Death toll in Eastern Europe during WW2 with no lend lease

So in our timeline about 35-40 million people were killed by the Nazis in their war of annihilation against the East. The US and Great Britain during this time offered close to 250 billion dollars of aid when adjusted for inflation to the Soviet Union after Barbarossa with a lot of this aid being food which no doubt saved millions of lives.

So for this timeline to work everything building up to WW2 is essentially the same with one difference, the Holodomor is far more known in the world with the Soviets doing a horrible job of keeping it under wraps. As a result there is more anti Soviet sentiment in the west so when Hitler launches Barbarossa FDR proposes lend lease but is voted down. Most other events still happen the same with slight twists.

Because of no lend lease Germany surrenders in February 1946 instead of May 1945, as without the trucks and oil for Kursk and Bagration every Soviet advance stalls after a while. Because of the Soviets having more trouble Germany is able to divert more soldiers to the west slowing the WAllues down, but they are able to push through as with the addition of the atomic bombs. Germany is split as same divide as in our timeline because both sides were slower as a result of no LL.

With this timeline what would the increased death toll possibly be without Lend Lease. After the Germans took Ukraine the Soviets lost something like 42% of their food production when they were already in a state of famine. I can see siege of Leningrad like numbers across all major soviet cities. Also millions more killed in the Holocaust as it takes longer to liberate the camps, on top
Of millions more red army soldiers and tens of thousands WAllies soldiers as a result of Soviets killing less.
 
After Pearl Harbor and the German DOW on the US I cannot see the US not following through on Lend-Lease for the Soviets. After all, the enemy of my enemy is my friend, well sorta.
 
You can't just magically make the buildup to WW2 the same. Well you can, but then you'd have to post this thread in the ASB subforum.
If there's more anti-Soviet sentiment, why wouldn't the west also declare war against USSR when it invades Poland?
Would large anti-Soviet sentiment in the west maybe cause Poland to go fascist and ally with Hitler, in the expectation they would be protected against the USSR? Then Hitler would remove the anti-Polish rhetoric and go with "the Poles were great brothers-in-arms when we owned them prior to 1918".
In that case would the west join Germany and Poland against the USSR?
 
If there's more anti-Soviet sentiment, why wouldn't the west also declare war against USSR when it invades Poland?
I actually originally had Great Britain launching operation Pike in this timeline.
Would large anti-Soviet sentiment in the west maybe cause Poland to go fascist and ally with Hitler, in the expectation they would be protected against the USSR? Then Hitler would remove the anti-Polish rhetoric and go with "the Poles were great brothers-in-arms when we owned them prior to 1918".


No I don’t see this happening because I don’t see Hitler being pragmatic enough to doing this
especially with Poland’s large Jewish population.

In that case would the west join Germany and Poland against the USSR?

No Nazis are just too psychotic for the WAllies to do an alliance.
 
No I don’t see this happening because I don’t see Hitler being pragmatic enough to doing this
especially with Poland’s large Jewish population.

No Nazis are just too psychotic for the WAllies to do an alliance.
It's not like a lot of Poles weren't antisemitic. He could bank on that. What makes him not pragmatic enough to secure his eastern border with an ally, when he was pragmatic enough to court monarchists, industrialists, and moderate socialists on his rise to power, and also pragmatic enough to accept Hungary, Italy, Romania, and Croatia as allies?

That's...just emotional thinking. The WAllies allied plenty of psychotic regimes (as well as literally *being* psychotic regimes) prior, during, and after the war.
 
Problem is that he signed Lend Lease into law on March 11, 1941. He then added China, then the Soviet Union in October, 1941. After December 11, 1941 this was a moot point. Look at history. IMHO US Congress wouldn’t have cared about starving people in Russia. This was a war for survival. It would have happened at some point. Germany had taken all of Europe, and was at the gates of Moscow. People back then had no way to know what we do now. It looked really bad for the good guys in 1941-1942. IMHO Russia would have gotten LL one way or another.
 
