Delayed Barbarossa

[Patukov]

Let's say that for some reason (Maybe France holds longer and keep fighting,or Greece or Yugoslavia) Hitler is forced to delay Barbarossa until February/March 1942 and the Soviets don't ignore the obvious Axis mobilization and makes some preparations....

What happens then?

 

[adam888]

It would be curious what the Germans would have done if Pearl Harbor
had occurred as scheduled in this scenario.

 

[Woolly Mammoth]

Depends whether Stalin is as bone headed as OTL (ever possible) and still ignores all the warning signs. If he does then this might even favour the Germans because of extra preperation time.

 

[Shaby]

It is hard to see that even in this situation - US in active belligerence against Germany they would have chosen to be dependant on Soviets. Come May '42, Germans roll over USSR and fare worse than in OTL.

 

[MattII]

By may 1942 I doubt it would be a roll-over, there would be probably several thousand more T-34s, which even if the Germans had got their 7.5 cm KwK 40 in place, would still have slowed the Germans down quite a bit. Possibly the Yak-7 will be available by the time the war starts as well, which I assume will be a nasty surprise to the Germans. The Pe-2 and Tu-2 will also be a nasty surprise for the Germans.

 

[Montanian]

Bevin Alexander's recent series of books rethinking the Soviet-German war brought up that Stalin was mobilizing for an attack within a few months of Barbarossa and German intelligence was somewhat aware of that, prompting Hitler's "strike first" rather than "what the hell?" attack. That does explain the massing of Soviet troops near the border and the level of surprise and disorganization when the planned attack turns into defense.

So if Hitler did decide to hold Barbarossa back, quite reasonably to acquire more supplies and munitions to rebuild what had been deeply depleted in the Western Europe campaigns, see Adam Tooze's "Wages of Destruction", and at least initially he was reacting to a Russian offensive into Poland, that's intriguing. Maybe the German's strengths with elastic defense and shortening supply lines allows the same vast encirclements of Soviet forces and the results are roughly the same but the battles are fought in Poland instead initially (which might affect Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgarias' actions or not really given where they'd be in relation to the Russian advance in 1941-2.

Simply attacking the Soviets later would mean:
1. U.S. support of the Allies was significantly retarded by Soviet spies/useful idiot supporters/direct funding of media and government officials. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, that vast "give peace a chance, stay out of the war" campaign became stridently interventionist in a day or two after Barbarrossa commenced. Do it later, the U.S. is even less mobilized by Pearl Harbor, some of the aid to Great Britain probably isn't allowed, maybe the American draft isn't extended, probably puts the U.S. about 3-12 months behind OTL in mobilization.
2. The pressure on Hitler from both deals with Japanese and internal issues as well as the Battle of the North Atlantic, probably still has Germany declare war on the U.S. shortly after Peal Harbor. That occurring before declaring war on his Russian allies is really intriguing. Stalin wouldn't be getting a flood of American trucks, planes, tanks, food, munitions, locomotives, etc. that sustained his war effort far more than Soviet propaganda admitted...so the Russian war effort is considerably weaker in 1942 and possibly after that, how it unfolds seems likely to change considerably.
3. Timing for Russian mud, permafrost, and winter are big deals and it's mostly forgotten how many German officers had trained in Russia, particularly on armored tactics/equipment testing in the 1930's before Hitler was able to ignore the Treaty of Versailles' weapons limitations, that's considerably different experience with terrain and conditions than a vague knowledge it had been hard on Napoleon as seems often implied. Holding back probably would mean Spring 1942.

 

[MattII]

Bevin Alexander's recent series of books rethinking the Soviet-German war brought up that Stalin was mobilizing for an attack within a few months of Barbarossa and German intelligence was somewhat aware of that, prompting Hitler's "strike first" rather than "what the hell?" attack.

Without getting into an argument over that particular situation, I'll point out several point that Alexander seems to have missed:

1) Lend-Lease was signed into law on March 11, so it's around for more than 3 months before Barbarossa.

2) There wasn't a whole lot of Lend-Lease going into Russia in 1941, and Russia wouldn't have needed it anyway since it would have had a lot more factories to work with, and wouldn't have lost production in moving the ones they managed to evacuate OTL.

3) The longer they delay, the longer the Soviets have to build up.

 

[Snake Featherston]

This is what happened in my A Sound of Thunder TL. Barbarossa is delayed a year because Hitler decides on a gamble of more submarines and a joint naval offensive intended to force the British to surrender. What actually happens is Japan inaugurates the Pacific War and the joint stress of Hitler's submarine offensive and the Imperial Japanese Navy are what enable the Nazis to secure a cease-fire from British overstretch. But by the time they launch Barbarossa their economy is in the middle of returning to producing the equipment for a land campaign, the campaign is very poorly designed, and they're plunged into a massive attrition battle that sees the USSR begin a series of rippling offensives that steadily destroy German logistics and thus the war ends with rather little fighting because Germany's logistical and economic power spiraled into a total collapse.

