Earlier Democarcy in Imperial Germany

[Fellatio Nelson]

If Imperial Germany had become more democratic in the 1890s/1900s.

I am assuming along the lines of the Chancellor being appointed by the Reichstag rather than the Kaiser, who retreats from day-to-day political life, and the threat of dissolution at the whim of the Kaiser being reduced to a theoretical rather than actual proposal.

Perhaps the body formed of distinguished politicians and German princes etc. would form a new upper chamber (a la House of Lords when it had power, maybe as per pre-1911 and 1949 Parliament Acts) being able to scrutinise and sanction legislation after it had been passed by the elected representatives. This would be a safeguard against 'radical' changes to the German political landscape.

What, if anything would prompt the handover of power from the Kaiser? Perhaps this would occur only without Willie.

 

[jolo]

It would be a pretty complicated process. There were a lot of structural problems within Germany which made reforms difficult:

- Prussia made up 2/3 of Germany, so their state government basically had all the power.

- In Prussia, there was an unequal voting system - rich people (usually the nobility) had more to say than people of medium income, who had more to say than the peasants.

- In the northeast of Prussia (the original Prussian areas), the "Junker"-System was prevalent - big (German) landlords possesed and controlled everything, the peasants (many of Polish origin) basically had few economic possibilities. A remnant of the time when Geman knights conquered the area. A lot of people from the ruling class would have liked the same for all of Germany.

- There was strong sentiment to create a medieval caste society - where people are usually born into a position in society, where wages in professions are determined by common believe of what a person from a certain profession should earn and markets are protected to keep it that way, and so on.

- Minorities (Foreigners, Jews, Polish, Intellectuals, Oppositionals, sometimes Catholics, and so on) were supressed in a lot of ways - difficulties entering a respected profession, ghettoisation, police brutality, unequal treatment of people by authorities often including the judiciary, and so on.

- Whenever a group of mainstream society got into trouble (joblessness, economic decline, or the likes), minorities who happened to be less in trouble at the time or just unpopular were made responsible. So there was a lot of popular pressure against any modernization of society and already a lot of unrest with just the few steps taken.

Basically, everyone who had or was something was under the impression he or she only had it due to such unfair conditions and their own struggle to keep them up. Therefore, it would've been difficult to reform the system peacefully. Especially as that would definitely have had disadvantages for a lot of people who were held up only by the system. Whenever things were tried that were against the interests of the Government (which was also usually part of the upper class) a dictatorship was possible - as happened before. People also were never really interested in long term effects of any reform. One of the reasons why Germany was economically pretty weak, despite a lot of industrial and military muscle.

That's also some of the reasons why Germans contributed so much to US and other population growth.

The slow rate of reforms actually happening may have been the fastest the system could handle.

I suppose only a very intelligent person who wins the position of chancellor with a rather conservative agenda but a lot of reform secretely on his mind could have achieved a rather peaceful transition of Germany into a modern country. It also wouldn't have been a matter of making a decision and pushing it through - rather, it would have been a matter of using and sometimes trying to create or increase popular sentiment to push through one reform after the other - resisting and weakening popular sentiments which are unproductive as much as possible at the same time.

A popular uprising might have been needed to transform Germany into a constitutional Monarchy. An embarassing abuse of power by the Prussian government might have been necessary to transfer their power and representation to the "counties" of Prussia, after which a real reform of the federal system would be possible. A press campaign, supported by most parties, might be needed to get done with the unequal voting system. A lot of propaganda for more competitiveness might be needed to clean up the German "caste" system. A lot of fuss about bad treatment of minorities might be needed to protect minorities better. And so on. Some flexibility to turn counterproductive popular sentiment into sth. useful might also be good - when a campaign against a minority cannot be halted for instance, enforcing melting pot strategies which are helpful for the members of the concerned minority in the long term.

If all this were to happen, loosing WWI might not have had such desastrous consequences for Jews, Roma, Communists, Intellectuals, Homosexuals and so on. Instead, we'd have lived through a few rather "poor" decades and a normal recovery later - similar to France after 1871. With more peaceful interaction with the neighbouring states and better international integration, a policy of not starting unnecessary wars might be the result of WWI - not revanchism.

But I doubt Europe was ready for lasting peace at that time, even with such changes...

 

[Faeelin]

- Minorities (Foreigners, Jews, Polish, Intellectuals, Oppositionals, sometimes Catholics, and so on) were supressed in a lot of ways - difficulties entering a respected profession, ghettoisation, police brutality, unequal treatment of people by authorities often including the judiciary, and so on.
.