So for this timeline to work everything building up to WW2 is essentially the same with one difference, the Holodomor is far more known in the world with the Soviets doing a horrible job of keeping it under wraps. As a result there is more anti Soviet sentiment in the west
I have sadly become a reader at least at the tutorial / course level in mid 20th century genocides.

  1. "The Holodomor" is a Ukrainian right wing nationalist narrative, reflecting a popular Ukrainian narrative, about the specific Ukrainian experience of the general and much larger 1932-33 Soviet famine and agricultural underproduction. "The holodomor" is a narrative, the famine was real but affected the Ukraine amongst other constituent republics, including at least one other major ethnic area in specific. The Ukraine seems to have been adversely affected in 1932 because of the pace of forced collectivisation. This led to the specificity of this narrative in Ukrainian nationalist politics being "the national trauma." I am switching between an articulated and disarticulated noun based upon the political "moment" of identity. Whether Ukraine is articulated or not in English is politicised by right wing Ukranian nationalist narratives.
    1. The West was utterly disinterested in this narrative until the 1990s
    2. The West was significantly disinterested in the holocaust narrative until the 1970s. World at War was special for featuring the holocaust.
    3. The western Ukrainian right-wing nationalist exile movement in the early 1930s was a disorganised piece of shit which couldn't sell propaganda to save itself. It makes the Captive Nations movement look articulate and professional. You're asking a lot of incompetents here. This is like asking Trots to run a revolutionary movement.
  2. The other elements of the Soviet famine, food supply misallocation economic crisis, and underproduction (dearth) aren't interesting to the west? Only the Ukraine specific elements? Isn't the Soviet Union horrible enough already?
There's a lot of allohistorical change to make the French and British care about Ukraine specific caused state preventable mass deaths. There's a lot to make the public care about mass deaths at all: vide: holocaust. I'm not saying that it couldn't happen. I'm just saying that the right wing nationalist Ukraine movement in the 1930s historically was utterly impotent in terms of the capacity to make the general public in the west care. I presume you understand that the Western Elite was much more real politik about caring about the soviet union?

>consequences there of
The West bleeds more, the East waits more. More Eastern second line units in 1947 are pushed into the advance. This changes the nature of the mass sexual reprisals from lack-of-blood guilt to reprisal guilt. Which probably largely means you shoot them when you're done. Millions of unmarried women. Imagine how cheap you can get a female doctor in Peoria in 1967. Almost as cheap as a Soviet female doctor in 1967 historically.

yours,
Sam R.

AND TO BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR: A state whose policies cause preventable deaths is failing as a Westphalian state. This is commonly considered to be immoral. It was not considered immoral during the 1930s, but the Soviet Union was one such state which considered such outcomes to be immoral. (The Soviet Union was a state capable of doing immoral things, however.). In the case of the 1932 Soviet famine in the Ukraine the CC wished to be able to amelioriate it, and took actions to amelioriate it, but had destroyed the institutions necessary for such an amelioration and had not created new ones. This is culpability in a Westphalian state: impotence is culpability. Moreover, the famine was at its greatest in areas with the greatest level of persecution of local landlords and regional trading networks, which were two ethnic areas, one being the Ukraine constituent republic. This was as a result of targeted class war, creating a situation where famine would be disproportionate, not a direct result of desiring the specific destruction of a constituent republic. [The language argument is far more suasive on this claim than the famine one.]

That the standard of argument is as poor that people recommend that I post post-scripts is bad news. The articles I'm reliant upon are 30 years old and well reviewed by people hostile to the analytical tendency of the scholars.

Ukraine lacked an effective western propaganda machine in the 1930s regardless of the purposive and causative mechanisms of preventable mass death under Westphalian governance.
 
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CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
I have sadly become a reader at least at the tutorial / course level in mid 20th century genocides.

