December, 1941: German army destroyed at gates to Moscow

[Electric Earth]

Does Hitler have enough resources to resist Russia's inevitable westward push? If not, does this mean Cold War begins in 1942?

 

[Rockingham]

This is confusing. The thread title seems to be asking for a (devestating) German defeat at Moscow, but you post seems to be asking for a German victory in general. Could you please clarify?

 

[Michele]

Does Hitler have enough resources to resist Russia's inevitable westward push? If not, does this mean Cold War begins in 1942?

Let's suppose you are asking whether a catastrophic defeat all along that front in December 1941 could be reversed by the Germans. The answer is yes. Logistics, lack of training, insufficient planning, doctrine and C3 on the Soviet side of the line would prevent a much deeper penetration than that they historically achieved in OTL. On the other side, the Germans had reserves and made many surprising comebacks later on. So yes.

Assuming the answer is a no, however, I don't see how the Cold War can begin in 1942. Even with the Germans in chaotic retreat all over the front, the Soviets still have a lot of kilometers, battles and casualties to put behind them, and nobody's interested in a cold war while there's a red-hot one around.

 

[Redbeard]

Does Hitler have enough resources to resist Russia's inevitable westward push? If not, does this mean Cold War begins in 1942?

In OTL December 1941 the German army was spread out from Leningrad in the north to the Black sea in the south, and to have it all destoyed at the gates of Moscow would be ASB. The forces present at Moscow in OTL winter of 41/42 were however depleted to a degree closing on total destruction, with a number of between 250.000 and 400.000 Germans being killed and thus outranging Stalingrad.

Neither Moscow nor Stalingrad in themselves broke the back of gthe German army as did not the huge losses inflicted on the Soviets in 1941-42 on the Red Army.

In other words 20th century armies as big as the German or the Red Army simply were too big to be destroyed in a single battle or even in a single campaign. But taking nearly four years of heavy attritional battle and huge defeats like Moscow, Stalingrad and Bagration - and you are close. But still, after all those defeats the German army had more men in the field and with more tanks than at the great victories in 1940-42 - their problem was that their enemies had grown even faster and had catched up in tactics.

Perhaps a withdrawal at Moscow in late 1941 could have produced an even larger German defeat, and that probably would have meant the Germans taking up a defesive psoition further west somewhere between Moscow and Smolensk for 1942. I doubt the Soviets by 1942 had the capacity to advance much further. By 1943 the relative strengths of Germany and SU might be quite close to OTL.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[CalBear]

It could be argued that the best thing that could happen to the Heer is a major defeat on the Moscow Front. That might force them to withdraw to a better defensive position, perhaps even convince Hitler to rething his broad front strategy (although given Hitler's underlying insanity, it might not help at all).

This might even avoid the attrition battles of Leningrad and especially Stalingrad. That COULD by the Reich an extra six months, perhaps a bit longer. At the least it might put more German civilians under Western Allied control on VE Day.

 

[alephh]

Agreeing with Michele

The only way I can imagine (faaaaaar stretch) the Cold War in 1942, is that somehow:
1) German retreat starts a german domino effect, creating chaos and more fallback (generals disagree and do not follow orders, communications totally break down, weather breaks down the supply-system...).
2) Russian offensive (even started without resources/reserves to maintain the pressure) manages to push on, capturing german trains/trucks/fuel, and everything just falls in their way (partizans, weather...).

And the Red Army rapes everything as it marches on... The world would not yet be numb to the nazi propaganda, and believes the german horror stories... And western leaders (many of them were more or less anti-communists before WWII) want to save the Western Europe. But with what resources/armies they could do that?


_

 

[Electric Earth]

Lotsa butterflies

I envisioned a German collapse at Moscow, with the armies to the South holding. With the Red Army moving westward with little opposition, the Fuhrer would have some nasty decions to make. Shifting the forces in the south to Moscow might be his only option. Then again, the Generals might overthrow Hitler and sue for peace. If the war in the East comes to an early end, Stalin would surely want to consolidate his position in Europe with blatent acts of aggression--and no USA or England to hold him in check.

 

[Redbeard]

It could be argued that the best thing that could happen to the Heer is a major defeat on the Moscow Front. That might force them to withdraw to a better defensive position, perhaps even convince Hitler to rething his broad front strategy (although given Hitler's underlying insanity, it might not help at all).

This might even avoid the attrition battles of Leningrad and especially Stalingrad. That COULD by the Reich an extra six months, perhaps a bit longer. At the least it might put more German civilians under Western Allied control on VE Day.

The Generals wanted to withdraw, but Hitler refused. He might for once have had a point, intuitively I would also in such a situation prefer to dig in and wait for the storm/winter to pass by. Undersupplied German units without winterequipment would be even more vulnerable if on the move than in static positions, and the Red Army of late 1941 was not in a position to isolate the German forces at Moscow.

The big tragedy (for Germany) is, that Hitler after that allways refused a retreat, also in situations where it would have been the obvious thing to do. Hitler saw his hammer work in 1940 and 41, but after that he saw everything as nails.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[Michele]

Agreeing with Michele

The only way I can imagine (faaaaaar stretch) the Cold War in 1942, is that somehow:
1) German retreat starts a german domino effect, creating chaos and more fallback (generals disagree and do not follow orders, communications totally break down, weather breaks down the supply-system...).
2) Russian offensive (even started without resources/reserves to maintain the pressure) manages to push on, capturing german trains/trucks/fuel, and everything just falls in their way (partizans, weather...).

And I agree with you that the stretch on both points above is too far. The Germans aren't going to reac tthat way in 1941/42, and the Soviets aren't going to feed an all-front offensive with booty. Logistical exahustion will stop them after some 200 kms at most, even without one teeny bit of German opposition.

 

[Prinz Richard Eugen]

Assuming the massive losses in the winter of '41-'42, the German 1942 offensive would have to be reduced or eliminated as the troops sent to AG South would be need to rebuild AG Center, This would remove the massive losses of Stalingrad, so by 1943, both sides would be about the same strtength as in OTL.

Unless Stalin gets even more greedy than in OTL and continues his advances along the entire Eastern Front until the entire front is overextended. As the Germans would be falling back onto their supplies and reinforcements, we could see a "super Kharkov " offensive, destroying many more Soviet men and supplies than in OTL. This would push the front further east and recapture most of the lost ground. Smaller summer offensives would leave the Germans with the resources to blunt any "42-"43 Soviet winter offensive.

 

[NapoleonXIV]

There is, however, another front in this war. One of the better known serious AH works is called 1943 and posits that the war could be won a year or more sooner with earlier Western invasions.

A disastrous defeat for the Germans may not result in collapse, but it would inevitably pull troops from the west, weaken the Atlantic wall and embolden Allied invasion plans in the Balkans and southern France. If by early 1943 Hitler is fighting land battles on two fronts he is not going to last much longer