I think Lord Haw Haw made a joke that the quickest way to end the war would be to issue every Canadian soldier in England a motorcycle and a bottle of whiskey and then tell him that Berlin is off limits.
Canadian tanks, troops, guns and planes to Malaya, Oct 1941
- Thread starter Admiral Beez
- Start date
I think Lord Haw Haw made a joke that the quickest way to end the war would be to issue every Canadian soldier in England a motorcycle and a bottle of whiskey and then tell him that Berlin is off limits.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
I don't see the Canadians shipping tank transporters. So, it comes to rail. The Malaya railways were meter gauge, with locomotives that weighed more than twice what a single Valentine weighs. However, can Valentines fit on the Malayan railways? What is the load gauge (the space needed to clear encroachments like bridges and platforms)? The Sherman below shows how a large tank needs space - a smaller Valentine may fit on the smaller gauge.
The below shows the small size of the rolling stock in Malaya.
Here are the Canadian Valentines being loaded onto trains. These railcars look twice the size.
Hopefully the engine isn't needed while the tank isn't on the move. Manual traverse and elevation won't need batteries or hydraulics.
Must admit I didn't give a thought to the FMSR being able to transport tanks due to the metre gauge.
Did a bit of research, from Wikipedia
Valentine tank width is 8ft 7.5in (2,629m)
25 pounder gun as shown in top photo, width is 7ft (2.13m) at wheel hubs
On a flatbed I figure they could just get on
However, passing through a station could be a bit problematic with platforms set too close to the rails. A case of close your eyes mother, here goes!
As always, I have come to this discussion much too late. I hope all interest has not been satiated. If I may, I will start with Admiral Beez’ original posting, which is very thought provoking. I do have a few disagreements, some of which actually work in favor of his original argument.
1. Tanks. The reason Canadian Valentine MK VI were selected for transfer to the USSR is they were prepared and loaded for sea voyage to Great Britain, and it made more sense to do so rather than off-load them and reload British-built Valentines. The convoy with Canadian Valentines was joined by British ships carrying Matilda and Tetrarch tanks – a total of 487 tanks. 145 were Matildas, and a “small batch” were Tetrarchs, so an estimate of 330 Valentines is probably not far off. The convoy arrived in the USSR around 18 December 1941. The Canadian Valentines were employed in late December 1941 and January 1942 in the Moscow Counteroffensive, so there will be a Soviet bill payer for sending 200 of these tanks to Malaya.
Nevertheless, this does not make a deployment of Valentine Mk VI to Malaya impossible. The convoy to the USSR was delayed considerably by the need to coordinate their arrival in the USSR and a proper anti-submarine escort in Arctic waters. The loaded ships were idle much of this time. I do not believe the Canadian Valentines would be shipped to Vancouver and across the Pacific; but leave from their historic port of Montreal, and sail the scheduled Halifax-Trinidad-Freetown-Cape Town-Colombo-Singapore convoy route. Although much longer than the route to the USSR, it would not encounter delays and the ships would likely be available for follow-on service much quicker than the historical voyage to the USSR. There would be no need to scrounge extra shipping as Admiral Beez suggests. The tanks would likely go in batches of 58, 58 and 84. The armoured regiment in 1941 was allocated 58 tanks, this allocates 26 attritional spares for wastage – perhaps a low number, but I am going with the total of 200.
As noted by others, there is no difficulty obtaining diesel fuel. It was available from the BP Jurong Island refineries as well as Royal Dutch Shell refineries at Tarakan and Balikpapan.
2. Troops. Colonel F F Worthington was quite a busy chap in 1939-42. In August 1940, he was the primary brain behind the organization and training of 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade (later 5 Canadian Armoured Brigade); although he was not selected to command. Six months later, on 3 February 1941, Colonel Worthington was indispensable in creating 1 Canadian Armoured Division (later 1 Canadian Armoured Division) to which 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade was assigned and required to duplicate itself in creating 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade. Separately, 1 Canadian Tank Brigade was organized the same day, pilfering two regiments from 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade. On 4 March 1941, Worthington was appointed to command 1 Canadian Tank Brigade and promoted to Brigadier. Only four months later, in July 1941, Brigadier Worthington and his brigade shipped to Great Britain. Their Valentine Mk VI tanks were sent to the USSR, and replaced by Matildas and later Churchill Mk I in January 1942.
Given the timing – July 1941 – and Admiral Beez' suggestion of sending Worthington to Malaya, it would logically follow that 1 Canadian Tank Brigade [11 Army Tank Battalion (Ontario Regiment); 12 Army Tank Battalion (Three Rivers Regiment); and 14 Army Tank Battalion (Calgary Regiment)] would follow their commander to Malaya. This would not mean as Admiral Beez suggests “Nearly the entirety of the Canadian Armoured Corps personnel, including mechanics and support teams is transported to Malaya to man the Valentines.” 1 Canadian Armoured Division will continue to develop as it did historically in Canada before sailing to join 1 Canadian Tank Brigade in Great Britain in November 1941.
