Consequences of a Greek Revolt of 1821 that fizzles out fast

[Khan Doomy]

In another thread we explored the possible consequences of Haled Efendi not pushing his Four Dynasties Plan on Phanariote support for a Greek Revolution after the Napoleonic Wars https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-greek-revolt-but-no-greek-revolution.540426/

Here I would like to posit a scenario were a Greek Revolt in 1821 happens but is quickly suppressed. Potential reasons for that could include Phanariote refusal to support the Philike Hetereia due to the changes mentioned in the other thread, The Russians arresting Ypsilanti ala the Austrians arresting Ferraios. Vladimirescu refusing to cooperate early, and a faster submission/suppression of Ali Pasha Tepeleni of Yanya/Ionnina. The revolution still erupts in the Morea and the Islands but the quicker arrival of Ottoman troops from Epirus (perhaps with better luck for Morean Muslim resistance) leads to the Rumeliote armatole not joining, and quixk suppression. In simple terms all that can go wrong goes wrong, and by winter 1821 the revolt has bee suppressed.

Part I

What would the consequences be? I would posit several starting with those that I think are the most likely, and then going to those that are conditional on your view of the development of modern Greek identity.

• Per Sukru Ilachak, whose arguments I accept, Mahmud II was an Islamist revivalist. The biggest effect of the Greek Revolution was to essentially be part of the events that forced him to give up his preference for Islamic Revivalism and instead embrace westernization. In this case the Revolt is defeated before European powers can interfere and without recourse to Egyptian forces ( https://cmes.fas.harvard.edu/public...ate-and-society-during-greek-war-independence )
• I expect thus Mahmud II to remain wedded to his Islamist revivalist thesis for longer. This has down-order consequences for things like the Auspicious Event (I think it still takes place but later, and in a different context. What possible context?), the formation of a modern army, and the start of westernizing reforms. Absent some event that shakes his belief in Islamic Revivalism, I expect Westernization to start slowly in the 1840s and take true form after a Russo-Ottoman War probably around the 1870s
• I expect Mahmud to seek to break the Greek speaking communities of southern Greece and the Aegean. Consistent with his Islamic Revivalism view-point I see a) revocation of privileges for autonomous communities involved in the revolt, especially those of the Commercial islands. b) I expect expulsion of the Maniotes (ala Souliotes), and perhaps a big part of the Samiote population. In the Morea key local families will be forced into exile. c) Increase of the jizya and harsher taxation and land concertation in Muslim hands in the Morea with the goal of forcing conversions (this worked in Crete both after the Orlov Revolts and after 1821, though it of course meant that at first chance the converts reverted to Orthodoxy) d) This might be self-defeating but would make sense in the context of his thinking. Restrictions if not outright destruction of the commercial fleets of the rebelling islands. This of course will ruin them (especially Psara). A result of these policies will be mass migration from southern Greece to central and western Europe or the eastern coast of the Aegean (Izmir/Smyrna, Ayvali(k) etc). The Hepatnisian Polity will receive big numbers, and then groups will continue forward to the historically strong Greek speaking communities of Italy and Central Europe.
• No Long Greek revolution, no Egyptian Intervention, there is less chance of Mehmet Ali Kavali of Egypt going to war with the Ottoman Sultan over the later’s failure to grant him lands promised in return for the suppression of the Greeks. Now I do think that Mehmet will make an attempt to force the Sultan to grant him Syria, but when and will it be a war? In 1833 he had a legitimate grievance. Would he start a war absent it.
• No Ottoman-Egyptian Wars of 1833-1841 , no Treaty of Unkiar-Iskelesi. No Treaty of Unkiar-Iskelesi, less likelihood of a Crimean War (since a big reason for the Russian brinkmanship was anger over the Straits Convention rendering that Treaty useless). I still think you get a Russo-Ottoman War at some point in the 1820-1870s period (probably as historically over the Balkan Slavic revolts, events that are independent of a Greek Revolution succeeding or not), but a Crimean War is less likely now. This of course pushes further away the onset of Westernization.
• The Morea becomes more Muslim. It was 15% Muslim in 1821. An Ottoman policy of heavy taxation and threats will create conversions as it did in Crete. While I do not expect Muslims to become a majority, we can easily see a 30% proportion
• The southern and western Aegean islands are ruined economically. Before the rise of commerce these islands were reliant mostly in subsistence farming. They revert to it (see David Brewer)
• In summary of the above: The Southern Greeks (and Arvanites) are ruined economically and see a big population decrease and emigration both outside the Ottoman Empire and to other places inside. The Southern Greek communities are ruined politically. The Ottoman Empire is slower to westernize as Mahmud’s II belief in Islamic Revivalism is not challenged. The Crimean War and the Ottoman-Egyptian Wars are less likely. South Greece becomes more Muslim. The South Slavic Revolts of the 1870s still happen, and thus possible a Ottoman-Russian War then.