However to get that situation required the combination of British mistakes and the challenge of Japan's Two-Ocean offensive and thus it wasn't really the Nazis doing that. Only Hitler viewed it that way, but since it was *Hitler* viewing it that way......

 

[Snake Featherston]

Bevin Alexander's recent series of books rethinking the Soviet-German war brought up that Stalin was mobilizing for an attack within a few months of Barbarossa and German intelligence was somewhat aware of that, prompting Hitler's "strike first" rather than "what the hell?" attack. That does explain the massing of Soviet troops near the border and the level of surprise and disorganization when the planned attack turns into defense.

So if Hitler did decide to hold Barbarossa back, quite reasonably to acquire more supplies and munitions to rebuild what had been deeply depleted in the Western Europe campaigns, see Adam Tooze's "Wages of Destruction", and at least initially he was reacting to a Russian offensive into Poland, that's intriguing. Maybe the German's strengths with elastic defense and shortening supply lines allows the same vast encirclements of Soviet forces and the results are roughly the same but the battles are fought in Poland instead initially (which might affect Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgarias' actions or not really given where they'd be in relation to the Russian advance in 1941-2.

Simply attacking the Soviets later would mean:
1. U.S. support of the Allies was significantly retarded by Soviet spies/useful idiot supporters/direct funding of media and government officials. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, that vast "give peace a chance, stay out of the war" campaign became stridently interventionist in a day or two after Barbarrossa commenced. Do it later, the U.S. is even less mobilized by Pearl Harbor, some of the aid to Great Britain probably isn't allowed, maybe the American draft isn't extended, probably puts the U.S. about 3-12 months behind OTL in mobilization.
2. The pressure on Hitler from both deals with Japanese and internal issues as well as the Battle of the North Atlantic, probably still has Germany declare war on the U.S. shortly after Peal Harbor. That occurring before declaring war on his Russian allies is really intriguing. Stalin wouldn't be getting a flood of American trucks, planes, tanks, food, munitions, locomotives, etc. that sustained his war effort far more than Soviet propaganda admitted...so the Russian war effort is considerably weaker in 1942 and possibly after that, how it unfolds seems likely to change considerably.
3. Timing for Russian mud, permafrost, and winter are big deals and it's mostly forgotten how many German officers had trained in Russia, particularly on armored tactics/equipment testing in the 1930's before Hitler was able to ignore the Treaty of Versailles' weapons limitations, that's considerably different experience with terrain and conditions than a vague knowledge it had been hard on Napoleon as seems often implied. Holding back probably would mean Spring 1942.

There are rather more mundane reasons for that Soviet massing on the borders and their poor preparation. The Soviet wars of aggression at Polish and Baltic and Finnish defense meant the USSR had to push its army further forward to secure its new borders, or otherwise it was basically in a position of doing much to gain nothing at all. This, however, meant the USSR had to start from scratch with defenses. The Purges explain the dislocation as Soviet generals were very inexperienced and Moscow's command and control and communications systems broke down altogether in the first two weeks. The surprise factor was due to the Soviets having had so many cries of wolf that they missed the wolf coming down upon the fold when it finally happened.

Soviet concepts in the MP-40 Plan were defensive, but were structured on a very bad basis, namely the belief that they would have two weeks to prepare for any Nazi assault and then would be able to conduct WWI-style mass offensives against it. The reality was that this meant their deployments were very stupid ones, the collapse of C3 meant their armies flailed the first two weeks for massive casualties and no positive results, and tactical flailing against Germans is a route to being bitch-slapped.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

3) The longer they delay, the longer the Soviets have to build up.

LL wasn't given to the Soviets until October due to the invasion and the likely chance of Soviet survival after the major losses of June-September and may not be if the British are not in the war when the invasion happens.

And the longer the Germans have to build up. They will have a massive air force ready at the end of it, which was a major deficiency IOTL with Barbarossa; the Luftwaffe was only about the same size as it was during the invasion of France and was therefore not able to lay down the same intensity of effort as during the Blitzkrieg. The increased Luftwaffe support would offset a lot of the ground power of the Soviets, especially when the Red Air Force would be swept from the skies. If/when the Soviets prevent the Germans from deep penetrations into their lines the Luftwaffe would serious benefit from not having to displace forward and can keep the major attrition battle going against the Soviets thanks to interdiction, something they couldn't do OTL due to the limited size of the Luftwaffe thanks to other commitments in Europe and Africa/Mediterranean. Here expect the Luftwaffe to be at least 4x as large in the East thanks to avoiding fighting anywhere but against the Soviets. Of course if the British are in the war then this is moot.

Another factor people seem to missing is that the Soviets had serious issues with replacements while they were upgrading their units; serious issues with experience with the new equipment especially their new aircraft; serious issues with maintenance because their new vehicles did not have replacements, their mechanics did not have experience working with these new models, and the shoddy work the early versions of the T34 and early aircraft had because of the pressure to get them into the field. Also the huge expansion of Soviet forces also meant that they had vastly inexperienced formations, leaders, and supply issues from having to supply all of these new units and upgrade them. They were producing new, inexperienced and undertrained mechanics to service their expanding forces, which means they are not likely to be effective in their designated roles yet, which would help increase inservicability in their units. The Soviets lacked domestic sources of Avgas, so had to limit the amount of training their air forces could do and were in no way about to improve training into 1942 as they were still expanding their air force. Basically Soviet training, experience, and organization would still be terrible in 1942 as would logistics and servicability of their mechanical units.

