Different defeat, War over Holland 1940

[Parma]

2.4

The air landings

The Netherlands had the questionable honor to be the target of the first large scale airborne attack in military history.
In the hinterland, a battalion of German paratroopers was dropped at the Moerdijk bridges and the close to Dordrecht and her bridges (both bridges are major connection between Rotterdam and Brabant, crossing significant waterways). Here and there they were directly confronted with anti-aircraft and resistance.

After an inspection of the defense of the airfields in December 1939 it was concluded that this defense of this vital airbases was completely inadequate in many ways. There for the defense of the essential airfields was re-organised from February 1939.
At airbase Waalhaven a battalion of German paratroopers landed and immediately fell into combat. At Waalhaven the paratroopers failed to break the defense of the airbase. The following transport planes in the impression that the paratroopers occupied the airfield tried to land. After three Ju-52 shot in to flames by the Dutch machine guns when landing, the other transport planes deviated to the filed near the Feyenoord stadium. The paratroopers retreated East, and established a defense perimeter to secure the secondary landing zone at the Feyenoord stadium.
The Dutch company guarding the HIH Siderius weapon factory was quickly over run.
At 05:00 o'clock twelve Heinkel He-59 seaplanes landed on the Nieuwe Maas river and the more than 100 men in rubber boats from this area occupied the Maasbruggen. The men from the seaplanes who landed at the East side of the bridges were fired at by the crew of the three 2 cm AA guns in front of the Rotterdam Station-Maas. The crew of this AA emplacement were warned by a police man who was walking his early morning beat and noticed the planes and the strange armed men coming out of the planes and trying to get to shore by small inflatable rafts. Never the less a large group managed to occupy the North side of the bridge and several buildings West of the North side of these bridges. The South side of the Maas bridges came in firm control of the German paratroopers coming from Feyenoord Stadium. They met fierce resistance of the Dutch units who were present at the Afrikaner square in Rotterdam South side. The Dutch units were eventually pushed back and retreat to the neighborhoudd Katendrecht, which is a kind of peninsula between two harbors, Maashaven and Rijnhaven. The reason to retreat to this area was because it is relative narrow at the land side and above all at the roof top of the large hangar of the Holland America Line (HAL) there was a battery of four 2 cm Scottini AA guns including a search light, in order to protect the HAL installations. Despite numerous attempts the Dutch occupation resist the paratroopers during the coming days.

The long building right side is the large HAL ware house where the 2 cm AA battery was placed.

At Rotterdam, despite the muddled command structure and shock of the attack by paratroopers, daring initiatives by a few officers and non-commissioned officers, supplemented with improvisation and courage, allowed for fairly rapid opposition.This rather gathered units were some times just drafted recruits. These ad-hoc units succeeded in taking the bridges under fire and prevented the German paratroopers from Feyenoord and Waalhaven from joining the North bank. The North bank was reached by the Dutch marines after heavy fighting later in the day. To prevent the bridges from remaining in the hands of the Germans, the Dutch Navy also came into action. The destroyer of Galen and the new gun boats ( small destroyers) K-5, K-6 and the old destroyer Z-5 , who had already provided air defense, provided artillery support. During the day destroyer Van Galen was severely damaged.

Airfield Waalhaven at the direction of the right bottom outside the photograph. The Fijenoord Stadium right top outside the photograph.

Around the Hague at the airfields Ypenburg, Ockenburg and airbase Valkenburg the battalion of paratroopers were dropped in a very disperse manner. Followed by dozens of Ju 52s who tried to land at the airports. At airbase Valkenburg and airfield Ypenburg, the paratroopers could not reach the airfields and the following Ju-52 transport planes had to deviate to secondary landing strips, in most cases the motor way between Rotterdam and the Hague, near Delft or the motor way the Hague Leiden or just any field the Ju-52 pilots could find or on the beach.
Airbase Valkenburg could be held and kept in tact by the defense guards just as air base Waalhaven.
After the first shock of the preceding bombardments the defense got off and fierce battles quickly broke out. The anti-aircraft crews get better aimed at their targets. Despite the initial surprise and chaos, the now strengthened and somewhat tighter organized Dutch troops managed to regain the airfields in the course of May 10th. The approximately five thousand Germans in the area, most paratroopers, were pushed into the defensive.

Moerdijk bridges are two bridges a railway bridge (in service since 1872) and a motor way bridge (in service since 1936) who crosses the estuary "Hollands Diep'' and have a length of around 1040 meters. After initial heavy confusion the defense of the bridges recovered and despite heavy fire managed to keep the bridge heads on both sides. The defenders of the South side were supported by reinforcements from the based at the 19th century fortress, "de Hel" and "Sabina", around Willemstad. Combined the Dutch forces managed to defeat the paratroopers on the South side. The defenders on the North side of the bridges were less fortunate and the German Paratroopers managed to roll nearly the entire defenses on this side of the bridge. Only the crews in the bunkers in the bridge pillars and on the dams inside the water, flanking the bridges were able to hold with a make shift defense firing North. Later the defenders manged to contact the army unit at the other side of one of the estuaries, Army group "Brigade C", and receive supporting artillery fire. The Moerdijk bridges remained in Dutch hands, however pressed but the bridges at Dordrecht were conquered by German airborne units. The Connecting motor way between Moerdijk, Dordrecht and Rotterdam become in firm control of the German airborne units.

Fighting in the air

Thanks to the standard instructions to warm the engines and make the airplanes ready to take of at 3:15 and to the re-vised readiness orders of February 1939 which also included the air-branch, LVA. the losses of airplanes on the ground was minimal. Although on some airfield the first bombs exploded while the last plane was still taking of, the whole Dutch air-fleet was in the air at the time of the first airstrikes and engaged the enemy.
A few of the Douglas D-8A light bomber and Fokker G-1 carried out air strikes on landed German units. The sky was full of Messerschmidt Bf 109.
The Hurricanes gave, as expected, a very good defense but more surprising is the punch the Fokker D-21's gave. The Fokker D-21, with their fixed landing gear and unprotected pilots manages to down more German planes than the Hurricanes. The German Bf 109 pilots could not resist to engage them in a dog fight with the slower D-21's who as the German pilots discovered were much more agile as their race horses.

