Could nuclear weapons have gotten Germany to surrender in 45-47 without a Western Allies invasion of Germany?

[Simon Darkshade]

Politically and practically, it's more reliable and probably more effective to use existing and available ground troops than a small number of weapons that need better control of the air than the allies had. Given that troops were coming in from both east and west, defeat was inevitable and only the cost of the allied win was going to change. Nuclear bombs could have helped against specific objectives, but creating the circumstances where nuclear bombs could be used would likely be similar effort to overruning them with ground troops.
But for sub pens a daring minisub raid could pave the way for invasion by removing an alt-Uboat threat. It could make a pretty good film - when casting it, please can I have a minor role as a white coated scientist for Tube Alloys?

After WW1, it was important to send a message that Germany had not only lost but been thoroughly beaten to avoid "Ah, but we would have won without the bomb/ the stab in the back/ losing millions to satisfy some madman's inadequacies...", so nukes or not an occupation would have been needed.

The cost of ground troops is hundreds of thousands of casualties. It can be argued that there are very real practical and political problems with that prospect as well.

Even with the war situation being held back a year, Allied control of the air is both well established and inevitable to grind further on. With the Russians back in the Ukraine and in a general position pre Bagration and the WAllies either back in France or not even on the Continent, the pressure for strategic use of the atomic bomb is going to be high, rather than tactical employment.

 

[Captain Homicide]

@ObssesedNuker, what is your opinion on the OP?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Well, best I can say is "maybe". Maybe one of the atom bombs kill Hitler. Maybe they inspire the military to coup him. Or maybe they don't and the Allies have to invade after hammering key German industries enough times. Or maybe the Allies decide for a cease-fire in 1944[1] rather then bet on the bomb[2]. Arguements can be advanced either way.

[1]If we assume a Soviet collapse in 1942, than the WAllies would initially almost certainly keep going on their early hopes that strategic bombing or the supposed "soft-underbelly" strategy. Now by the end of '43, it would become obvious that strategic bombing wasn't making good it's promise (especially in a ATL where the Soviet Union went down and allowed Germany to divert the fuel expended there into training additional pilots and maintaining more airframes as operational, which would drag out the air fight) and that Italy wasn't a easy target. And obviously, without the bulk of the Heer off dying in Russia, there isn't much prospect for D-Day in '44. So I figure 1944 would be the "make or break" point for the WAllies on whether to keep the war in Europe going or not if the Soviet Union is down.
[2]The bomb was too uncertain a prospect as late as May 1945 for policymakers to regard it as something to base their decisionmaking on with great certainty. So without hindsight, it'd be viewed as a gamble.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Do we see the same shut down occurring as in @ with an active war against a better positioned Nazi Germany? I’m not so sure.

Definitely not. The halt of production operations occurred because It was not needed. Had the war continued production would have continued.

Some of figures I have seen refer to 3 plutonium bombs and 1 uranium bomb per month, and more:

That fits the goal Groves stated when the construction of the two breeder reactors was underway. The lower numbers Rhoades and others provide are drawn from a combination of the actual production rate of the 4-5 cores actually refined to September 1945, and estimates allowing for some of the problems encountered that summer. When production was started. Maybe some of those problems could have been resolved and the output stepped up, maybe not. Maybe a physicist with a detailed knowledge of the original Haniford reactors could make a valid estimate.

I've not found any indication of how many devices or bombs were ordered. Parsons had at least a dozen prepared & present on Tinian, tho only one Plutonium core had been delivered and one more was enroute in August. Have to check the books.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Now by the end of '43, it would become obvious that strategic bombing wasn't making good it's promise

The goals of the POINTBLANK Directive were not expected to be achieved until early spring of 1944. There were a few observers who were questioning the effectiveness of the strategic campaign at the end of 1943, but Harris, Spaatz, & the other air chiefs were in January 1944 still claiming they were on track. Just a little more effort they claimed would do it. It was not until late March 1944 Eisenhower politely told them they were mistaken and initiated the focus exclusively on supporting preparation for OVERLORD. Perhaps he might have taken action sooner, but it was not until late March he got a firm commitment from Roosevelt and Marshal to back him up if he fired any of the air commanders. Perret refers to theses changes in command policy, strategy, and perception of the strategic bombing campaign in his biography of Eisenhower, and his history of the US air campaigns 'Winged Victory'. In the later book he clearly faults the US air forces commanders for badly overestimating their capability in 1942 - 43. And, for not recognizing this. John Ellis in 'Brute Force' covers the same ground & is a little rougher on the unrealistic attitudes of the Air Force leaders, Brit and American. In multiple tables & charts he summarizes the data showing the failures. through to the spring of 1944.

