Dien Bien Phu
- Thread starter Ultima770
- Start date
From what I know of the battle the French bloodied the Vietnamese pretty well. The problem is that while the Vietnamese were able and willing to throw more troops in to the fight the French couldn't do the same. While the French could maybe perform better in this battle, the conclusion to the conflict is pretty much already set.
The Navarre Plan was idiotic from the get go. "Hey let's put all our eggs in an isolated basket in the middle of enemy territory!"
Rather than making the French do better (because a Henri Navarre who's up to the task would've came up with a better plan to begin with) you'd instead have to make the Viet Minh have a misstep for once. Like buying into the assumption that getting artillery to the valley would be a no go and attempting to storm the base without it.
Rather than making the French do better (because a Henri Navarre who's up to the task would've came up with a better plan to begin with) you'd instead have to make the Viet Minh have a misstep for once. Like buying into the assumption that getting artillery to the valley would be a no go and attempting to storm the base without it.
Well there was a suggestion - 'Hell in a Very Small Place' I think - that at the last minute, as in the end of the dry season when the Viet Minh were all in the valley ready to go, just waiting for the monsoon to turn most of the French strong points into swamps, to then evacuate the garrison.
That would leave the Viet Minh Main Force stuck in an isolated valley in the precise arse end of nowhere. Yes, they intended to protect Laos with a few similar fortresses on the Bong Son Plain, apparently, the locations were far superior for the purpose. Not surrounded by hills that dominated them, not SWAMPS in the wet season, not too far from French-controlled areas for cargo aircraft to ship in enough supplies to actually build proper fortifications etc.
No this would not change anything in the long run besides buying the French some time to carry out some other plan. The question 'Such as what, exactly?' comes to mind, but that was the suggestion.
Honestly, it sounds like an elaborate prank rather than a strategy.
Indeed. It was this large superiority in artillery that won the Viet the battle. Not just in howitzers, but in the antiaircraft fires as well. The French artillery commander was so demoralized by the unexpected situation he committed suicide.
I recall some hyperbolic comment in a book about the French "...hopelessly maneuvering tanks, in the age of Guerillia warfare." This remark was a bit ignorant. The Viet Minh demonstrated the ability to plan, organize, and fight a set piece attritional battle. While it is possible to find failings in the Viet Minh performance their overall conduct of this battle, in terms of commanders judgement and in staff work was equal to that of the battles in Europe in either world war. Getting all that artillery & 30,000+ men into position, with sufficient food and ammunition was no half assed trick by insurgents hiding amongst the villagers. The French got curb stomped by a professionally run operation.
Not quite that. The reason the French went there is the location was a road hub important to VM logistics. Navarre hoped to: 1. Disrupt supply traffic. 2. Raid outwards from the 'airhead' 3. Lure the VM into counter attacks the French could defeat will adroit manuvered and superior firepower. They also picked one of the VM supply depots that were dispersed around the region.
After the French defeat the VM corps was in a good location for subsequent operations. The road network in the region did not meet 20th Century European standards, but it was more than adaquately for manuvering the VM field armies against the French garrison's and inadaquate mobile forces.
It wasn't the best source but as I remember, while it was a tactical defeat, the strategic goal was to relieve the pressure on Hanoi and re-establish a defensive line there.
Then for some reason they called a peace conference at the same time...
Of course it doesn't take away from Giap pulling a Hannibal, but I do wonder what would have happened if there hadn't been a peace conference at the same time, how would the war proceed?
Did not know about the hub, pretty interesting !
Some claim that communications problem was deliberate. Navarres staff included a lot of die hards who were fixated on military victory, and preservation of empire as the desirable political goal. They were fixated on proving the VM could be routed and the peace conference was unnecessary, or at least redirecting it in favor of preserving the empire.
Coulsdon Eagle
Monthly Donor
I recall reading many years (decades?) back that Lord Curzon in late 1890s / early 1900s wrote of a virtually unknown (to the West) hamlet in Indochina in such a strategically important position... Dien Bien Phu.
longsword14
Banned
The peace talks were decided well before DBP. Navarre's motivation might have been to put the VM in a bad military position before they started, it did not change the outcome of the war because the French were going to lose control of the north anyway, and the VM were not going to control the South either.
No.
The whole battle and siege were founded on the belief that Viet Min forces were inferior and could not muster an effective siege. Other than a 1960's style intervention with B52's and an Arc Light Bombing the position was unattainable.
I think it's possible to defend Dien Bien Phu if you fortifies the mountains over your base which otl were used by the vietminh heavy artillery.
But it's a stretch because they need to reconise the vietminh is a capable opponant, with an extraordinary logistic. The battle was when french high command failed to reconise it was possible to put heavy artillery up there.
If you denies the hills, the french army isn't cut off and can ressuplies faster than the vietminh.
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Just how were the French going to do that? They didn't have the airlift capacity or supply train for an operation like that.
No, Dien Bien Phu was destined for failure from the start.
elkarlo
Banned
I agree. No way the French coukd maintain an air bridge that Kong of that size. Was a pipe dream from the get go
I've seen at least one account alleging that the Rats of Nam Yum, internal deserters from the French force, eventually numbered as many as one-third the garrison, with the implication that, had they fought, the outcome would have been different.