 

[Khan Doomy]

Part II

Here we start exploring the bigger divergences concerning the development or not of the modern Greek nation. Now a lot of it depends on your view on the development of the Neo-Hellenic identity.

One school popular with people who hold negative views of modern Greek history (there are posters in these forums that share them) argue that there is no such thing as a Greek identity. It was fashioned by the British or the Russians, or the Bavarians, or the Masons or what have you, and a direct result of the foundation of the Greek State. I find this view problematic considering the Intellectual Greek Renaissance of the 1740s-1820s, and the expansion of Greek language education in that era, but on the other hand one could argue that there are groups of modern Greeks who became Greeks due to state action.

If you ascribe to this logic, then what are the consequences for the identity of the Greek expressing peoples of the Ottoman Empire and the Eastern Mediterranean? What are the consequences for Heptanisians (my paternal descent), Islanders etc. There is of course the Rhomeic identity in the Ottoman Empire, but that is not the same thing everywhere in it (Cappadokians vs. Pontics vs. Constantinopolitans) and of course irrelevant to the Heptanisians. Of course some groups will become assimilated into other Christian groupings (Bulgarians, VlachoRomanians) but others? I cannot see Arvanites becoming Albanians, because they will still be getting a Greek education for several decades before Albanian education becomes competitive. What national identities do you think will develop ? I know some will say Ottomanism, but considering a) the Muslim elite aversion to true equality (see Candan Badem “The Ottoman Crimean War”) and Phanariot focus on taking over the empire from inside, I just cannot see this working out. What other possibilities exist and how will they become politically expressed in the Age of Nationalism?

I can see the development of two related but distinct national identities one Western Greek centered on the Ionian Islands and the Epirus region, and another Eastern Greek one developing from the Rhomeic one. But what about the Aegean Islanders?

So for those who reject the existence of modern Hellenism, what follows a failed Greek revolt? Do any “modern” identities tied to the Greek language develop? Do they seek political expression, and where?

 

[Khan Doomy]

Part III

Here we discuss with those that do agree with the idea that a modern Greek identity had already developed in the 18th century. How does the failure of the Greek Revolt of 1821 affect its political expression? The Phanariotes will champion their take it over from inside plan, which might make them willing to paly along with a constitutional Ottomanism, but remember in this case that westernization will come later in the 19th century (last two or last decade). Long term it will hit up to the attitudes that Candan Badem discussed among Muslim Ottoman elites. You are still getting the South Slav Revolts, and thus the expulsions of Rumelian Muslims from parts of the Balkans. Thus you still get the exacerbation of Christian-Muslim relationships in the Empire and the conditions that gave birth to the CUP.

Only now you do not have a Greek state to serve as a focal point for an alternative to the Ottomanist overthrown from within Phanariote logic. The most likely Greek state to form would be the Heptanisian Polity probably as part of British attempts to balance Russian influence due to a victorious Russian Balkan war. But the Heptanisian islands are no piedmont (ideologically yes but not militarily). I can see them getting the opposite Epirote coasts and Missolonghi, but the point is this Greek state starts later (1870s) and further from Asia Minor. Irridentist energy will be devoured with getting the Morea, Continental southern Greece, and down the path into the Aegean, rather than Macedonia, Thrace or Asia Minor. What does this mean for Greek nationalism? What is the fate of the Ottoman Greeks?

