Could Malta have been taken in Spring 1941?

[Deleted member 1487]

So Rommel just ends up with more supplies in Tripoli yes? And all he has to do to use them is to advance to Tripoli? Where he already has a surplus of surpples.

Assuming Malta falls he gets better supply from Benghazi (not used to capacity due to threat from Malta) which he can then use to take Tobruk by planned assault and then be able to use that and Bardia to get forward supplies to prepare for operations in Egypt.

 

[Amelikite]

Assuming Malta falls he gets better supply from Benghazi (not used to capacity due to threat from Malta) which he can then use to take Tobruk by planned assault and then be able to use that and Bardia to get forward supplies to prepare for operations in Egypt.

Benghazi was used, and it was in range of the DAF. Its capacity was 15000 tons. Greater use of Benghazi would have a limited impact. Sorry, that should be coastal shipping could only carry 15000 tons.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Benghazi was used, and it was in range of the DAF. Its capacity was 15000 tons. Greater use of Benghazi would have a limited impact.

Yet when reading about Operation Crusader Rommel was furious that Benghazi wasn't being used more and Malta was sinking a lot of his supplies. Sure Benghazi was being used, but not to capacity and the DAF was not hitting it anywhere near like it was in 1942 during El Alamein.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Malta_(World_War_II)#Allied_offensive

The Allies were able to launch offensive operations from Malta. Some 60% of Axis shipping was sunk in the second half of 1941. The DAK and its allies needed 50,000 short tons (45,000 t) of supplies a month, but were not receiving that much, and as a result they were unable to resist a strong counter-offensive by British forces in Operation Crusader.[1]

For example, in July 62,276 tons of supplies were landed by the Axis, half of the figure in June.[95] In September 1941, 830 Naval Air Squadron sank or damaged the ships Andrea Gritti (6,338 tons) and the Pietro Barbaro (6,330 tons). Ultra intercepts found that 3,500 tons of aerial bombs, 4,000 tons of ammunition, 5,000 tons of food, one entire tank workshop, 25 Bf 109 engines and 25 cases of glycol coolant for their engines were lost.[96] Further success was had later in the month, although British losses from anti-aircraft fire from Italian ships were often heavy.[97] One reason for accepting heavy losses was the difficulty in bombing accurately. Lloyd asked his bombers to attack at mast-height, increasing accuracy but making them easier targets for Italian anti-aircraft defences. Losses averaged 12% during this time.[98] No. 38, 40 and 104 Squadrons, equipped with Wellington bombers, hit Axis convoys in Tripoli.[99]


In concert with Royal Navy submarines, the RAF and FAA sank 108 Axis ships (300,000 grt) between June and September.[92] In September, one-third of the 96,000 tons of supplies dispatched were lost to British submarine and air attack.[100]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Malta_(World_War_II)#cite_note-FOOTNOTESpooner1996327-100

Part of the reason for this favourable outcome in November 1941, was the arrival of the Royal Navy's Force K. Its forces successfully destroyed an entire Axis convoy during the Battle of the Duisburg Convoy,[101] which practically blockaded Libyan ports.[102] Soon after, Force K was reinforced by the arrival in Malta of Force B with the light cruisers, HMS Ajax and Neptune, and the K-class destroyers, Kimberley and Kingston, on 27 November.[103] Joint operations with the RAF were so effective that during November 1941 the Axis supply line suffered significant losses. Among the written-off Axis cargo were precious fuel stores. The total loss of fuel amounted to 49,365 tons out of 79,208 tons.[104] Among the contributors to the sinking of Axis shipping was 828 Naval Air Squadron, 830 Naval Air Squadron, the British 10th Naval Flotilla and No. 69 Squadron RAF which shadowed convoys with their Maryland aircraft.[105] In particular, special flights of RAF Wellingtons, which were fitted with air-to-surface vessel radar, were critical to Force K operations. Ultra intelligence would reach Malta on Axis Convoy movements. The RAF Malta Command would then dispatch the ASV-Wellingtons to sweep the seas and direct the British naval forces to the targeted convoy.[106]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Mediterranean#1941