Yes the Soviets would be better off, but not dramatically so. The German expansion would also offset a lot of the advantages gained by the Soviets too, so though the net would be Soviet plus, its not nearly as big as you'd think. Plus the further west the Germans are when winter hits actually is a gain to them, as their logistics would be much better and leave them less vulnerable to counterattacks and attrition due to conditions. It also means their firepower can be supplied properly instead of having to rely on small arms to defeat mechanized offensives.

 

[Snake Featherston]

LL wasn't given to the Soviets until October due to the invasion and the likely chance of Soviet survival after the major losses of June-September and may not be if the British are not in the war when the invasion happens.

And the longer the Germans have to build up. They will have a massive air force ready at the end of it, which was a major deficiency IOTL with Barbarossa; the Luftwaffe was only about the same size as it was during the invasion of France and was therefore not able to lay down the same intensity of effort as during the Blitzkrieg. The increased Luftwaffe support would offset a lot of the ground power of the Soviets, especially when the Red Air Force would be swept from the skies. If/when the Soviets prevent the Germans from deep penetrations into their lines the Luftwaffe would serious benefit from not having to displace forward and can keep the major attrition battle going against the Soviets thanks to interdiction, something they couldn't do OTL due to the limited size of the Luftwaffe thanks to other commitments in Europe and Africa/Mediterranean. Here expect the Luftwaffe to be at least 4x as large in the East thanks to avoiding fighting anywhere but against the Soviets. Of course if the British are in the war then this is moot.

Another factor people seem to missing is that the Soviets had serious issues with replacements while they were upgrading their units; serious issues with experience with the new equipment especially their new aircraft; serious issues with maintenance because their new vehicles did not have replacements, their mechanics did not have experience working with these new models, and the shoddy work the early versions of the T34 and early aircraft had because of the pressure to get them into the field. Also the huge expansion of Soviet forces also meant that they had vastly inexperienced formations, leaders, and supply issues from having to supply all of these new units and upgrade them. They were producing new, inexperienced and undertrained mechanics to service their expanding forces, which means they are not likely to be effective in their designated roles yet, which would help increase inservicability in their units. The Soviets lacked domestic sources of Avgas, so had to limit the amount of training their air forces could do and were in no way about to improve training into 1942 as they were still expanding their air force. Basically Soviet training, experience, and organization would still be terrible in 1942 as would logistics and servicability of their mechanical units.

Yes the Soviets would be better off, but not dramatically so. The German expansion would also offset a lot of the advantages gained by the Soviets too, so though the net would be Soviet plus, its not nearly as big as you'd think. Plus the further west the Germans are when winter hits actually is a gain to them, as their logistics would be much better and leave them less vulnerable to counterattacks and attrition due to conditions. It also means their firepower can be supplied properly instead of having to rely on small arms to defeat mechanized offensives.

1) And in insufficient quantity or quality to affect the outcome of the 1941 fighting in any way, shape, form or fashion. So this means a great heap of nothing.

2) Sure, and the Germans have an army that at its peak is a very tiny modern force superimposed on a WWI Army, against an army whose defects in machinery will be made good. The Soviets gain more from time than the Nazis do, and more in completely different ways. The Soviets were ready for a war, the Nazis were partially ready for battles.

3) And the German concept of logistics was "Clap your hands if you believe, then machine gun people until they're willing to be slaves." What you say is true, and it's irrelevant. Soviet mechanized corps of all T-34 forces against a German invasion of 1942 will ruin the whole day of the tiny portion of the German army that's suited for 20th Century war, and after that the question is where and when. Nazi fanboys never like hearing this, but Germany in WWII was utterly unsuited for a serious modern war. Against a USSR that starts with the T-34 in mass quantities the question will be how soon the Soviets assume major production and how soon the Germans realize that raping their way through the USSR to destroy its cities and turn the survivors into slaves is unlikely to happen.

4) No it's not. The Axis frankly put will only credit the Soviets with actually fighting when, not if, it turns out that their armies are torn to shreds. People give the Nazis credit for planning on a rational military basis. The regime never did this.

 

[Genmotty]

...but Germany in WWII was utterly unsuited for a serious modern war.

And yet they made a preaty good attempt at it for 5 years ¬.¬


I think the distinction needs to be made in noteing that German Army was designed with the concept of the armoured scherpunkt, and localised tactical force concentration. This was great for tactical operations, but suffered when looking at an operational level of force concentration.

This coupled with the 'victors complex', and difficulties in fighting a two front war simply lead to the 3rd Reich taking on too much than it can chew.