The bill payer is that 14 Army Tank Battalion (Calgary Regiment) is not available to be shot apart at Dieppe (no loss compared to saving Malaya) – but more significantly 1 Canadian Tank Brigade is not available for Sicily; and Major General Worthington is not available to convert 4 Canadian Division into 4 Canadian Armoured Division beginning in January 1942. I would trade that for Malaya.
I see no issue with Brigadier Lawton being sent to Malaya. He was not senior to Brigadier Worthington having been appointed to that rank on 1 September 1941. Both knew each other well, having served together for more than a decade in the Military Training Directorate. Brigadier Lawton had staff training and experience that would have been far better employed in Malaya than Hong Kong. As an aside, see: http://www.canadianmilitaryhistory.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/3-Wentzell-Lawson-at-Hong-Kong.pdf
It is likely that Brigadier Worthington would be commander of an expanded Force C – handing 1 Army Tank Brigade to his historical successor Colonel R A Wyman; and Brigadier Lawson commanding 19 Canadian Infantry Brigade (19 is the next unused number) with Royal Rifles of Canada, Winnipeg Grenadiers, and the engineer component Admiral Beez recommends sending.
3. Guns. (Note: Although Admiral Beez mentions sending 1 and 2 Canadian Medium Regiments to Malaya; his diagram is that of the more appropriate Field Regiment. 1 and 2 Canadian Medium Regiments were Corps level assets with six-inch and later 5.5-inch guns. Field Regiments were equipped with 25pdr howitzers. 1 and 2 Canadian Medium Regiments went to Great Britain in 1940, where 2 Canadian Medium Regiment converted to 2 Canadian Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment. A new 2 Canadian Medium Regiment was being formed from 18 Canadian Field Regiment in 1941.)
Here I am at a loss to find units to send to Malaya. All Field Regiments are assigned to I Canadian Corps or Canadian Divisions, and 1 Canadian Armoured Division is short two of its three regiments. It did not get its second until 1942 and its third in 1944.
4. Aircraft. The first 20 Hurricane Mk I off the assembly line were an RCAF order. An additional 166 Hurricane Mk I and 268 Hurricane Mk X built by CCF were to RAF orders, and dispersed to RAF Squadrons in Great Britain and the Middle East; and Lend-Lease to Russia. 25 of the Mk X were transferred to the RCAF. The following 50 MK XI were to RCAF order, as were 474 Hurricane Mk XII. 458 Hurricane Mk XII were completed as Sea Hurricanes for the RN. These last two orders were on the production line simultaneously. I see no other way for Hurricanes to go to Malaya without sending Buffaloes to Egypt. Not a fair exchange. As an aside, the Brewster Buffalo was bought by the RAF for use in Europe, not Malaya. One of the factors in sending it to Malaya is they could be transported by neutral American-flag ships. Otherwise they may have languished as advanced trainers in Toronto or the West Indies. Hurricanes require ships flying the Red Duster.
5. Command. I may be one of the few defenders of Percival, but all of the blame for the loss of Malaya lay in Whitehall; not Singapore. Percival’s manual on infantry tactics in Malaya was used to excellent effect by the few commanders who bothered to read it. Indeed, this entire discussion is premised on what additional aid could be sent to Malaya. Nothing is set forth on how Percival, with his historical forces could have employed them with different operational concepts or tactical finesse to save the day. Even if Percival had not been bluffed at the Ford factory, Yamashita would have emerged conqueror on schedule at 100 days instead of a month early.
1. Tanks. The reason Canadian Valentine MK VI were selected for transfer to the USSR is they were prepared and loaded for sea voyage to Great Britain, and it made more sense to do so rather than off-load them and reload British-built Valentines. The convoy with Canadian Valentines was joined by British ships carrying Matilda and Tetrarch tanks – a total of 487 tanks. 145 were Matildas, and a “small batch” were Tetrarchs, so an estimate of 330 Valentines is probably not far off. The convoy arrived in the USSR around 18 December 1941. The Canadian Valentines were employed in late December 1941 and January 1942 in the Moscow Counteroffensive, so there will be a Soviet bill payer for sending 200 of these tanks to Malaya.
Nevertheless, this does not make a deployment of Valentine Mk VI to Malaya impossible. The convoy to the USSR was delayed considerably by the need to coordinate their arrival in the USSR and a proper anti-submarine escort in Arctic waters. The loaded ships were idle much of this time. I do not believe the Canadian Valentines would be shipped to Vancouver and across the Pacific; but leave from their historic port of Montreal, and sail the scheduled Halifax-Trinidad-Freetown-Cape Town-Colombo-Singapore convoy route. Although much longer than the route to the USSR, it would not encounter delays and the ships would likely be available for follow-on service much quicker than the historical voyage to the USSR. There would be no need to scrounge extra shipping as Admiral Beez suggests. The tanks would likely go in batches of 58, 58 and 84. The armoured regiment in 1941 was allocated 58 tanks, this allocates 26 attritional spares for wastage – perhaps a low number, but I am going with the total of 200.
