WanderingProfessor
Banned
Regardless, the Japanese-American population will be judged very harshly just for being Japanese even if some opposed the occupation.
Days of Infamy: Invasion, Occupation, and Liberation of Hawaii (1941-1943)
- Thread starter Alterwright
- Start date
I have no doubts that Japanese-Americans who originally enlisted in the US Army in our history will never get that chance here. I fear that the 442nd Infantry Regiment will never be conceived.
I can also imagine that George Takei of Star Trek fame will be more bitter growing up, and might never even become an actor.
It also rather depends on how many of those goodies the Japanese Army plans to keep for itself ...
Which is likely, yes. I can see a few Japanese soldiers keeping M1911s or Thompsons as war prizes or keeping them for later use for themselves. The Type 100 SMG wasn't widely distributed as far I can tell.
That might be true. Quite a few Nisei were recruited from Hawaii at this time.
As for the Nisei and their families on Hawaii... hm. While the Nisei may not be trusted enough to join a Royal Hawaiian Army, they and their families might be collaborating more with the Japanese in terms of just helping to keep the island's economy running. Japanese immigrants and descendants made up a sizable population of Hawaii and I can see individuals being used as interpreters for the Japanese.
I was speaking on the topic of every Japanese-American that could be severely affected by the stigma from the Hawaii occupation.
I can be certain that the US military will not embrace the idea of recruiting Japanese-Americans (both in Hawaii and on the mainland) because of how bad the PR coming from the post-occupation, and the likely chance that bigoted whites in the military will take their anger out on them. In turn, it might stifle civil rights for Japanese-Americans in the long term.
So, I finished the novels a few years ago. I was wondering what could happen with a more Japan focused America. Do the Americans even care about Europe afterwards? Did someone actually proposed to deport all Japanese Americans to Hawaii?
I suspect that it is at least somewhat more tricky (at least on a political level) for FDR to dispatch assets to Europe but, even in this timeline, with Mr Roosevelt in the White House there's every likelihood of the US doing it's bit to pull down the Third Reich as well as the War Government of Japan - though to what degree the Invasion, Occupation & Liberation of Hawaii pulls US focus away from the Atlantic into the Pacific after the war is a question for the ages.
Also, having recently read THE MAN IN THE HIGH CASTLE (and having started to watch the TV series) one can only wonder what the precise status of that timeline's Hawaii might happen to be - 'Independent' Kingdom or just more territory for the Pacific States?
Also, having recently read THE MAN IN THE HIGH CASTLE (and having started to watch the TV series) one can only wonder what the precise status of that timeline's Hawaii might happen to be - 'Independent' Kingdom or just more territory for the Pacific States?
To be fair, historically speaking, the US strategic situation once they entered the war did have a significant amount of resources and men devoted to fighting Japan despite agreeing with the British to commit to a "Germany First" grand strategy. The issue was that, for the US, the Japanese posed the more immediate threat to US and allied forces in the Pacific due to their naval capabilities. The Japanese needed to be checked in the Pacific. And with the Fall of the Philippines in early 1942, plus the naval battles of the Coral Sea, Java Sea, and Midway, the US had to devote alot of men to even have enough force to stop the Japanese.
In a way the US was already kind of focusing much of its attention on the Japanese, especially when it came to naval and marine forces. Alot of the Army was deployed to Europe, but the vast majority of the US Navy and pretty much all of the USMC was dedicated to fighting Japan. While the U-Boat threat to shipping in the Atlantic was significant and even though the US assisted greatly in reducing that threat the Japanese had the greatest navy out of the Axis powers. That threat alone was enough to make the US focus is navy mostly on the Pacific, especially since the Royal Navy was stretched thin fighting across the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Pacific. The US couldn't simply fight a defensive war against Japan, it needed to check and counter attack to attain more favorable positions to enable future offensive actions.
I will say though, with a timeline that has Hawaii being lost to the Japanese, this might mean that the "Germany First" strategy has some serious and very vocal opposition. I'm not sure that even loosing Hawaii would mean the US changes its grand strategy with the British, but definitely means that resources will have to be allocated very differently in this timeline. The war will have to be extended for sure too.
@Alterwright is the Japanese occupation of Hawaii the same as an Operation Sea Lion in Europe? Or it is more of : "you need the right circumstances to make it realistic?" what about the second question?
The invasion of Hawaii here and Operation Sea Lion, in my opinion, feel roughly similar, but are not. You could argue that conditions for invading Hawaii were already ideal for the Japanese - they had taken the Americans completely by surprise and had they launched their airborne attacks in a third wave with the intention of invading perhaps they could have devastated even more of the American fleet at harbor. But I think that this operation is unique and separate to Sea Lion, just for the fact that the Japanese prepare these kinds of operations very differently.