Well, there you go. Some fevered questions for feverish nights. Enjoy.

 

[Lascaris]

• I expect thus Mahmud II to remain wedded to his Islamist revivalist thesis for longer. This has down-order consequences for things like the Auspicious Event (I think it still takes place but later, and in a different context. What possible context?), the formation of a modern army, and the start of westernizing reforms. Absent some event that shakes his belief in Islamic Revivalism, I expect Westernization to start slowly in the 1840s and take true form after a Russo-Ottoman War probably around the 1870s

That's potentially catastrophic then and there for the Ottomans. An Ottoman empire that goes to the mid 19th century without an army built on European lines? We are on Opium wars territory by 1860-70 with Ottoman armies collapsing catastrophically. Best case scenario for the Ottomans might be Iran. Worst case? I'd say China but the Ottoman empire isn't sufficiently big for this. So I would not be entirely surprised if we are dealing with complete collapse and dismemberment by 1880.

• I expect Mahmud to seek to break the Greek speaking communities of southern Greece and the Aegean. Consistent with his Islamic Revivalism view-point I see a) revocation of privileges for autonomous communities involved in the revolt, especially those of the Commercial islands. b) I expect expulsion of the Maniotes (ala Souliotes), and perhaps a big part of the Samiote population. In the Morea key local families will be forced into exile

Ok... how do you get the Maniots driven out? This didn't happen in 1770 with the relative balance of power much more tilted in the Ottoman favor. And Mani population wise is much more important than the Souliotes, population was around 38,000. If the Maniots could beat off Ibrahim pasha or for that matter the Bavarians afterwards they can beat off the Ottoman armies in the Morea. Would the Porte go to the trouble of organizing a large army to take down Mani, when it had not done so in centuries? I would doubt it.

• . c) Increase of the jizya and harsher taxation and land concertation in Muslim hands in the Morea with the goal of forcing conversions (this worked in Crete both after the Orlov Revolts and after 1821, though it of course meant that at first chance the converts reverted to Orthodoxy) d) This might be self-defeating but would make sense in the context of his thinking. Restrictions if not outright destruction of the commercial fleets of the rebelling islands. This of course will ruin them (especially Psara).

One notes said fleets were able to fight off the Ottoman navy for the entirety of the revolution. So if Mahmud is not willing to compromise, with someone like Voulgaris placed on the head of Hydra for example, the islanders take their ships and leave wholeshale? Where do they likely go? I'd argue the British held Ionian islands. It's not as if Britain would mind several thousands skilled sailors and hundreds of ships setting up shop in their territory. There is after all the precedent with Minorca and the Angli-greqs.

• No Long Greek revolution, no Egyptian Intervention, there is less chance of Mehmet Ali Kavali of Egypt going to war with the Ottoman Sultan over the later’s failure to grant him lands promised in return for the suppression of the Greeks. Now I do think that Mehmet will make an attempt to force the Sultan to grant him Syria, but when and will it be a war? In 1833 he had a legitimate grievance. Would he start a war absent it.

I would look at this the other way round. Mahmud OTL systematically went around destroying the ayans and re-establishing central authority all around the empire. Why he will not try to restore direct rule over Egypt as well sometime in the 1830s? Now I would expect an Ottoman invasion of Egypt in say 1839 to go off catastrophically but that's a different question

• No Ottoman-Egyptian Wars of 1833-1841 , no Treaty of Unkiar-Iskelesi. No Treaty of Unkiar-Iskelesi, less likelihood of a Crimean War (since a big reason for the Russian brinkmanship was anger over the Straits Convention rendering that Treaty useless). I still think you get a Russo-Ottoman War at some point in the 1820-1870s period (probably as historically over the Balkan Slavic revolts, events that are independent of a Greek Revolution succeeding or not), but a Crimean War is less likely now. This of course pushes further away the onset of Westernization.

As mentioned is is not going to end well... for the Ottomans.

• The Morea becomes more Muslim. It was 15% Muslim in 1821. An Ottoman policy of heavy taxation and threats will create conversions as it did in Crete. While I do not expect Muslims to become a majority, we can easily see a 30% proportion
• The southern and western Aegean islands are ruined economically. Before the rise of commerce these islands were reliant mostly in subsistence farming. They revert to it (see David Brewer)
• In summary of the above: The Southern Greeks (and Arvanites) are ruined economically and see a big population decrease and emigration both outside the Ottoman Empire and to other places inside.