The units with the G-1 were hit hardest. Although they could out run any German bomber with their 1000 hp Wright engines, they were less agile than the single engine Bf 109 fighters.
The biplane Fokker C-5 and C-10 flew their reconnaissance missions and threw their small 25 and 50 kilo bombs on the advancing German troops, while trying to stay alive by flying just above the tree and roof tops. Fokker G1's also were used in air attack roles, with their six machine guns and light bombs they performed very well. The sight of own war planes was a morale boost to the Dutch defenders, more than the damage they inflicted or information they gathered.

Despite the overwhelming presence of enemy airplanes the most pressing matter was to secure the airbases. Airbase Bergen only had to fill the bomb craters which was quickly done and was in use the rest of the day. Ypenburg and Valkenburg could only be used the next morning. Waalhaven would be used while it was still very close to the location of the German airborne units. Airport Schiphol was nearly destroyed, considerable number of KLM DC 2 and DC 3 air liners were in flames. Many air units deviate to Navy air base De Kooy, or auxiliary air fields.

The first day was for many men a shock, however many would over come the initial panic and fear, and despite the chaos and miscommunication or complete lack of communication the defense got organised. How ever dispersed the losses of the air branch was limited and the aim to destroy the Dutch fighters and bombers failed.
The airborne landings, did not, according to plan for the Germans. There are no large Dutch units surrounded, which the Poles and French, and later mostly the Russians often came across.

OTL, The defense of the airfield was very poor organised and even more poorly lead by some exceptional incapable officers. Valkenburg and Ypenburg were at the end of the day back in Dutch hands and the German troops in defense. The defense of Waalhaven, even it was a very important airfield and even more important location, at the South front of "Vesting Holland" was exceptional inadequate lead by remarkable incapable officers. The senior officer in command of Waalhaven, had plenty of communication equipment, in contrast of the rest of the army, but deemed it unnecessary to install and use it. The position of the defenses was wrong in any manner. Earth works were limited and the position of the command post was completely at the wrong location.
Since there is no time wasted with a paper war between the COC General Reijnders and the minister of Defense, in TTL, the staff officers have more time for real issues. In this TL the importance of the airfields is understand and the defense or lack of it, is recognized and drastically improved. More than the improvement in field works, like bunkers who will be ready in time , TTL, is the staffing and officer corps commanding the defense of the airfields. The airplanes had orders to make them air ready before 3:15 however the air crew had to drive to the dispersed planes instead of being ready next to their airplanes. As for Bergen the airfield crew was in the impression the airplanes they heard were flying to the UK and decided not to go airborne to defend the Neutrality.
The auxiliary airfield like Oostvoorne never existed however there was a sport airstrip in the dunes. The location however was under investigation in the late 30-ties but needed improvements and better drainage which needed some funding and there for never materialized. At 10 May several G1's landed on the beach close by the airstrip, but the pilots of the G1's, after camouflaging their airplanes, were struck in bureaucracy to get air fuel and ammunition to their stranded aircraft . It took three days to organised this and then the airplanes were discovered and strafed by German fighters on the ground.

 

[Parma]

Mooerdijk Bridges

 

[Parma]

Rotterdam and airbase Waalhaven

 

[Parma]

3.1

May 11 the 1940.

Northern Provinces.
The five border battalions continued as well and as badly as possible with their delay actions against the 15,000-strong German 1st cavalry division that moved along three routes towards Afsluitdijk.
The the actions of border battalions consisted not only of blowing up or destroying bridges and retreat. Enforced with modern Bohler anti tank guns and the last moment reinforced with armored cars gave the border battalions the possibility to stage numerous delay fights and hit and run actions. Despite the losses this actions made at the defenders side it delayed the German 1st cavalry division considerable.

Advance of Central and Southern Netherlands
After crossing of the river Ijssel late at the 10th the the German units were severely delayed during the 11th in their advance to wards the Grebbelinie. The disposition of considerable number of armored cars and light tanks, West of the river Ijssel was not taken care in German planning. As border battalions in the North the 4th Regiment Hussars of the 2nd Army Corps, re-enforced with M39 armored cars and several L-60 tanks which gave them the fire power and mobility to stage fierce delaying actions after the German crossing of the river IJssel.

Late on the 11th of May, units of the SS Standarte Der Führer regiment had reached the city of Wageningen, a city in the front area of the Grebbe Line, a defense line before the "Fortress Holland"(Vesting Holland). The SS units had to fight them self through Arnhem and the surrounding area, after their crossing of the river IJssel, which took more time than anticipated. The fighting in the urban and forest area were ambushes, after which the Dutch defenders retreat, before they could be out flanked.

The presence of the wireless of communication equipment counter weight the sometimes chaotic command and control from the higher command and contributed to their relative success. The wire less communication also resulted in the intense use of the 10,5 cm artillery. However the battery commanders had the brightness to relocate the guns in order not o get shot at by counter artillery or aerial bombing, this saved the pieces but reduced the artillery support.

The planned Dutch water weapons, the inundations, needed time to fill the located inundated area's.
The Grebbe defense line it self was a partly inundated defense position consisting of field reinforcements interspersed with small concrete bunkers. Since the mobilisation the area was under court marshal, so firing fields were cleared. There were also few barbed wire barriers. Where inundation was lacking, outposts were set up.

The 11th was still fought around Mill, but there was no breakthrough. Many of the German units in the armored train were captured or killed and the units of the following troop train retread after heavy fighting. The men of the Dutch 3rd army corps that defended the Peel-Raam defense line, however, gained confidence. The artillery attached to the 3rd army corps started shelling the estimated locations of the field bridges who crosses the river Maas in the North of the line with uprising success and with this frustrating the movement of German heavy artillery and reinforcements towards the Peel-Raam defense line.
Despite this success the line was under heavy air attack and indirect or direct artillery fire which destroyed several bunkers in the first line. The areal bombardments were a heavy burden on the defending troops as well. The presence of own artillery prevent complete destruction of the first line.
At the end of the 11th three sorties of Fokker G-1 and Douglas 8A on German positions took place. Although he bombing raids and machine gunning raids did inflict damage on German supply trains, the sight of Dutch airplanes was more important as a morale boost.