As noted by others, there is no difficulty obtaining diesel fuel. It was available from the BP Jurong Island refineries as well as Royal Dutch Shell refineries at Tarakan and Balikpapan.
2. Troops. Colonel F F Worthington was quite a busy chap in 1939-42. In August 1940, he was the primary brain behind the organization and training of 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade (later 5 Canadian Armoured Brigade); although he was not selected to command. Six months later, on 3 February 1941, Colonel Worthington was indispensable in creating 1 Canadian Armoured Division (later 1 Canadian Armoured Division) to which 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade was assigned and required to duplicate itself in creating 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade. Separately, 1 Canadian Tank Brigade was organized the same day, pilfering two regiments from 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade. On 4 March 1941, Worthington was appointed to command 1 Canadian Tank Brigade and promoted to Brigadier. Only four months later, in July 1941, Brigadier Worthington and his brigade shipped to Great Britain. Their Valentine Mk VI tanks were sent to the USSR, and replaced by Matildas and later Churchill Mk I in January 1942.
Given the timing – July 1941 – and Admiral Beez' suggestion of sending Worthington to Malaya, it would logically follow that 1 Canadian Tank Brigade [11 Army Tank Battalion (Ontario Regiment); 12 Army Tank Battalion (Three Rivers Regiment); and 14 Army Tank Battalion (Calgary Regiment)] would follow their commander to Malaya. This would not mean as Admiral Beez suggests “Nearly the entirety of the Canadian Armoured Corps personnel, including mechanics and support teams is transported to Malaya to man the Valentines.” 1 Canadian Armoured Division will continue to develop as it did historically in Canada before sailing to join 1 Canadian Tank Brigade in Great Britain in November 1941.
The bill payer is that 14 Army Tank Battalion (Calgary Regiment) is not available to be shot apart at Dieppe (no loss compared to saving Malaya) – but more significantly 1 Canadian Tank Brigade is not available for Sicily; and Major General Worthington is not available to convert 4 Canadian Division into 4 Canadian Armoured Division beginning in January 1942. I would trade that for Malaya.
I see no issue with Brigadier Lawton being sent to Malaya. He was not senior to Brigadier Worthington having been appointed to that rank on 1 September 1941. Both knew each other well, having served together for more than a decade in the Military Training Directorate. Brigadier Lawton had staff training and experience that would have been far better employed in Malaya than Hong Kong. As an aside, see: http://www.canadianmilitaryhistory.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/3-Wentzell-Lawson-at-Hong-Kong.pdf
It is likely that Brigadier Worthington would be commander of an expanded Force C – handing 1 Army Tank Brigade to his historical successor Colonel R A Wyman; and Brigadier Lawson commanding 19 Canadian Infantry Brigade (19 is the next unused number) with Royal Rifles of Canada, Winnipeg Grenadiers, and the engineer component Admiral Beez recommends sending.
3. Guns. (Note: Although Admiral Beez mentions sending 1 and 2 Canadian Medium Regiments to Malaya; his diagram is that of the more appropriate Field Regiment. 1 and 2 Canadian Medium Regiments were Corps level assets with six-inch and later 5.5-inch guns. Field Regiments were equipped with 25pdr howitzers. 1 and 2 Canadian Medium Regiments went to Great Britain in 1940, where 2 Canadian Medium Regiment converted to 2 Canadian Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment. A new 2 Canadian Medium Regiment was being formed from 18 Canadian Field Regiment in 1941.)
Here I am at a loss to find units to send to Malaya. All Field Regiments are assigned to I Canadian Corps or Canadian Divisions, and 1 Canadian Armoured Division is short two of its three regiments. It did not get its second until 1942 and its third in 1944.
4. Aircraft. The first 20 Hurricane Mk I off the assembly line were an RCAF order. An additional 166 Hurricane Mk I and 268 Hurricane Mk X built by CCF were to RAF orders, and dispersed to RAF Squadrons in Great Britain and the Middle East; and Lend-Lease to Russia. 25 of the Mk X were transferred to the RCAF. The following 50 MK XI were to RCAF order, as were 474 Hurricane Mk XII. 458 Hurricane Mk XII were completed as Sea Hurricanes for the RN. These last two orders were on the production line simultaneously. I see no other way for Hurricanes to go to Malaya without sending Buffaloes to Egypt. Not a fair exchange. As an aside, the Brewster Buffalo was bought by the RAF for use in Europe, not Malaya. One of the factors in sending it to Malaya is they could be transported by neutral American-flag ships. Otherwise they may have languished as advanced trainers in Toronto or the West Indies. Hurricanes require ships flying the Red Duster.