In that sense Barbarossa in most permiatations is a death knell unless other PODs affect the 'western front' and its ability to be conducted by the Allies. Even then, its a close call because Stalin historically nearly lost it twice; one during the initial invasion where he was paralised with indecision, and thus the army under him was fearing they would incur his wrath for the wrong action, and a second time when Army Group center was at the gates of Moscow and he had to make the decision to 'hold the line' and stay in Moscow, or flee on his armoured train futher east, and with it a strategic withdrawel.

Both of these two events could have cost the entire war in the east for the Soviets. If Stalin had comitted suicide, or maintained his 'isolation' for a longer period then the army wouldn't have begun its retreats when it did. And if he left Moscow political enermies would have stepped in and the army may have fallen apart resulting in a total collaspe of the soviet political system and millitary within a few weeks.

Really most people don't realise how close the soviet union came to blowing it because of Stalin in those first few months of Barbarossa.


A delayed Barbarossa may make these 'shocks to the leadership' less for Stalin, but if the German Wehrmacht gets to Moscow he is almost certain to take the train, since it was totally expected he would, and nobody knows why really he didn't (well I don't know, and the source film/book that I watched/read on it didn't claim an answer).

There are also a myriad of other blunders, but these were two very pivotal moments on the Soviet side of things.


EDIT: Trying to find the documentary I want, not found it yet, but this one might be interesting to people;

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N6dX-XhQU04

 

[Deleted member 1487]

1) And in insufficient quantity or quality to affect the outcome of the 1941 fighting in any way, shape, form or fashion. So this means a great heap of nothing.

Agreed, but LL won't be around later when it would be critical...from the US. The British provided huge amounts of material too early in the invasion. From June on the British were shipping to Murmansk and Archangelsk, plus opening up the Persian supply lines. They were providing radios, tanks, and airplanes among other things, which were critical in the fighting around Moscow when the newly Western equipped units were operational. So yeah, I'd say it means something.

Also the Soviets are going to be supporting the Germans materially throughout this period without being paid for it thanks to the trade deal that Molotov signed and expanded in 1940. This is all stuff the Soviets cannot use for themselves in the mean time and the Germans didn't have access to after June 1941.

2) Sure, and the Germans have an army that at its peak is a very tiny modern force superimposed on a WWI Army, against an army whose defects in machinery will be made good. The Soviets gain more from time than the Nazis do, and more in completely different ways. The Soviets were ready for a war, the Nazis were partially ready for battles.

The same could be said of the Soviets until 1944-5 and would at best be an incomplete picture of both armies. The vast majority of all WW2 armies except for the US wasn't motorized or mechanized. Until 1943 the Soviets are just upgrading their armies, not expanding motorization in infantry units.

Not only that, but the Soviets are forming totally mechanized corps/armies divorced from the bulk of the Red Army's infantry for deep penetrations, but they have no experience fighting this way against modern, experienced foe, all while having terribly inexperienced over-promoted officers and conscripted infantry with little to no experience with modern machines and combat.

3) And the German concept of logistics was "Clap your hands if you believe, then machine gun people until they're willing to be slaves."

That's a non-sequitor. The two have nothing to do with the other. Logistics isn't occupation policy.

What you say is true, and it's irrelevant. Soviet mechanized corps of all T-34 forces against a German invasion of 1942 will ruin the whole day of the tiny portion of the German army that's suited for 20th Century war, and after that the question is where and when. Nazi fanboys never like hearing this, but Germany in WWII was utterly unsuited for a serious modern war. Against a USSR that starts with the T-34 in mass quantities the question will be how soon the Soviets assume major production and how soon the Germans realize that raping their way through the USSR to destroy its cities and turn the survivors into slaves is unlikely to happen.

Not if the T34's don't have replacement engines and have shitty mechanics that can't keep the T34's in the field. In that case, which was the case in 1941 and 1942 OTL, the T34 is just a pill box and can be bypassed, especially when it has the 2 man turret and no radio like OTL. In one year the Soviets aren't going to develop an electronics industry capable of equipping the Soviet armies without LL.

There is nothing here about being a Nazi or German 'fan boy' but rather a realistic assessment of Soviet limitations. You're swinging the pendulum too far in the other direction, heading into Red Army 'fan boy-ism'.

The Soviet economy had massive problems and wasn't itself especially suited to a modern war with modern technologies until the 1950's. LL helped much more than you are allowing for. Yes LL didn't really kick in from the US until 1942-3, but the British were extremely helpful to the Soviets in 1941-1942. You're not allowing for their tanks, airplanes, radios, etc. that was all coming in through LL in Murmansk and Persia from June on. The US LL was actually getting passed on to the Soviets from the British in 1941 long before October.

The Red Army of 1941-1943 was a different animal than late 1943-1945. Don't assume that an extra year is suddenly going to make the early T34's more mechanically reliable or the men manning them really that much more experienced considering the vast resources the Soviets were putting into forming new units, not improving the ones they already had.

