Consequences of an earlier republican Europe

In 1804, Napoleon decides NOT to crown himself Emperor, and remains Consul-for-Life. As a result, and because of butterflies, he wins. So around 1820 he dies peacefully in Paris and Europe looks like this:

FranceAndSisterRepublics.jpg


But with a few additions:
  • The kingdoms of Spain and Portugal dissolved, and replaced by several sister republics (Algarves, Lusitania, Galicia, Castille, Aragon, and Navarre).
  • A Rhenish Republic to protect France's western flank.
  • A Polish Republic to check Prussia, Austria, and Russia.
  • An Hungarian Republic to further check Austria.
How long could this system last after Napoleon dies? Who takes over after him? How would it affect Europe's development, particularly in so far as liberal ideas were counter-cultural for much of the 19th Century, but here they would be hegemonic from the start?
 

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My major question here- I won't go so far as to claim it's the major question, but I do believe it's very important in determining the effects of a Napoleonic Republican victory- is how the actual populations involved feel about "their" republics, especially outside of France proper. We're used to considering democratic thought hegemonic, but in Europe in the 19th century most people actually were monarchists. Foreign imposed republics may be extremely unpopular, with consequent low probabilities of long term survival.

Other factors also militate against a truly long term French-led European hegemony. Britain is likely to be relatively hostile to a France that can't help but seem like a commercial and military threat, even if Napoleon and his successors are able to keep the situation diplomatically better than the "constant war with occasional truces to rebuild our forces" that characterized OTL. Austria, too, is probably going to be fairly hostile for a long time even if French victories push it to make accommodations- whenever things look like they're going wrong for France and her republican allies, there are likely to be outside hostile forces looking to take advantage. Meanwhile, its unlikely that France will be able to retain as much of a military advantage over her opponents as she had under Napoleon as other armies learn to copy French innovations (like professional staffs) and/ or to take advantage of French military weak points (as Spanish guerillas OTL).

OTOH I don't want this analysis to sound solely doom and gloom! France has two major advantages here that she lacked OTL. The first is major allies to the East. Poland, at least, should be capable of linking the new French republicanism with older traditions- the Sejm- in order to build some popular support. Austria, Russia, and Prussia will all have their military calculations significantly changed if the new French allies to the East can be turned into stable, militarily effective nations- and I have high hopes for Poland and to a lesser extent Hungary (which lacks Poland's previous "democratic" history, but has ethnic and linguistic differences from its most recent rulers to help encourage a nationalism centered around rather than in opposition to the new country but will have to contend with the nobilities tendency to look to the HRE for legitimacy.) The other major advantage for France is diplomatic. She'll be able to reach out to progressive politicians in England as proof that democratic politics can work; appeal to the US as a fellow republic that has shared ideals; and appeal to political idealists in other European countries. If she's smart, she'll also be able to approach European monarchies by portraying the immediate post-revolutionary period as a bad period of "radicalism" that has now passed, leaving a new "safe" commercial republic in its wake that- like the Dutch- doesn't have to be a threat to everyone. It's still not an ideal diplomatic position, and they're probably trapped in the awkward position of having two different messages intended for two different audiences that both audiences can always hear; but it's still better than Napoleon's position OTL having alienated most political radicals but lacking anything attractive to offer to his fellow Monarchs.

Some other random points that didn't fit anywhere:

Italy's likely to see a reunification movement sooner rather than later given preexisting ideas (c.f. Machiavelli) and most of the peninsula being under a collection of republics.

Relationships with the Pope are going to be a challenge, and are the most likely flashpoint for Franco-Italian conflict that I can see.

I see Spain as the region most likely to not like being under republican rule- very conservative, very religious, more united history than Italy, lots of local groups that will see changes to traditions as attacks rather than modernization, and mountainous terrain for guerillas to operate in.

France's diplomatic relations with the US probably don't matter a great deal in 1820 (unless the French naval build up and the War of 1812 have gone very differently) but are obviously only going to become more important as the 19th century wears on and the US begins/ continues to industrialize and expand.

I haven't really mentioned France itself much thus far. It's likely to have an interesting period immediately after the death of Napoleon, which will determine whether they end up with a system of Consuls-for-life, possibly semi-hereditary, that may not really resemble our concepts of democracy very much (ironically, depending on how it develops, if the Parlement maintains some power it may resemble a British-style Constitutional Monarchy with greater powers for the Monarch). Conversely, if the for life element of the Consuls title gets dropped then France will have to transition to a real democracy with elections and presumably political parties (eventually) something that they haven't really had before.
 
