Actually this was heard right after the war from Franks own division commanders. Swartzkof and Powell actually discussed releaving him. So it was NOT hindsight.
If it was after the war, then I believe that is in fact the definition of hindsight.
I really think you have no idea how bad the IRaqi army was at that time after more then 40 days and nights of air bombardment. Yes there were a few units with fight left in them but not many. It was a demoralized and beaten army before the ground campaign began. Numerous military papers have been done by several different armies about it. It was considered the textbook example of how to defeat an army before you had to fight it. It was not just the bombardment which no one not having gone through it can describe. Psychological warfare as well. On top of all that the officer corps of the regular Iraqi army was very poor. Many of them deserted before the ground campaign began. By the time the ground war began, there was less then 4 divisions worth that were still willing to fight and they were spread out with a battalion here and there. Remember that the air campaign was especially geared towards destroying any mechanized units and the Republican Guard in particular. THe Intelligence assesment on the day it began considered the Iraqi army to be less then 30% combat effective. Franks was just too cautious to do what needed to be done.
I understand that the Iraqi Army was a quivering mass out in the middle of the desert. But there's no way (at least until 73 Easting) that we could've known that the attack on the ground would've gone so well against opposition. And at that point, how could he have just said, "Hey, division commanders: I know we don't have prepositioned fuel trucks for it and I told you to go with a different frag plan, but damn the torpedoes and start driving as fast as you can."
There was already an artillery unit in VII Corps that ran out of gas just moving at the speed they did. Moving any faster, and they would've been conducting an offensive like the Israelis on the first and second days of the Yom Kippur War in the Sinai: all armour, and no infantry or tube artillery.
I come from the school that says you don't engage the enemy in anything approaching a fair fight. I don't care how demoralized he is: if he has a battalion and you can bring a brigade, do it. If he manages to scrape up a brigade, then you bring a division and soften him up with airstrikes before you even get there.
That's the kind of fighting that gets the enemy demoralized in the first place.