5. Command. I may be one of the few defenders of Percival, but all of the blame for the loss of Malaya lay in Whitehall; not Singapore. Percival’s manual on infantry tactics in Malaya was used to excellent effect by the few commanders who bothered to read it. Indeed, this entire discussion is premised on what additional aid could be sent to Malaya. Nothing is set forth on how Percival, with his historical forces could have employed them with different operational concepts or tactical finesse to save the day. Even if Percival had not been bluffed at the Ford factory, Yamashita would have emerged conqueror on schedule at 100 days instead of a month early.
Correction to post: 1 Canadian Armoured Division is later 5 Canadian Armoured Division in August 1943. I foopahed.
100th Canadian Valentine left production line Nov 6th 1941, if order was placed earlier and production went smoother 200 could have been ready at this time.
Maybe USS Saratoga, out of refit 15 Aug 41, could make a run to Singapore, Sara carrying 100 Canadian built Hurricanes, half crated, could arrive in Singapore in a timely fashion.
1st CATB in UK training on Churchill's 14 ATB and Matilda's 11th & 12th ATB, so a crash course conversion to Valentines needed, if 1st CATB is to be shipped to Singapore they should take CS tanks with them to supplement the 2pdr armed Valentines.
Perhaps send 166 Newfoundland Field Artillery Regt, in UK converting to 25pdr.
The 3 Prince class AMC's could have been sent to Indian Ocean to relieve RN cruisers for operations out of Singapore.
Maybe USS Saratoga, out of refit 15 Aug 41, could make a run to Singapore, Sara carrying 100 Canadian built Hurricanes, half crated, could arrive in Singapore in a timely fashion.
1st CATB in UK training on Churchill's 14 ATB and Matilda's 11th & 12th ATB, so a crash course conversion to Valentines needed, if 1st CATB is to be shipped to Singapore they should take CS tanks with them to supplement the 2pdr armed Valentines.
Perhaps send 166 Newfoundland Field Artillery Regt, in UK converting to 25pdr.
The 3 Prince class AMC's could have been sent to Indian Ocean to relieve RN cruisers for operations out of Singapore.
Okay @Eric C Johnson welcome on board. Your answers to @Admiral Beez question are interesting, specially for the first topic: Tanks, The first Valentine tank to roll out of CPR Angus Shops was May 22, 1941. Now the first Valentine tank to roll out in England was in May 1940 and went into production in July. When British ask Canada to produce this tanks in Canada, the government didn't enforce the company to start production in January but in May. Now if the government had made Col. Worthington in charge, he would have gotten his first tank by late January, 1941 and by Sept would have produce more then 500 tanks.
About the Troops, Canada could have sent 3 infantry battalions: 1st Battalion, Winnipeg Grenadiers Regiment; 1st Battalion, Royal Rifles of Canada Regiment; and 2nd Battalion, Victoria Rifles of Canada Regiment. The first two battalion we know its history but where does 2nd battalion, Victoria Rifles of Canada come from? Well the history of this battalion was that it was formed on November 7, 1941. But if this battalion was formed in February 1941, by September the battalion could be sent to Singapore. Maybe during March through July this battalion could be train in dense forest and use this training for jungle warfare. Also 1st Battalion, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa Machine Gun Regiment.
Guns, this field regiments were available: 24th Field Artillery Regiment (Reserved), 26th Field Artillery Regiment(Reserved), 30th Field Artillery Regiment, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment(Reserved), 49th Field Artillery Regiment (Anti-aircraft), and 57th Field Artillery Regiment (Anti-aircraft). These could be found in Wikipedia.
Aircrafts and Command I have already posted in a different thread which I will leave here https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/best-british-general-for-malaya.411900/
Hope you enjoy @Eric C Johnson
Many thanks for the warm words of welcome from all. I also appreciate Logan2879 acting as my reconnaissance trooper – he has found and clued me into these sites.
I limited the scope of my critique to the original hypothesis by Admiral Beez. Having done a bit more research, and benefitted from the comment by Ramtank2 regarding the delivery of the 100th tank in November 1941; I now have some doubts as to the total accuracy of my previous comments; although conclusions may not change.
The British Ministry of Supply placed its order for Valentine Mk VI tanks with the Canadian Pacific Angus Railway shops in early June 1940 – that is after Dunkirk and the loss of virtually all British armour with the BEF-France. Any prescient order prior to June 1940 presumes a prescient knowledge that the BEF-France was badly deployed on the operational and tactical level; an easier problem to fix than increasing tank production. For Canadian Pacific to produce its first tank only 11 months after production order from drawings and plans only – no tooling, jigs or other equipment from Great Britain is an incredible industrial feat. I have difficulty seeing it happening any sooner.