It's also going to be a fun question as to what form these republics take and how consolidations might occur or be handled.
 
Napoleon won't need to divorce Josephine to get a male heir. I mean, that consideration might even provide part of the tippingpoint for him not becomign emperor TTL.

How will he reward his generals - or his siblings? I can see Louis being just as happy in the Neterlands - he might get to stay TTL. He seemed like he wanted to be a wise ruler and not simply follow Napoleon's orders. I dont know about the others. As for murat or Bernadotte, do they have the temperment to *only* be consuls for life or whatever they choose to use in their kingdoms? Or, would Napoleon' just choose locals? I don't know how many liberal politicians will wantg the jobs till it's certain Napoleonwill win.
 
My major question here- I won't go so far as to claim it's the major question, but I do believe it's very important in determining the effects of a Napoleonic Republican victory- is how the actual populations involved feel about "their" republics, especially outside of France proper. We're used to considering democratic thought hegemonic, but in Europe in the 19th century most people actually were monarchists. Foreign imposed republics may be extremely unpopular, with consequent low probabilities of long term survival.

Other factors also militate against a truly long term French-led European hegemony. Britain is likely to be relatively hostile to a France that can't help but seem like a commercial and military threat, even if Napoleon and his successors are able to keep the situation diplomatically better than the "constant war with occasional truces to rebuild our forces" that characterized OTL. Austria, too, is probably going to be fairly hostile for a long time even if French victories push it to make accommodations- whenever things look like they're going wrong for France and her republican allies, there are likely to be outside hostile forces looking to take advantage. Meanwhile, its unlikely that France will be able to retain as much of a military advantage over her opponents as she had under Napoleon as other armies learn to copy French innovations (like professional staffs) and/ or to take advantage of French military weak points (as Spanish guerillas OTL).

OTOH I don't want this analysis to sound solely doom and gloom! France has two major advantages here that she lacked OTL. The first is major allies to the East. Poland, at least, should be capable of linking the new French republicanism with older traditions- the Sejm- in order to build some popular support. Austria, Russia, and Prussia will all have their military calculations significantly changed if the new French allies to the East can be turned into stable, militarily effective nations- and I have high hopes for Poland and to a lesser extent Hungary (which lacks Poland's previous "democratic" history, but has ethnic and linguistic differences from its most recent rulers to help encourage a nationalism centered around rather than in opposition to the new country but will have to contend with the nobilities tendency to look to the HRE for legitimacy.) The other major advantage for France is diplomatic. She'll be able to reach out to progressive politicians in England as proof that democratic politics can work; appeal to the US as a fellow republic that has shared ideals; and appeal to political idealists in other European countries. If she's smart, she'll also be able to approach European monarchies by portraying the immediate post-revolutionary period as a bad period of "radicalism" that has now passed, leaving a new "safe" commercial republic in its wake that- like the Dutch- doesn't have to be a threat to everyone. It's still not an ideal diplomatic position, and they're probably trapped in the awkward position of having two different messages intended for two different audiences that both audiences can always hear; but it's still better than Napoleon's position OTL having alienated most political radicals but lacking anything attractive to offer to his fellow Monarchs.

Some other random points that didn't fit anywhere:

Italy's likely to see a reunification movement sooner rather than later given preexisting ideas (c.f. Machiavelli) and most of the peninsula being under a collection of republics.

Relationships with the Pope are going to be a challenge, and are the most likely flashpoint for Franco-Italian conflict that I can see.

I see Spain as the region most likely to not like being under republican rule- very conservative, very religious, more united history than Italy, lots of local groups that will see changes to traditions as attacks rather than modernization, and mountainous terrain for guerillas to operate in.

France's diplomatic relations with the US probably don't matter a great deal in 1820 (unless the French naval build up and the War of 1812 have gone very differently) but are obviously only going to become more important as the 19th century wears on and the US begins/ continues to industrialize and expand.

I haven't really mentioned France itself much thus far. It's likely to have an interesting period immediately after the death of Napoleon, which will determine whether they end up with a system of Consuls-for-life, possibly semi-hereditary, that may not really resemble our concepts of democracy very much (ironically, depending on how it develops, if the Parlement maintains some power it may resemble a British-style Constitutional Monarchy with greater powers for the Monarch). Conversely, if the for life element of the Consuls title gets dropped then France will have to transition to a real democracy with elections and presumably political parties (eventually) something that they haven't really had before.