[2]The bomb was too uncertain a prospect as late as May 1945 for policymakers to regard it as something to base their decisionmaking on with great certainty. So without hindsight, it'd be viewed as a gamble.

Dead on. In 1943, or in the first half of 1944 no one was canceling any bomber production or standing down the air forces in anticipation of super bombs. Even in early 1944 when it was certain the Uranium bomb would work as advertised and a fair idea of its strength was known plans to continue the strategic bomber campaign into 1945-46* were continued

(*At that date, Jan 1944, it was assumed Germany would not cease fighting until mid 1946)

 

[A_simple_pilgrim]

Even if the Soviet Union was hollowed out by 1944 to the point where the Germans could pull resources away from the eastern front, is there a reason why the Allies wouldn't just wait for the bomb while continuing the strategic campaign against Germany?

If there's a year where there's no ground combat between the Allies and Germany does any pressure form to just end it? Once they do test the bomb how long will they sit around to build up a stockpile before going on the attack? Would they even decide to build up a stockpile at all?

What would be the theoretical policy for nuking germany if there was no ground invasion or a failed D-day? Would the Allies have any inclination to come to some sort of settlement with Germany if there are multiple failed amphibious landings? Say one in Italy and another in France. Would Hitler need to die or be deposed for the Allies to consider a conditional peace?

 

[Trevayne]

The goals of the POINTBLANK Directive were not expected to be achieved until early spring of 1944. There were a few observers who were questioning the effectiveness of the strategic campaign at the end of 1943, but Harris, Spaatz, & the other air chiefs were in January 1944 still claiming they were on track. Just a little more effort they claimed would do it. It was not until late March 1944 Eisenhower politely told them they were mistaken and initiated the focus exclusively on supporting preparation for OVERLORD. Perhaps he might have taken action sooner, but it was not until late March he got a firm commitment from Roosevelt and Marshal to back him up if he fired any of the air commanders. Perret refers to theses changes in command policy, strategy, and perception of the strategic bombing campaign in his biography of Eisenhower, and his history of the US air campaigns 'Winged Victory'. In the later book he clearly faults the US air forces commanders for badly overestimating their capability in 1942 - 43. And, for not recognizing this. John Ellis in 'Brute Force' covers the same ground & is a little rougher on the unrealistic attitudes of the Air Force leaders, Brit and American. In multiple tables & charts he summarizes the data showing the failures. through to the spring of 1944.



Dead on. In 1943, or in the first half of 1944 no one was canceling any bomber production or standing down the air forces in anticipation of super bombs. Even in early 1944 when it was certain the Uranium bomb would work as advertised and a fair idea of its strength was known plans to continue the strategic bomber campaign into 1945-46* were continued

(*At that date, Jan 1944, it was assumed Germany would not cease fighting until mid 1946)

Thanks and I agree with much of this. I do have a few quibbles.

Nobody would be preparing to reduce strategic bomber efforts because few if any of those decision-makers knew about the bomb and the ones that did would realize it would raise questions about why. Those not in the know would be asking why are we reducing our strategic bombing efforts before we have won. Especially since ITTL the allies have not done as well.

I probably wasn't sufficiently clear in my original question. I was asking if Germany could be driven to surrender by nuclear bombing. That implies that serious nuclear bombing is possible, so German air defenses don't really matter, or they don't matter enough.

Assuming there are no allies troops on German soil, would the Germans continue if the allies destroy cities and the oil industry? With every synthetic oil plant nuked along with Berlin and several other cities, how long do they continue? Do they resist like the OTL Japanese who didn't surrender until the US effectively destroyed the 100 largest cities and nuked two more and got invaded by the Soviets, or are they more reasonable?

My impression is they might well surrender after a few bombs if Hitler was killed, but would probably continue to fight as long as he was alive. I am not sure how much longer if the oil industry was destroyed and it was clear that Germany would have no fuel for its planes, tanks, and U-boats in a few months. I know they can adapt vehicles to alcohol, but I don't think that works for planes or subs.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Thanks and I agree with much of this. I do have a few quibbles.

Nobody would be preparing to reduce strategic bomber efforts because few if any of those decision-makers knew about the bomb and the ones that did would realize it would raise questions about why. Those not in the know would be asking why are we reducing our strategic bombing efforts before we have won. Especially since ITTL the allies have not done as well.

The reason Ike cut off the strategic bombing campaign in April was the necessity to address the targets of Operation OVERLORD. Harris and Spaatz had been 'uncooperative' since December & SHAEF needed a maximum effort in support of the invasion and its related operations. This was a very temporary hiatus & the direct attacks on Germany resumed full force in June-July. A similar temporary change occurred in Italy where Eakers 15th Air Force focused for a couple months on supporting the 12th Air Force & RAF tactical airfares in Operation STRANGLE. When Op DIADEM succeeded in May the 15th resumed full on attacks into Germany.

