I'm curious. Seeing as the CSA was so much more dependent on imports that was the Union, and the efforts of the US to blockade the South, what would have been the direct effects of an ACW without a Union blockade? I would ask you to assume that this is because of US decision (not necessarily a wise or correct one), not foreign intervention or pressure. How does the redirection of money, men, and material play out for both sides? How much more can the CSA purchase abroad given its finances? How would land campaigns be directed, if capturing ports were the way to shut off imports?
CSA Without Blockade
- Thread starter Kevin C. Smith
- Start date
Anaxagoras
Banned
Well, the Union made a strong effort to capture ports from the beginning of the war until almost its final days.
In answer to your broader question, the main impact of there being no blockade would be on the home front. Inflation would be much lower, which would have a massive impact on the course of the war. And basic essentials would be in much greater supply than was the case IOTL. Militarily, the main impact would be higher quality gunpowder and artillery fuses for the rebels. The Southerners were actually well supplied with weapons and ammunition, thanks largely to the genius of Josiah Gorgas. It was not quantity that was the problem, but quality. Something like a quarter of Confederate artillery shells failed to explode on account of poor fuses. Importing such things from abroad rather than having to manufacture them at home would be a considerable advantage.
The ability to import quality foreign weapons, ammunition, medicines, and other essential war materials is a potential game changer. The ability to export their cash crop sees a far more stable Confederate economy too.
I think this probably belongs in the ASB section as why wouldn't the Union do that? The entire Union government would have to be run by mindless twits from Lincoln on down. The advantages are so obvious this is simply impossible not to happen. The only way for a blockade not to happen is for the Brits to break it, which you ruled out in the OP.
Saphroneth
Banned
I can't help but think that if the Virginia had some wrought iron, chilled iron or even steel bolts (note, OTL she had cast iron shot and shell for her battle with Monitor - mostly shell) then she'd have sunk the Monitor in fairly short order.
That's going to have an effect on the war, it'll be great CSA propoganda.
(n.b. OTL there were three shell hits on the Monitor's deck and several on the belt. The belt was 3-5" thick and the deck was 1" - and a penetration or two pretty much sinks Monitor since she's got almost no reserve buoyancy, the deck was awash.)
That's going to have an effect on the war, it'll be great CSA propoganda.
(n.b. OTL there were three shell hits on the Monitor's deck and several on the belt. The belt was 3-5" thick and the deck was 1" - and a penetration or two pretty much sinks Monitor since she's got almost no reserve buoyancy, the deck was awash.)
Almost, but it is within the realm of possible if you push at a few things. Something like Lincoln only ordering port closures at first, the European powers not respecting such an act.
Not overtly likely, but not unlikely enough to be completely outside the realm of possibility.
The ship was completed in March of 1862, and scuttled by May when its home port was overrun, so I don't think that would make much of a difference. And in the meantime, it wasn't suitable for the open sea, so its effects would only be small scale.
Saphroneth
Banned
Hence why I said the propoganda effect would be the main change, because a better-armed Virginia would almost certainly defeat Monitor.
And I'm actually not so sure Virginia was completely unsuitable for the open sea. Her freeboard is comically low, but that didn't necessarily stop a Monitor if they got a tow, and she's built on the skeleton of the old Merrimack but actually has shallower draft... not a world changer by herself, few ships are, but if Virginia beat Monitor unambiguously and then escaped south (to Charleston?) it would be a huge propoganda coup for the CSA.
That matters in civil wars.
TFSmith121
Banned
Your point of departure would have to be no USN, which
Your point of departure would have to be no USN, which would require no US, which would sort of make secession moot.
Blockade is an obvious response to a conflict between an autarky with a long sea going tradition and an agricultural power without one. The equivalent would be expecting Germany to try and wage a naval war with France, instead of a land war.
Best,
Your point of departure would have to be no USN, which would require no US, which would sort of make secession moot.
Blockade is an obvious response to a conflict between an autarky with a long sea going tradition and an agricultural power without one. The equivalent would be expecting Germany to try and wage a naval war with France, instead of a land war.
Best,
Agreed, there is simply no reason for the US not to blockade the CSA. Even if the USN were non-existent when war broke out there would have been a blockade within a year or tow after the US built one. However the USN not existing is a near-ASB event in and of itself.
