Canadian tanks, troops, guns and planes to Malaya, Oct 1941

RAF is a bit of a misnomer - as usual - and speaking of Hurricanes -
https://thejavagoldblog.wordpress.com/2016/04/29/raafnzraf-squadrons-in-malaya-1941/
It's the same as the whole "Britain fought alone against the Nazis*" thing. It's not technically true but it might as well be.

*There's all the dominions, Greeks, Yugoslavs, various free forces, the entire Empire, the US navy escorting convoys (pre Pearl Harbour), many thousand Irish and the gap between the British troops leaving the European mainland and the attack on the Soviet Union is measured in weeks.
 
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The butterflies from such small changes would be enormous, and how the Japanese react to the IJA being bogged down on the Malay peninsular would be interested. Judging from their actions in OTL, I expect them to double down.

Personally, I'm interested in how this impacts Canada post war, would this lead to Canada being a member of SEATO, and deploying troops in Japan rather than Europe?
If nothing else it would have very good relations with Australia and New Zealand. Maybe some joint military planning and naval exercises as well.
 
If the Valentines reach Malaya before the Japanese attack (which the can't really launch any earlier than they did) the Commonwealth forces still have the advantage as the Japanese tanks would need to be at point blank range to penetrate the CW tanks armour but the Valentines can penetrate Japanese tanks at long range.
 
If the Valentines reach Malaya before the Japanese attack
That's certainly my plan in the OP.

By Dec 1941, the Canadian contribution of two hundred Valentines, fifty 25-pdrs, nearly four thousand tanker/infantry/engineers/support personnel, and two hundred Hawker Hurricanes have been in place and preparing for the predicted invasion since August 1941, with the last of the tanks arriving in October 1941.

Hopefully Percival has been convinced to use these five months to build road blocks, pill boxes and other barriers. Apparently when Singapore fell the IJA found tons of concrete, rebar and construction equipment that Percival never authorized the use of, for fear of worrying the locals.

I am leaning toward thinking that with this level of reinforcement an inexperienced CnC like Percival is likely to be replaced. Monty is needed in North Africa. We need a British general with an ability to command mobile forces.
 
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Monty's not needed in the desert until after 1st El Alamain, and he was second choice then. Malaya needs a commander who can train men, not panic if things don't go to plan and cut through all the Bull. On the ground that's Monty, in the Air that's Park and at sea that's Sommerville. Put someone symbolic as C in C or have Wavell make Singapore his command post. What ever else you do train the men morning and night, shake out the dead wood and have the men ready to fight. Oh and have Gordon Bennet catch something nasty from a Lady Boy in Boogie Street Singapore.
 
Monty's not needed in the desert until after 1st El Alamain, and he was second choice then.
Per Wikipedia, Monty was only a temporary lieutenant-general, and only achieved that rank in July 1941, having been promoted to major-general in 1938.

Does he have the necessary rank to become ground or overall commander of British forces in Malaya? We'd want him in place soon after the decision to send the Canadian reinforcements was made in January 1941, as this occurrence would demonstrate the new importance Britain placed on protecting Malaya via offensive capability.

and at sea that's Sommerville.
There's nothing wrong with Phillips, and you're not going to send Sommerville to command two capital ships and four old destroyers. Maybe later once Indomitable, Hermes, and the ABDA forces are in place. I've often wondered why Phillips didn't use his eight Shagbats to reconnoiter up the coast instead of sending his capital ships within striking range of IJA land based airpower to search for the enemy landing craft, but there must be reasons. Apparently Phillips was a capable commander, well missed by the RN.
 
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Oh and have Gordon Bennet catch something nasty from a Lady Boy in Boogie Street Singapore.

Many a jack has found to his alleged surprise, that he has bitten off more than he can chew, particularly if he meets a lady from the top floor... at the four floors. Gelang also comes to mind.
 
That's pretty much what I heard. A warning tale told to young National Servicemen. My dad was stationed in Singapore twice in the 50's and 60's. My mother also told me about that street's reputation. We were watching the Virgin Soldiers at the time. They were there when it was filmed and all the long haired fifth formers slouching about suddenly got short back and sides and learned drill.
 
Per Wikipedia, Monty was only a temporary lieutenant-general, and only achieved that rank in July 1941, having been promoted to major-general in 1938.

Does we have the necessary rank to become ground or overall commander of British forces in Malaya? We'd want him in place soon after the decision to send the Canadian reinforcements was made in January 1941, as this occurrence would demonstrate the new importance Britain placed on protecting Malaya via offensive capability.

There's nothing wrong with Phillips, and you're not going to send Sommerville to command two capital ships and four old destroyers. Maybe later once Indomitable, Hermes, and the ABDA forces are in place. I've often wondered why Phillips didn't use his eight Shagbats to reconnoiter up the coast instead of sending his capital ships within striking range of IJA land based airpower to search for the enemy landing craft, but there must be reasons. Apparently Phillips was a capable commander, well missed by the RN.

