig]

Given the limited ressources of the Reich, early development of the V1 and V2 means something else has to be dropped.

So, as the V1 begin to fall on London, the french and british armies are entering Fulda. Germany lose.

 

[DMA]

Given the limited ressources of the Reich, early development of the V1 and V2 means something else has to be dropped.

Actually the point of the V1 was to use resources which weren't deemed vital to the war effort in other areas.

So, as the V1 begin to fall on London, the french and british armies are entering Fulda. Germany lose.

How do the French & British armies acheive this?

 

[Nytram01]

Considering the V1 isn't all that advanced, as these things go, what if, after the German defeat in the Battle of Britain, they immediately start sending the V1s over Britain, in late 1940, whilst the Luftwaffe recovered for its full commitment to Operation Operation Barbarossa.

So how does Britain react in late 1940-early 1941 to having the V1s reign death from the sky?

Do the Germans rush forward the development & deployment of the V2?

And do the Germans do any better against the Russians, by not having the Luftwaffe distracted by operations against Britain (eg the OTL Blitz)?

Anything else?

Britain would likely react the same way it did in OTL. It would continue to try and create counter measure to the V1's until they found an effective way to defend against them. Obviously Radar would be important again...

An earlier V1 attack on Britain might lead to a faster develoment of a high-speed, low flying airplane like the Hawker_Tempest

 

[Michele]

For the time being, I won't question the likelihood of V-1s being available this early; I'm just analyzing the possible consequences, taking for granted that somehow they were.

The British would react exactly as they reacted to the rain of death from the sky that they were receiving by German night bombing in the same time frame in OTL: chin up and a stiff upper lip. The V-1s wouldn't be doing more damage than the Blitz, actually much less.

The Germans might rush the development of the V-2s, of course.

The Germans don't do much better against the Soviets. The real toll for the Luftwaffe, the one it did not recover from, was the daylight Battle of Britain campaign. During the fall/winter Blitz they took losses, but much less. Considering that in OTL they already fared exceedingly well in the initial stages of Barbarossa, a limited divergence like not having to do the Blitz won't have great consequences.

As to the V-1s being intended not to sacrifice resources needed elsewhere, maybe you are thinking about production. Research and development need money, and money can be used elsewhere, especially in 1937-1940.

 

[The Dean]

The British would react exactly as they reacted to the rain of death from the sky that they were receiving by German night bombing in the same time frame in OTL: chin up and a stiff upper lip. The V-1s wouldn't be doing more damage than the Blitz, actually much less.

This is quite true and also it could have a negative effect for Germany by accelerating the development of faster interceptors, proximity fuses and radar gun control.

 

[jkay]

This'd be great news for the Allies. I just read Churchill's statement on V-weapons' average error - 10 MILES. Most hit the burbs, not anything important. They were much, much less cost-effective than bombing from planes. It was the first round of guidance systems, a hard problem, so no surprise it was bad.

Hardly the terror of today's smart missiles and highly accurate ICBMs, eh?

 

[DMA]

This'd be great news for the Allies. I just read Churchill's statement on V-weapons' average error - 10 MILES. Most hit the burbs, not anything important. They were much, much less cost-effective than bombing from planes. It was the first round of guidance systems, a hard problem, so no surprise it was bad.

Hardly the terror of today's smart missiles and highly accurate ICBMs, eh?

Depends if you're one of the unfortunate people who live in the 'burbs'. I'm sure they'd argue that the V-1s, dropping on them, are akin to anything other than living in terror

 

[SunilTanna]

The Germans can't plan to launch from Northern France until they have over-run France. And the Germans only really want to bomb Britain after they realize that defeating France is not causing Britain to surrender. So I think the earliest is perhaps 41 or 42.

Anyway, the Brits aren't able to overrun the launch sites then, and bombing them would less effective in OTL. The Germans also have the possibility of saving up lots of V1s and much more of them all in one go.

 

[jkay]

DMA wrote:
Depends if you're one of the unfortunate people who live in the 'burbs'. I'm sure they'd argue that the V-1s, dropping on them, are akin to anything other than living in terror

Those few who actually had drops go near, including some cows, yes, and they did make big, scary noises going overhead.

But you're missing the point of my (Churchill's, really - that's where I got it) cost-effectiveness argument: for the same amount of money, Germans were able to drop alot more bombs alot more effectively using bombers. That is, the British people could see much more terror in their skies (including bigger noises on the way to bomb sites) and military effect OTL than if they'd mostly used V-weapons.

 

[DMA]

Those few who actually had drops go near, including some cows, yes, and they did make big, scary noises going overhead.

But you're missing the point of my (Churchill's, really - that's where I got it) cost-effectiveness argument: for the same amount of money, Germans were able to drop alot more bombs alot more effectively using bombers. That is, the British people could see much more terror in their skies (including bigger noises on the way to bomb sites) and military effect OTL than if they'd mostly used V-weapons.