Exception... Chios. Chios is likely to be much better off TTL...

• The Southern Greek communities are ruined politically. The Ottoman Empire is slower to westernize as Mahmud’s II belief in Islamic Revivalism is not challenged. The Crimean War and the Ottoman-Egyptian Wars are less likely. South Greece becomes more Muslim. The South Slavic Revolts of the 1870s still happen, and thus possible a Ottoman-Russian War then.

By that time two generations have passed since the failed 1821 revolt. Time seems about right for another one.

Part II

Here we start exploring the bigger divergences concerning the development or not of the modern Greek nation. Now a lot of it depends on your view on the development of the Neo-Hellenic identity.

One school popular with people who hold negative views of modern Greek history (there are posters in these forums that share them) argue that there is no such thing as a Greek identity. It was fashioned by the British or the Russians, or the Bavarians, or the Masons or what have you, and a direct result of the foundation of the Greek State.

That's plain silly so snip.

Part III

Here we discuss with those that do agree with the idea that a modern Greek identity had already developed in the 18th century. How does the failure of the Greek Revolt of 1821 affect its political expression? The Phanariotes will champion their take it over from inside plan, which might make them willing to paly along with a constitutional Ottomanism, but remember in this case that westernization will come later in the 19th century (last two or last decade). Long term it will hit up to the attitudes that Candan Badem discussed among Muslim Ottoman elites. You are still getting the South Slav Revolts, and thus the expulsions of Rumelian Muslims from parts of the Balkans. Thus you still get the exacerbation of Christian-Muslim relationships in the Empire and the conditions that gave birth to the CUP.

Only now you do not have a Greek state to serve as a focal point for an alternative to the Ottomanist overthrown from within Phanariote logic. The most likely Greek state to form would be the Heptanisian Polity probably as part of British attempts to balance Russian influence due to a victorious Russian Balkan war. But the Heptanisian islands are no piedmont (ideologically yes but not militarily). I can see them getting the opposite Epirote coasts and Missolonghi, but the point is this Greek state starts later (1870s) and further from Asia Minor. Irridentist energy will be devoured with getting the Morea, Continental southern Greece, and down the path into the Aegean, rather than Macedonia, Thrace or Asia Minor. What does this mean for Greek nationalism? What is the fate of the Ottoman Greeks?

I'm short of inclined to disagree of the relative military potential of an Heptanesian polity here. TTL by the 1870s it has a population somewhere in the 300-400,000 range depending on the number of refugees it got in 1821. A British trained Heptanesian army with modern arms against non-westernized Ottoman garrisons in Crete and Peloponnese? I know on whom I would be betting.

But actually this is... irrelevant. Lets take the biggest side effect of the POD to its logical conclusions. TTL Ottoman Empire HAS NOT WESTERNIZED. Then you have a wave of Christian revolutions, Greece, Bulgaria, Bosnia going off in 1876 followed by the inevitable repression and atrocities making it to European newspapers followed by the Russian army marching in in what has been the first Russo-Ottoman war since 1812. Only the Ottoman armies TTL are fewer in numbers, lack the modern arms imported in massive amounts in OTL and much more importantly lack the Harbiye officers and western organizational model. Oh and to make things funnier, the 260 million pounds taken in loans from Europe in 1854-74 and the close interconnection of the Ottoman economy with the west? Well gone, in particular the loans, commercial penetration is in all likehood still happening. So how is the TTL Ottoman empire viewed here? Were I to guess in even more colonial terms than OTL.

So what are the likely results of this alternate Eastern crisis? The Serbs and Montenegrins are likely doing much better off in their war with the Ottomans, the Greek revolt in the south is likely doing pretty well with direct or indirect Heptanesian support the 1854 Thessalo-Epirote and the 1866 Cretan revolts are a reasonable example here IMO. And then Russia joins the fray. No Plevna delay TTL, the not quite modernized Ottoman armies in the Balkans and the Caucasus are collapsing instead and have we mentioned that since TTL there was no Crimean war the Russians have an actual navy in the Black Sea?