For Hungary:
You make some very good points but at least in the case of Hungary I dont see this working at all. The nobility was strongly against Napoleon OTL and actually preferred to fight him under Austrian rule than to accept independence on his terms. A democratic Napoleon they would oppose even more. So occupy the country and get rid of the nobility? Maybe but the early 1800's Hungary was a very rural state - in the mid 1800's the leaders of the liberal movement in Hungary were nobles - because urban society was still very far from being strong and developed enough to be a factor in the kingdom's political life. In early 1800's thats even more true. The urban populace is very small, economically weak and rarely hungarian (german or jewish) at the time - the germans especially being loyalists to Austria. Building a system to replace the dominance of the nobles would be very hard. Do the french install some kind of peasent republic? I strongly dount it would work.
Further Hungary because of its sparse population, the mountgains and swamps around the Tisza is very good country at the time for guerilla warfare (see how the betyár's still thrived in a much more developed country nearly a century later). All in all im very sceptical of the ability and more specifically the willingness of the french to keep pretty far away Hungary under the boot which could be very similar to OTL's Spain - just farther away.

Rest of Europe:
I have a strong suspicion that many of the french created republic would be not too enthusiastic about the idea. Maybe if Naopoleon lived long enough to allow the sytem to consolidate but he dies too son and the states are too young - and in most cases foreign. Napoleon's legacy would be also extremely shaky - he claims to lead a republic but he would be really a dictator. His state would be democratic in name only. I think that after Napoleon's death a strong anti-french/republican movement would sweep Europe with the support of any state where the old elite's still reign. This might be strong enough - especially if the sucession is in question and I think that likely.
Would Napoleon have a son? I don't think he could marry Marie Lousie as "only" a consul for life. Further if he still remarried and had a son around 1811 like OTL that son would be 9 years old at his death. He won't succeed him or not for long. He was a strong quasy ruler, who conquered a huge empire with a weak legitimacy based on military success... I see that as a recipe for a sucession war between his marshalls. With the anti french and anti-republican movements through-out Europe erupting I would be very surprised if France wasn't either completely defeated or at least booted out from the rest of Europe. This would also likely result in a much stronger reaction - a much more determined and longer lasting holy alliance.

All in all I dont think french hegemony in Europe would long survive Napoleon.
 
How long could this system last after Napoleon dies? Who takes over after him? How would it affect Europe's development, particularly in so far as liberal ideas were counter-cultural for much of the 19th Century, but here they would be hegemonic from the start?
What kind of republics are we talking about here? Because Napoleon's France, even in its republican phase, is very much a dictatorship. By 1804, Napoleon has already made himself a consul for life, and is an absolute monarch in all sense, but the title. He is also the president of the Italian republic, though I believe only for a 10 year term there. And if he lasts in these positions untill his death, how much does it change the ideas of republicanism in Europe? After all, Napoleon has shown that the style of leadership of a republic can be quite the same, as that of the Absolute monarchies of Europe. One can even be the ""democratic leader"" of several countries at once.

Meanwhile his conquests seem problematic to survive long-term.
A Rhenish Republic to protect France's western flank.
The Rhine territories were considered to be an integral parts of the newly forged French republic. Unless this means some kind of Country EAST of the Rhine, as a French buffer, it would make little sense for Napoleon to give up this territory, and would cause much anger in France (as late as the deffense of homeland campaign, Napoleon was insisting on preserving the Rhine border). It would however likely be the country, where Republicanism in French form (either napoleonic or more liberal), could actually last. The other three...
  • A Polish Republic to check Prussia, Austria, and Russia.
  • An Hungarian Republic to further check Austria.
If there was one fact in both of these country, it was the strenght of the local nobility, that would in some form last up untill World war 2. The nobles own almost all the land, they benefit from the allegiance of the mostly uneducated commoners, and enjoy the support of the Church. This was something even Napoleon and Davout (who had rather dim view of the Polish nobility during his local tenure, aside from Poniatowski), had to recognize, and act cautiously with.
Now, a Republican form of government isn't completely impossible here, but it would very much be Aristocratc republics. Which is extremely distant from the ideas of the French revolution, though considering Napoleon's role as autocrat, it wouldn't be that surprising. There are now presidents in Hungary and Poland, almost certainly nobles, elected by nobles. Does that seem like a liberal system?
Or Napoleon could go full-on revolution. All power to the people, seize the lands of the nobility, a bit of state terror to liquidate those pesky aristocrats. Expect, he would be extremely hard pressed to find anyone else to put in power. A few eduacated traders and city dwellers could be found, but would have little to-no experience running anything like a country. He is also likely to face a hostile church, who has an extremely high influence in both Poland and Hungary, and will be terrified by the possibility of loosing their rights and wealth.
He could force French officials to handle these things, which would show him as a foreign invader, forcing a regime and foreigners on these countries (which he was).
By the time of Napoleon's death, these Eastern allies will either be a) somewhat stable republics in name only, controlled by the local aristocracy, who might well decide to invite a new king, as long as he keeps their priviliges b) barely functioning republics, with only somewhat experienced administrators, possibly facing food shortages due to rushed and radical land seizing policies, with a lot of exiled nobles in Vienna, Berlin and Petrograd, beging the old monarchs to come and restore order c) almost completely disfunctional French protectorates, utterly hated by their populations.
In all of these cases, they will be surrounded by hostile powers, hoping to carve them to pieces. More on that later.
The kingdoms of Spain and Portugal dissolved, and replaced by several sister republics (Algarves, Lusitania, Galicia, Castille, Aragon, and Navarre).
Option c from the previous part is very much active here. A series of artificial states, despised by the conservative locals, run by a country that has previously acted harshly against the holy church? Even if Napoleon manages to completely crush the local guerrilas, and beat any uprising that springs up, the moment that he dies, the whole collection of monstrosities is going to come crushing down.

