Desert Storm, 3 Days Longer?

burmafrd

Banned
I was in England preparing ammunition at the time of Desert Storm. I can tell you that in Europe the Highway to Hell was publicized to the max and many were screaming about a slaughter and to end it. So there was a lot of pressure at this end- and John Major was no Thatcher. So I have no doubt that Bush was hearing about this big time/

As regards Franks- the US Army Staff College at Carlisle in its summation said this: General Franks was too cautious in facing an enemy clearly demoralized and already trying to escape. I wish they had this online but in typical Army BS very little of their studies are available that way except for some WW2 and earlier ones. BOttom line was Franks had an army many times more effective and capeable and he acted like McClellan.
 
BOttom line was Franks had an army many times more effective and capeable and he acted like McClellan.

Yes, because the attrition tactics of the "successful" Union general in the Civil War are perfectly reasonable in a modern, casualty-averse society. :rolleyes:
 

burmafrd

Banned
I would of thought that the analogy of slow and over cautious was enough- but I guess not. McClellan was successful?
 
Guys

From what I remember there was a lot of talk about the war being over in 100 hours [of ground combat]. Could be wrong but got the impression it had been decided to end it then because it made such a good sound bite. Remember being frustrated at the time because it seemed obvious to me - as a total amateur;) - that it was being ended for political reasons and we were losing a chance to remove Saddam, or at least so greatly cripple him that he might well be overthrown.

Steve
 

burmafrd

Banned
Over 600 artillery shells with mustard and nerve agent were found in Iraq after 2002. Who knows how many were quietly buried in the desert and will likely never be found? Saddam did not destroy his WMDs, they gradually deteriorated. BUT remember how long mustard stays potent- to this day French farmers are sometimes gassed by shells dug up from WW1, more then 90 years old.

As I said I was in England and got the European news and comentary and they kept playing the "Highway of Death" video over and over again- pressure certainly was on Bush to end it quickly. And the Egyptians and Saudi's were also pushing for it to end as fast as possible. And remember this- if you had asked ANYONE if Saddam was still going to be around 12 years later in March of 1991 they would have looked at you as being crazy or stupid.
 

MacCaulay

Banned
As regards Franks- the US Army Staff College at Carlisle in its summation said this: General Franks was too cautious in facing an enemy clearly demoralized and already trying to escape. I wish they had this online but in typical Army BS very little of their studies are available that way except for some WW2 and earlier ones. BOttom line was Franks had an army many times more effective and capeable and he acted like McClellan.

I just don't accept that. He would have encircled the Republican Gaurd, yes, but he would've ended up to their west and north completely spread out. The whole "three division fist" wouldn't have been able to stay together.

And most of the attacks I've read on his being too cautious read like Monday Morning Quarterbacking: "Of course he should have known the USAF could destroy whole mechanized divisions!" "Why didn't he realize the army that had been fighting Iran for 8 years was a blubbering mass in the desert?"

All those questions are great in hindsight, but they were only asked with anything approaching a serious tone because the Air Force was written a blank check to say what it wanted after the war ended.
 

burmafrd

Banned
Actually this was heard right after the war from Franks own division commanders. Swartzkof and Powell actually discussed releaving him. So it was NOT hindsight. I really think you have no idea how bad the IRaqi army was at that time after more then 40 days and nights of air bombardment. Yes there were a few units with fight left in them but not many. It was a demoralized and beaten army before the ground campaign began. Numerous military papers have been done by several different armies about it. It was considered the textbook example of how to defeat an army before you had to fight it. It was not just the bombardment which no one not having gone through it can describe. Psychological warfare as well. On top of all that the officer corps of the regular Iraqi army was very poor. Many of them deserted before the ground campaign began. By the time the ground war began, there was less then 4 divisions worth that were still willing to fight and they were spread out with a battalion here and there. Remember that the air campaign was especially geared towards destroying any mechanized units and the Republican Guard in particular. THe Intelligence assesment on the day it began considered the Iraqi army to be less then 30% combat effective. Franks was just too cautious to do what needed to be done.
 

MacCaulay

Banned
Actually this was heard right after the war from Franks own division commanders. Swartzkof and Powell actually discussed releaving him. So it was NOT hindsight.

If it was after the war, then I believe that is in fact the definition of hindsight.

I really think you have no idea how bad the IRaqi army was at that time after more then 40 days and nights of air bombardment. Yes there were a few units with fight left in them but not many. It was a demoralized and beaten army before the ground campaign began. Numerous military papers have been done by several different armies about it. It was considered the textbook example of how to defeat an army before you had to fight it. It was not just the bombardment which no one not having gone through it can describe. Psychological warfare as well. On top of all that the officer corps of the regular Iraqi army was very poor. Many of them deserted before the ground campaign began. By the time the ground war began, there was less then 4 divisions worth that were still willing to fight and they were spread out with a battalion here and there. Remember that the air campaign was especially geared towards destroying any mechanized units and the Republican Guard in particular. THe Intelligence assesment on the day it began considered the Iraqi army to be less then 30% combat effective. Franks was just too cautious to do what needed to be done.