I agree with you. Absent a invasion the strategic airfares will remain focused on destroying German industry.

 

[A_simple_pilgrim]

OTL the Germans were significantly less reasonable than the Japanese in my opinion. I don’t think the Japanese had literal children fighting tanks in the streets. While the main Japanese government surrendered, the head nazi leadership all had to die and their flunkies signed the surrenders. Even then more units refused to surrender and fought to the death in the coming days.

And about taking about all the fuel, did Germany have so few synthetic refineries that a dozen nukes could take them out? Did the allies know of every synthetic refinery? Were none of them built underground? While extreme damage can be caused I don’t think you can take production to 0 unless you have the men to physically disassemble every plant and then occupy the land to prevent new ones from being made.

Also will the allies Nuke the industrial facilities of the occupied territories and Italy if both are still firmly held?

 

[Pauh the federalist]

There are several solutions to that problem, but the most obvious one is probably also the simplest: nuke your way in, starting from the outside. Use nukes to clear a path through the air defences, starting from where you can reliably get a bomber to. It doesn't take many nukes, even on peripheral targets, before the air defence proposition becomes much more complicated. Any bomber flying alone probably is carrying a nuke, and you absolutely want to shoot it down, but you still can't ignore the 1000-bomber stream heading for the Ruhr. Their destruction might be less concentrated but it'll add up, and any of them might be carrying an a-bomb and waiting for the opportunity to separate from the stream and make an unscheduled excursion to Bielefeld (if it even exists).

This method uses more nukes, but you'd still probably need fewer than a dozen to start having an impact and you can stockpile some before you start the offensive (which you'd probably want to do anyway). If you can deliver an ongoing series of nuclear strikes I think the effects will become noticeable quickly and the German ability to reliably intercept bombers would be degraded relatively fast. I'm only guessing, but I think you'd need fewer than 50 to get the Nazi regime to a crisis point, possibly fewer than 10... but it would probably be more than 2 or 3.

With "nuke your way in" I am imadgening the allies using nukes to clear a beach landing zone and then millions of allied soldiers suffering from radiation poisoning as just one possible instance in a string of possible battlefield clearing tactics that a "nuke your way in" approach might entail because that early on we had almost no understanding of the effects of radiation.

 

[Trevayne]

OTL the Germans were significantly less reasonable than the Japanese in my opinion. I don’t think the Japanese had literal children fighting tanks in the streets. While the main Japanese government surrendered, the head nazi leadership all had to die and their flunkies signed the surrenders. Even then more units refused to surrender and fought to the death in the coming days.

And about taking about all the fuel, did Germany have so few synthetic refineries that a dozen nukes could take them out? Did the allies know of every synthetic refinery? Were none of them built underground? While extreme damage can be caused I don’t think you can take production to 0 unless you have the men to physically disassemble every plant and then occupy the land to prevent new ones from being made.

Also will the allies Nuke the industrial facilities of the occupied territories and Italy if both are still firmly held?

Err, the Japanese were planning on arming millions of civilians with spears, so I doubt your assertion that the Germans were more stubborn.

As for the synfuels plants, they were large industrial complexes built above ground in prewar. I am not aware of any built after the war started or underground. They were difficult targets IIRC because to destroy them specific machine very needed to be wrecked via direct hit or near miss by conventional bombs. This becomes much less of an issue with nuclear weapons.

For that matter, where did I say a dozen? What I meant and thought I said was one for each synfuel plant, 1-2 for Ploesti (more if needed, the refineries and wells were spread out) and Berlin and the next 5 largest cities. Per wiki, there were 25 German synfuels plants. They tried building seven underground plants in 1944-45, but none were completed. I need to do more research to get an idea if those plants could have been nuclear resistant or just conventional resistant.

The big problem with going underground is that conventional bombproof construction is not necessarily nuclear bomb proof. For example, sub pens with 10 meters of concrete were quite resistant to conventional bombing. With a nuclear ground burst in the 10-15 kt range, the entire pen is vaporized, roof and all since the crater is likely to be ok after than the facility.

As for Allied willingness to bomb sites located in occupied territory, just look at the OTL history. There were lots of targets bombed in France.

Edit: Palestine to Ploesti

 

[A_simple_pilgrim]

Err, the Japanese were planning on arming millions of civilians with spears, so I doubt your assertion that the Germans were more stubborn.

All sorts of things were planned by all parties in the war. Japanese leadership could make any assertion about fighting Americans with rocks, but they were reasonable enough to surrender before things got to that point. The Germans didn't. The only reason that there were no German plans to arm people with spears is because they always had enough industry to arm people with guns.