The next big problem is Napoleon himslef. Or rather the fact of what happens after his death. There will be a highly powerfull millitary, probably rather fine with a dictatorial republic. The parlamentariens will likely want more powers. Napoleons relatives and in-laws will want to keep their powers and leadership positions. There are still regions like Vendee with strong Bourbon sympathies. Its a powderkeg waiting to explode, and tear the whole country apart.

The foreing situation is even worse. Britain will almost certainly support the Spanish Bourbons (could have very interesting effect on Americas) and Braganzas, as a French hegemony over Spain is utterly unacceptable. In Russia, Alexander will have to tolerate not only an independant Polish state, but a republican Polish state, and unless Russia is extremely unlucky and gets a tsar Constantine, any ruler of it will likely see to wipe a Polish state off the map. Habsburgs will still have their core territories in Austria, Bohemia and perhaps Croatia under control, and will certainly want a full revenge, to say nothing of Prussian desire to reclaim Poznan and expand in the West. The other German states will either be under French dominance or somewhat independant, mostly monarchies, and likely terrified of France spreading revolution to them, while nationalistic outrage over French Rhineland will also be quite problematic. So basically, everyone not under him wants Napoleon's creation dead, and is only kept at bay out of fear of Napoleon, and French strenght, something highly likely to end with Napoleon's death.

I expect a rather interesting inpact on Nationalism. In Germany, with Napoleon holding the Rhine provinces (either directly or as a puppet state), an extremely anti-French version of it is likely to develop. Liberation of the Rhine is going to be the main goal alongside unity itself. Meanwhile, Austria might actually take a strongly nationalist turn. This actually occured under von Stadion during the 5. coalition, where the Austrians experimented with supporting anti-French nationalists (for example: Archduke Karl's call for a German uprising upon his entry into Bavaria, support for the Tyrolean rebels, and the nationalist fervour that was encouraged among the common people to great success), and with such a reduced state of the empire, this outlook might take center stage.

In Spain, which was torn apart by the French, it is not a even a question, the local nationalism is going to be extremely anti-French, with a very similar situation likely arising in Portugal. Meanwhile, Italian nationalists are also not likely to be too pro-French. Napoleon might have declared an Italian republic, but it is effectively a French puppet, that only controls the North of the peninsula, and not even all of it. Let's not even get into all the problems with the papacy. The repulic in Naples, judging by the quick collapse of the Parthenopean Republic the moment the French troops withdrew in 1799, is likely to be kept alive by French bayonets, with local elites support, while king Ferdinand is waiting at Sicily, with British support. I wouldn't be too surprised, if Italian nationalists took the view thta Napoleon was just another foreign overlord, who forced himself as Italian head of state.

Even in the "liberated" Poland and Hungary, nationalism is going to be rather confused. After all, the independant states are either run by the nobility, or by the French. Neither fits very well with ideas of liberalism, and the rather is quite anti-nationalistic.

Honestly, I expect the effect on liberalism and republicanism to be rather negative. In France, the republic has been subverted to be a one-man Autocracy. In other countries, the local republics are either noble-controlled, kept alive by French arms, or utterly hated by the local populace, with a few expections like Switzerland. That is not a good look for Republicanism, especially if the power struggle after Napoleon's death results in some form of civil war.
 