Benghazi couldn't be used anywhere near capacity during this period due to sinkings, making Tripoli the only safe port and shortest route to use. With Malta being taken in May none of that was possible. Rommel gets a lot more supplies and greater AAA and aircraft protection of Benghazi can be used for that port. With a capacity potential of over 1500 tons a day of supplies they can get a LOT more forward, which changes the situation dramatically for Crusader if not even earlier, with Tobruk potentially falling in Summer or Autumn 1941 before Crusader could be launched. Then Tobruk is a significant supply hub. Any major need to keep airpower bombing Malta is removed for 1941 and on, so that airpower can be used against the British from airbases in Cyrenaica.

 

[jahenders]

In a word -- yes -- it could have been taken, but it would have been costly and would likely mean that Crete is NOT taken.


The forces used in Crete could have been used to take Malta, with the addition of some Italian naval and marine forces. Assuming Germany conducts the assault like Crete, it's losses are probably high and it wouldn't then try airborne assaults on Crete.

Crete was a costly assault, largely because of dispersed airborne forces and dubious coordination. Though they took Crete, the battle convinced that using airborne troops in this was way a bad idea. OTOH, it helped convince the allies that airborne troops could be very valuable (though with improved tactics).

Taking Malta would have made a big difference to the war in Africa, improving German/Italian air and naval coverage for shipping to Africa.

If they don't take Crete, the RAF (and later USAAF) can base bombers there to attack targets in/around the Balkans, but it wouldn't be easy to supply until late in the war when the allies essentially controlled the Med.

If they had to choose Malta or Crete, they probably should have chosen Malta.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

In a word -- yes -- it could have been taken, but it would have been costly and would likely mean that Crete is NOT taken.

The forces used in Crete could have been used to take Malta, with the addition of some Italian naval and marine forces. Assuming Germany conducts the assault like Crete, it's losses are probably high and it wouldn't then try airborne assaults on Crete.

Crete was a costly assault, largely because of dispersed airborne forces and dubious coordination. Though they took Crete, the battle convinced that using airborne troops in this was way a bad idea. OTOH, it helped convince the allies that airborne troops could be very valuable (though with improved tactics).

Taking Malta would have made a big difference to the war in Africa, improving German/Italian air and naval coverage for shipping to Africa.

If they don't take Crete, the RAF (and later USAAF) can base bombers there to attack targets in/around the Balkans, but it wouldn't be easy to supply until late in the war when the allies essentially controlled the Med.

If they had to choose Malta or Crete, they probably should have chosen Malta.

Yeah its going to be one or the other. Malta seems to have been the more important in the overall course of the war. Assuming Malta is taken and heavy losses to the airborne force (but probably not the aircraft due to the AAA and aircraft of Malta being heavily suppressed unlike at Crete), though probably not OTL losses due to only 1 German division being used and no botched naval landing. The paras would not then be available for Barbarossa, but there is unlikely to be more than 10% of the aircraft losses of Crete due to no need to land Ju52s on interdicted airfields and no hidden unsuppressed AAA, nor land based aircraft capable of taking the air. Actually then given that only the Paras would be messed up (plus probably Italian paras and marines) plus some Italian naval losses, Malta would be a significantly less costly operation with greater immediate rewards. Leaving Crete to the Brits would actually be more costly to them in the long run, as they would need to garrison, supply, and upgrade it, while the Germans can base their X. Fliegerkorps and whatever air units they had deployed against Malta against Crete instead in Greece and the Aegean islands along with Italian anti-shipping forces.

So what can the Germans then do with the windfall of taking Malta? Supply in Africa in 1941 is going to be significantly better and in 1942-43 MUCH better. Italian and German air units used against Malta can be used against Crete instead; the Germans will likely lose a lot less aircraft against Malta in 1941 vs. OTL Crete, so they can have probably over 200 more aircraft than IOTL vs. the USSR, including over 150 Ju52 transports and ~100 more Stukas. They lose a LOT less equipment and supplies shipping things to Africa and less merchant shipping and warships. What does it mean for the fighting around Tobruk and the Libyan-Egyptian border in the second half of 1941? What do the British end up doing with the forces saved from having to supply and garrison Malta? Do they just end up at Crete instead (once upgraded) and can they be remotely as effective against a Central Mediterranean locked down by the Axis?