TFSmith121
Banned
Like most "save the webels" ideas, it depends on
Like most "save the webels" ideas, it depends on individuals who were demonstrably a) pretty capable individuals and b) successful, historically, to suddenly become drooling idiots.
And, as repeatedly demonstrated during the actual conflict, (and unsurprisingly, given the 3-1 or even 4-1 population differential the loyalists enjoyed over the rebels), even if someone important stopped one, they had a deputy who (generally) could and did step up and kept up the fire.
As a thought experiment, consider that even if someone important - in the Lincoln Administration, the Army, the Navy, or even in a key state - "departs" because they stopped one, or fell off a horse, or died of cholera, or whatever - they all had someone (several someones, in fact) who would have replaced them.
As much as Lincoln and Grant were amazingly capable individuals, truly the right men at the right time, is someone really going to argue that Hamlin or Seward or Sherman or Meade were not pretty damn capable, as well?
One can, but it veers into the realm of the fantastic, and if one wipes out everyone of note in the US at this point, it gets rather fantastical.
An obvious point of comparison are how many effective general officers the US had in the field by the end of the war who, demonstrably, were capable of effectively leading an army or army group in the field against the best (or worst) the rebels could provide to face them. One can include Grant, Sherman, Meade, Thomas, Sheridan, Ord, and Canby on the US side, presumably, before one even gets to the corps commanders; on the rebel side, who's left?
There's Lee. Okay, that's one. If one is very charitable, maybe JE Johnston; maybe Kirby-Smith and Beauregard if one squints really hard.
2 to 1, at least; probably closer to 3-1, since the US corps were pretty close to a rebel army in strength by 1865.
Quantity has a quality all of its own; quantity and quality is pretty close to undeniable.
Best,
Like most "save the webels" ideas, it depends on individuals who were demonstrably a) pretty capable individuals and b) successful, historically, to suddenly become drooling idiots.
And, as repeatedly demonstrated during the actual conflict, (and unsurprisingly, given the 3-1 or even 4-1 population differential the loyalists enjoyed over the rebels), even if someone important stopped one, they had a deputy who (generally) could and did step up and kept up the fire.
As a thought experiment, consider that even if someone important - in the Lincoln Administration, the Army, the Navy, or even in a key state - "departs" because they stopped one, or fell off a horse, or died of cholera, or whatever - they all had someone (several someones, in fact) who would have replaced them.
As much as Lincoln and Grant were amazingly capable individuals, truly the right men at the right time, is someone really going to argue that Hamlin or Seward or Sherman or Meade were not pretty damn capable, as well?
One can, but it veers into the realm of the fantastic, and if one wipes out everyone of note in the US at this point, it gets rather fantastical.
An obvious point of comparison are how many effective general officers the US had in the field by the end of the war who, demonstrably, were capable of effectively leading an army or army group in the field against the best (or worst) the rebels could provide to face them. One can include Grant, Sherman, Meade, Thomas, Sheridan, Ord, and Canby on the US side, presumably, before one even gets to the corps commanders; on the rebel side, who's left?
There's Lee. Okay, that's one. If one is very charitable, maybe JE Johnston; maybe Kirby-Smith and Beauregard if one squints really hard.
2 to 1, at least; probably closer to 3-1, since the US corps were pretty close to a rebel army in strength by 1865.
Quantity has a quality all of its own; quantity and quality is pretty close to undeniable.
Best,
Last edited:
Until the North produces half a dozen for every one the CSA can. To build their own version of the Virginia wouldn't take the Union very long at all considering they had more shipyards and no shortage of steel. It took the Union less time to build the Monitor from scratch than it took the Confederacy to cover the Merrimack in armor.
TFSmith121
Banned
There's also the minor point the US built even larger ironclads
There's also the minor point the US built even larger ironclads than Virginia from the keel up in the exact same time period, as witness Re d' Italia and Re d' Portigallo...
Merrimac had four sister frigates in the USN (Colorado, Minnesota, Roanoke, and Wabash) as well as a larger, half-sister (Niagara); in additon, Franklin was all but finished but still on the ways.