The problem in reality was that Japanese higher command, both in the Navy and Army, were split on how to deal with the Hawaii question. Even under the most idea circumstances for the Japanese an invasion of Hawaii was going to be a highly costly gamble, if not entirely out of the question. For one the Army was always at odds with going along with any Navy-centered operations in the Pacific - getting troops earmarked for the supposed Midway amphibious assault was a challenge. Both the Japanese Navy and Army were very inexperienced when it came to amphibious assaults as well, with no coordination or effective communication between Army and Navy to facilitate a contested beach assault. They had only performs assaults on uncontested shorelines in China, and even those were very sloppy. There is also evidence that says that pre-planning and training to assault contested beaches was almost entirely non-existent - something that shocked me considering that even the Germans had to do some kind of prep for Sea Lion. On top of that its likely the Japanese invasion force would be outnumbered - the US garrison on Oahu was rather significant, numbering around 25,000 soldiers by the end of 1941, a jump from 15,000 from the interwar years.
Oh. As for the deportation of all Japanese Americans to Hawaii - that would have been highly unfeasible. See, Hawaii is an island state that relies heavily on imports of good to support the population it already has. And its a crowded place on those islands. Deporting the Japanese-Americans from the mainland to Hawaii would have been a logistical apocalypse. Hawaii simply can't support that kind of an influx of people so quickly, it would have devastated life there and put a tremendous strain on the islands.
I don't think they would be deported to Hawaii. I think that there might be an expulsion of Japanese-Americans from Hawaii to somewhere where they can't cause mischief (real or perceived), possibly in CONUS. Or at least, away from Oahu and the important naval base there.
The IJA did alert three divisions for Hawaiian Operations to start training, along with artillery, engineers, and a tank regiment, with training for possible deployment to be completed by Sep '42. However, the Battle of Midway OTL made sure that such training was made unnecessary, and two of the divisions were sent south to New Guinea and the Solomons. The third (7th Infantry) remained in Japan for the duration, though one regiment (28th Infantry) did go to the Solomons and was destroyed on Guadalcanal (the Ichiki Detachment at Alligator Creek and then the rest of the regiment during the Sep-Oct battles...
I know. This was a follow-up answer to someone else asking about where they would be deported to. Hawaii cannot support an influx of people like that.
After reading the books I was always wondering how the rest of the war would have gone, midway probably have been a Tarawa like battle, followed by a huge push into the central pacific (maby the Japanese navy comes out to fight this time).
One thing should be noted that the books mentioned that the british pacific fleet was sunk during the indean ocean raid, wonder how that effects things.
I wonder if operation FS would happen here, especially after the first battle of the north pacific and with no british feet in being there seems to be a open period for such a operation.
IF successful that would seem to close any attempts at opening a southern frount by McArthur and the army. Giving Nimitz and the fleet sole billing to run the war until he gets to the Philippines.
One thing should be noted that the books mentioned that the british pacific fleet was sunk during the indean ocean raid, wonder how that effects things.
I wonder if operation FS would happen here, especially after the first battle of the north pacific and with no british feet in being there seems to be a open period for such a operation.
IF successful that would seem to close any attempts at opening a southern frount by McArthur and the army. Giving Nimitz and the fleet sole billing to run the war until he gets to the Philippines.
The war beyond is mentioned only briefly--the New Guinea campaign is implied to be going pretty much as OTL, with the Allied forces pushing the Japanese away from Port Moresby. So MacArthur is presumably still doing his best to start a US-Australia war.
The Hawaii liberation campaign gives the US, presumably, much of the experience in developing amphibious landing techniques that they got IOTL at Tarawa. So, at least, later landings will go more smoothly than their equivalents did IOTL.
Midway and Wake are the next logical steps for the US, since Japanese bombers keep harassing Hawaii from the former. Then the Marshalls. So, like IOTL but perhaps with a delay of months to a year?
One has to wonder how Guadalcanal went ITTL.
The Hawaii liberation campaign gives the US, presumably, much of the experience in developing amphibious landing techniques that they got IOTL at Tarawa. So, at least, later landings will go more smoothly than their equivalents did IOTL.
Midway and Wake are the next logical steps for the US, since Japanese bombers keep harassing Hawaii from the former. Then the Marshalls. So, like IOTL but perhaps with a delay of months to a year?
One has to wonder how Guadalcanal went ITTL.