 

[Amelikite]

Yet when reading about Operation Crusader Rommel was furious that Benghazi wasn't being used more and Malta was sinking a lot of his supplies. Sure Benghazi was being used, but not to capacity and the DAF was not hitting it anywhere near like it was in 1942 during El Alamein.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Malta_(World_War_II)#Allied_offensive


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Mediterranean#1941

Benghazi couldn't be used anywhere near capacity during this period due to sinkings, making Tripoli the only safe port and shortest route to use. With Malta being taken in May none of that was possible. Rommel gets a lot more supplies and greater AAA and aircraft protection of Benghazi can be used for that port. With a capacity potential of over 1500 tons a day of supplies they can get a LOT more forward, which changes the situation dramatically for Crusader if not even earlier, with Tobruk potentially falling in Summer or Autumn 1941 before Crusader could be launched. Then Tobruk is a significant supply hub. Any major need to keep airpower bombing Malta is removed for 1941 and on, so that airpower can be used against the British from airbases in Cyrenaica.

Rommel was faced with the problem that his logisticians kept telling him that what he wanted to do was impossible with the supplies that he had on hand. Rommel therefore had two options, he coud go back to Hitlers original plan and defend, or he could blame someone else. As a capable German officer, he chose option b.

" The reason for giving up the pursuit is almost always the quartermaster's growing difficulty in spanning the lengthened supply routes with his available transport. As the commander usually pays great attention to his quartermaster and allows the latter's estimate of the supply possibilities to determine his strategic plan, it has become the habit for the quartermaster staffs to complain at every difficulty, instead of getting on with the job and using their powers of improvisation, which indeed are frequently nil." - Rommel
I note that your quote boasting of the success of Malta, doesn't acctually claim that all the shipping was sunk out of Malta does it. It fudges the matter. So can we agree that if Malta was lost Axis shipping losses would not be Zero?
Lett me also point out that Rommel supply situation did not depend on what was lost but what got through and what he was able to do with it.
The constraint upon delivery of supplies was the capacity of local shipping available.
"Tobruk could take about 1,500 tonnes (1,500 long tons) per day but lack of shipping made its capture irrelevant" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Desert_Campaign#Analysis
Then you still have to truck supplies to Rommel through the desert. which means of course that the further Rommel advances the more difficult his problem.

"While the critical role of Malta as a base for British interdiction of the Axis strategic lines of communication is undeniable, the limited intratheater distribution system was the more important problem facing the Afrika Korps. The most significant weaknesses in this system were the limited capacity of the available ports and the inadequate capabilities of German and Italian overland transportation assets. These two factors alone contributed more to Rommel's final defeat at Alam El Halfa than did all other factors combined, including enemy action for much of the campaign. Van Creveld states—

Despite everything, the Italians succeeded in putting an average of 72,000 tons—or just above Rommel's current consumption—across the Mediterranean in each one of the four months from July to October [1941]. Rommel's difficulties, therefore, stemmed less from a dearth of supplies from Europe than from the impossible length of his line of communications inside Africa."
http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb01/MS610.htm

If the Germans had no need to keep attacking Malta, then it equally follows that the British would have no need to keep supplying Malta, unless they were planning to supply the Germans. That means that planes and supplies could be sent somewhere else. North Africa perhaps?

"at one point during the campaign the Desert Fox requested an additional 8,000 trucks. " it follows from this that even shortening his supply lines would not eliminate his problems.

​

 

[Amelikite]

The truth is North Africa was a side show, it was never going to attract the sort of resources that the Germans wanted to put into the Soviet Union. Rommel was wrong to try to turn what was planned as a defensive operation into a resource consuming offensive operation. It just wasted, what was better used elsewhere.

