Could Gallipoli succeed?

[Cryhavoc101]

There is a high chance that had the attempt to force the straights been persevered with and the fleet managed to break into the Sea of Marmara then Istanbul would have been abandoned and the straights captured.

The US Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire Henry Morgenthau (Father of Henry Morgenthau who wrote the post war Germany Morgenthau plan that thankfully was never implemented) - who utterly despised the Ottomans (he was one of the people that blew the whistle regarding the Armenian massacre) wrote that the Ottoman leadership was grabbing every vehicle they could find to allow their family's and as many valuables as they could carry in order to flee the city and a sense of panic had gripped them with the Ottomans convinced that the defences would not hold another attempt. The German ambassador had begged the US Embassy to allow his staff and family members to seek shelter when the British and French arrived

Commodore Roger Keyes who commanded the 'small ships' remained adamant to his dying day that the reorganised mine sweepers (the civilian crews having been replaced with the crews from the sunk and crippled pre-dreads) could have successfully cleared the straights and allowed the heavy units to enter the Sea of Marmara.

The problem unfortunately was that the senior leadership 'on the ground' namely Carden, then De Roebuck 'bottled it'

They saw the loss of so many Battleships as a disaster - while Churchill saw it as a cheap price to pay given virtually every single ship with the exception of a couple of newer ships were utterly expendable (with many of the Pre Dreads slated to be decommissioned anyway) - and given what was at stake - Support for Russia, Safety of the Suez and Oil wells as well as bringing Greece, Bulgaria and Romania into the war on the Entente side and an earlier Italian entry into the war on the Entente side.

So I think a couple of things needed to be done

• No telegraphing of the attack - the shelling of the forts in early Nov was 'stupid'!
• A more concise and direct decision from both British and French Governments and continued commitment to the objective.
• Keep pressing the attack
• Judicious use of airpower for spotting purposes
• Have the minesweepers given RN crews - not civilians - from the start

 

[Riain]

Since command arraignments, the poor security, and bad planning were key factors Im with the Doomed school. You need to reach that far back to multiple PoD to get success. Sure theres some changes during the landings or battle that are interesting Wi, but the thing was a train wreck before the soldiers started their first rehearsal.

Oh wait, a useful rehearsal of the landings was not done. Another fail.

I tend to think these problems are the easiest to fix since they require the fewest changes to personnel and organisational structure and can basically be handwaved into existence by chance and human decision. There is likely a combination of available Generals, chains of command and lines of responsibility that drastically reduces these staff problems: General X gets appointed to Chief of Staff, General Y gets a Corps command while General Z gets this division instead of that one and the General Staff and Admiralty come to a better command structure. All of a sudden the available;e pieces are used better and the results get better.

Of course this could go the other way, but since the OTL outcome was below average there's plenty of scope to produce a result at somewhat above average.

 

[I want to learn]

I think Gallipoli could have succeeded but it’s not as simple as pressing on with a second day of naval attacks. I believe the reason that De Roebuck did not continue was that stiff Ottoman resistance convinced him that even if he got battleships into the Sea of Marmara, it’s not very clear what they’d accomplish. Hoping that the enemy would quake in the boots and wave the white flag at the mere sight of the majestic battleships of the Royal Navy is only half a step less fanciful than “and we’ll be greeted as liberators!”. In all likelihood De Roebuck would have faced the prospect of securing a large hostile metropolis with nothing more than lightly armed landing parties of sailors, failed at this task and then have to force the Narrows a third time if he wants any of his ships to escape. If seizing the Turkish straights was possible, alacrity was needed (and missing from the Allies IOTL) but the other missing piece was some gesture at inter-service coordination.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

I think Gallipoli could have succeeded but it’s not as simple as pressing on with a second day of naval attacks. I believe the reason that De Roebuck did not continue was that stiff Ottoman resistance convinced him that even if he got battleships into the Sea of Marmara, it’s not very clear what they’d accomplish. Hoping that the enemy would quake in the boots and wave the white flag at the mere sight of the majestic battleships of the Royal Navy is only half a step less fanciful than “and we’ll be greeted as liberators!”. In all likelihood De Roebuck would have faced the prospect of securing a large hostile metropolis with nothing more than lightly armed landing parties of sailors, failed at this task and then have to force the Narrows a third time if he wants any of his ships to escape. If seizing the Turkish straights was possible, alacrity was needed (and missing from the Allies IOTL) but the other missing piece was some gesture at inter-service coordination.

They had the 29th Division (the only uncommitted regular army division at the time), ANZAC Corps (2 Infantry Divisions plus 2 Cavalry Brigades) and a large Detachment of Royal Marines - about 4 Divisions in terms of manpower - as well as RN shore parties - committed to occupying Istanbul following a successful entry into the Sea of Marmara.

Nothing about it was simple but they had troops standing by to occupy the city.

 

[Mikestone8]

I suppose the real answer is yes - provided that everything went exactly right at every stage. But that's so unlikely that it's hardly worth discussing.

So - In theory yes, in practice probably no. A bit like the German offensives in 1918.

 

[white crowe]

I think Gallipoli could have succeeded but it’s not as simple as pressing on with a second day of naval attacks. I believe the reason that De Roebuck did not continue was that stiff Ottoman resistance convinced him that even if he got battleships into the Sea of Marmara, it’s not very clear what they’d accomplish. Hoping that the enemy would quake in the boots and wave the white flag at the mere sight of the majestic battleships of the Royal Navy is only half a step less fanciful than “and we’ll be greeted as liberators!”. In all likelihood De Roebuck would have faced the prospect of securing a large hostile metropolis with nothing more than lightly armed landing parties of sailors, failed at this task and then have to force the Narrows a third time if he wants any of his ships to escape. If seizing the Turkish straights was possible, alacrity was needed (and missing from the Allies IOTL) but the other missing piece was some gesture at inter-service coordination.