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How will he reward his generals - or his siblings? I can see Louis being just as happy in the Neterlands - he might get to stay TTL. He seemed like he wanted to be a wise ruler and not simply follow Napoleon's orders.
Which is why Napoleon replaced him, just as all the previous administrators. And that's the big problem here, because Louis was not disloyal, nor were his predecessors, but this was not enough for Napoleon. He just kept on pulling the string constantly tightener in Holland. And that created the constant problem for the local government, how to deal with new demands, without losing more and more local support. What the local populace wanted, was not what Paris wanted. Especially the Continental system was hated.
 
IMO, there are two substantially different issues wrapped into one:
1. France is a Republic ruled by anybody but Napoleon.
2. France is <no matter what> ruled by Napoleon.

In the 1st scenario there is a chance, with the reasonably intelligent and pragmatic people in charge, to achieve a lasting peace: the main issue was not as much ideology (which significantly eroded under the Directorate) but rather a policy of the never-ending wars (“we half half a million men under the arms and if the war stops, they’ll turn against us”), which can be put to the end with the borders generally acceptable for both sides.

In the 2nd scenario it does not really matter if Napoleon remains the 1st Consul or if he decides to proclaim himself Huangdi, Pharaoh, Negusa Nagast, Basileus, Padishah or Sapa Inca because he is still exactly the same person with all resulting consequences. To think about it, probably any of the titles I mentioned would be less irritating for the European monarchs than one he chose in OTL.
 
Would Napoleon remain First Consul and keeps republican façade may not prevent his downfall, but it would kill Bonapartism in the future.
 
Napoleon won't need to divorce Josephine to get a male heir. I mean, that consideration might even provide part of the tippingpoint for him not becomign emperor TTL.

How will he reward his generals - or his siblings? I can see Louis being just as happy in the Neterlands - he might get to stay TTL. He seemed like he wanted to be a wise ruler and not simply follow Napoleon's orders. I dont know about the others. As for murat or Bernadotte, do they have the temperment to *only* be consuls for life or whatever they choose to use in their kingdoms? Or, would Napoleon' just choose locals? I don't know how many liberal politicians will wantg the jobs till it's certain Napoleonwill win.
If Napoleon were smart, he would be tapping his close allies and kin to run his satellite republics.
 
As @alex pointed out, president-for-life, pharoah, inca or grand poobah is all essentialyl the same thing. As to him naming family members:
True, but the other republics when they did exist were not in OTL lifetime tenured. Now, you could argue that this might've changed had Napoleon been First Consul for life rather than Emperor of France, but I'm not convinced.
 
In the 1st scenario there is a chance, with the reasonably intelligent and pragmatic people in charge, to achieve a lasting peace: the main issue was not as much ideology (which significantly eroded under the Directorate) but rather a policy of the never-ending wars (“we half half a million men under the arms and if the war stops, they’ll turn against us”), which can be put to the end with the borders generally acceptable for both sides
In this case, I can see France's republican projects in the Netherlands and Switzerland, but no more. In Italy, ironically France would have had greatest chance to achieve a successful democratic republican experiment in Venice - imposing republican reforms on an existing republic would be still easier than on a monarchy (as the latter of which would require overthrowing a monarch).
 
In this case, I can see France's republican projects in the Netherlands and Switzerland, but no more. In Italy, ironically France would have had greatest chance to achieve a successful democratic republican experiment in Venice - imposing republican reforms on an existing republic would be still easier than on a monarchy (as the latter of which would require overthrowing a monarch).
It seems that by the early XIX the Netherlands (both) and Switzerland were more or less an accepted fact. Italy was much less so and Venice would be extremely problematic being too close to the Austrian sphere of interests and too far from the French borders to be a justifiable buffer state. Not sure how much of a popular support “democracy” had in Italy of that time.
 
In the 1st scenario there is a chance, with the reasonably intelligent and pragmatic people in charge, to achieve a lasting peace: the main issue was not as much ideology (which significantly eroded under the Directorate) but rather a policy of the never-ending wars (“we half half a million men under the arms and if the war stops, they’ll turn against us”), which can be put to the end with the borders generally acceptable for both sides.
Who would you say these “reasonable people” are? And what borders might be acceptable?
 
Who would you say these “reasonable people” are? And what borders might be acceptable?
One of the expected scenarios in the case of Napoleon’s death in the 2nd Italian campaign was a military triumvirate of Moreau, Massena and Bernadotte. Napoleon himself was expecting just Bernadotte. In both these cases the only one with the political and administrative experience was Bernadotte and he was definitely a reasonable person openly preaching a defensive policy (not Napoleon’s “offensive is a best defense”). At least some of the British politicians considered triumvirate as an acceptable scenario if France restricts itself to the borders of 1795 with the already/still existing sister republics (which means that Italy is back within Austrian sphere of influence).
 
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