I understand that the Iraqi Army was a quivering mass out in the middle of the desert. But there's no way (at least until 73 Easting) that we could've known that the attack on the ground would've gone so well against opposition. And at that point, how could he have just said, "Hey, division commanders: I know we don't have prepositioned fuel trucks for it and I told you to go with a different frag plan, but damn the torpedoes and start driving as fast as you can."
There was already an artillery unit in VII Corps that ran out of gas just moving at the speed they did. Moving any faster, and they would've been conducting an offensive like the Israelis on the first and second days of the Yom Kippur War in the Sinai: all armour, and no infantry or tube artillery.

I come from the school that says you don't engage the enemy in anything approaching a fair fight. I don't care how demoralized he is: if he has a battalion and you can bring a brigade, do it. If he manages to scrape up a brigade, then you bring a division and soften him up with airstrikes before you even get there.
That's the kind of fighting that gets the enemy demoralized in the first place.
 

burmafrd

Banned
I should have said what the divisional commanders had to say was said DURING the war and came out afterwards. This is in the official records of the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry. They urged faster movement.

You can make all the excuses you want but the intelligence coming in every day said the Iraqi army was beaten and demoralized and that intelligence was correct. Franks ignored it because he was just too scared to push. Like I said he was McClellan part deux.
 
Interesting discussion going here, and Im glad to have heard a new (to me) perspectives on Frank's performance during the First Gulf War,
but I guess the real question in so far as the POD goes isn't if Franks moved fast enought in OTL but if he could have closed the noose with 72 more hours.
 
Coalition troops were also tremendously exhausted after 100 hours of advance, and most importantly, the lead divisions of the VII Corps were reaching the limits of their effective supply lines. Continuing the war any longer exponentially increases the risk, and the casualities of the war would have been in the thousands instead of the mere hundreds.

What would destroying a few more Republican Guard's divisions have accomplished? The Coalition had already accomplished all of the political objectives set forth for the Operation. Kuwait was liberated, Saddam had been severely chastised, and most importantly, the body count was acceptably low.
 

burmafrd

Banned
What supply problems? Outside of the 24th Mech going to the Euphrates and almost running out of gas, there were no supply problems that were more then momentary. You seem to have forgotten that most of this battle was carried out in a relatively small area.
 
First time here, everyone. Interesting discussion here.

I'm thinking if the success of Desert Storm had been so great, there were many who would have considered pushing onto Baghdad and pushing Saddam out of power. I know Bush and Powell felt their goals were met, but Schwarzkopf had said that he would be willing to push forward to the Iraqi capital and he felt that with as disoriented as the Republican Guard was that within a matter of a few more days they could take Baghdad. Could the Allies have taken Baghdad at that point?

Plus, one other possibility of an elongated Desert Storm. At one point, Iraq had sent hundreds of its own planes to Iran to make sure they weren't destroyed by the Allies, with the "promise" of the Iranians returning them after the war. Obviously they kept them, but I could have seen where the Iranians might suddenly decide to invade Iraq on their own. I see it as them trying to gain revenge for the brutal 8-year war they had fought with the Iraqis just a few years prior. Would there have been a possibility of an Iranian invasion of Iraq and possibly further complicate matters?
 

burmafrd

Banned
No one thought Saddam would be around another 12 years, most thought he would be gone by the end of the year. It was a political decision forced by teh Saudi's and others already worried about the post war problems.
 

MacCaulay

Banned
Interesting discussion going here, and Im glad to have heard a new (to me) perspectives on Frank's performance during the First Gulf War,
but I guess the real question in so far as the POD goes isn't if Franks moved fast enought in OTL but if he could have closed the noose with 72 more hours.

In my mind (and I'm going to assume in burmafrd's as well), there's no question that they could've closed the gap if the war had just kept going for 72 more hours. It's that me and burmafrd seem to have a fundamental disagreement on the state of VII Corps if it had moved fast enough to close the gap in the time the war lasted in OTL.

What supply problems? Outside of the 24th Mech going to the Euphrates and almost running out of gas, there were no supply problems that were more then momentary. You seem to have forgotten that most of this battle was carried out in a relatively small area.

Good point. No sense in creating supply problems by overextending your lines, correct? If 2ACR runs out of gas and the Medina Division pops up and decides to attempt to take a bite while they're refuelling, then we'd be here arguing about how Franks shouldn't have moved so fast.
 
When the ceasefire was called the British 1st Armoured Division was the only unit fully refueled, rearmed ready to rock and roll. It would have taken another 24 or maybe 12 hours to replenish the US armoured units. That's not to say 1st Armoured (UK) couldn't have leapfrogged the US units and then a day later the US units doing the same when the UK division needed replen. Also the UK 5th Airborne Brigade, which had not taken part in the war was sitting in their Hercs at Brize ready to deploy if the ceasefire had not been called.
 
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