  1. "The Holodomor" is a Ukrainian right wing nationalist narrative, reflecting a popular Ukrainian narrative, about the specific Ukrainian experience of the general and much larger 1932-33 Soviet famine and agricultural underproduction. "The holodomor" is a narrative, the famine was real but affected the Ukraine amongst other constituent republics, including at least one other major ethnic area in specific. The Ukraine seems to have been adversely affected in 1932 because of the pace of forced collectivisation. This led to the specificity of this narrative in Ukrainian nationalist politics being "the national trauma." I am switching between an articulated and disarticulated noun based upon the political "moment" of identity. Whether Ukraine is articulated or not in English is politicised by right wing Ukranian nationalist narratives.
    1. The West was utterly disinterested in this narrative until the 1990s
    2. The West was significantly disinterested in the holocaust narrative until the 1970s. World at War was special for featuring the holocaust.
    3. The western Ukrainian right-wing nationalist exile movement in the early 1930s was a disorganised piece of shit which couldn't sell propaganda to save itself. It makes the Captive Nations movement look articulate and professional. You're asking a lot of incompetents here. This is like asking Trots to run a revolutionary movement.
  2. The other elements of the Soviet famine, food supply misallocation economic crisis, and underproduction (dearth) aren't interesting to the west? Only the Ukraine specific elements? Isn't the Soviet Union horrible enough already?
There's a lot of allohistorical change to make the French and British care about Ukraine specific caused state preventable mass deaths. There's a lot to make the public care about mass deaths at all: vide: holocaust. I'm not saying that it couldn't happen. I'm just saying that the right wing nationalist Ukraine movement in the 1930s historically was utterly impotent in terms of the capacity to make the general public in the west care. I presume you understand that the Western Elite was much more real politik about caring about the soviet union?

>consequences there of
The West bleeds more, the East waits more. More Eastern second line units in 1947 are pushed into the advance. This changes the nature of the mass sexual reprisals from lack-of-blood guilt to reprisal guilt. Which probably largely means you shoot them when you're done. Millions of unmarried women. Imagine how cheap you can get a female doctor in Peoria in 1967. Almost as cheap as a Soviet female doctor in 1967 historically.

yours,
Sam R.

AND TO BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR: A state whose policies cause preventable deaths is failing as a Westphalian state. This is commonly considered to be immoral. It was not considered immoral during the 1930s, but the Soviet Union was one such state which considered such outcomes to be immoral. (The Soviet Union was a state capable of doing immoral things, however.). In the case of the 1932 Soviet famine in the Ukraine the CC wished to be able to amelioriate it, and took actions to amelioriate it, but had destroyed the institutions necessary for such an amelioration and had not created new ones. This is culpability in a Westphalian state: impotence is culpability. Moreover, the famine was at its greatest in areas with the greatest level of persecution of local landlords and regional trading networks, which were two ethnic areas, one being the Ukraine constituent republic. This was as a result of targeted class war, creating a situation where famine would be disproportionate, not a direct result of desiring the specific destruction of a constituent republic. [The language argument is far more suasive on this claim than the famine one.]

That the standard of argument is as poor that people recommend that I post post-scripts is bad news. The articles I'm reliant upon are 30 years old and well reviewed by people hostile to the analytical tendency of the scholars.

Ukraine lacked an effective western propaganda machine in the 1930s regardless of the purposive and causative mechanisms of preventable mass death under Westphalian governance.
Trying to parse this response.

Are you saying that Ukrainian (and Kazak) Kulaks, followed by the overall population of the impacted regions were not specifically targeted by the Central Government?
 
I have sadly become a reader at least at the tutorial / course level in mid 20th century genocides.