A French vanguard had in fact reached Breda and sent out reconnaissance units to Moerdijk bridges. Eventually the French main force (parts of a tank and mechanized division) did not pass Tilburg.
During the 10th the defenses of the North bank of the Moerdijk bridges was reduce to the bunkers East and West of the Bridges and on the bridges it self. The perimeter defense of the flanking bunkers was already reduced to a small front and despite support and reinforcements from the South side the perimeter defense was broken by one bunker. Since this bunkers only brought flanking fire to the South side, not to the North. The bunkers could not defend them self against an opponent from the North if the perimeter defense was broken. During the night this defense collapsed. Dutch reinforcements from the South bank had to retreat back. A counterattack, on the 11th, to recapture the North shore of the Moerdijk bridge failed. The Moerdijk bridges on the North side were in German control.

The "Brigade C'" which moved across the river Kil, West of Drodrecht, failed to recapture the Dordrecht bridges. This brigade only arrived in April after first stationed behind the Waterline as a reserve. Most of the men of this brigade, referred as army group "de Kil" consist of elder reservist. Brigade C was moved to this position to reinforce the relative poor manned South front of fortress Holland. This happened after analyse of the Norwegian and Danish campaign of the Germans.

A positive side was the capture of the bridge over the river Merwede by the 3rd Border Battalion which was sent from their initial position around Rosendaal at the Belgian border. The bridge connecting the Island of Dordrecht from the East, was recently finished and by some reasons not part of German plans. Thanks to swift action of the commander of the 3rd Border Battalion the bridge could be secured form both sides. A continuation of the attack was halted due to increasing German resistance but above all communication errors and conflicting orders from the commander Fortress Holland, General Van Andel.

Around Dordrecht, the troops did their best to recapture the bridges . The communication and coordination between the General Staff, and the cooperating units was often difficult, which made attempts to undertake (planned) counterattacks more difficult, most of this was not due to the lack of communication means but more the lack of training.

The French had failed to make a fist. Unaware as they had been at first of the German presence North of Moerdijk bridges, they messed around hesitantly and lost the momentum. After they had granted the Luftwaffe half a day to intervene, the French vanished not to return. Later that 11th May Général Gamelin ordered his 7th Army to refrain from any offensive action East of Breda and maintain a firm frontier around Etten, Roosendaal and Bergen op Zoom. From that directive it becomes clear that Moerdijk didn't matter to the French no more. Even the bridges would be in Dutch hands.

In the South the hopeless attempts to coordinate French-Dutch joint operations failed time and again. The Dutch on their part did managed to hold the line of the Peel-Raam defense line.

The 9th German armored division, was still at the North of the Peel-Raam defense line. While the German 6th Amy already left the Netherlands and advanced into Belgium.
How ever it became clear that it would be hard to hold the Peel-Raam defense line a day longer. There were significant gaps shot in the first line of bunkers and the French refused to go further East than Breda.

Bridges of Dordrecht/Zwijndrecht rail connection Rotterdam-Dordrecht-Breda-Antwerp. Motorway connection Rotterdam-Dordrecht. Dordrecht at the bottom of photo
The battle around Rotterdam

The battle in Rotterdam went sporadically in many places. Sporadic in the bigger picture does not automatically mean sporadic for those who fought. Nevertheless, the 11th was mainly a matter of delimitation. The Rotterdam defense took position on the North bank of the Nieuwe Maas to prevent a German crossing. At the Maas bridges the Germans were stuck and also on the Noordereiland they were isolated. More pressing the airbase Waalhaven was still in Dutch hands. One attempted to conquer the airbase failed, after the precious airborne units were used to setup a defense perimeter in order to withstand a counter attack of the Dutch, which however did not come on the 11th.
The fragmented Dutch ad hoc units, consisting of everything from regular regiment troops to depot units and marines (recruits) received reinforcements from regiments or battalions from the 2nd and 4th Army Corps in the course of May 11th. These sometimes not completely organically equipped or complete units with a varying mix of skill arrived in the course of the day and evening. Again counter attacks failed mainly due to poor coordination from the top.

The battle around The Hague

The German airborne troops in the area around The Hague were pushed into the defensive after failing to conquer the three airfields fiercely defended by Dutch units. Around The Hague a number of Dutch units were ordered to purge the area between Katwijk and Wassenaar beach. Unfortunately, this largely failed. Where some units booked some field gains, units next to them retreated. The communications were bad and orders were confusing or even contradicting. The units were often not larger than company size instead of bigger formations whihc was an order of General Van Andel. The idea was to keep units behind in case more airborne landings took place. The result was that were the attacks of the Dutch were successful, the units were too small to encircle the Germans, who could easily with draw. At Wassenaar it came to confusing fights where mutual coordination was difficult. Dutch artillery shot at the village of Valkenburg, where the largest German concentration of troops was located.

The air landings in side "Vesting Holland" made General Van Andel, commander of the stationary units suddenly a central figure of the defense of the Netherlands. A role no one anticipated not at least he himself. General Van Andel was a retired senior officer, friendly but not any more able to anticipate and act in modern war fare. Due to the threat of the Southern front of "fortress Holland"" the number of men under his command grew form a mere 20000 to more than 50000, which he and his staff with the overload of information receiving could not handle.
The pressure become too much for the old General and by the end of the 11th he suffered a nerve break down. His tasks and staff were taken over by the HQ. This initial set back of losing a senior officers turned out to be a positive one the next day. The the communication and orders improved and the next day larger units, battalion size units were formed to attack the German units around The Hague and Rotterdam.

The battle in the air

In the air, the LVA aircraft, at least the planes that survived the previous day, did what ever they could. Several attacks occurred at the airfields by Ju-87 bombers and Bf 109 fighters, which caused several losses on the ground. Sorties were made to bomb enemy units at the Peel-Raam defense line and in front of the Grebbe defense line. At Rotterdam and the surrounding of The Hague several bombing and machine gunning raids were done at the landing areas or concentration areas of German airborne units. Several fighters were made air worthy again after severely damaged.
Defense fights were delivered by the D-21, Hurricanes and G1's, with mixed success. At the end of the second day of war the LVA, could still use half of their first line airplanes. At the end of the day Ypenburg could be used. Valkenburg and Waalhaven were in Dutch hands but were very close to enemy units. The airbase Waalhaven lay close to the tramway to Oostvoorne which ended on the beach near the emergency airfield. During this day many equipment and even one 2 cm AA gun were moved by steam tram to this location.