I think this is what I find hard to avoid.

If the Ottomans were so fragile that Gallipoli could have knocked them out of the war, then the OTL landings would have knocked them out of the war.

 

[Mikestone8]

I think this is what I find hard to avoid.

If the Ottomans were so fragile that Gallipoli could have knocked them out of the war, then the OTL landings would have knocked them out of the war.

Indeed.

Even if the Dardanelles are forced, can the *Bosphorus* not be defended? Iirc it is a lot narrower, hence easier to defend. .

 

[KarneeKarnay]

What do you all think about the lack of artillery? Many of the new commanders bloodied by the Western Front were adamant that in modern warfare, the only 2ay to advance was under artillery fire and too a degree that was right. The Battle of Mons and Loo had proven thst against entrenched enemy positions, advance without artillery was disastrous.

However in Gallipoli the Turks were not entrenched everywhere. I think it was the third landings in August? At least one landing was completely exposed with only about 200 Turkish Defenders between them and essentially seizing the peninsula high ground. But the British commander was overly cautious in advancing without bringing what limited artillery he had assure and Despoke, failed to take advantage of this.

 

[Cockroach]

Indeed.

Even if the Dardanelles are forced, can the *Bosphorus* not be defended? Iirc it is a lot narrower, hence easier to defend. .

Istanbul is on the Sea of Marmara end of the Bosphorus. If your capital city is under the guns of a dozen Pre-Dreadnoughts you've already kinda lost...

 

[Sarthak]

The Ottomans and Germans had intel on Gallipoli three weeks before it was launched allowing the Ottomans to defend easily. That really screwed the attack. Prevent the intelligence being breached and maybe there's a chance. Though even without the extra troops, there were 80,000 troops in European Turkey, so it would still not be easy

 

[Mikestone8]

Istanbul is on the Sea of Marmara end of the Bosphorus. If your capital city is under the guns of a dozen Pre-Dreadnoughts you've already kinda lost...

It could be bombarded, but not necessarily taken. The munitions factory there would need moving to a more secure location, but there's no reason why Turkey couldn't continue the war.

Keep in mind that, from what I know of Turkish politics, loss of office could all too easily mean loss of *life*. The Turrkish leaders would be fighting for their lives, so unlikely to give in easily.

Also, how safe would rte warships be? Could the Turks sow the SoM wih mines?

 

[AdA]

It's not an impossible job but it's a difficult one.
Joint operations in this scale were a novelty then and this was a joint combined operation.
It would have to be done early, and it would have to be done right.
No purely naval operations, plan it from the start as a landing with naval support.

But there are safer options to remove the Ottomans from the war.
Alexandretta comes to mind (and there was a thread about it a few months ago). But the Allies could have done in 1915 what they did in 1917 (a properly planned operation to defeat the ottomans in Mesopothania) and in 1918 ( a properly planned operation to defeat the ottomans in Palestine and Syria).
Just cancel Salonika and a few operations in France, and use the forces wasted on the OTL Dardanelles operations.

This would have the extra advantage of bypassing the Arab Revolt, that gave a good film but bad politics,

 

[ArtosStark]

What do you all think about the lack of artillery? Many of the new commanders bloodied by the Western Front were adamant that in modern warfare, the only 2ay to advance was under artillery fire and too a degree that was right. The Battle of Mons and Loo had proven thst against entrenched enemy positions, advance without artillery was disastrous.

Its kind of important to understand that WW1 was a continuous learning process for everyone. Perhaps most of all for the British Army. Even had the entire Regular Army of 1914 survived the massive increase in size of British Forces would have rendered the army as a whole inexperienced. As it was, the forces available in 1915 were often severely lacking in tactical doctrine and training.

In 1914 the BEF entered the war with the training and doctrine necessary for fire and maneuver. Half-companies would advance and retreat under the cover of fire from other half-companies. This was an idea that had been building before the Boer war but had really come home to roost during that conflict. With the loss of the Regulars as organized units, the emphasis was on getting soldiers into combat quickly and many of the trainers were retirees who had not themselves been trained in fire and maneuver. Along with the realization of the importance of artillery cover this led to the infantry having a bit of a crisis of confidence. They did not yet have the tools they would get later that allowed a reduction in dependence on the artillery. And they were not trained well enough to make full use of the tools that they did have.

Likewise the artillery is also dealing with both attritional losses and a massive influx of less well trained volunteers and communication and coordination between infantry and artillery is not what it would later become.

This means that Gallipoli is going to be fought at possibly the worst point in the war, in regards to doctrine and training. The old professionalism is mostly gone, and the new advances have not yet come, and those in charge are still working out what works and what doesn't. Add to this the extra challenges of fighting on unfamiliar terrain in an amphibious assault and it is not really surprising that mistakes were common among the British forces.

 

[Sarthak]

Also the Ottomans had chockfull of mines that they were going to sink into the Sea of Marmara if the Brits managed to force the RN through. Pretty sure that would make a naval assault on Istanbul very very costly. enver wanted to do it immediately but Kemal managed to convince him otherwise iotl. If the initial assault is successful, Pasha is going to dump those mines into the Marmara.

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

The tip of the Gallipoli peninsula is a long way from Constantinople. Even from the sprawling modern urban mass of Istanbul, it is a 4-hour drive on modern motorways to Echeabat (Maidos) and another hour on local roads down to Helles and Anzac. All along the route there are rolling hills with ridges barring the advance. It would require quite a substantial land force to move up to the Ottoman capital.

Also, before the Allied fleet can enter the Sea of Marmara, the Ottoman batteries on the Asiatic shore beyond the Narrows will need to be neutralised. They never got past Chanak (Canakale) OTL.