The salient point to this, is “Canadian Valentines” were not owned by Canada; and their intended use to equip 1 Canadian Tank Brigade was only because the British agreed to do so when they requested that it be formed. Tank brigades – in 1940 still an Army-level asset – fit into British, but not Canadian military planning. Thus, it really makes little difference if the 200 Valentine tanks Admiral Beez proposes to send to Malaya came from Canadian or British factories – all Valentine tanks were British-owned. The British certainly could have sent them, provided the Russians become the bill payer for that decision.
Canadian military planning in 1940 envisioned armoured divisions, which are a corps-level asset. The Canadian Ministry of Defence therefore ordered cruiser tanks – the Montreal Locomotive Works built Ram I and Ram II tanks; and later the Grizzly version of the M4 Sherman. These tanks were owned by Canada, not the British.
As for additional infantry, I confined my comment to the two battalions that Admiral Beez mentioned. Logan2879 is correct – other additional infantry battalions could have been sent. One prime possibility is 13 Canadian Independent Brigade, which contained The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles of Canada, and the Lincoln and Welland Regiment. This brigade moved from Camp Niagara to Camp Naniamo on 8 April 1941. It “disbanded” on 13 August 1941 and the same day “re-formed” as 13 Canadian Brigade, a part of 6 Canadian Division. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada were sent to Jamaica, the Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles of Canada to coast defence duty at Esquimalt, and the Lincoln and Welland Regiment to Newfoundland.
13 Canadian Brigade then received the Irish Fusiliers (Vancouver Regiment) and Edmonton Fusiliers, essentially trading three Ontario regiments for two West Coast. In late August 1941, the Royal Rifles of Canada arrived from Newfoundland – a Quebec unit. On 10 September, the Winnipeg Grenadiers arrived from the West Indies and were assigned to 14 Canadian Brigade. As is well known, neither the Royal Rifles of Canada nor Winnipeg Grenadiers lasted long in 6 Canadian Division – on 22 September 1941 they were allocated to Force C destined for Hong Kong.
Their replacements are interesting – King’s Own Rifles of Canada from Saskatchewan went to 14 Canadian Brigade; and in October (exact day uncertain) the Victoria Rifles of Canada (returning from Force W in Newfoundland) were assigned to 13 Canadian Brigade.
As a comment: in general the First Battalion of a Canadian Non-Permanent Militia unit mobilized for active service did not wear its numerical designation. This custom was to ensure the battle honors of the Canadian Active Service Force (CASF) units were “won” by the regiment as a whole. The Second Battalion was a Home Service, or a Reserve Army unit that functioned in similar manner to a British Army Holding Battalion – soldiers too young or too old to serve overseas; physically unfit; recuperating; undergoing training; or who prior to conscription, refused overseas service; etc. If a second CASF battalion was formed, it usually was the Third Battalion, such as the 3/Batallion Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal; or the 3/Edmonton Fusiliers. Unfortunately this system was not honored by the Black Watch of Canada and the Canadian Scottish Regiment which redesignated their Second (Reserve Army) Battalions as the Third Battalion, and then formed a Second Battalion as a CASF unit.
Here is a hefty chunk of mystery that I cannot explain. The Second (Reserve Army) Battalion was nearly always organized at the same time the CSAF unit was mobilized from the Canadian Non-Permanent Militia. This did not happen with the Victoria Rifles of Canada, mobilized on 24 May 1940 and sent to Newfoundland in November 1940. 2/Victoria Rifles of Canada was not formed until 7 November 1941 – I double-checked; and Logan2879 is correct as to that date. I cannot explain why, but I can speculate that on 7 November 1941, Victoria Rifles of Canada were being prepared for overseas service – perhaps to join Force C. This is only a guess on my part.
The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG) were mobilized as a part of 4 Canadian Brigade on 1 September 1939; and when 2 Canadian Division was gutted to form Force Z in Iceland; the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG) arrived there on 7 July 1940. The unit departed Iceland for Great Britain in April 1941, and was attached to I Canadian Corps until August 1941. It then became the machine gun regiment for 3 Canadian Division. I can’t see that division being the bill payer for another Malaya unit in mid-1941.
I also respectfully remain unconvinced about Field Regiments. Converted from infantry – the Kootenay Regiment – to 24 (Kootenay) Field Brigade on 15 December 1936; it was mobilized as a Reserve Army (training and holding) unit designated 24 (Kootenay) Field Regiment in November 1940; and not reorganized as a CASF unit until assigned in March 1942 to 7 Canadian Division. Likewise, the 26 (Manitoba Rangers) Field Brigade was assigned to the Reserve Army in November 1940 and reorganized as a CASF unit in May 1942 prior to assignment to 8 Canadian Division the following month. It soon replaced 24 (Kootenay) in 7 Canadian Division when that unit was transferred to 6 Canadian Division. I cannot find a 30 Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery on the Regimental List, but I can find a 30 Anti-aircraft Regiment.