  1. "The Holodomor" is a Ukrainian right wing nationalist narrative, reflecting a popular Ukrainian narrative, about the specific Ukrainian experience of the general and much larger 1932-33 Soviet famine and agricultural underproduction. "The holodomor" is a narrative, the famine was real but affected the Ukraine amongst other constituent republics, including at least one other major ethnic area in specific. The Ukraine seems to have been adversely affected in 1932 because of the pace of forced collectivisation. This led to the specificity of this narrative in Ukrainian nationalist politics being "the national trauma." I am switching between an articulated and disarticulated noun based upon the political "moment" of identity. Whether Ukraine is articulated or not in English is politicised by right wing Ukranian nationalist narratives.
    1. The West was utterly disinterested in this narrative until the 1990s
    2. The West was significantly disinterested in the holocaust narrative until the 1970s. World at War was special for featuring the holocaust.
    3. The western Ukrainian right-wing nationalist exile movement in the early 1930s was a disorganised piece of shit which couldn't sell propaganda to save itself. It makes the Captive Nations movement look articulate and professional. You're asking a lot of incompetents here. This is like asking Trots to run a revolutionary movement.
  2. The other elements of the Soviet famine, food supply misallocation economic crisis, and underproduction (dearth) aren't interesting to the west? Only the Ukraine specific elements? Isn't the Soviet Union horrible enough already?
There's a lot of allohistorical change to make the French and British care about Ukraine specific caused state preventable mass deaths. There's a lot to make the public care about mass deaths at all: vide: holocaust. I'm not saying that it couldn't happen. I'm just saying that the right wing nationalist Ukraine movement in the 1930s historically was utterly impotent in terms of the capacity to make the general public in the west care. I presume you understand that the Western Elite was much more real politik about caring about the soviet union?

>consequences there of
The West bleeds more, the East waits more. More Eastern second line units in 1947 are pushed into the advance. This changes the nature of the mass sexual reprisals from lack-of-blood guilt to reprisal guilt. Which probably largely means you shoot them when you're done. Millions of unmarried women. Imagine how cheap you can get a female doctor in Peoria in 1967. Almost as cheap as a Soviet female doctor in 1967 historically.

yours,
Sam R.

AND TO BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR: A state whose policies cause preventable deaths is failing as a Westphalian state. This is commonly considered to be immoral. It was not considered immoral during the 1930s, but the Soviet Union was one such state which considered such outcomes to be immoral. (The Soviet Union was a state capable of doing immoral things, however.). In the case of the 1932 Soviet famine in the Ukraine the CC wished to be able to amelioriate it, and took actions to amelioriate it, but had destroyed the institutions necessary for such an amelioration and had not created new ones. This is culpability in a Westphalian state: impotence is culpability. Moreover, the famine was at its greatest in areas with the greatest level of persecution of local landlords and regional trading networks, which were two ethnic areas, one being the Ukraine constituent republic. This was as a result of targeted class war, creating a situation where famine would be disproportionate, not a direct result of desiring the specific destruction of a constituent republic. [The language argument is far more suasive on this claim than the famine one.]

That the standard of argument is as poor that people recommend that I post post-scripts is bad news. The articles I'm reliant upon are 30 years old and well reviewed by people hostile to the analytical tendency of the scholars.

Ukraine lacked an effective western propaganda machine in the 1930s regardless of the purposive and causative mechanisms of preventable mass death under Westphalian governance.
Sorry to tell you, but the existence of non-ukrainian victims of holodomor doesn't nullify the atrocity which was the holodomor as a whole.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
I have sadly become a reader at least at the tutorial / course level in mid 20th century genocides.

  1. "The Holodomor" is a Ukrainian right wing nationalist narrative, reflecting a popular Ukrainian narrative, about the specific Ukrainian experience of the general and much larger 1932-33 Soviet famine and agricultural underproduction. "The holodomor" is a narrative, the famine was real but affected the Ukraine amongst other constituent republics, including at least one other major ethnic area in specific. The Ukraine seems to have been adversely affected in 1932 because of the pace of forced collectivisation. This led to the specificity of this narrative in Ukrainian nationalist politics being "the national trauma." I am switching between an articulated and disarticulated noun based upon the political "moment" of identity. Whether Ukraine is articulated or not in English is politicised by right wing Ukranian nationalist narratives.
    1. The West was utterly disinterested in this narrative until the 1990s
    2. The West was significantly disinterested in the holocaust narrative until the 1970s. World at War was special for featuring the holocaust.
    3. The western Ukrainian right-wing nationalist exile movement in the early 1930s was a disorganised piece of shit which couldn't sell propaganda to save itself. It makes the Captive Nations movement look articulate and professional. You're asking a lot of incompetents here. This is like asking Trots to run a revolutionary movement.
  2. The other elements of the Soviet famine, food supply misallocation economic crisis, and underproduction (dearth) aren't interesting to the west? Only the Ukraine specific elements? Isn't the Soviet Union horrible enough already?
There's a lot of allohistorical change to make the French and British care about Ukraine specific caused state preventable mass deaths. There's a lot to make the public care about mass deaths at all: vide: holocaust. I'm not saying that it couldn't happen. I'm just saying that the right wing nationalist Ukraine movement in the 1930s historically was utterly impotent in terms of the capacity to make the general public in the west care. I presume you understand that the Western Elite was much more real politik about caring about the soviet union?