Will the Soviets do better than they did in OTL 1941 here ITTL 1942? Definitely! The Germans won't advance as far and the Soviets will avoid much of the pocket battles they fought. We also are dealing with a major amount of uncertainty here too: are the British in the war or not? Are the Soviets going to get LL or not? The scenarios are vastly different if the British are still in the war or not or if the Japanese have attacked the US already or not.

If the British are still in the war and the Japanese have attacked the US, then the Germans are fucked even if they didn't declare war on the US. That means the Germans are tied down in the West with their one trump card, the Luftwaffe, while the Soviets have their Siberian divisions in the West ready and waiting.

If the scenario is the opposite, then the Soviets are fucked. The Germans have their full weight ready for the Soviets, access to world markets and raw materials, and probably access to gas without having to worry about British retaliation on German cities to restrain them. This also means no LL from anyone for the Soviets, which is severely problematic in 1942 and would only get worse as time went on.

4) No it's not. The Axis frankly put will only credit the Soviets with actually fighting when, not if, it turns out that their armies are torn to shreds. People give the Nazis credit for planning on a rational military basis. The regime never did this.

That is much to simplistic to describe what was going on in the large numbers of German agencies charged with planning and proliferated due to Nazi administrative insanity. There was actually good planning done and good intelligence that was ignored by the supreme planning committee under Hitler at OkW. That is where the problems were located mostly, as the failures of Hitler and his sychophants influences everything. Planning and intelligence was tossed out based on ideology, not to mention the shitty industrial planning of Goering. Still the air campaign given the restrictions placed on it were still ridiculously effective and was well planned. Even the tactical-operational planning at the army group level and below worked out pretty well until major strategic flaws later in the campaign derailed things. To say the German system was irredeemably fucked is no better than saying the same of the Soviets.

Again you're swinging the pendulum too far in the favor of the Soviets in response to your perception of German-wanking. I fully understand why you have this emotional reaction to too much "Germanz rule!" that goes on on this board, but don't let that cloud your judgement of the Germans actual successes and the actual failures of the Soviets and their system.

 

[Snake Featherston]

And yet they made a preaty good attempt at it for 5 years ¬.¬


I think the distinction needs to be made in noteing that German Army was designed with the concept of the armoured scherpunkt, and localised tactical force concentration. This was great for tactical operations, but suffered when looking at an operational level of force concentration.

This coupled with the 'victors complex', and difficulties in fighting a two front war simply lead to the 3rd Reich taking on too much than it can chew.

In that sense Barbarossa in most permiatations is a death knell unless other PODs affect the 'western front' and its ability to be conducted by the Allies. Even then, its a close call because Stalin historically nearly lost it twice; one during the initial invasion where he was paralised with indecision, and thus the army under him was fearing they would incur his wrath for the wrong action, and a second time when Army Group center was at the gates of Moscow and he had to make the decision to 'hold the line' and stay in Moscow, or flee on his armoured train futher east, and with it a strategic withdrawel.

Both of these two events could have cost the entire war in the east for the Soviets. If Stalin had comitted suicide, or maintained his 'isolation' for a longer period then the army wouldn't have begun its retreats when it did. And if he left Moscow political enermies would have stepped in and the army may have fallen apart resulting in a total collaspe of the soviet political system and millitary within a few weeks.

Really most people don't realise how close the soviet union came to blowing it because of Stalin in those first few months of Barbarossa.


A delayed Barbarossa may make these 'shocks to the leadership' less for Stalin, but if the German Wehrmacht gets to Moscow he is almost certain to take the train, since it was totally expected he would, and nobody knows why really he didn't (well I don't know, and the source film/book that I watched/read on it didn't claim an answer).

There are also a myriad of other blunders, but these were two very pivotal moments on the Soviet side of things.

1) Actually they really didn't. It's more that their enemies made mistakes, some unavoidable, some inexcusable, and their massed panzers gave them very narrow margins of success. The Soviet mistakes mattered less because the German concept of the war was invalidated at Smolensk when their "war is won in two weeks" mentality got a bucket of cold water in the face. Poland had a no-win situation, Denmark had no army, Norway never got a chance to get an army as opposed to disorganize units, Holland had no army, and the UK and Belgium were driven from Europe from Sickle-Slice, not direct defeats at Nazi hands. France was beaten from poor allocation of reserves, not Nazi strength. 1941 was the result of the Nazis and Soviets flying by the seat of their pants, a factor that favors the German way of war that had no strategic conceptions whatsoever.

2) The longer the Germans wait, the more the Soviets replace their more obsolete armor with the T-34s, while Nazi ideological arrogance means that they'll think weapons that defeated France certainly will be able to do the same to a society of subhumans run by a clique of human parasites. The reality of the T-34 being invincible to German armor and antitank forces would be perfectly irrelevant and reports of the disasters that unfold would be dismissed. Sure, Hitler might build up more, but he's not an AH.com poster with hindsight. He genuinely believed the USSR would disintegrate in a series of border battles and then the Nazis reach the Volga in a joyride in three months. Both sides build up, but a Soviet buildup with higher-quality weapons *and* superior masses of troops is vastly likely to crush Barbarossa far shy of Minsk, let alone Moscow and Leningrad.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Agreed, but LL won't be around later when it would be critical...from the US. The British provided huge amounts of material too early in the invasion. From June on the British were shipping to Murmansk and Archangelsk, plus opening up the Persian supply lines. They were providing radios, tanks, and airplanes among other things, which were critical in the fighting around Moscow when the newly Western equipped units were operational. So yeah, I'd say it means something.