No offense, but this seems questionable. I find it hard to believe, for instance, that persecution against Catholics was common in Bavaria.

 

[jolo]

No offense, but this seems questionable. I find it hard to believe, for instance, that persecution against Catholics was common in Bavaria.

Not in Bavaria, but in Prussia and other Protestant states. Also, the Catholic states as a whole had quite a few disadvantages at the time, as well as Catholics moving to Prussia (but that's true both ways). Also, there were at times quite a few government activities against the "Centrum", basically a catholic party, and their constituency.

 

[Dave Bender]

Missed Opportunity in 1871

I think the best chance to make Germany a republic would be 1871. Wilhelm I was getting old and did not really want to be emperor of a united Germany. Otto Bismarck talked him into it.

If Wilhelm I refuses the position Germany might become a republic in 1871. Bismarck is almost certainly still going to be chancellor. But now he will be responsible to the Reichstag instead of to the German Kaiser.

 

[Nicole]

If Wilhelm I refuses the position Germany might become a republic in 1871. Bismarck is almost certainly still going to be chancellor. But now he will be responsible to the Reichstag instead of to the German Kaiser.

That's, in my mind, the least likely thing that would happen. Instead, there would likely be no Germany, and it would remain Prussia and all the other states (All the other states did keep their kings and the like, you know... Wilhelm not being Emperor isn't going to make them give up their thrones. And I assume Wilhelm wasn't talking about stopping being King of Prussia, either.)

 

[Othniel]

Well Austria could have been part of the German Condeferation and then Prussia and Austria might cause for smaller states to gain more power as they can swing what happens within the confederation by siding with or against the Prussians or the Austrians... but have no power when the two agree. Imagine New York as Prussia and Austria as Texas in the House of Representives, with all other states being like the American Midwest. Only a view votes to tilt the sides when they disagree, but when they agree there is no beating them. Hopefully most of the time they disagree.

 

[Nicole]

Well Austria could have been part of the German Condeferation and then Prussia and Austria might cause for smaller states to gain more power as they can swing what happens within the confederation by siding with or against the Prussians or the Austrians... but have no power when the two agree. Imagine New York as Prussia and Austria as Texas in the House of Representives, with all other states being like the American Midwest. Only a view votes to tilt the sides when they disagree, but when they agree there is no beating them. Hopefully most of the time they disagree.

If you see the German Confederation (pre-1866, it included alot of Austria... German-Austria, Tyrol, Czechia.. pretty much everything that became Austria in Austria-Hungary other than Bukovina and Galicia) slowly becoming a united Germany, I agree that could happen. Austria would have a big advantage that a large part of it would be separate (Hungary, Galicia, Transsylvania (likely to remain separate from Hungary without an Ausgleich), Croatia), but Prussia would have a large pull. Though you'd have to get rid of 1866, so Prussia wouldn't be as strong (Hannover, Electoral Hesse, etc. all independent rather than Prussian)

 

[Othniel]

If you see the German Confederation (pre-1866, it included alot of Austria... German-Austria, Tyrol, Czechia.. pretty much everything that became Austria in Austria-Hungary other than Bukovina and Galicia) slowly becoming a united Germany, I agree that could happen. Austria would have a big advantage that a large part of it would be separate (Hungary, Galicia, Transsylvania (likely to remain separate from Hungary without an Ausgleich), Croatia), but Prussia would have a large pull. Though you'd have to get rid of 1866, so Prussia wouldn't be as strong (Hannover, Electoral Hesse, etc. all independent rather than Prussian)

It would have to be rather early, and that means Bismarck losing to the liberials or not being there at all. Dominated by Austria if the states don't agree with Prussia, dominated by Prussia when they do, and never dominated by the smaller states by themselves.

 

[Steffen]

A POD would be earlier: the liberal fight against military reform in Prussia wasn´t fought with souch bitterness, the liberal side doesn´t cling to the Landwehr system as a symbol, the budget goes through, so the triumphs of the new military system introduced against the the will of the Prussian parliament works not against the liberals.

If we could POD-in some kind of locust into the american great plains, we see less stress on the eastern agrarian areas, which possibly apt for more reform in order to maximize profit instead of minimizing risk through state intervention.

What I also could imagine is strengthening the pro-Austrian side. Let´s asume the 1866 campaign against Austria and Saxony goes on as OTL,
but the Hessian, Wurttembergian, Bavarian... armies quickly mobilize and march northwards to meet the Hannoverian army.
We don´t see the Langensalza fiasco, the prussians drive the southern armies slowly back without much bloodshed and battles.