Summary

On the first day practically all events had been managed by local commanders and remarkably enough that had often resulted in effective defense or even an aggressive recovery from the first blow.
Curiously during the second day of the war after the first shock of the invasion and massive air landing in the West had been absorbed nearly all went wrong.

On the second day when the high commands - like GHQ and the staff of Fortress Holland - had taken over, virtually all seemed to go wrong. That was not in all cases related to the directives from the top, but in the cases where it had mattered it was. Although many units fought hard at company and platoon level, fighting on the Dutch side was rather chaotic on the 11th. The lack of coordination and training with wireless communication became painfully clear. Nevertheless, the situations in and around Rotterdam and The Hague seemed to stabilize.
For the Germans the airborne landings around The Hague were going bad. The airborne landings around Rotterdam and Dordrecht had more success, despite the paratroopers could not occupy one of the Moerdijk bridge heads, they repulsed a counter attack by Dutch units and French armored cars. More pressing was the now delay of the 9th armored division.
The battle for the Netherlands was not decided when it was 12 May ...

The Dutch army had shown much resilience when it had been taken by surprise on the 10th. Local commanders or even platoon-leaders had shown - on many locations - that they were very much able to act and react. When the higher echelons took over on the second day, all went wrong. From a reactionary force the Dutch had to become an initiating one and that was exactly the Achilles Heel of the army. Its poor officer and NCO education showed its devastating effects on the performance of the troops. It was seldom the equipment (after all, the Germans lacked much communication equipment too) or the weaponry that made the difference, not even the boldness or courage, but it was the ability that was missing.

 

[dutch1980]

Please make it last longer than 5 days...

 

[Parma]

3.1.1

The basic layout of Dutch defense line
The Dutch defense was focused on the french one, as regarding the defense doctrine, and the doctrine regarding filed reinforcements. However with a Dutch twist to it.

French WWI defence structure
The French concept was based on a main-defense zone that was given shape by a front-line and a stop-line, as well as a third line in the rear of the main-defense zone.

The front- and stop line were interconnected by linking-trenches every hundreds of meters. As such the main-defense zone comprised some sort of a box-pattern. These interconnecting trenches had many functional purposes. Reinforcements could be fed to the front-line, casualties and injured men could be transported to the rear and - in case of an enemy penetration is some sector - the linking trenches could be used to seal off the penetration in the flanks. Also the relief of front-units could be executed under full cover. Ammunition could be transported as well as spare arms.

The distance between the lines should not be too short, nor should it be too long. Would it be too short, it would create a hazard to own troops once artillery would be applied in support of the stop line defenses after an enemy penetration. Would the distance be too long, the stop line would not be able to suppress a penetrating enemy force, which would provide the enemy too much room to move and expand. The distance between the front line and the stop line was in the range of 300-500 meters.

The front-line had to be the most formidable defense. The front-line was not to be lost and any sector penetrated by the enemy had to be retaken soonest. As such the front-line had to have a subsidiary trench structure with first reserve units, additional supplies and company command posts. The capacity of the front-line had to be large and as such extended dug out shelters had to be part of both the actual forward trenches as well as the subsidiary line.

Both the 'no man's land' in front of the forward trench-line and the area between the front-line and stop-line had to be packed with obstructions and land-mines. The area between front- and stop line obviously had to be modestly undermined, but the 'no men's land' had to be virtually impregnable.

The stop line defenses were supposed to provide the re leave of the forward defenses. The battalion command posts and local supply caches had to be incorporated in the structure. The stop line was not extremely fortified like the front-line. It did have to contain the light infantry support guns and mortars though.

Behind the stop line the light and medium field artillery units had to be deployed. These units had to be highly mobile so that they could be applied in a dynamic theater. In between these positions the rear line was situated, containing second line reserves, bulk caches and regiment command posts. Behind the rear defenses the more static artillery was positioned.

The Dutch implementation
General lay out for the Grebbe defense line, Peel-Raam defense line and Wons defense line.
The Dutch had obviously cut out all the frippery of the French concept. The interconnecting trenches between the stop- and front line had not been constructed. The subsidiary trenches at the front-line were absent. However the extensive obstruction and undermining of the no man's land was present. Moreover the capacity of the trench system was modest. Large forces were as such spread out and concentrations of force were impossible due to lacking shelters and hide-outs.

The front line itself was the main-defense line with many fortified sail-ants incorporated in it. These sail-ants contained machine-gun nests which were able to cover at least 120 degrees of the front, as such being able to give both frontal and flanking fire. Also concrete bunkers/pillboxes were constructed in and just behind the front-line.

The stop line was the rear of the main-defense zone and hosted company command posts, first reserve troops and ammunition stocks. Only occasional weapon-points were prepared in this second line. Infantry guns, AT guns and mortars were positioned in front of and behind the stop-line.

Behind the stop line the artillery positions had been dug out. The artillery had prepared many different fire missions in the sector in front of the main-defense as well as some in front of the stop-line. These fires had been accurately measured in and field commanders requesting a fire mission could as such suffice by just requesting a certain prepared fire code, possibly with addition of the length and intensity of the fire and the target information, infantry targets usually required HE / air burst ammunition with quick fuses, vehicles required slow or impact fuses.

The rear line - which the French applied during WWI - was absent all along. At some locations a thin trench had been dug out, but that was nothing like the French concept prescribed. Basically the entire defenses consisted of the front- and stop line.

The lay of the Grebbe defense line.
The front-line was situated behind vast inundated area's, but at two locations near the city of Amersfoort and at the Grebbeberg these inundations had not been set due to the elevated terrain. A concrete mill was under construction that had to flood the area in front of the Grebbeberg defenses too. It had not been delivered when war broke out. In the sectors where these inundations were omitted so called forward positions had been prepared. These were isolated trenches - usually containing a light machine gun squad or entire platoon. The positions were not connected and usually placed in a pattern with some hundred meters of depth. Unfortunately the designers had not developed a hedge-hog shape but a traditional face forward trench that obviously had a blind spot equaling at least 120 degrees, often more. That feature in combination with the isolated in depth pattern posed the immense liability that positions could be outflanked one by one. These forward defenses had some fire power form mortar batteries Their task was to prevent the enemy from undertaking reconnaissance missions against the main defenses and prevent the positioning of enemy troops close by. Obviously these forward defenses would be called back or forced back at some point after which the alarming and preventative tasks would be lost as well.