I am open to arguments that many additional units could be sent to Malaya, as long as a convincing case can be made as to why some other Theater or Command should be the bill payer.
I also found the recommendation by Logan2879 to check https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/best-british-general-for-malaya.411900/ to be very interesting.
I limited the scope of my critique to the original hypothesis by Admiral Beez. Having done a bit more research, and benefitted from the comment by Ramtank2 regarding the delivery of the 100th tank in November 1941; I now have some doubts as to the total accuracy of my previous comments; although conclusions may not change.
The British Ministry of Supply placed its order for Valentine Mk VI tanks with the Canadian Pacific Angus Railway shops in early June 1940 – that is after Dunkirk and the loss of virtually all British armour with the BEF-France. Any prescient order prior to June 1940 presumes a prescient knowledge that the BEF-France was badly deployed on the operational and tactical level; an easier problem to fix than increasing tank production. For Canadian Pacific to produce its first tank only 11 months after production order from drawings and plans only – no tooling, jigs or other equipment from Great Britain is an incredible industrial feat. I have difficulty seeing it happening any sooner.
The salient point to this, is “Canadian Valentines” were not owned by Canada; and their intended use to equip 1 Canadian Tank Brigade was only because the British agreed to do so when they requested that it be formed. Tank brigades – in 1940 still an Army-level asset – fit into British, but not Canadian military planning. Thus, it really makes little difference if the 200 Valentine tanks Admiral Beez proposes to send to Malaya came from Canadian or British factories – all Valentine tanks were British-owned. The British certainly could have sent them, provided the Russians become the bill payer for that decision.
Canadian military planning in 1940 envisioned armoured divisions, which are a corps-level asset. The Canadian Ministry of Defence therefore ordered cruiser tanks – the Montreal Locomotive Works built Ram I and Ram II tanks; and later the Grizzly version of the M4 Sherman. These tanks were owned by Canada, not the British.
As for additional infantry, I confined my comment to the two battalions that Admiral Beez mentioned. Logan2879 is correct – other additional infantry battalions could have been sent. One prime possibility is 13 Canadian Independent Brigade, which contained The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles of Canada, and the Lincoln and Welland Regiment. This brigade moved from Camp Niagara to Camp Naniamo on 8 April 1941. It “disbanded” on 13 August 1941 and the same day “re-formed” as 13 Canadian Brigade, a part of 6 Canadian Division. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada were sent to Jamaica, the Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles of Canada to coast defence duty at Esquimalt, and the Lincoln and Welland Regiment to Newfoundland.
13 Canadian Brigade then received the Irish Fusiliers (Vancouver Regiment) and Edmonton Fusiliers, essentially trading three Ontario regiments for two West Coast. In late August 1941, the Royal Rifles of Canada arrived from Newfoundland – a Quebec unit. On 10 September, the Winnipeg Grenadiers arrived from the West Indies and were assigned to 14 Canadian Brigade. As is well known, neither the Royal Rifles of Canada nor Winnipeg Grenadiers lasted long in 6 Canadian Division – on 22 September 1941 they were allocated to Force C destined for Hong Kong.
Their replacements are interesting – King’s Own Rifles of Canada from Saskatchewan went to 14 Canadian Brigade; and in October (exact day uncertain) the Victoria Rifles of Canada (returning from Force W in Newfoundland) were assigned to 13 Canadian Brigade.
As a comment: in general the First Battalion of a Canadian Non-Permanent Militia unit mobilized for active service did not wear its numerical designation. This custom was to ensure the battle honors of the Canadian Active Service Force (CASF) units were “won” by the regiment as a whole. The Second Battalion was a Home Service, or a Reserve Army unit that functioned in similar manner to a British Army Holding Battalion – soldiers too young or too old to serve overseas; physically unfit; recuperating; undergoing training; or who prior to conscription, refused overseas service; etc. If a second CASF battalion was formed, it usually was the Third Battalion, such as the 3/Batallion Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal; or the 3/Edmonton Fusiliers. Unfortunately this system was not honored by the Black Watch of Canada and the Canadian Scottish Regiment which redesignated their Second (Reserve Army) Battalions as the Third Battalion, and then formed a Second Battalion as a CASF unit.
Here is a hefty chunk of mystery that I cannot explain. The Second (Reserve Army) Battalion was nearly always organized at the same time the CSAF unit was mobilized from the Canadian Non-Permanent Militia. This did not happen with the Victoria Rifles of Canada, mobilized on 24 May 1940 and sent to Newfoundland in November 1940. 2/Victoria Rifles of Canada was not formed until 7 November 1941 – I double-checked; and Logan2879 is correct as to that date. I cannot explain why, but I can speculate that on 7 November 1941, Victoria Rifles of Canada were being prepared for overseas service – perhaps to join Force C. This is only a guess on my part.