Also the Soviets are going to be supporting the Germans materially throughout this period without being paid for it thanks to the trade deal that Molotov signed and expanded in 1940. This is all stuff the Soviets cannot use for themselves in the mean time and the Germans didn't have access to after June 1941.

Sure, and the Nazis will need to be doing something else for Barbarossa to be delayed at all. Lend-Lease did not affect Soviet victory over the Germans, it affected the degree to which the USSR would build an empire in Europe. The Soviets ground up the Wehrmacht without Lend-Lease as a relevant factor in any sense.

The same could be said of the Soviets until 1944-5 and would at best be an incomplete picture of both armies. The vast majority of all WW2 armies except for the US wasn't motorized or mechanized. Until 1943 the Soviets are just upgrading their armies, not expanding motorization in infantry units.

Not only that, but the Soviets are forming totally mechanized corps/armies divorced from the bulk of the Red Army's infantry for deep penetrations, but they have no experience fighting this way against modern, experienced foe, all while having terribly inexperienced over-promoted officers and conscripted infantry with little to no experience with modern machines and combat.

And yet these tanks outgun anything the Nazis have, while the Nazis have experience fighting armies that go home after a few weeks of getting stomped on, not one willing to spend eight weeks and hundreds of thousands of lives in failed counterattacks. The Soviets suffer from inexperience, yes, but the Nazis frankly put don't have a modern army, only a few modernized divisions. The Soviets have a *concept* of a *modern war*, the Nazis at most improvised the modern *battle* during a war.

That's a non-sequitor. The two have nothing to do with the other. Logistics isn't occupation policy.

Actually the two had everything to do with each other. HItler made up a number of Nazi worker shortfalls by imposing slave labor on Europe. It was a pattern that went back to WWI. Germany, simply put, relied on slaves to attempt to cover for its industrial weaknesses. Germany was not able to do so effectively, Tsarism and the USSR were able to do so more efficiently.

Not if the T34's don't have replacement engines and have shitty mechanics that can't keep the T34's in the field. In that case, which was the case in 1941 and 1942 OTL, the T34 is just a pill box and can be bypassed, especially when it has the 2 man turret and no radio like OTL. In one year the Soviets aren't going to develop an electronics industry capable of equipping the Soviet armies without LL.

There is nothing here about being a Nazi or German 'fan boy' but rather a realistic assessment of Soviet limitations. You're swinging the pendulum too far in the other direction, heading into Red Army 'fan boy-ism'.

Except that your point is invalid because Lend-Lease was flat-out irrelevant for the Soviet war until 1943. IOTL the Germans hit a Red Army with a great surplus of obsolete weaponry. ITTL the Germans hit a larger army without that obsolete weaponry, meaning they take massively higher losses earlier on and get ground up earlier and further west, meaning more Soviet factories move east, meaning a smaller logistical crunch for the USSR, meaning a worse overall situation for Hitler's rapelootpillage genocidal monstrosity of a war. The Soviets need Lend-Lease to wage an offensive campaign to occupy half of Europe as it filled in their logistical production. They did not need it to defeat Germany, which they did in a timespan when the democracies were flat out requiring to move Heaven and Earth to defeat all of two German divisions and a great deal of Italian ones. The argument that the USSR needed Lend-Lease to win is wrong. It needed that to conquer Central Europe, it won before that.

-snip-

And this is flat-out wrong. UK aid was never more than a fraction of US aid, and neither variant meant anything in the timeframe where the USSR won their war. It only meant something in enabling the Soviets to reach the Elbe to link up with the democracies. The Soviets won their war against the great bulk of the Wehrmacht in the amount of time it took the USA to 1) build a real army, 2) get that army in the war, 3) grind up a measely amount of German and a rather larger amount of Italian divisions in North Africa. In this timeframe the Soviets in 1941 shattered the Wehrmacht's strategic ability to win the war, broke Nazi strategic offensive capability at Stalingrad, and collapsed German operational ability at Kursk. Only by this last battle did the democracies even get to Sicily.

The Soviets with a superior armored capability will tear the everloving heart out of the Nazi butchers in a rather short span of time. The Soviets, however, don't have the logistical steam all by themselves to push west against determined opposition, though it depends on the scale of the ATL *Barbarossa defeat as to the rest of this.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

1) Actually they really didn't. It's more that their enemies made mistakes, some unavoidable, some inexcusable, and their massed panzers gave them very narrow margins of success. The Soviet mistakes mattered less because the German concept of the war was invalidated at Smolensk when their "war is won in two weeks" mentality got a bucket of cold water in the face. Poland had a no-win situation, Denmark had no army, Norway never got a chance to get an army as opposed to disorganize units, Holland had no army, and the UK and Belgium were driven from Europe from Sickle-Slice, not direct defeats at Nazi hands. France was beaten from poor allocation of reserves, not Nazi strength. 1941 was the result of the Nazis and Soviets flying by the seat of their pants, a factor that favors the German way of war that had no strategic conceptions whatsoever.