Probably the two worst mistakes the Dutch had made on all their defense lines was cutting back on the proven French concept, of linking trenches between the two defense-lines and the failing of a genuinely strong front-line with large capacity and integrated subsidiary trench system. Both these flaws had seriously decreased the value of the defense lines
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3.2

May 12 1940

On this third day of war, the coordination and sometimes chaotic command (also in higher regions) improved. The communication and use of the wireless and telephone become better. The investments in field radio's clearly showed it value, despite the poor training with this equipment and that on platoon level the orders and reports still had to be distributed by paper and men.

North Netherlands

The 1st German cavalry division still did not arrived for the Wons defense line. This front defense line of the Kornwerderzand defense line was about 7 kilometers long and lay between Makkum and Zurich in Friesland. There were concrete bunkers incorporated, one of the last ones finished between March and April and the planned inundations were implemented. This inundations were only made after enforcing the martial law. The positions were defended by only a battalion. The Dutch border battalions still managed to delay the German 1st cavalry division. In the late afternoon the first units of the border battalions reach the Wons defense line and at the end of the evening the entire border battalion had retreat behind this defense line.
( In OTL the inundations were nearly non existent due to objections of local authorities which could not be over ruled due to the absence of the martial law. The concrete pill boxes were not ready, it was planned to start the construction of these bunkers in May. The pillboxes who were present were some sort of earth works, holes of wood, dirt and peat, easily to detect in the flat country and no protection.)

Advance of Central and Southern Netherlands

Grebbe defense line

The 4th Regiment Hussars of the 2nd Army Corps, re-enforced with M39 armored cars and several L-60 tanks, which their opponent did not have, had relatively few losses since May 10 since the crossing of the river Ijssel. They had already all the necessary action-packed reconnaissance and reasonably successful delay actions behind them. On the 12th they get hold of it with SS units in the area in front of the Northern part of the Grebbe Line. Their defense was very successful.

At midday the 12th May the three battalions of the SS regiment attacked the outposts at the South end of the Grebbe line, after an introductory artillery bombardment. The outpost lost some of their their field telephone connections through the artillery fire, and had to relay on their radio connections, which sometime give battery problems. Never the less the Dutch artillery answered the German artillery fire, but was initially not effective. The German artillery fire was not particularly effective too except at breaking up the connections.

After the artillery the SS units made their first attack on the out posts. Thanks the clearings in front the out post the defensing men had a free field of fire which made the attack of the SS units not effective. More important the coordination between the artillery and the out poss improved which made the Dutch artillery more effective against the attacking Germans during the day.

Despite numerous attacks and artillery bombardments by the Germans failed to conquer the outpost in the South of the line. In the center and North of this line the SS units only reach the front of the outposts in the evening.

Peel-Raam defense line.
Due to the advance of the 6th Army in Belgium and the refusal of the French to move more East than Breda, forced General Reijnders to give the order of retreat form the Peel-Raam defense line. The defense line had endured heavy attacks and bombardments and even the defense was still strong it was uncertain it could sustain another day. General Reijnders ordered the 3rd Army to retreat in the night behind the South Willems canal. The Light division would defend the retreat.
Since the 3rd Army corps was relative well motorized or mobile, the retreat went orderly.
The Germans started their attack with an intense ground air attack, followed by direct artillery fire on the strong points of the Peel-Raam defense line as they experienced the previous day. After nine o'clock the defense line was taken, at Mill, only locally defended by units of the light division who retreated just before the main attack.
In the afternoon the 9th German armored division , finally on the move, was encountered by the first Dutch antitank guns armored cars and tanks with deadly success.

The Dutch defense in the sector between Den Bosch and the Wilhelmina-canal was pressed hard during the second half of the afternoon of the 12th, the soldiers who manned the Peel-Raam defense line were exhausted and the the armor of the Light Divison was out numbered by the German 9th. At the end of the afternoon of the 12th, the Dutch had to retreat if not to be over run.

The first actions against the thin Willemsvaart-canal defenses by German point formations had been followed by some lively local fights along this improvised defense line line. At the city of Veghel for instance, where the first units of the 9th Tank Division operated, intensive fighting had taken place during the afternoon of 12 May. It had cost the Germans some light armored units. Even after deploying a medium tank platoon the Dutch defenders were able to inflict serious damage , thanks to the presence of anti tank guns and own armored units. At most positions where the Germans developed concentrated assaults, the defenses had to yield at some point. Despite local penetrations of the Dutch defense lines, crossing of the Willemsvaart-canal, which were often not materialized quick enough due to lacking bridging material, or the presences of a Dutch artillery battery, mortar squad or armored cars or tanks.

The 9th Tank Division had divided itself over two main marching routes. The Northern formation took the road Den Bosch North of Breda and had orders to link-up with the besieged airbornes at Dordrecht. The Southern formation took the road Veghel - Tilburg - Breda, the same road that had been hammered and strafed by the ever so active Luftwaffe.

A third column would follow the Northern route, after which the 254th Infantry Division followed. The SS Verfügungs Division later Standarte Deutschland, Standarte Germania, and as off May 13 the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and the 256th Infantry Division were sent along the route Eindhoven - Breda. South of this the 30th and 56th Infantry Division progressed too, basically aiming for the area around Belgian Turnhout. Behind all this four more reserve infantry divisions followed, of which 208.ID and 225.ID across Dutch soil.

Only late in the evening of 12 May the Germans had crossed the line Den Bosch - Eindhoven - Valkenswaard, with some forward formations even near Tilburg.

Next the Germans would finally meet with the French. High hopes were in the hearts of the Dutch defenders, who witnessed their powerful ally with all its modern equipment. The Dutch were certain that the odds would be shifted. Now the Germans would meet their equal, was the general perception. This perception would soon grow into a deception ...

 

[Marquis]

A few ideas.