At which point the rest of Europe realizes the Russians are on their way to Constantinople if not there and nice colonial territory you cannot defend you have there Ottoman empire, lets grab some ourselves. How the collapse plays out? Uncertain. Do you actually get an independent Greece or Bulgaria frex or Russian and British protectorates here? How the rest of Europe was affected by the lack of the Crimean war?

Assuming we did not have world war then and there, I'd expect a complete collapse of Ottoman control in Europe. San Stefano Bulgaria, Greater Serbia and Montenegro. I'd guess Russia did leave a much reduced Russian influenced Ottoman state in Constantinople and north-central Anatolia with something like Unkiar-Iskelesi in place, outright annexed eastern Anatolia and Pontus and created Bulgaria on San Stefano Borders. What about the Greeks here? They are the vehicle of British influence here. Not certain you get an independent Greece and not an actual British protectorate here, if I wanted to be funny I'd make it a dominion. For certain TTL Greece is the United States of the Ionian Islands grabbing the rest. Either way it controls what British seapower could grab, Epirus, Greece south of the Olympus with maybe a sliver of Macedonia, Chalkidiki and Thessaloniki taken over by the RN before the Russians could reach them? Plus the Aegean islands Crete and Cyprus.

What's happening in the rest of Anatolia? The French will be using their Egyptian ally as a vessel of expansion into Syria and pointts north, the Italians will have colonial ambitions and Britain has no reason not to accommodate Italian ones in frex Cilicia or Antalya or both. Ironically enough TTL Greece may be getting Smyrna here, there was an even larger Greek population in Ionia after all, even more will be coming from Macedonia TTL and I don't see why Britain would not want to control Smyrna through their Greek satellite/protectorate...

 

[Khan Doomy]

Good points. I think you are right that Mahmud tries something against Mehmet Ali and gets his face punched, and so in a way you might still get the OTL process. But on the other hand the Auspicious Event also is made later which might make it less likely for him to have the biological time.

1) On the Maniots. Sure it could be a hard nut to crack, but a combination of naval and land blockade might do the trick. Hell take me everything that can go bad goes bad, and have the Congress of Europe also help with a blockade of Mani. Also Hurshid is a better commander is coming with an Imperial army (not Albanian armed groups) so maybe it is a much serious than in the Orlov Revolt.

2) You could have some efforts at a modernized army (ala China) but yes nothing like OTL absent a slap in the face. That said I would not completely underestimate the ability of the Un-reformed army to hold some fort long enough even against Russia.

3) Arvanites moving to the Heptanisian Polity makes sense. There were Arvanite communities (for example the Mountain villages of Ainos in Keffalonia) and thus it would have both precedent and local element. That said the mass influx of refugees will also exacerbate the social issue in the Heptanisos. Which might be interesting.

4) Commercially and based on Ottoman precedent I think two groups will gain from the ruin of commercial insular republics. A) Asia Minor Greeks and the North Eastern Aegean Islands, and B) of course the North Africans.

5) On the Heptanisians. I actually envision them intervening in Continental Greece during a Russo-Ottoman War via a Garibaldi style campaign as opposed to a full out interstate war. I can see many Maniotes, Souliotes and other Greeks of the Islands actively participating in the Risorgimento, gaining military experience there and then planning some kind of such campaign in Epirus and Misslonghi. Indeed why not a later, more epic and diffrent Siege of Misslonghi as the founding event of one of the modern Greek states (a Western Greek state not just in name but also substance). On the other hand I expect the politics of Ottoman Greeks in Asia Minor to follow more of the trajectory of the Armenian ones. A conflcit between accommodationist religious elites (Phanariotes) vs. secular socialist nationalist organisation probably inspired and founded in the Heptanisus.
6) For me the big question is the Aegean. I can see multiple major powers interests in protectorates and colonies there. Crete us if course the greatest prize with its harbor of Suda, but also the Argo-Saronic (Poros), Lemnos (Mudros) are also prizes worth major power interest.

All in all good fun.