The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG) were mobilized as a part of 4 Canadian Brigade on 1 September 1939; and when 2 Canadian Division was gutted to form Force Z in Iceland; the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG) arrived there on 7 July 1940. The unit departed Iceland for Great Britain in April 1941, and was attached to I Canadian Corps until August 1941. It then became the machine gun regiment for 3 Canadian Division. I can’t see that division being the bill payer for another Malaya unit in mid-1941.
I also respectfully remain unconvinced about Field Regiments. Converted from infantry – the Kootenay Regiment – to 24 (Kootenay) Field Brigade on 15 December 1936; it was mobilized as a Reserve Army (training and holding) unit designated 24 (Kootenay) Field Regiment in November 1940; and not reorganized as a CASF unit until assigned in March 1942 to 7 Canadian Division. Likewise, the 26 (Manitoba Rangers) Field Brigade was assigned to the Reserve Army in November 1940 and reorganized as a CASF unit in May 1942 prior to assignment to 8 Canadian Division the following month. It soon replaced 24 (Kootenay) in 7 Canadian Division when that unit was transferred to 6 Canadian Division. I cannot find a 30 Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery on the Regimental List, but I can find a 30 Anti-aircraft Regiment.
I am open to arguments that many additional units could be sent to Malaya, as long as a convincing case can be made as to why some other Theater or Command should be the bill payer.
I also found the recommendation by Logan2879 to check https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/best-british-general-for-malaya.411900/ to be very interesting.
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@Eric C Johnson here is the page of 30th Field Artillery (Canadian): http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/30-field-artillery-regiment/index.page
1st order for 100 Canadian Valentine hulls Oct 1939, British order.
1st drawings received Jan 1940, 90% drawings received by Oct 1940.
April 1940 order withdrawn.
June 1940 300 Valentine's, no armament periscopes or telescopes, ordered by British.
June 1940 488 complete Valentines ordered by Canada to equip Canadian Army Tank Brigade.
1st CATB equipped with Churchill's and Matilda's on arrival in UK due to late production of Valentine's.
Even if the early production order had not been withdrawn I don't see how more than 200 tanks could have been completed by Dec 1941 armour production being biggest bottleneck.
1st drawings received Jan 1940, 90% drawings received by Oct 1940.
April 1940 order withdrawn.
June 1940 300 Valentine's, no armament periscopes or telescopes, ordered by British.
June 1940 488 complete Valentines ordered by Canada to equip Canadian Army Tank Brigade.
1st CATB equipped with Churchill's and Matilda's on arrival in UK due to late production of Valentine's.
Even if the early production order had not been withdrawn I don't see how more than 200 tanks could have been completed by Dec 1941 armour production being biggest bottleneck.
From Canadian Forces Publication A-DH-267-003 Insignia and Lineages of the Canadian Forces. Volume 3: Combat Arms Regiments, it is worth noting the lineage of 30 Field Regiment:
http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/ol-lo/vol-tom-3/par1/art/30far-30rdc-eng.asp
Originated 9 May 1905 in Ottawa, Ontario as the 8th Brigade of Field Artillery, CA
I stand corrected on the 488 Valentines ordered by Canada. The Cabinet approved that purchase on 13 August 1940, the same day the organization of the Canadian Armoured Corps was approved and implemented by General Order 250. There are other sources, including the Profile series that state 1 Canadian Tank Brigade was organized at the request of the British Government, with the agreement that Canada would provide units and the British the necessary equipment. I also need to correct Colonel F F Worthington's career sketch. On 13 August 1940 he was appointed "Officer Administering, The Canadian Armoured Corps with duties as laid down by the Adjutant General." He was appointed Commander of 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade as one of those adjunct duties. He was a busy chap.
There is some great literature on Canadian military history. These include "The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps" by John Marteinson and Michael R McNorgan; and "We Stand on Guard" by Marteinson.
http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/ol-lo/vol-tom-3/par1/art/30far-30rdc-eng.asp
Originated 9 May 1905 in Ottawa, Ontario as the 8th Brigade of Field Artillery, CA
- Redesignated 2 February 1920 as the 1st Brigade, CFA
- Redesignated 1 July 1925 as the 1st Field Brigade, CA
- Redesignated 3 June 1935 as the 1st Field Brigade, RCA
- Redesignated 7 November 1940 as the 1st (Reserve) Field Brigade, RCA
- Redesignated 1 March 1943 as the 1st (Reserve) Field Regiment, RCA
- Redesignated 1 April 1946 30th Field Regiment, RCA
- Redesignated 12 April 1960 30th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA
I stand corrected on the 488 Valentines ordered by Canada. The Cabinet approved that purchase on 13 August 1940, the same day the organization of the Canadian Armoured Corps was approved and implemented by General Order 250. There are other sources, including the Profile series that state 1 Canadian Tank Brigade was organized at the request of the British Government, with the agreement that Canada would provide units and the British the necessary equipment. I also need to correct Colonel F F Worthington's career sketch. On 13 August 1940 he was appointed "Officer Administering, The Canadian Armoured Corps with duties as laid down by the Adjutant General." He was appointed Commander of 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade as one of those adjunct duties. He was a busy chap.