Spoiler: A few naval ideas

Sanity options for the Dutch Navy:
1905: Sell Marten Harpertzoon Tromp to Imperial Russian Navy.
1906: Cancel coast defence ship Jacob van Heemskerck and don't lay down De Zeven Provinciën.
1911: Order a pair of Armstrong-Whitworth Latorre-class super dreadnoughts. There's a high chance that they'll be bought off the Dutch by the RN. Keep good will with Britain by 'escaping' interned British troops.
1919: Refuse the ordered super dreadnoughts. Instead spend refund plus a bit to purchase the three incomplete Admiral-class battlecruisers.
__________________________________________

1919: Cancel the three Java-class cruisers and negotiate the license to construct the the County class heavy cruiser a few years later and build a full 3 ships.
1933: Don't build the cruiser de Ruyter.
1935: Don't build the three Tromp-class cruisers.
1936: Build three Town/Edinburgh-class big light cruisers.
1939: Dutch Consul in Montivideo, Uruguay, and Embassy in Buenos Aires negotiates succesfully with Uruguayan Government, German Consul, British Consul and Captain Hans Langsdorff to acquire DKM Graf Spee and repatriate the crew.
1939: To frustrate the potential sale of the as-yet incomplete warships to the hated Bolsheviks, Großadmiral Rader and an Abwehr liaison offer the Dutch the three vessels, Schwererkreuzer 'J', 'K, and 'L'. The offer is accepted, 'K' is delivered in February, completed, 'J' and 'L' in incomplete condition, but with all necessary materials and armament transferred.
____________________________________________

1910: Base the Wolf-class destroyer off HMS Swift. Three times bigger and nearly three times more powerful, the Swift design should keep you in modern destroyers to WWII.
1926: Don't build eight Admiralen-class destroyers.
1937: Don't build four Gerard Callenburgh-class destroyers.
1937: Build next generation of 12 destroyers of the Tribal-class.
__________________________________________

1919: Reduce the Brinio-class gunboats to training ship reserve.
1919: Purchase Lord Clive, General Wolff and Prince Eugene (monitors with 1x2 12" and 1x1 18" guns).
1922: Buy M-class (12" gun) submarine monitors.
1924: Cancel the two Flores-class gunboats.
1931: Cancel gunboat J M von Nassau.
1937: Cancel sloop van Kingsbergen.
1937: Build an additional four Tribal-class destroyers.

Result is a force of:
3 Admiral-class battlecruisers.
1 Deutschland-class armoured cruiser.
3 County-class heavy cruisers.
1 (+2 incomplete) Hipper-class heavy cruisers.
3 Town/Edinburgh-class cruisers.
8 HMS Swift-class destroyers.
16 Tribal-class destroyers.
3 Lord Clive-class monitors.
3 M-class submarine monitors.
3 Brinio-class training gunboats.

Cancelled:
3 Coast defense ships (1 sold)
7 Light cruisers.
12 Destroyers (+8 to different design.)
6 Gunboats.

A lot of this can probably be built in the Netherlands (apart from 2nd hand cheap surplus stuff).

 

[Marquis]

A few more ideas.

You have a total lack of artillery above 5.9"/15cm. I suggest the acquisition of:

1 Brigade Superheavy Railway Artillery.
50 GCR 8K 2-8-0 locomotives.
25 BL 12-inch railway howitzers.
25 BL 9.2-inch Mk.XIII railway guns.
50 AA trucks (2 x 2 4")
100 AA trucks (2x4 2lb Pom-Pom).

Fortress artillery:
5 BL 18-inch railway howitzers.
12 BL 15-inch siege howitzers.
20 BL 13.5-inch naval guns
50 BL 9.2-inch naval guns.
60 BL 5.5-inch naval guns.
200 Twin QF 4-inch naval AA guns.
1000 QF 2lb Pom-Poms.

You also lack snipers. Fit them out with Mausers or Lee Enfields, plus scopes.
Lahti L-39s, produce many of them for mobile anti-tank.

As for aircraft, have you considered that the Fokker D.XXI had proposals for folding undercarriage, 20mm cannon and the Bristol Hercules engine - if there are issues with the engine then GET BRISTOL TO FIX IT! Breaking the contract would be expensive and counterproductive when you could boost the reliability of a widespread Allied aero engine rather than opting for a type from the neutral American manufacturers.

 

[Parma]

A few more ideas.

You have a total lack of artillery above 5.9"/15cm. I suggest the acquisition of:

1 Brigade Superheavy Railway Artillery.
50 GCR 8K 2-8-0 locomotives.
25 BL 12-inch railway howitzers.
25 BL 9.2-inch Mk.XIII railway guns.
50 AA trucks (2 x 2 4")
100 AA trucks (2x4 2lb Pom-Pom).

Fortress artillery:
5 BL 18-inch railway howitzers.
12 BL 15-inch siege howitzers.
20 BL 13.5-inch naval guns
50 BL 9.2-inch naval guns.
60 BL 5.5-inch naval guns.
200 Twin QF 4-inch naval AA guns.
1000 QF 2lb Pom-Poms.

You also lack snipers. Fit them out with Mausers or Lee Enfields, plus scopes.
Lahti L-39s, produce many of them for mobile anti-tank.

As for aircraft, have you considered that the Fokker D.XXI had proposals for folding undercarriage, 20mm cannon and the Bristol Hercules engine - if there are issues with the engine then GET BRISTOL TO FIX IT! Breaking the contract would be expensive and counterproductive when you could boost the reliability of a widespread Allied aero engine rather than opting for a type from the neutral American manufacturers.

Thank you for the input, also the naval one.
It is only complete ASB....

 

[Marquis]

Thank you for the input, also the naval one.
It is only complete ASB....

I know .

I tried to base the naval one totally on modifying or repurposing OTL orders, programs and actual ships.

I don't understand why the Dutch didn't invest in fortress artillery.

The suggestions for thee D.XXI are close to OTL though.