Well, I'm afraid I can't agree with you or even Churchill on these points. To quote from Wiki...

In early December 1944, an American General Clayton Bissell wrote a paper which argued strongly in favour of the V1 compared to conventional bombers[7]

The following is a table he produced:

Blitz (12 months) vs V1 flying bombs (2¾ months)

......................................... Blitz ..........V1

1. Cost to Germany

Sorties............................... 90,000.... 8,025
Weight of bombs tons......... 61,149... 14,600
Fuel consumed tons............ 71,700..... 4,681
Aircraft lost.......................... 3,075............0
Men lost............................... 7,690............0

2. Results

Houses damaged/destroyed.. 1,150,000... 1,127,000
Casualties................................ 92,566... 22,892
Rate casualties/bombs tons............ 1.6........ 1.6

3. Allied air effort

Sorties.................................... 86,800....... 44,770
Planes lost................................ 1,260............ 351
Men lost...................................... 805......... 2,233

As you can see, the V-1 campaign was no picnic for the British. Nearly 23 000 became casualties & I'm betting that's not including the cow numbers Instead, considering it only took place over a few months, it was highly effective, even if flawed.

 

[jkay]

First, he doesn't look at the cost to Germany in cash, Churchill's point. And there surely were men lost in accidents.

As important, he fails to look at any sense of military consequences from the two raids. The V[X] raids failed to do much militarily significant damage because they lacked the concentration on particular targets needed to get important targets, while German bombers blew up many important military, industrial, and strategic targets - notably the London airfields that many think could potentially have won the Battle of Britain if the targeting had been kept.

By contrast, most bombed civilian/cow populations have only strengthened their resolve (the famous stiff upper lips) making it a target of questionable usefulness. Notice no terror bombing was used by us in Afghanistan or Iraq.

 

[DMA]

First, he doesn't look at the cost to Germany in cash, Churchill's point. And there surely were men lost in accidents.

I don't think Hitler cared about cash at this stage in the war. Besides which it was cheaper to build a V-1 & shoot it off at London than have a bomber get shot down by a Spitfire.

As important, he fails to look at any sense of military consequences from the two raids. The V[X] raids failed to do much militarily significant damage because they lacked the concentration on particular targets needed to get important targets, while German bombers blew up many important military, industrial, and strategic targets - notably the London airfields that many think could potentially have won the Battle of Britain if the targeting had been kept.

Actually the Blitz was no different than the V-1 attacks, in this respect, insofar as the Blitz was really carpet bombing. It was not percision military attacks as you may argue. The Allies did the same thing to Germany.

By contrast, most bombed civilian/cow populations have only strengthened their resolve (the famous stiff upper lips) making it a target of questionable usefulness. Notice no terror bombing was used by us in Afghanistan or Iraq.

We know that now, thanks to the benefit of hindsight. Back in WWII they didn't. They thought otherwise. And, it goes without saying, that it wasn't just a German fault. The Allied airforces did the same thing too from 1942 onwards, thanks to 'Bomber' Harris, which rose to its height with the 1 000 bomber raids.

 

[paxau]

Some of us are forgetting that V-bombs actually were meant for blowing up while bombers are supposed to come back.

 

[bouscher]

Well, an earlier development of V1 and V2 will probably cause an earlier development of more advanced missiles, meaning that Germany might have had an operational ICBM (A19,A20), and well...that could have given the Germans the ability to use non-conventional warfare (using either gas or germs, and maybe nuclear in later stages of the war).

 

[Michele]

I don't think Hitler cared about cash at this stage in the war. Besides which it was cheaper to build a V-1 & shoot it off at London than have a bomber get shot down by a Spitfire.






Actually the Blitz was no different than the V-1 attacks, in this respect, insofar as the Blitz was really carpet bombing. It was not percision military attacks as you may argue. The Allies did the same thing to Germany.






We know that now, thanks to the benefit of hindsight. Back in WWII they didn't. They thought otherwise. And, it goes without saying, that it wasn't just a German fault. The Allied airforces did the same thing too from 1942 onwards, thanks to 'Bomber' Harris, which rose to its height with the 1 000 bomber raids.

Sure, by the time when the V weapons were used in OTL, Hitler may have had less concerns about cash. On the other hand, you are proposing to have them used in 1940. Before Barbarossa is even kicked off. You sure that in that case, cash would be of no concern?

Again with reference to costs, your comparison of the costs is off kilter. Sure a bomber which is lost over England is a pity, while the V weapon is, actually, a bomb (therefore intended to end its one-way journey there). But you should take into account the Research & Development costs of that bomber and that weapon. The bomber's R&D costs, by the way, should be divided over the number of sorties it actually came back from, before being downed; and more often than not, research done on previous bomber models comes in handy, too. The V-1's R&D costs, OTOH, have to be divided over that 8,000 figure, alone. You'll see a V-1 wasn't more economical than a bomber lost.