So Prussia doesn´t annex Hannover and Hessen-Kassel, but takes as face-saving gesture (war won= expansion) the Hanseatic cities and the two Mecklenburgs.
Saxony still cedes a province around Halle to Prussia, but is allowed to take the thuringian states in compensation.
Hessen "secures" the city of Frankfurt and Schaumburg-Lippe.

So now, we have several stronger states and practically none of the grand-duchies-of-village-x-and-village-y-plus-half-of-a-grain-field-over-there,
Prussia is still the unchallenged primus of the new Reich, but the other states have the chances to install a resourceful administration and can delegate officials to the Reich government in Berlin, so the "double hatting" of prussian state adminstration and federal government doesn´t take place.

This leads to a paradox effect: Strengthening the States strenghtens the federal government.

The next task would be giving the Reichstag clear powers in some spending isssues where they can show the nation and themselves that they are a capable and responsible and not the "Reichsaffenhaus" (the ape house as in the zoo) as Kaiser Wilhelm stated.

 

[Redbeard]

Hi Jolo

I'm pleased to see someone describing Imperial Germany beyond the label of "militarism" and I basically agree in what you say. But I will claim that the elements described could be found in about the same degree in most west European countries at the time, also those in the midst of or soon to begin a true democratisation.

I do think you overlook one important element of Germany 100 years ago though, and that is the very strong German labour movement. Socialdemocracy was a German invention and German Socialdemocrats inspired labour activists all over the industrialised world. By early 20th century the Socialdemocrats had become very strong, and they probably would have won a majority in the next election if WWI had not erupted. This of course caused a lot of opposition from the old elites, but again, so it also did elsewhere without stopping the democratisation or involving civil war etc. On the contrary Germany had since Bismarck a tradition of social reforms and the tendency for capital and labour to find together to regulate business no matter what the old elites would say, was also present in Germany.

I can think of two types of PoD's.

The first is somehow solving Germany's main strategic problem of being positioned between a hostile Russia growing stronger each day and a hotheaded France gradually regaining her strength, and on top of that pissing off GB too. So many external enemies simply gave too many excuses/reasons to postpone reforms. Not alienating GB with a huge naval programme will be a good start, and a more neutral GB will be a good basis for developing an early "International Intermediation Institution" avoiding situations like the start of OTL WWI where events took their own course. Russia will need some special attention, basically trying to keep the good relations from earlier in 19th century. Keeping A-H on a short leash in the Balkans might help. France is more difficult, as the French are blinded by an urge for revenge, but as long as they have no big allies, it is no serious problem.

With the basic startegic problem solved I'm certain reforms will come by itself, no matter of persons.

My second PoD concerns persons however. One might be Wilhelm's father Frederick III living longer: He apparently was a sensible person with close and positive relations to GB (his wife was a daughter of Queen Victoria). I doubt if he would have started a naval programme like Wilhelm. That of course points to any PoD that can remove/change Wilhelm. Having Bismarck continue longer and more importantly be followed by a similar strategic thinking person would certainly help a lot, and pershaps the most important, but also a person who could moderate Wilhelm in the same way Alanbrooke moderated Churchill. If recognising the importance of the German naval programme in the proces of bringing Germany in a position of strategic problems, then perhaps a very small Pod might suffice. Adm. von Tirpitz, the Secretary of the Navy was the primary person behind the naval programme. Without his abilities as a lobbyist and orator Wilhelm could have wanted his shiny battleships to outshine cousin Edward's ships as much as he could, it wouldn't have mattered - parliament wouldn't have payed. Apparently many of the annual naval laws were politically close run things - so perhaps a bad hair day in the parliament for Tirpitz might be just enough. Or my favourite type of PoD: some nice girl taking the attention at the right moment - where are all the nice girls when you need them?

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[Fellatio Nelson]

Thanks chaps, most interesting.

I am assuming that, aside from near-revolution or Wilhelm II having a change of heart, implementing reform post-1888 would have been a rather protracted process and dependent upon the right Chancellor (who would need to be willing to see his own 'class' lose influence).

I assume, however, that had Frederick III (or his son, Henry) been on the throne for an extended period this would have been more popular and far quicker: presumably no 'loyal' Prussian could be seen to go against the express wishes of his King and Emperor?

 

[jolo]

Hi Redbeard,

I pretty much agree with you on the Labour movement being an important factor. But I also see them as pretty conservative in terms of rules helping to protect their wages - very many weren't really against this "caste" system, or monarchy, or the likes at least until the war.