Admiral Philips problem was that despite all the evidence that had been building up over the previous 2 and a bit years of actual war he didn't believe air power was a threat to a fleet at sea. Admittedly no capital ship had yet been sunk by air power alone but it was a lethal blind spot. That the RAF was allegedly waiting to provide a cap to Force Z but the call was never made also doesn't show him in a good light. It could be argued that he was new in theater and therefore may not have received the proper briefing yet. Had he had more time to get to grips with things he might not have made the mistake he did and on another day he might have gotten away with it. Like so much of the Battle of Malaya the loss of Force Z is a tale of missed opportunities and could so easily have been avoided. Had there been a little more time to prepare things could have been so different.

What if he'd called for aid earlier? What if the Indomitable or Hermes had been with them? What if they'd waited in Ceylon for Indomitable to arrive? What if they'd been ordered into the Java Sea to secure the supply route into Singapore? What if there'd been a RN submarine force at Singapore and no need to send Force Z north? There are many possible changes some big some small.
 
Admiral Philips problem was that despite all the evidence that had been building up over the previous 2 and a bit years of actual war he didn't believe air power was a threat to a fleet at sea.
I can't accept that. By Dec. 1941 we've seen the FAA cripple two modern battleships at sea in Bismarck and Veneto, and the Italian and German air forces hit the RN hard in the Med.

I suspect that Phillips did not know he was in easy range of the long endurance IJN strike aircraft. But JMO.
 
I don't think anyone outside Japan realized the range of the Zero, Nell and Betty...
It is noteworthy that the IJN/A strike aircraft that hit Force Z had no fighter cover of their own. Perhaps all the Zeros were elsewhere? Imagine the slaughter the Buffaloes could have made of those thin-skinned torches the IJN/A flew.
 
I am really enjoying this thread. However I was thinking that if large forces of modern armour were available in 1941 the Brits would have sent them to the desert or for the defence of the Home Islands (who predicted that the Russians would fight on?). The only reason for the deployment of first rate equipment and troops to the far east would be a clear and imminent threat from Japan (crucially being taken seriously). If this was the case Britain would have sent reinforcements as it tried too OTL after the Japanese attack. Therefore if the threat was taken seriously then reinforcements could have been sent direct from Britain in larger numbers than the odd battalion of engineers and the like that has been mentioned here. Although it is highly likely that in this scenario Canada would/could have been called upon to help out.

I suspect that if the British and Commonwealth Governments/commanders really expected an attack and prepared accordingly their performance would have been better (albeit probably marginally). Further if reinforcements had been sent as a response to this greater precieved danger then the Malaysian campaign would have looked very different even (dare I say it) with Percival in command. Remembering they dont have to win, only hold Singapore until reinforcements arrive.
 
I say go for it as a fascinating POD. Could be the Canadian government says no to the forlorn hope of a symbolic reinforcement of Hong Kong. They agree to move East to defend Malaya and Singapore, but also insist on further support by Canadian armored and engineer regiments. Again not being interested on wasting their troops in a gesture. Not crazy IMHO even if it is not what the British command would choose.
 
I am really enjoying this thread. However I was thinking that if large forces of modern armour were available in 1941 the Brits would have sent them to the desert or for the defence of the Home Islands
The Valentines were available in 1941, were not wanted by Britain and dumped on the Soviets. Most of the Canadian army was idle, and complaining they had nothing to do beyond garrison duty; which lead to the Hong Kong and Dieppe disasters.

So, we have Canadian men and tanks being under-utilized. I'm just suggesting we use them. And sending unwanted Valentines and untrained infantry to Malaya isn't a massive shift in strategy.
 
I say go for it as a fascinating POD. Could be the Canadian government says no to the forlorn hope of a symbolic reinforcement of Hong Kong. They agree to move East to defend Malaya and Singapore, but also insist on further support by Canadian armored and engineer regiments. Again not being interested on wasting their troops in a gesture. Not crazy IMHO even if it is not what the British command would choose.
It could parallel the Australian PM diverting Australian soldiers from Burma to Australia iirc 1942.
 
I can't accept that. By Dec. 1941 we've seen the FAA cripple two modern battleships at sea in Bismarck and Veneto, and the Italian and German air forces hit the RN hard in the Med.

I suspect that Phillips did not know he was in easy range of the long endurance IJN strike aircraft. But JMO.
I've seen an interview with Admiral Leach who was a Midshipman with Force Z and who's father Commanded Prince of Wales in which he said he heard his father warned about it.
 
With tanks and presumably better commanders, can we see Matador's invasion into FIC? Keep in mind the tanks aren't all in place until October 1941.
 
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