 

[Parma]

3.2.1

The Light Division

The Light Division - known as the Light Brigade shortly before the war - was part of the armed forces that knew no equal. It was a Dutch response to the growing mechanization of armies worldwide. In addition, it was a component in which hussars (motorized with motorcycles or armored cars and even tanks) , artillery ( all with motor traction, trucks and lorries) and infantry ( bicycles or trucks machine guns and mortars all motorized with trucks) were actively united, which was not the issue elsewhere. Finally, it was a different matter that the infantry, the cyclists, were better trained than the regular infantry. For example, in principle all infantry men were trained in the operation of the light machine gun (which was not the case with the regular infantry) and sections were better trained for the independent fight. This distinction in training with respect to the regular infantry was due to the task that the Light Brigade and subsequently the Division had in the form of an operational 'fire service', with clearly offensive tasks. The entire train, supplies, was motorized
The LD was in fact the mobile workhorse for the Field Army. Her support and combat units were completely motorized. Even the units such as the 7-field were provided with motor-traction shortly before the war, in which the fire-arms were specially equipped with wheels and chassis that would allow for such rapid traction. As a result, the fire arms were given dense rims and rubber wheels, which in addition to practical use made the appearance much more modern.

The Light division comprised about 10000 men and was, everything but light. It was nearly, for Dutch understandings, an armored division and very well motorized.
It was equipped with one squadron (12) of L-60 tanks, two squadrons (24) of heavy armored cars M-39, one squadrons (12) of light armored cars M-37, two battalions of motorbike hussars, four batteries of motorized artillery ( 7 cm field and 10,5 cm Bofors model 34), motorized anti-tank guns (Bohler 4.7cm), two motorized batteries air defense( 2 cm Oerlikon) and mobile - partially motorized infantry. Mobile means the soldiers used bikes to relocate them self. The L-60 tanks were transported for long distances, on flatbed lorries who were towed by modified TRADO artillery tractors. The other vehicles were or TRADO artillery tractors, lorries or Ford 4x4 trucks. Further there were motorized mortar batteries with a total of 36 mortars. The machine guns were Vickers heavy machine guns and half of the number of light machine guns were the modern Czechoslovak ZGB 33.

Initially nearly all modern armored vehicles were located in Brabant, only in March 1940 the Dutch relocated their armor. The older ones M-36 were to defend the airfield and attached the the border battalions in the North, while 12 M-39, 24 M-37 armored cars and four L-60 tanks were located to the units behind the Ijssel line accompanied by other motor bike hussars.

The LD was supported by the 3rd Border Battalion and the 6th Border Battalion which were both completely mobile and motorized as well.

A 7 cm field gun (Krupp) with modified wheels and under carriage, for motorized traction, after battle.

Hussar with motor bike and MG as transport

Landsverk L181s of the Dutch 1st squadron 1936

Armored car DAF M37 (OTL M39)
(no drawings known of the OTL DAF Pantrado 2 design)

Swedish build L-60 "Panser Strijd wagen " Armored fighting Vehicle. With Bofors 37 mm gun in May 1940
appearance. (credit tank encyclopedia)

 

[Parma]

Updated and revised

 

[dutch1980]

Will the evacuation of Breda happen here?

 

[Hetzer1901]

Really enjoyed reading this. Can’t wait for more.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Really enjoying this TL

I have often considered the difference to the Spring 1940 offensives had the other Democracies (Norway, Netherlands and Belgium etc) made a better stand and better decisions etc

It would be interesting to give Norway the same treatment

 

[Dutchguy101]

Great timeline keep it up

 

[Parma]

3.3

May 12 1940

Rotterdam
In Rotterdam the local fights between the Dutch troops and the German air landing troops continued for the third day. In the morning a large formation of troops were concentrated and in the afternoon an attack was staged in order to control the Maas-bridges. The attack was initiated by a heavy mortar bombardment of the Insurance office building right in front of the North ramp of the bridges, were a group of German paratroopers controlled North side of the bridges. The mortar grenades heavily damaged the building and during the explosions Dutch units were able to advance to this building. After the bombardment stopped there was initial heavy fighting within the building but finally German resistance ended. A following attack on the South end of the bridge at the ""Noorder eiland" failed after heavy fighting and several deadly capitulates on the Dutch side.
Although the Dutch only regain control over the North side of the bridges, the Germans were suffering from continuous assaults on their positions. Not any rest was given to them and they had a hard time re-supplying their troops.

Especially the Dutch marines had proven themselves tough and determined adversaries to the Germans and it didn't fail to leave some impression on the latter. Still, casualties mounted up at both sides and the German command grew increasingly worried over the state and status of their troops in Rotterdam.

The third day of the war was the last day that the field at the Feyenoord Stadium was used by German transport planes. It were mainly supplies that were flown in.

At Rhoon a battle was fought between a small Dutch force and Germans of IR.72, a reserve unit of the 22.LL.ID that had been provided from the regular 46th Infantry Division. The Germans were aiming a the Spijkenisse bridge in order to stop a supply line of reinforcements to the Waalhaven airfield, and as a stage to a possible capture of airfield Waalhaven. The Dutch stayed in control but did not pursue the Germans who retreated. The Spijkenisse bridge remained in control and the occupation even expanded along the banks of the Oude Maas river. During the day more reinforcements arrived at Waalhaven in anticipation of a large attack against the Germans in Rotterdam South and Fyenoord
Delft and Overschie
At the village of Overschie, nowadays part of Rotterdam, just north of Rotterdam, German airborne and air-landing troops who had been dropped as part of the Ypenburg and Ockenburg task-forces had assembled and fortified themselves. Altogether the force counted between 750 and 1.000 men. Generalleutnant Graf von Sponeck - commander of 22.LL.ID - was in charge of this group. The General had made a daring march with his men from Ockenburg to Overschie. The few hundred men with him had bumped into Dutch opposition at the village of Wateringen only, where the Dutch had a command post guarded by a squad of Dutch defenders and supported by two armored cars.
The General had brought his long range transmitter squad (and material) with him. As such he was able to contact General Student on the other side of Rotterdam. Apart from the operational advantages of such, it gave him the opportunity to have the Luftwaffe instructed to drop urgently required supplies at the village of Overschie.

The village was surrounded by open and flat terrain, partially even by water. The main entrance to the village was a bridge that connected to the main road to Delft and The Hague. On the Rotterdam side the village was blockaded by Dutch forces sealing off the city along the entire northern outskirts. In Delft the Dutch had assembled considerable forces and artillery.

In itself the German occupation of a small perimeter was not too much of a problem to the Dutch. The airborne s were to weak to operate offensively and within their very limited occupied area they were no direct threat. If it wouldn't have been for the fact that the Germans controlled the main road between The Hague and Rotterdam from Overschie, the Dutch would have probably left them as they were. Now, they became a liability to all traffic between the two cities, and with the front line at the Nieuwe Maas it was imperative that the German occupation of Overschie had to be subdued.