There is some great literature on Canadian military history. These include "The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps" by John Marteinson and Michael R McNorgan; and "We Stand on Guard" by Marteinson.
Admiral Beez
Banned
Book on the Canadian Valentine
Info on War Office order, and production rate (3 tanks a day), 100 tanks per month from April 1941 onwards
Some PODs needed to get my 200 Valentines in place by October 1941.
Info on War Office order, and production rate (3 tanks a day), 100 tanks per month from April 1941 onwards
Some PODs needed to get my 200 Valentines in place by October 1941.
- Sept 10, 1940, decision to design and produce the Ram tank for the newly formed Canadian Armoured Corp does not occur. Instead, in June 1940 Canada orders 488 Valentines (the same OTL order, but from Feb 1941).
- Issues with rate of production are overcome. For example, in October 1941, a British investigation determined many issues that should have been overcome.
- A good history of the Canadian Valentine production issues can be found here https://tinyurl.com/m7dord5
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Admiral Beez
Banned
Now, if someone wants to write a timeline here, I suggest Worthington get some Canadian Chinese to send with his units.
IOTL, many Chinese-Canadians served in Malaya behind Japanese lines in Special Ops.
Canadians to use:
- Gunner http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/briti...ww-ii-efforts-at-new-museum-exhibit-1.3068056
- British recruiting Asian Canadians http://ccs.library.ubc.ca/en/chronology/chViewItem/1/0/14/
- Neil Chan, commando http://www.ccmms.ca/veteran-stories/army/neill-chan/
- Chinese officer http://www.ccmms.ca/veteran-stories/army/roger-cheng/
- Commando, based at Borden, same as Worthington http://www.ccmms.ca/veteran-stories/army/eddie-chow/
- Boxer http://www.ccmms.ca/veteran-stories/army/wing-hay-young/
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Admiral Beez
Banned
As for getting non-Chinese Malays on side, the University of Malaya is well connected to the British establishment, so there must be some leadership there that can help Percival or his replacement connect with the Malays.
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Admiral Beez
Banned
And, lastly some Valentine pics I've found, including the Canadian prototype, shown below breaking through the curtain!
- http://www.qrlnymuseum.co.uk/images/165Valentines.jpg
- https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/originals/2c/ee/86/2cee86af797bc35bbe6a3187c890220b.jpg
- http://www.mapleleafup.net/vehicles/cac/
- http://www.mapleleafup.net/vehicles/cac/valentine.html
- Valetine armour
- Valentine in jungle
- Valentines on transporter
- Very first Canadian Valentine May 1940
- Great resource of pics of Canadian factory
I'd say yes. There were lots of interesting variants, such as this anti aircraft version http://www.ww2incolor.com/d/520111-4/03614
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Logan2879Logan2879
@Eric C Johnson where did you find the información on the 13th Canadian Brigade?
Primarily from the George Nafziger Collection Series: The British Armies in World War Two: An Organizational History; Volume Six; The Canadian Army; by David Hughes, David A Ryan and Steve Rothwell. The on-line Catalog is: http://home.fuse.net/nafziger. E-mail is Nafziger@fuse.net.
@Eric C Johnson where did you find the información on the 13th Canadian Brigade?
Primarily from the George Nafziger Collection Series: The British Armies in World War Two: An Organizational History; Volume Six; The Canadian Army; by David Hughes, David A Ryan and Steve Rothwell. The on-line Catalog is: http://home.fuse.net/nafziger. E-mail is Nafziger@fuse.net.
Reference: The use of Chinese in Malaya, the efforts were too little - too late. LTC John Dalley, Chief of the Special Branch of the Federated Malay States Police Force, argued for the creation of a Chinese-based guerrilla force as early as 1940. On 25 December 1941, he received authorization to do so, and drew largely upon the existing "Singapore Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army". Organized by the Chinese Nationalist Government in 1939, it soon fractured into Nationalist and Communist Factions. Known as officially as "Dalforce", and in the propaganda of the time as "Dalley's Desparadoes"; it is difficult to assess its effectiveness other than as the successful incubator for the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army and the postwar Communist insurgency that led to the Malayan Emergency in 1948-60.
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