 

[TFSmith121]

Here's a basic question:

Depends on your framing of the Crete situation, why would the Germans take the help they didn't think they needed? They took it when they needed it. They also had Italian ships escorting their own failed landing attempts and were working well together with convoys to Africa at the same period while the Luftwaffe and Italians were working together in Africa and in Sicily, while Rommel and the Italian troops he worked with and commanded were doing just fine rolling the British back to Egypt in March-June. Later Crete based air transports worked with cut off Italian garrisons on the Egyptian border to supply them.

Here's a basic question:

Who is in command for this HERKULES '41?

This is a corps-sized amphibious operation against a heavily defended island, and the defense force is a peer competitor known for the tenacity of their infantry - and they have been in occupation of the island since 1814. The Italians have no comparable experience, period, and the Germans' only slightly analogous experience was Norway.

By May, 1941, the Italians have been fighting in the Balkans since the previous October; the Germans have just finished a months-long campaign in Yugoslavia and Greece, and are already planning on invading the USSR in June... at sea, this is one month after the Tarigo convoy, two months after Matapan, and the same month that convoys Tiger and Splice get through. The largest operational ships in the Italian fleet are the three surviving old battleships, since Vittorio Veneto and Littorio are both under repair until August, 1941, and Cavour was wrecked in 1940; meanwhile, the British have Queen Elizabeth, Barham, Valiant, and Warspite, along with Formidable, all operating from Alexandria.

The Italians and Germans have air supremacy in the Balkans, but not in the Central Mediterranean or in North Africa; and this is the same month that BREVITY is fought.

Sorry, but I'm not seeing the Axis having the capabilities, time, or command organization to manage an invasion of Malta in the summer of 1941, certainly not with all else being historical up to the Greek surrender.

Best,

 

[pattersonautobody]

The other issue for Rommel having better supply is that Egypt was pretty vulnerable in 1941 due to the Greek adventure. If Crete is retained the British then have over 25k men and their equipment locked down defending Crete, plus a lot of naval support that would not be available to defend Egypt if Rommel invaded. The balance of forces was much more favorable then in Mid-1941 for the Axis than it would be in 1942 when the 8th army got built up. In December 1941 the Axis and British had roughly equal numbers during Crusader, but the Germans lacked air support (Barbarossa) and Malta interdicted their supply lines as they stood on the border with Egypt. With Malta out of the picture in April 1941 then its not inconceivable that Rommel could move on Egypt and leave Tobruk invested while the British were at the nadir of their strength due to Greece and being locked down in Tobruk. He'd have a much better shot in terms of balance of force than he did in 1942.

In retrospect, taking Crete looks like the better, short term move. The Nazis thought they were going to knock out Russia in a few weeks anyway. So, once Russia is out of the way, who cares about the island of Crete? They will be pumping oil out of the Caucasus and not need to pay them back unlike the Romanians.

Of course, Nazi thinking would have been wrong, but it is strange they viewed Crete as such a threat in the short term, being that they were such short term thinkers.

In the end, the decision was made for Crete, and not Malta, simply because Hitler thought Crete would be taken barely without a shot fired, while everyone knew Malta was going to cost something.

With hindsight, we see that a Malta operation, at worst, would have ended up like Crete but with much bigger long term dividends. It improves the Axis position in Africa and the Mediterranean by about 6 months to maybe even a year, especially if Churchill gets the US to go full-retard and commit a whole front in Greece, which would be twice as disastrous as Italy. Italy would stay in the war just when some of their good weapons start getting mass produced, fighting in easily defensible Greek soil, where the vast majority of German reserves are thanks to the Russian front. It allows the Germans to not have forces in resource sinks like Southern France and Italy, and commit them all to Greece. Even as late as 1943, the Axis can very well still push the Allies into the sea if they commit to Greece.