 

[Normal for Norfolk]

For that matter, where did I say a dozen? What I meant and thought I said was one for each synfuel plant, 1-2 for Palestine (more if needed, the refineries and wells were spread out) and Berlin and the next 5 largest cities. Per wiki, there were 25 German synfuels plants. They tried building seven underground plants in 1944-45, but none were completed. I need to do more research to get an idea if those plants could have been nuclear resistant or just conventional resistant.

For Palestine do you mean Ploesti?

 

[Jonah Carter]

I'm not sure why we should just accept at face value that the Soviets even could be stopped in Eastern Europe. By the time they're pushing into Belarus/the Baltic States, Germany is so broken down militarily that the biggest Soviet delay isn't actually fighting German troops, but waiting to let their logistics system catch up to the new front. Even if the Germans felt secure enough in the West to completely dismantle their defenses in France and send all those troops east, it wouldn't make up for the quality and quantity gap that existed by then.

 

[Trevayne]

For Palestine do you mean Ploesti?

Yes, I really hate my tablet's autocorrupt.

 

[nbcman]

That is still well behind the Manhattan Project. From viability to an actual production effort of a working bomb that yields tangible results is a different thing. The Germans considered they would need five years to separate the necessary isotopes (https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1942-1945/rivals.htm ).

The scale required was a bit above what the Germans had, but you will note that my mention of resources did not go into fissionable material.

The Manhattan Project used 1/7th of all the electricity produced in the United States from 1943-1945, or 14.28%. In 1940, the USA produced 179.9 billion kilowatt hours compared to 63 of Germany (https://www.statista.com/statistics/1261019/wwii-electricity-output-major-power/ ). Now, if those numbers stayed completely static, which we know that they did not, then we'd be looking at 77 billion kilowatt hours equivalent, or 40% of all electricity that Germany produced in a three year period, just for arguments sake.

We do know that US electrical generation capacity increased over the course of the Second World War, and that German electrical generation capacity decreased, particularly once the Combined Bomber Offensive really hit its pomp. We also know that Germany had quite a few competing priorities apart from the relatively distant possibility of nuclear weapons.

That claim of 14% or 1/7 of US electricity production was used for the Manhattan Project was disproven quite a while ago.

APS -APS April Meeting 2011 - Event - Correcting a Persistent Manhattan Project Statistical Error

In his 1987 autobiography, Major-General Kenneth Nichols, who served as the Manhattan Project's "District Engineer'' under General Leslie Groves, related that when the Clinton Engineer Works at Oak Ridge, TN, was completed it was consuming nearly one-seventh (∼ 14{\%}) of the electric power being generated in the United States. This statement has been reiterated in several editions of a Department of Energy publication on the Manhattan Project. This remarkable claim has been checked against power generation and consumption figures available in Manhattan Engineer District documents, Tennessee Valley Authority records, and historical editions of the Statistical Abstract of the United States. The correct figure is closer to 0.9{\%} of national generation.

There was a discussion of the TVA power generation and the power requirements for Manhattan Project back in this thread from a while ago: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...he-fall-of-moscow.428605/page-4#post-15977332

 

[jmc247]

No Germany is not going to unconditionally surrender if nuked. Not with a-bombs in any event. You could get a negotiated surrender of some sort, but unconditional requires something more.

 

[RanulfC]

No Germany is not going to unconditionally surrender if nuked. Not with a-bombs in any event. You could get a negotiated surrender of some sort, but unconditional requires something more.

Threats of air dropping kegs of American 3.2 beer?

Randy

 

[Gunnarnz]

With "nuke your way in" I am imadgening the allies using nukes to clear a beach landing zone and then millions of allied soldiers suffering from radiation poisoning as just one possible instance in a string of possible battlefield clearing tactics that a "nuke your way in" approach might entail because that early on we had almost no understanding of the effects of radiation.

Yes, that's possible, although the radiation levels would drop quite fast from airbursts. You wouldn't need many ground bursts to soften up a landing zone, mostly what you want to do is prevent reinforcements arriving, and the beach defences themselves can be handled adequately with conventional weapons. In any case, though, even if they knew it, it's entirely possible the Western Allied leaders would shrug and say "yep, sounds acceptable" (Stalin wouldn't hesitate for a moment). They were willing to spend lives to achieve things if the value gained by doing so was sufficient to justify it, and securing a foothold on Nazi-occupied Europe is a pretty valuable objective.

 

[AlterKnacker]

I'm not sure why we should just accept at face value that the Soviets even could be stopped in Eastern Europe.

OP said,

The basic assumption is that the U-boat war is even more successful than OTL from the very beginning and this means less lend-lease to the Soviets and UK and less Allied forces overall.

Perhaps it's successful enough that not only is the Murmansk route closed, but a German U-boat base at Sasebo has closed off Vladivostok?