>consequences there of
The West bleeds more, the East waits more. More Eastern second line units in 1947 are pushed into the advance. This changes the nature of the mass sexual reprisals from lack-of-blood guilt to reprisal guilt. Which probably largely means you shoot them when you're done. Millions of unmarried women. Imagine how cheap you can get a female doctor in Peoria in 1967. Almost as cheap as a Soviet female doctor in 1967 historically.

yours,
Sam R.

AND TO BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR: A state whose policies cause preventable deaths is failing as a Westphalian state. This is commonly considered to be immoral. It was not considered immoral during the 1930s, but the Soviet Union was one such state which considered such outcomes to be immoral. (The Soviet Union was a state capable of doing immoral things, however.). In the case of the 1932 Soviet famine in the Ukraine the CC wished to be able to amelioriate it, and took actions to amelioriate it, but had destroyed the institutions necessary for such an amelioration and had not created new ones. This is culpability in a Westphalian state: impotence is culpability. Moreover, the famine was at its greatest in areas with the greatest level of persecution of local landlords and regional trading networks, which were two ethnic areas, one being the Ukraine constituent republic. This was as a result of targeted class war, creating a situation where famine would be disproportionate, not a direct result of desiring the specific destruction of a constituent republic. [The language argument is far more suasive on this claim than the famine one.]

That the standard of argument is as poor that people recommend that I post post-scripts is bad news. The articles I'm reliant upon are 30 years old and well reviewed by people hostile to the analytical tendency of the scholars.

Ukraine lacked an effective western propaganda machine in the 1930s regardless of the purposive and causative mechanisms of preventable mass death under Westphalian governance.
You need to reply to my question posed in post #10 within four hours of your next log in.

Everyone please note that is a question SPECIFICALLY for Sam R.
 
Are you saying that Ukrainian (and Kazak) Kulaks, followed by the overall population of the impacted regions were not specifically targeted by the Central Government?
Targeted specifically when on what basis?

Rural small traders and peasants with assets were specifically targeted under the narrative of removing kulaks, despite very few kulaks existing. This wasn’t withholding food aid or lacking the distribution network to supply aid.

The Ukraine was targeted specifically in the 1930-33 social warfare by the Soviet state and party against its own population. The Wheatcroft Tauger debates portray this targeting as class warfare against a production centre. The attacks on first language acquisition are a much clearer attack on Soviet ethnicities, especially as the experience in the Ukraine republic differed from other republics. ( https://doi.org/10.2307/2500600 )

The famine wasn’t in the interests of the Soviet elite, and the crop failure was universal. Subsequent crop failures which were universal didn’t demonstrate republic level excess mortality. Attacks on political identity and ethnic identity in the Ukraine after WWII were targeted as political activities policing and preventing language access. And as Tauger cites from minutes the party voted for famine relief specifically in relation to the Ukraine republic. That they lacked the capacity to ameliorate famine and that they dismantled the past locally controlled methods of famine amelioration replacing them with nothing is monsterous. But it doesn’t seem to be the chosen method to attack Ukraine nationality as subsequent famines’ general character shows, as voting to act on the famine in secret state level committees shows. Nor during the 46 famines was there a national eviction as with other nationalities.

The Ukraine republic was repeatedly targeted on political bases, as a production site on class bases, and linguistically. But as Tauger’s minutes show the Soviet party seems to have not wished to starve millions of people; but done so by a wilful and malicious incompetence that is all the more damning given they protested they were a rational elite.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Targeted specifically when on what basis?