They also usually weren't willing to put up a lot of fighting for "mere" structural reforms like changing the federal system - especially if they weren't sure what that means for winning elections.

Actually, some of the rightist and most of the liberal/centrist parties were more likely to push reforms, except in areas were the workers were concerned directly.

But I agree that a similar development to GB might be possible.

 

[Redbeard]

Hi Redbeard,

I pretty much agree with you on the Labour movement being an important factor. But I also see them as pretty conservative in terms of rules helping to protect their wages - very many weren't really against this "caste" system, or monarchy, or the likes at least until the war.

They also usually weren't willing to put up a lot of fighting for "mere" structural reforms like changing the federal system - especially if they weren't sure what that means for winning elections.

Actually, some of the rightist and most of the liberal/centrist parties were more likely to push reforms, except in areas were the workers were concerned directly.

But I agree that a similar development to GB might be possible.

There certainly was a split in the labour movement with communists around mainly Liebknecht wanting only the revolution, but the reformist socialdemocrats were certainly the strongest and apparently did not hesitate to contribute to rounding up the communists - if payed by recognised political power.

The SD's even supported the declaration of war, in anticipation of a short war and taking over political power soon after. Then they needed an image of a responsible party being concerned over general German interests.

I'm certain that a German SD party at power would immediately have started reforming, that was the core of their ideology, which in all practical terms was copied and pasted into Scandinavia. In many ways I could imagine a development in Germany similar to that in Scandinavia in early 20th century. Britain was/is IMO quite a lot more "caste" than Germany or Scandinavia has ever been.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[Steffen]

One question we have to talk about is the SD attitude towards the churches. If they are as rabid anti-clerical as marxist writing indicates, or at least are perceived as such, I see "happy times" coming, with a staunchly monarchist protestant church.
If we consider the resistance and outrage against "10-commandments-Hoffmann" (left-wing politician who was briefly secretary of education) in the early 1920, I rather see a mild form of civil war coming.

 

[Othniel]

I wonder if they'd take a Communard approach and tell churches they can stay open if they allow for public meetings in the evening during a shortterm coup....

 

[jolo]

There certainly was a split in the labour movement with communists around mainly Liebknecht wanting only the revolution, but the reformist socialdemocrats were certainly the strongest and apparently did not hesitate to contribute to rounding up the communists - if payed by recognised political power.

The SD's even supported the declaration of war, in anticipation of a short war and taking over political power soon after. Then they needed an image of a responsible party being concerned over general German interests.

I'm certain that a German SD party at power would immediately have started reforming, that was the core of their ideology, which in all practical terms was copied and pasted into Scandinavia. In many ways I could imagine a development in Germany similar to that in Scandinavia in early 20th century. Britain was/is IMO quite a lot more "caste" than Germany or Scandinavia has ever been.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

I'd say the political system would make the process more messy - maybe a military coup or government dictatorship if the labor party wins the election, maybe a few years of ineffective governing under heavy rightist resistance (similar to the Weymar Republic) after which the SD's loose and have a hard time gaining an absolute majority again, maybe the same splitting into moderates and extremists as in OTL, or likewise.

I'd also say they have a hard time avoiding mistakes in their economic agenda - marxist teachings haven't really been proven very effective economically, but they'd sure be tried when the SD's come to power in a TL without WWI as it was.

 

[Fellatio Nelson]

Okay, would this be a plausible scenario:

After scrapping the anti-socialist laws and consequently 'dumping the pilot', Kaiser Frederick III/Henry/Wilhelm II (whoever) decide to reform German politics: reason for this could be entirely personal; could be response to demands for change through compromise and thus isolate extremists.

1) The Chancellor is elected by the Reichstag, rather than appointed by the Kaiser.

2) The Government is formed from members of the Reichstag, rather than made up of appointed persons.

3) The Bundesrat or royals and appointed persons is installed as a genuine upper house of the Reichstag (perhaps headed by the Kaiser??) and acts in a similar way to the House of Lords at the time in the UK. It could either have the power to reject all legislation coming from the Reichstag, or be like the post-1911 Parliament Act in the UK, where it can only delay legislation and demand it be presented to the H of Commons once again for a vote, after which it can be forced through.

Thus, the monarch becomes detached from day-to-day politics whilst keeping hold of his royal prerogative through signing legislation into law etc. (A sort of beefed-up UK monarch of the time.)


- Is this plausible?

- Would we see - as already mooted - some form of civil disorder within Germany (how would the other monarchs take it??)

- How would this affect international relations, with a special emphasis on UK, its A-H ally and the Franco-Russian Alliance?