Six to one odds (eight to one if the Italian ships are taken over) in ironclad frigates before the end of 1862, if there was a need.
Add New Ironsides, Monitor, the Passaics, etc., in the same time frame.
Which doesn't even include odds and ends like Galena.
To pretend otherwise is a typical STW fantasy by the neo-cornfeds.
Best,
There's also the minor point the US built even larger ironclads than Virginia from the keel up in the exact same time period, as witness Re d' Italia and Re d' Portigallo...
Merrimac had four sister frigates in the USN (Colorado, Minnesota, Roanoke, and Wabash) as well as a larger, half-sister (Niagara); in additon, Franklin was all but finished but still on the ways.
Six to one odds (eight to one if the Italian ships are taken over) in ironclad frigates before the end of 1862, if there was a need.
Add New Ironsides, Monitor, the Passaics, etc., in the same time frame.
Which doesn't even include odds and ends like Galena.
To pretend otherwise is a typical STW fantasy by the neo-cornfeds.
Best,
One point about the blockade is that there was a land as well as a sea element. Without Ship Island and the capture of islands such as the Outer Banks and Roanoke Island the USN would not have had the bases that it needed. Without the bases all the CSA ports would remain open. In fact, in spite of the blockade, some of them remained open for the entire war
The problem the CSA would have had taking/holding these is a lack of manpower. If it deploys troops against the blockade that is less men in the field armies. If it does not then as on OTL the USN holds/knocks off ports and bases.
The problem the CSA would have had taking/holding these is a lack of manpower. If it deploys troops against the blockade that is less men in the field armies. If it does not then as on OTL the USN holds/knocks off ports and bases.
The Union had the manpower to run a sea as well as a land war against the CSA's numbers. In contrast the CSA is stretched to the limit.TFSmith121 said:
TFSmith121
Banned
Very true... the US could even manage a few LICs to the side
Very true... the US could even manage a few LICs to the side of the main effort (Dakota War, etc.) as well as remain (essentially) on the offensive in the eastern, central, and western theaters from (roughly) every year of the war, beginning in 1862, plus the amphibious operations at divisional strength on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts in 1862 (Port Royal, Roanoke, and New Orleans).
The rebels managed offensives worth the name in two theaters in 1862, one in 1863, and were on the defensive everywhere else for the remainder of the war.
And there was a gap of at least 18 months (1861-62) where the US was not even coming close to full mobilization.
Foote's "one hand behind its back" comment is very true.
Best,
Very true... the US could even manage a few LICs to the side of the main effort (Dakota War, etc.) as well as remain (essentially) on the offensive in the eastern, central, and western theaters from (roughly) every year of the war, beginning in 1862, plus the amphibious operations at divisional strength on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts in 1862 (Port Royal, Roanoke, and New Orleans).
The rebels managed offensives worth the name in two theaters in 1862, one in 1863, and were on the defensive everywhere else for the remainder of the war.
And there was a gap of at least 18 months (1861-62) where the US was not even coming close to full mobilization.
Foote's "one hand behind its back" comment is very true.
Best,
Saphroneth
Banned
I'm not arguing that this will set the world on fire, or change who wins the war.
I'm arguing that a different outcome to history could happen for a battle, and that battles influence things somewhat. It gives a different narrative (that is, it's more of "the North used numbers to defeat the South's superior individual ships" - perception counts for a lot) and it means that the idea of "armour overcoming weapons technology" is not prevalent - it might even prevent the "ram" side path that ships went on after the ACW and after Lissa. (No ram path after the ACW means the ships at Lissa don't have rams, even if Lissa happens on schedule.)
It'll certainly make the Monitor concept less influential, and that probably will mean the Union builds more broadside ironclads - which might well make things better for them overall on the naval front, or might not if it means they have to build a second, separate set for inshore bombardment.
(Not wasting all those resources on the twenty Casco class follies might be possible, which would result in a stronger Union navy for the same resources).
The point I'm trying to make is - try not to just reflexively assume "oh the North wins anyway" and stop thinking. Even if you do come to the conclusion that the North wins anyway, think about how they win and how that affects future developments.