Okay, now your biases are on display and we can see the flaws in your thinking: 1) the Germans can do nothing right and 2) the ground campaign is all that matters. I see you forgot to mention how the Allies (French/British) were beaten in Norway despite having naval superiority and the Germans losing a major portion of their fleet.

Both of these are terrible mistakes to make when talking about the conduct and course of WW2. The Germans beat the Poles in a straight up fight and learned a lot from the experience. They trained very hard, made major doctrine changes, and were more ready for battle in 1940 than the Allies. Sure the Allies made major mistakes in 1940, just as the Soviets did in 1941, but they could have won regardless or at least stalemated the Germans. But they lost in the field. They were pushed back and crushed. It was far more than just they walked into a trap; they could have supplied their pocket from the Channel ports and held out, but they didn't and it wasn't nerves that forced them to retreat. It was that they were beaten in the field and could fight as well or quickly as the Germans. Plus they lost control of the air, which brings us to point #2:

The air war was just as, if not more critical than the ground war. Yet you totally ignore it when talking about the Eastern Front or making excuses for the Western Front in 1940. Without control of the air the Germans could not have crossed the Meuse or won at Sedan. They would have suffered major counter attacks to their flanks in 1940 and lost their spearheads. The Allies had better tanks and more of them in 1940, yet their superiority was useless in the field, even though the Germans couldn't breach the armor of the Soumas and Matildas of the Allies. Why? Because of the Luftwaffe. Regardless of your opinion of how the Germans fought on the ground, they decisively beat the Allies in the air over France. When on equal ground they won in a head on battle with the French and British. This wasn't ancillary to the fighting on the ground, it was the critical campaign turning out. It was planned and carried out by the Germans and they won big in the air and on the ground because the critical component of their doctrine, CAS, tactical, and operational bombing, all was figured into the ground campaign. It gave the Germans the win because their strategy depended on it.

Fast forward to the Eastern Front:
1941 the Germans constantly won even when the T34 and KV1 appeared, though their tanks and AT units couldn't beat them...just like they could beat the British and French tanks in 1940. Yet the Germans still won major victories. Why? Air Power. It was the critical part of their victory over the Soviets and would be ITTL. Yet you totally ignore it in favor of the 'magical' T34. Guess what? The Germans fought the T34 with their Stukas, Ju88s, He 111s, etc. not their tanks. If the British are out and the Germans get more time to build up their bomber forces then the extra mechanically unreliable early T34s without radios are just going to find extra Stukas and other bombers taking them out from the air. I agree that with the British in the war the Germans are going to be at a major disadvantage, but if they are out or are crippled enough that the Germans can use extra bombers on the Eastern Front, then all the tanks in the world are pointless, because the fundamental factor which allowed the Germans to win every time up until winter 1941, when the Luftwaffe was grounded, was the Luftwaffe.

The aerial onslaught is what is going to destroy the Soviets and the bunched up deep battle units of early T34s are going to be big, fat, juicy targets for the German bombers. And assuming the Germans have put more bombers in the field, then they are going to have the capability to interdict the Soviet logistics from the air, which turns those gas guzzling, munition firing, mechanical replacement needing tanks into useless hunks of metal when the necessary supplies aren't getting through.

OTL the Germans never conducted a systematic anti-logistics campaign in the East like they did in the West because they didn't have enough bombers. ITTL they will have the time to build up those bombers and can now go train busting with their Ju88c heavy fighters and logistic hub bombing with their regular, extra Ju88s and He 111s. The Soviets never had to deal with this OTL, I'd be curious to see how they do without LL to replace all of the trains they lost IOTL.

2) The longer the Germans wait, the more the Soviets replace their more obsolete armor with the T-34s, while Nazi ideological arrogance means that they'll think weapons that defeated France certainly will be able to do the same to a society of subhumans run by a clique of human parasites. The reality of the T-34 being invincible to German armor and antitank forces would be perfectly irrelevant and reports of the disasters that unfold would be dismissed. Sure, Hitler might build up more, but he's not an AH.com poster with hindsight. He genuinely believed the USSR would disintegrate in a series of border battles and then the Nazis reach the Volga in a joyride in three months. Both sides build up, but a Soviet buildup with higher-quality weapons *and* superior masses of troops is vastly likely to crush Barbarossa far shy of Minsk, let alone Moscow and Leningrad.

And the more the Germans build up the Luftwaffe. They had to anyway, because they still either had to fight the British, which requires lots of air planes, or for fighting the planned war against the Americans down the road. The Germans were already planning on building up major forces whether or not they were fighting anyone. It sounds more like you're projecting an arrogance toward and ignorance of German plans on this Soviet-wank scenario you have in your head. Frankly you're too hung up on the gear-porn of the early, shitty T34's than the real war winner: the bomber.