If the allies are smart, the simply retake Malta and Sicily, kicking Italy out of the war 9 months later than OTL. But, with the Malta move, there are so many butterflies. Vichy might very well fight longer in North Africa, being that the German position is so much stronger with an Axis Malta.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Apparently Admiral Raeder suggested the island be taken when pushing his Mediterranean strategy in 1940 and I'm curious, based on reading I did for my recent thread on no battle of Crete, whether it was doable in the Spring of 1941 when Rommel was first committed. The Luftwaffe was able to suppress the island pretty well in the Spring until it was drawn off to support Rommel moving up against Torbuk. Clearly a move against Malta would mean Crete is off the table, as it would require both the 7th Flieger division and 22nd Airlanding to even attempt Malta. Malta would be reinforced over the Summer and Autumn of 1941 leaving it in a strong position to resist in 1942, but it would seem that in early 1941 Malta was still pretty vulnerable to an invasion. Especially if more air power was siphoned off of the Blitz, which was pretty much going to end due to the Balkan operation and Barbarossa anyway before achieving anything more than harassment, would it have been possible to launch an airborne and naval invasion of Malta successfully in March-May 1941 as Rommel was going on the attack in Libya? If it were successful what would it mean for Rommel's options in Libya? I know he was highly frustrated that Benghazi wasn't being used very much due to the threat of Malta, so supplies had to be trucked in from Tirpoli, using much of them in the process. What say you all?

My understanding is that Italy had in early 41 - only the 1 'marine' Regiment of 2 Battalions (recently expanded from 1 'long service' battalion) with no specialised equipment or amphibious assault legacy (they had been sitting on some Island or other in the Pacific as colonial troops during the 30's) - 3 Parachute battalions had been raised - typically, from 3 different parts of the army rather than as 1 regiment. These were trained and equipped along the lines of the German FJs of the day.

So Italy's contribution to the actual assault can be 2 Marine Battalions with no specialised equipment or training and 3 Parachute Battalions.

Granted these troops were often highly motivated but against regular infantry fighting from prepared positions.......

Im not sure what forces the British had in place in 1941 but in 1940 it was aside from Artillery units - (coastal and AAA) - a Brigade of Infantry + 1 Maltese Infantry Battalion.

By 1942 - this force had grown to a full British Infantry Division + 1 Maltese Infantry Brigade.

Given the smaller size of Malta, its natural and man made fortifications and the length of time that the British had been there compared to Crete - I am hard pressed to believe that the litany of mistakes made by the British on Crete that allowed the German FJ troops to snatch Victory from the Jaws of Defeat would be repeated on Malta.

Therefore as there was no point where an Axis assaulting formations (Paras and Marines) had the necessary strength to overwhelm the defenders - i.e. 3+:1 ratio - I would conclude that any such assault in 41 would result in costly failure for the Axis.

 

[TFSmith121]

In the spring of 1941, according to Joslen,

My understanding is that Italy had in early 41 - only the 1 'marine' Regiment of 2 Battalions (recently expanded from 1 'long service' battalion) with no specialised equipment or amphibious assault legacy (they had been sitting on some Island or other in the Pacific as colonial troops during the 30's) - 3 Parachute battalions had been raised - typically, from 3 different parts of the army rather than as 1 regiment. These were trained and equipped along the lines of the German FJs of the day.

So Italy's contribution to the actual assault can be 2 Marine Battalions with no specialised equipment or training and 3 Parachute Battalions.

Granted these troops were often highly motivated but against regular infantry fighting from prepared positions.......

Im not sure what forces the British had in place in 1941 but in 1940 it was aside from Artillery units - (coastal and AAA) - a Brigade of Infantry + 1 Maltese Infantry Battalion.

By 1942 - this force had grown to a full British Infantry Division + 1 Maltese Infantry Brigade.

Given the smaller size of Malta, its natural and man made fortifications and the length of time that the British had been there compared to Crete - I am hard pressed to believe that the litany of mistakes made by the British on Crete that allowed the German FJ troops to snatch Victory from the Jaws of Defeat would be repeated on Malta.

Therefore as there was no point where an Axis assaulting formations (Paras and Marines) had the necessary strength to overwhelm the defenders - i.e. 3+:1 ratio - I would conclude that any such assault in 41 would result in costly failure for the Axis.