- Ericsson's Monitor failing the first test of battle would (apparently) make the Monitor concept look worthless, changing the shape of the US Navy to a more conventional broadside-ironclad format going into the latter half of the war.
- The greater success of the Virginia, and her escaping to Charleston, would make the naval war seem more of a war of equals. (It doesn't change Charleston's fate, that port never fell OTL.)
- The apparent evidence that armour makes ships harder but not impossible to defeat with the guns of the time (which is closer to the truth than the reverse) would make the gun-vs-armour debate a little different, with people talking of gun-resistant rather than gun-proof ships.
- As such, you'd potentially see less of a ram revolution, and prevent ships going down that little false path - which has major implications for naval ship design for the whole second half of the century.
- If you see the US building their equivalents of the Virginia, then their naval buildup takes longer - Merrimack herself took nearly two years authorization to commission, and she was one of the fastest... and at 3,200 tons, she's going to take longer than 1,000 ton Monitor to build at the same workrate.
See how, even though the result of the ACW is pretty much the same, the wider implications are different?
This is kind of what "Alternate History" is about. It's not all looking for ways for Nazi Germany to win WW2 (or -3), and it's not all about assuring one another that the world was destined to one specific inviolable path.
That doesn't change the fact that it is an ASB scenario to begin with. The Union is going to blockade the South unless every US government official from Lincoln on down is mindswapped with a drooling idiot. I made a thread for the CSA to use nothing but banzai attacks CSA Banzai but I put it in the ASB category for that reason. This is something the CSA would never do. Even the Japanese didn't do that. The Banzai attack was basically a way for a Japanese soldier to get a glorious death when all hope was lost and hopefully get lucky and take some Americans down with him before he dies. It was an elaborate form of suicide .
TFSmith121
Banned
CSS Virginia could no more sail to Charleston, SC
CSS Virginia could no more sail to Charleston, South Carolina then she could to the Pacific.
Do the words "Cape Hatteras" mean anything to you?
http://ncmaritimemuseums.com/graveyard-of-the-atlantic/
CSS Virginia commissioned as such in February, 1862, and the Hampton Roads action occurred in March. Gee, what happens in the winter and spring in the Atlantic off North America?
And the point regarding Virginia is the US could convert the six existing steam frigates (five in commission plus Franklin) and/or take over the two ships being built for the Italians, if necessary, at any point in 1862, and much more quickly then the rebels could do anything...
As it was, Roanoke was converted to a 3x2 turret ship in 12 months at the Brooklyn Navy Yard; cutting down the second deck and chain-cladding her, which would have made a much more effective sea-going conversion than Virginia's, wouldn't have taken a third of that time.
And the two ships being built by Webb in New York for Italy were laid down in 1861, launched in 1863, and commissioned in 1864, as commercial projects in the middle of wartime...
Best,
CSS Virginia could no more sail to Charleston, South Carolina then she could to the Pacific.
Do the words "Cape Hatteras" mean anything to you?
http://ncmaritimemuseums.com/graveyard-of-the-atlantic/
CSS Virginia commissioned as such in February, 1862, and the Hampton Roads action occurred in March. Gee, what happens in the winter and spring in the Atlantic off North America?
And the point regarding Virginia is the US could convert the six existing steam frigates (five in commission plus Franklin) and/or take over the two ships being built for the Italians, if necessary, at any point in 1862, and much more quickly then the rebels could do anything...
As it was, Roanoke was converted to a 3x2 turret ship in 12 months at the Brooklyn Navy Yard; cutting down the second deck and chain-cladding her, which would have made a much more effective sea-going conversion than Virginia's, wouldn't have taken a third of that time.
And the two ships being built by Webb in New York for Italy were laid down in 1861, launched in 1863, and commissioned in 1864, as commercial projects in the middle of wartime...
Best,
Last edited:
Roanoke was never an effective unit either after her conversion, and relegated to harbour defence.
Saphroneth
Banned
I see that Norfolk was captured in May, OTL. That seems to be late enough in the year that a low-freeboard ship is not certain to be sunk. Monitor sank on December 31, and the Union Navy tried to tow her around at that time of year - I think it not beyond the bounds of possibility that the attempt could be made in early May and that Virginia would not necessarily sink.