Actions against Overschie
In the late evening of the 12th Dutch forces started deploying for an assault on the German stronghold from the direction of Delft. Altogether more than three companies, 550 men, went along in three separate columns. Two columns advanced almost parallel, along the old and new motorway, the third one came from the North-East. These troops were able to proceed up to a point where they were at two-and-a-half km distance from Overschie. In the meantime the columns had taken some wandering German troopers prisoner and collected quite some enemy weapons and supplies. At the really point, a road crossing, the troops were ordered to halt and await for two other battalions with six armored cars. Thanks to the presence of field radio's the battalions quickly could coordinate their operations and movements and continued their advance. Due to darkness the fighting slowed down. The Dutch machine guns did not had tracer rounds. In the early morning around 4:00 clock at the 13th the fighting continued.
Around Overschie, and North Rotterdam a complete battle unfolded between units of Von Sponeck and the large concentration of three Dutch battalions. The first major action developed around a mill and factory at the Northern part of Overschie. The Dutch received some assistance from a civilian who could reproduce the exact German positions.
Mortars, heavy machine guns and two armored cars were deployed. The mill came under heavy fire. A direct hit caused 17 Germans to be wounded, of which 6 only suffered minor wounds. Next the Dutch charged the terrain of the mill and the factory, covered by mortar and machine gun fire. Capturing the terrain. The remaining Germans had retreated to the village center.
The battalion at the main road had been pinned down by German MG fire initially including the fire that had come from the mill.
Two infantry guns, some field guns and two armored cars supported this battalion. They took aim at everything that moved and blew up German barricades. The Lieutenant-Colonel, who monitored the fight in front, was early in the battle hit by a bullet in the neck and when he was replaced by a Major the latter was wounded in no time by a German bullet in the head too. Then a Captain took charge of the battalion. The assault went on and gradually the Dutch gained ground.
Dutch artillery firing at German strong point guided by infantry observations who report the German positions by wireless.
Infantry fighting squads advances supported by the armored cars to German strong points. At around 17:00 the 13th Von Sponeck wired General Student that he was forced to surrender. The German air borne an air landing troops, were surrounded, had severed heavy casualties and more important were running out of ammunition. Around 700 Germans surrendered.

Valkenburg
Earlier on the 12th , at the village Valkenburg the Dutch, finally reconquered the village after intense artillery fire. Especially the center of the village suffered from this shelling and nearly all houses sustained some degree of damage from this relentless pounding and intense street fighting. The remnants of the German defenders finally surrendered. This made the airbase of Valkenburg at least safe from enemy land units. The base was in use since the initial attack despite several mortar shell fired form paratroopers nearby.

Changes the top
Dutch counter measures against the German strongholds initially left much to be desired. The Commander Fortress Holland, Genral van Andel, had ordered his subordinate commanders not to undertake any action beyond company size. This very peculiar order had found its origin in the fact that the GHQ still expected additional air landings and required the remaining troops of the 1st Corps to remain intact and at direct disposal. Larger scale actions would cause troops involved to jeopardize their state of readiness.
The side effect of this very questionable order was that the Dutch siege-forces around Valkenburg and Overschie did not have the authority to launch large scale assaults, let alone coordinated actions from more directions. A very unfortunate situation. It would mean that both German strongholds would remain in place, hardly without any serious challenge.

After General van Andel was relieved form duty at the end of the 11th, this order was revoked and large units were formed. This resulted in the successful defeat of paratroopers around Valkenburg on the 12th.
After their success at Valkenburg the units were ordered to move to the motor way South of the Hague in the direction of Delft. More units were concentrated West of Schiedam. All in preparation of large concentrated attack on the remaining paratroopers who were now concentrated around Overschie.

In the Air
At the end of the 12th, the LVA, the air branch was at 40% of their strength. Earlier damaged planes could be repaired, by the the ground crews who worked night and day and managed to get planes flying again with the limited means they have. At airbase Valkenburg they even had the danger to be over run by raiding parties of German paratroopers or mortar shelling by the same paratroopers who were nearby. Damaged air frames were the least problem. The main problem was to keep the engines running. Spare parts for engines and spare engines are in short supply, especially for the Merlin's of the Hurricanes.
Flights of G-1's, attack several time the landing zones near the Fyenoord stadium. Other G-1 strafing German units advancing the Wons-line in the North. Several sorties by G-1's, Douglas and escorted by D-21's are made at the island of Dordrecht and in the South in order to support the retreating Peel division and Light Brigade. This sorties in the at the Southern front are inflicting damage and support the ground forces but also are a cause of attrition, Nearly all sorties ending in a air fight. Is it not between Dutch bombers and their escorts who are attacked by German fighters, Bf -109, then it is between Dutch escorting fighters who engage Luftwaffe bombers, mainly Ju-87.
The bi-plane C-5 and C-10 fly their reconnaissance missions, and engage enemy troops on the ground, not without danger to be shot out of the air by the Luftwaffe.

Several transports of German POW's to IJmuiden harbor were ordered by General Reijnders on the 12th. The POW's came from all front-lines in the country. Many of them were Luftwaffe personnel of downed planes, airborne and air landing troops. In the early morning of the 13th the Steam Ship Phrontis would steam out of the harbor of Ijmuiden and reach the UK later that day, with 1,011 POW's on board.

(OTL prison transport and numbers did happen.
Attack on Overshie was less successful, mainly due to a panic attack of the driver of the one armored cars. The man had to be forced by his commander at gun point to continue to advance. The driver finally broke, put the armored car in reverse, driving over one of his infantry comrade, who followed the armored car behind, almost killing him. This panic retreat of the armored car ended a bloody but successful advance of the Dutch.)

 

[Broek]

Looks interesting. Bookmarked and subscribed. May be an interesting read when i get back from work.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Nice update.

OTL was there many POWs transported to the UK

For example I know that many Luftwaffe pilots and crews captured by the French were released after the armistice

Also heavy losses and failure by the Falshirmjaeger might have knock on implications for the future use of Paratroopers by all nations?

 

[HJ Tulp]

Nice update.

OTL was there many POWs transported to the UK

The prison transports seem to be like OTL, maybe with larger numbers.