In the spring of 1941, according to Joslen, looks to be two brigade headquarters with (at least) the following battalions assigned to Malta Command:

2nd Devons, 1st Dorsets, 2nd Royal West Kents, 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, 1st KOMR, 2nd KOMR, 3rd KOMR, 8th Manchester, 1st Hampshires, 4th Buffs, 11th Lancashire Fusiliers, 1st Cheshire (MG), 1st Durham Light Infantry - 13 battalions total, of which at least seven were prewar regulars and three were recruited locally.

Add in the field, coastal, and AA artillery, engineers, etc...

Yeah, good luck to a hasty offensive with the available German and Italian forces - one light airborne division, maybe the 5th Mountain Division, and whatever the Italians would assign ...

Best,

 

[thaddeus]

The truth is North Africa was a side show, it was never going to attract the sort of resources that the Germans wanted to put into the Soviet Union. Rommel was wrong to try to turn what was planned as a defensive operation into a resource consuming offensive operation. It just wasted, what was better used elsewhere.

IMO the Axis should have just fought from "Tripolitania" and struck some type of accord with Vichy regime to allow supply through Bizerte (use of which WAS discussed along with Aleppo and Dakar.)

 

[Cryhavoc101]

In the spring of 1941, according to Joslen, looks to be two brigade headquarters with (at least) the following battalions assigned to Malta Command:

2nd Devons, 1st Dorsets, 2nd Royal West Kents, 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, 1st KOMR, 2nd KOMR, 3rd KOMR, 8th Manchester, 1st Hampshires, 4th Buffs, 11th Lancashire Fusiliers, 1st Cheshire (MG), 1st Durham Light Infantry - 13 battalions total, of which at least seven were prewar regulars and three were recruited locally.

Add in the field, coastal, and AA artillery, engineers, etc...

Yeah, good luck to a hasty offensive with the available German and Italian forces - one light airborne division, maybe the 5th Mountain Division, and whatever the Italians would assign ...

Best,

So the answer is a pretty solid no then

Unlike the Imperial forces on Crete who had the disadvantage of poor comms and incomplete ToE and some serious loss of cohesion due to their hasty evacuation from Greece (for example they had virtually no Telephone cable and this resulted in poor communication between sub units) while in Malta this reinforced regular Division was operating from a fortified Island with a full ToE and stacks of AAA

IMO the Axis should have just fought from "Tripolitania" and struck some type of accord with Vichy regime to allow supply through Bizerte (use of which WAS discussed along with Aleppo and Dakar.)

So the Axis does not attempt to threaten the Canal then?

This was pretty much the reason that the British fought the campaign in North Africa - at least initially.

So the British also sit tight - building up their strength while knocking out Italian Colonies and rolling up their military in East Africa and mugging Vichy French of their possessions in the Middle East with out having to be overly concerned about supporting a campaign in North Africa.

By early 1941 the British have built up to the point that the Italians cannot resist them (with no DAK - there having not been a reason for it to be deployed) in North Africa - probably resulting in a Solid defeat of the Italian forces in Libya.

All the while the British ending up with probably having more 1st String Ships, Squadron/Wings and Divisions that can be sent East to reinforce Malaya and then Burma than per OTL.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

So the answer is a pretty solid no then

Unlike the Imperial forces on Crete who had the disadvantage of poor comms and incomplete ToE and some serious loss of cohesion due to their hasty evacuation from Greece (for example they had virtually no Telephone cable and this resulted in poor communication between sub units) while in Malta this reinforced regular Division was operating from a fortified Island with a full ToE and stacks of AAA

There is a big difference though, Malta was to be more a naval invasion than an airborne one. Due to proximity to Sicily some 150 bombers could make 4 sorties a day to support the airborne forces, who were supposed to secure the high ground over the landing site and hold off island defenders until the landing infantry could establish a foothold.
This was the situation in 1942:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Herkules

 

[Athelstane]

That would end the threat of Malta, but not allow for the invasion of Egypt as I thought before. It would seem that Tobruk would be needed for that. Taking Malta though improves supply to Benghazi which then could allow for the taking of Tobruk before Operation Crusader, which then would allow for the necessary forces to be built up to defeat Crusader and then invade Egypt in December 1941-January 1942.