The table, anyway, lacks credibility. Written in 1944, it can certainly take into account the Allied losses with accuracy; it can't be accurate as to German losses. The fact alone that no German casualty is listed for the V-related accidents is telling.
I also have doubts as to the total toll of the V campaign.

In any case, not one item in the table disproves the basic fact you have already been told: the conventional bomber campaign caused more damage in Britain.

 

[Michele]

The Germans also have the possibility of saving up lots of V1s and much more of them all in one go.

Bad idea. The Germans tried very hard to learn from the hit location of previous V-weapons. Firing many of them during the first day equates to making sure that 90% of them miss any significant target and just dot the countryside.

Note anyway that, having managed to turn each and every one last German agent in Britain into a double agent, the British pretty much ruined that German attempt at correcting the vagaries of their guidance systems by taking into account the actual hit locations – simply because the Germans were fed disinformation.

 

[Michele]

Well, an earlier development of V1 and V2 will probably cause an earlier development of more advanced missiles, meaning that Germany might have had an operational ICBM (A19,A20), and well...that could have given the Germans the ability to use non-conventional warfare (using either gas or germs, and maybe nuclear in later stages of the war).

The Germans won't be able to tip ICBMs with nuclear warheads because they won't have any nuclear devices.
As to tipping 3 or 4 ICBMs with B or C warheads by early 1945, there is a very faint possibility of that. At a time when an Allied crop-duster can overfly most of Germany, it wouldn't be such a good idea, though.

 

[DMA]

Sure, by the time when the V weapons were used in OTL, Hitler may have had less concerns about cash. On the other hand, you are proposing to have them used in 1940. Before Barbarossa is even kicked off. You sure that in that case, cash would be of no concern?

Again with reference to costs, your comparison of the costs is off kilter. Sure a bomber which is lost over England is a pity, while the V weapon is, actually, a bomb (therefore intended to end its one-way journey there). But you should take into account the Research & Development costs of that bomber and that weapon. The bomber's R&D costs, by the way, should be divided over the number of sorties it actually came back from, before being downed; and more often than not, research done on previous bomber models comes in handy, too. The V-1's R&D costs, OTOH, have to be divided over that 8,000 figure, alone. You'll see a V-1 wasn't more economical than a bomber lost.

The table, anyway, lacks credibility. Written in 1944, it can certainly take into account the Allied losses with accuracy; it can't be accurate as to German losses. The fact alone that no German casualty is listed for the V-related accidents is telling.
I also have doubts as to the total toll of the V campaign.

In any case, not one item in the table disproves the basic fact you have already been told: the conventional bomber campaign caused more damage in Britain.

ROTFLMAO!!!!

 

[Michele]

I've looked up some more reliable sources than a Wikipedia page citing an article citing a 1944 table. Predictably, the Wikipedia data aren't trustworthy. Alfred Price's Britain Air Defences 1939-45 tells a rather different story.

For starters, the V-1s launched against Britain were over 10,000, not 8,025. This number is closer to the figure of the flying bombs that actually crossed the British coastline, or were otherwise observed by the defences: 7,488. This isn't surprising given that the table quoted couldn't, as I mentioned, rely on German sources, having been compiled in 1944.
Of these over 10,000 missiles, only 3,531 eluded the defenses; the rest did not reach initial speed, veered off course on their own, suffered other technical problems, or were shot down. Of the 3,531 that did elude the defenses, only 2,419 reached London, and about other 31 reached another target worth of note; the rest did not. This rather puts in perspective the usefulness of these weapons. By "target" I mean a generally built-up area, of course, nothing more specific.

What's even more interesting is that "casualty" in the table quoted of course means both deaths and injuries. By consulting some more discriminating sources, it turns out only 6,184 were killed by the V-1s; the rest were wounded. The British suffered 92,700 civilian losses in the war, most of them to bombing and, very evidently, the overwhelming majority of them to conventional bombing.

Price doesn't give a statistics for houses. Other sources, anyway, offer a similar picture as the ratio of deaths to injuries; destroyed houses being mentioned in the vicinity of 15-18,000. So lumping everything under destroyed/damaged is a bit disingenuous.

We can now reassess the casualty/bomb tonnage rate provided in the table. For starters, the table is inherently wrong; a V-1 weighed about 2.2 tons, so the total tonnage for 8,025 V-1s would be 17,655 tons. This alone reduces the rate to 1.3, and, alone, casts a shadow on the trustworthiness of the source. If in addition we consider that not 8,025, but 10,000 were fired, that ratio goes further down to about 1.

Note that, since the total weight of each V-1 is wrong in the table, it's quite likely the figure concerning fuel is wrong too. This is negligible from a practical POV, but it adds to the final assessment about that table's overall reliability.