Rural small traders and peasants with assets were specifically targeted under the narrative of removing kulaks, despite very few kulaks existing. This wasn’t withholding food aid or lacking the distribution network to supply aid.

The Ukraine was targeted specifically in the 1930-33 social warfare by the Soviet state and party against its own population. The Wheatcroft Tauger debates portray this targeting as class warfare against a production centre. The attacks on first language acquisition are a much clearer attack on Soviet ethnicities, especially as the experience in the Ukraine republic differed from other republics. ( https://doi.org/10.2307/2500600 )

The famine wasn’t in the interests of the Soviet elite, and the crop failure was universal. Subsequent crop failures which were universal didn’t demonstrate republic level excess mortality. Attacks on political identity and ethnic identity in the Ukraine after WWII were targeted as political activities policing and preventing language access. And as Tauger cites from minutes the party voted for famine relief specifically in relation to the Ukraine republic. That they lacked the capacity to ameliorate famine and that they dismantled the past locally controlled methods of famine amelioration replacing them with nothing is monsterous. But it doesn’t seem to be the chosen method to attack Ukraine nationality as subsequent famines’ general character shows, as voting to act on the famine in secret state level committees shows. Nor during the 46 famines was there a national eviction as with other nationalities.

The Ukraine republic was repeatedly targeted on political bases, as a production site on class bases, and linguistically. But as Tauger’s minutes show the Soviet party seems to have not wished to starve millions of people; but done so by a wilful and malicious incompetence that is all the more damning given they protested they were a rational elite.
Thanks for the response.
 

kham_coc

Banned
The Ukraine republic was repeatedly targeted on political bases, as a production site on class bases, and linguistically. But as Tauger’s minutes show the Soviet party seems to have not wished to starve millions of people; but done so by a wilful and malicious incompetence that is all the more damning given they protested they were a rational elite.
So if I parse you right, the famine was the unintentional result of policies pursued, where Ukrainians (and other minorities) where not so much targeted as the preferred victims of this "natural disaster"?
 
Previous to the extension of Lend Lease to the USSR there were a rising quantity of cash purchases on war material from the US. This period primarily covers the latter half of 1941. My question is if the conditions of the OP exclude these cash purchases, or if those are allowed to increase. Also the British sent material assistance that was technically not Lend Lease. Is this to continue, or is it waived away as part of the assumptions in the OP.

Unrelated to that & the effect on the USSR and Red Army is what happens to the material sent from the US as Lend Lease? A hefty portion of it could be used directly by the other Allies and US military. Then there is the cargo shipping used to transport all that to the USSR. Having those ships available for US, British, Free French, or ANZAC cargo does a lot to widen the shipping bottleneck in 1942-43.
 
So if I parse you right, the famine was the unintentional result of policies pursued, where Ukrainians (and other minorities) where not so much targeted as the preferred victims of this "natural disaster"?
The wiki article reads like incompetence.
For example
I remembered that the Soviets exported grain to buy industry. However I didn’t know or forgot about the mass slaughter of cows and sheep. They should have cut grain exports in anticipation of shortages after that. However it is almost certain that local communist party officials screwed over the farmers who did that when the famine came . I don’t have evidence of that but knowing human nature I would be shocked if it did not happen.

Upon further research those who slaughtered the animals were probably already dead or on their way to the gulags

 
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Would large anti-Soviet sentiment in the west maybe cause Poland to go fascist and ally with Hitler, in the expectation they would be protected against the USSR? Then Hitler would remove the anti-

Fascist parties typically don't ally with one another when they have their own base of support. When Nazi Germany invaded and created puppets in various countries, they relied on traditional conservative anti-communist establishment politicians, as Fascist political parties A- had very little support, and B- as Nationalism is integral to fascist ideology, they were often pointedly anti-german or at least had goals anathematic to Nazi Germany's plans. Fascist political parties were put into power by Nazi Germany when they had essentially lost control of their puppets and relied on force of arms to keep those puppets afloat.

A fascist Poland, in my opinion, would be less likely to ally with Nazi Germany, than a simpler Hungarian/Romanian/Bulgarian style conservative government.
 
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