Indeed, Rommel is likely still too weak to invade Egypt. But if he can take Tobruk, it considerably simplifies his defensive position. He's not stretched trying to cover both a major siege and the Egyptian frontier at the same time.

 

[Athelstane]

The Italians and Germans have air supremacy in the Balkans, but not in the Central Mediterranean or in North Africa; and this is the same month that BREVITY is fought.

No question this is a tough draw for the Axis, for all the reasons given. It's an almost ideal size and terrain for defense - about a third smaller than Guam or Oahu, two islands whose remarkable defensibility has already been discussed in this forum ad nauseam, and over twice the size of Saipan. And we know how long and how expensive Guam was to take for V Amphibious Corps and Fifth Fleet to take (about 20 days) against a garrison of just under 20,000 men. And like Guam and Saipan, the British had years to prepare a defense in depth, unlike Crete. If the British fight hard for it (and they almost surely will), it will be a tough fight, and a long enough one to risk the intervention of the Royal Navy in force.

The advantage to the Axis, on the other hand, is that it's so close to Sicily for land-based air support and reinforcement.

All I can say is that taking it in 1940 sure as hell looks a lot more attractive.

 

[Athelstane]

Of course, Nazi thinking would have been wrong, but it is strange they viewed Crete as such a threat in the short term, being that they were such short term thinkers.

It seems to have been a largely Luftwaffe initiative - some payback for the BoB. The political dimension - allowing a key part of Greek territory to remain under the control of the Allies, and for Greek resistance to rally in - looked unattractive. I'm not aware of any discussion of the danger of its use as a bombing platform.

That said, there is something to be said for the danger that having it makes adventures into Greece a more irresistible quagmire for Churchill.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

There is a big difference though, Malta was to be more a naval invasion than an airborne one. Due to proximity to Sicily some 150 bombers could make 4 sorties a day to support the airborne forces, who were supposed to secure the high ground over the landing site and hold off island defenders until the landing infantry could establish a foothold.
This was the situation in 1942:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Herkules

Nice Map - but having seen the Maltese Coastline I can only assume that the planners for this operation had not

Here is a picture of the coastline where this airborne and amphibious landing is due to take place....

Now if I was planning an amphibious invasion this coastline would not top my list of places to conduct it.

Ditto for an Airborne landing....at night

The Axis forces are in for a serious hiding if they attempt C3/Herkules in 1941.

 

[pattersonautobody]

It seems to have been a largely Luftwaffe initiative - some payback for the BoB. The political dimension - allowing a key part of Greek territory to remain under the control of the Allies, and for Greek resistance to rally in - looked unattractive. I'm not aware of any discussion of the danger of its use as a bombing platform.

That said, there is something to be said for the danger that having it makes adventures into Greece a more irresistible quagmire for Churchill.

Good points, though I will reiterate that the Nazis must've thought Crete would have been a pushover. They would have likely not have done it if they knew what the result would be.

 

[thaddeus]

IMO the Axis should have just fought from "Tripolitania" and struck some type of accord with Vichy regime to allow supply through Bizerte (use of which WAS discussed along with Aleppo and Dakar.)

So the Axis does not attempt to threaten the Canal then?

This was pretty much the reason that the British fought the campaign in North Africa - at least initially.

So the British also sit tight - building up their strength while knocking out Italian Colonies and rolling up their military in East Africa and mugging Vichy French of their possessions in the Middle East with out having to be overly concerned about supporting a campaign in North Africa.

By early 1941 the British have built up to the point that the Italians cannot resist them (with no DAK - there having not been a reason for it to be deployed) in North Africa - probably resulting in a Solid defeat of the Italian forces in Libya.

my scenario was to send DAK, just fight defensive war, "allowing" the British to occupy Cyrenica as well as Egypt. basically fight a terrorist war against them.

plausible the Axis holds out as long as IOTL.