Look, the Germans cannot do nearly as well in 1942 as in 1941, especially if the British are still in the war. They are going to be fighting an attrition war and the Soviets are better prepared for it, but they are not going to be able to do nearly as well as you seem to think. A big reason is that you are totally ignoring more than half of the reason the Germans did as well as they did in 1939-41. So how can we trust your scenario when you are blatantly demonstrating complete ignorance of such a critical part of German doctrine and success and Soviet failure and liability?

 

[Snake Featherston]

1) The Allies weren't beaten in Norway on the seas, they killed the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet there for the duration of the war. They were beaten in Norway from poor organization, their weaponry was in 1940 superior to the Germans just as much as the T-34 was relative to 1941-2 Panzers. The problem with the Strategic Bombing Offensive argument is that the Butt Report indicated how much BS was in the argument that bombing broke Germany. If anything the Germans nearly broke Allied war effort and the absence or presence of the Luftwaffe didn't really do much on the Eastern Front. It if anything tended to make Germany's job harder, such as at Stalingrad where it primarily gave the Red Army a lot of nice shelter thanks to Richtoften's bombing raid.

The Germans also didn't have the resources or mental conceptions for a strategic air campaign, and if we judge by the ineffectiveness of the Allied campaign in 1941-4, then it's a pretty fair argument that the CBO didn't do anything until the ground troops were in a position to do what they needed. Air forces lied about this to justify their unnecessary existence, it was only a lie.

2) Actually I'm pointing out the only reasons they did well at all in 1940, when by most reasonable analyses the French and British should have won that campaign in a matter of weeks. The Germans always faced enemies with superior numbers, and in 1940 an enemy with vastly superior quality of equipment. What they had as a counterbalance was enemy stupidity and their own willingness to gamble on the enemy being stupid. The Wehrmacht was never an invincible engine of destruction, it was a balky, limited force that survived on the inability of its enemies to recuperate a defeat on their borders.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

snip

Alright, you seriously have a massively flawed understanding of the history of WW2. LL was seriously important from 1941 onward, not just because of the Americans either; you are totally leaving out the major British contributions, especially in 1941 and 1942 when the bulk arrived and was critical to helping the Soviets around Moscow.

Not only that but you somehow think the Soviets could have won without LL, which is factually false and demonstrates a level of ignorance of the timing and amounts of the delivered goods that borders on Soviet propaganda, as that is exactly what they claimed. I'm not saying the Germans could have won if the Soviets didn't have LL, but the Soviets could not invaded Germany proper without it. In fact the Germans could have held onto large parts of the Soviet Union without LL and likely would have lost the equivalent of Brest-Litovsk without British and American combat efforts.


As to your ideas on the combat efforts see my last post.

 

[Genmotty]

...The Soviet mistakes mattered less because the German concept of the war was invalidated at Smolensk when their "war is won in two weeks" mentality got a bucket of cold water in the face...

...He genuinely believed the USSR would disintegrate in a series of border battles and then the Nazis reach the Volga in a joyride in three months....

Did you not get the sarcasm in a comment followed by a sarcastic smily ¬.¬

It's glad to see that you base your response on the flippant comment rather than the content of the post.


Have a watch of these;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&v=wi38oYWOSvY&NR=1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rqov8Ctu7n4

It nearly did fall apart for the Soviets. I agree that Germany's success had much to do with diplomacy and weakened surrounding powers, but shrewd diplomacy is all part of waging war.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Did you not get the sarcasm in a comment followed by a sarcastic smily ¬.¬

It's glad to see that you base your response on the flippant comment rather than the content of the post.


Have a watch of these;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&v=wi38oYWOSvY&NR=1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rqov8Ctu7n4

It nearly did fall apart for the Soviets. I agree that Germany's success had much to do with diplomacy and weakened surrounding powers, but shrewd diplomacy is all part of waging war.

No, it really never did fall apart for them. Rather what happened was they had a bad plan worse-executed, but when the Germans ran into an eight week battle at Smolensk they realized that the victories on the Soviet border weren't enough. Barbarossa failed. They improvised after that but from there you get a sequence of brilliant tactical operations without any strategic rationale whatsoever, a scenario favoring Stalin, not Hitler. Hitler's the one that needed a plan, Stalin just had to wear Hitler down in 1941, in no small part to do all that moving of factories that enabled the Soviets to outproduce the Nazis in December of 1941, when on paper that should have been the other way around. The Nazis won battles in 1941, yes. What they never did was find a consistent strategy that worked. That was the 1918 approach all over again and the same pattern and same results recurred. The German army seems good only because people are willing to buy into a Ludendorff myth that German generals are always stabbed in the back and can never make mistakes.

I am not at all denying the gravity of the Soviet defeats in the border fighting. What I am denying is that these defeats were somehow a German success given they switched strategies no less than three times between Barbarossa and their third strategy in Operation Typhoon, given a different Operational name for a reason German fanboys erase so they can wank off to the concept that Barbarossa "succeeded".