Actually, there are people in this forum that are much more unreasonable (if not trollish) on WWII topics than you ever were. Some of them are on my ignore list already. You aren't.
I'm glad.
And here is where I think that your honest moral-driven wish to see them fail is making you exaggerate a lot. There are plenty of PoDs (quite likely some combination of them is necessary, rather than a single one, but that does not invalidate the point) in 1939-41 that can make reap a full victory, and up to early 1943 that can get them a compromise victory.
I don't believe it's impossible for them to win, or for something almost as bad to "win" (big DoD fan, me) with an earlier PoD. What would be the "moral" purpose of refusing to believe dystopia is possible because of
this but accepting it as plausible if we assume
that? My views about the war are based on military realities.
Personally, I think that our difference of methods is how I consider what people thought and why to be part of the military realities. Hitler was a fruitbat, the Japanese leadership were rushing determinedly into the abyss, and there's no two ways about it. To have people do things they would never have done (eg, for Italy to base its foreign policy and military effort on the premise of a war with the Entente starting in 1940 way back in 1936) is to me no less "ASB" than time travel and what-have-you. As B Munro recently and hilariously quoted: I'll maintain an attitude of agnosticism if you tell me that Gladstone was haunted by the ghost of Parnell in his final hours. I'm not Gladstone. But if you tell me that on his first meaning with Queen Vic, he kept his hat on in the drawing room, slapped her matily on the back, and offered her a cigar - that I'm not going to believe, perfectly possible as it may be in a scientific sense.
True, but I would argue that most of the time, it was defeat, not victory, that made them radicalise more and more during the war. E.g., it was defeat that made them switch from deportation to extermination as the default solution to the "Jew problem".
Say what? Heydrich called the internment of the Polish Jews in ghettoes "preparatory" in 1939, so clearly the idea was in the command structure, and the funny thing about the Nazi state was that ideas generally went
up towards the Fuehrer and not the reverse.
And were the Nazis being defeated in June 1941? That was when organised, designated deathsquads swarmed across Lithuania and Belarus. Less efficient, but the object was the same.
Hence, I expect that sufficiently early victory (and the earlier the PoDs are that shift the course of things towards their victory, the easier to implement they are) would forestall at least some of that radicalization.
The ideas, as I said, existed in 1939, and they went up as people jockied for favour with the Fuehrer. Earlier victory just gives them more resources to work with.
"Some"? I don't expect to see German civilians being shot by panicky officers on trumped-up charges to encourage the others without the Allies baring down on the country, but that was a tiny - though edifying - portion of the Nazi death-toll.
Bah. Here's you that you are making the victorious Nazi much stronger, competent, and resourceful than they would actually be. Killing all, or even most of, the Slavs west of the Urals is a huge, huge, huge effort.
Killing 60% of European Jews was an enormous effort which right up to the end diverted considerable resources from the actual military effort. There was no
reason to do it except that the Nazis were batshit crazy. And hey, the huge, huge effort did
fail, in a horrible sort of way. They were stopped.
So why shouldn't they attempt an enterprise which is hardly any
more useless, arbitrary, and insane? 60% of Russians, Ukrainians, Belarussians, Armenians, and Turkic peoples would still be pretty staggering.
Also, the Nazis managed to kill off 60% of the Soviets under their most immediate power (prisoners of war) without any effort at all. They just didn't feed them, clothe them, or shelther them. Much simpler than gas-chambers, and the result was much the same.
They killed 20-25% of the portion of Belarus, too, under war conditions (which meant "large areas of Belarus controlled by Partisans so thoroughly that there were actual Kolkhoz behind German lines"). Lots of Jews in that figure, obviously, but in peacetime conditions, what's to stop them keeping it up?
The Holocaust, remember, was a massive piece of
organisation. When you single out particular minorities for immediate genocide, that implies eleborate schemes of identification, classification, and transportation.
In Belarus, they just turned up at an arbitrary village, herded the people into a barn, set fire to it, and machine-gunned everything for good measure. Not very neat, but it did the job.
The Soviet Union's war losses amounted to some 14%. Imagine I just shot every tenth person in your hometown? In your country?
I tend to regard "they are going to kill every Slav in Europe" in the same field of dystopic fantasy with "they are going to invade America", only somewhat more plausible.
It's the difference between crossing an impassable ocean barrier guarded by an excellent navy to overcome the greatest industrial economy in the world, and shooting helpless women and children.
One of those is actually pretty easy, for a certain kind of person.
And again, I think you are largely exaggerating the long-term committment of the regime to Hitlerite foibles. IMO there is the same kind of biased hindsight at work here as if many people would assume that Stalinist purges would have gone on forever if the Soviet regime hadn't fallen in a TL where the USSR fell in 1952.
Thing is, Stalin never came
close to killing 14% of Soviets. By the way, why the fixation with purges? The bodycount of purges was pretty small, in absolute terms. Obviously the psychological effects of people in senior positions vanishing at night completely at random are pretty severe for the whole country, but only small classes of the Soviet population were even
being purged, and a considerable number were consigned to GULAG rather than killed. This is also pretty much
exactly what the Nazis did on a much smaller scale in 1933-5: a few choice executions and lots of detentions to show everybody what is and isn't acceptable. Hardly mass-murder.
Stalin's acts of mass-murder were the decapitations of intelectual life in his conquered territories (and while Katyn was a tragedy, it was by its very nature a one-off and comparatively limited tragedy compared even to what happene dto the Polish people in Volhynia, for instance), artificial famines brought about by economic policy (an economic policy that was by-and-large
finished by 1941), and ethnic cleansings. It also bares pointing out that ethic cleansings in the line of sobbing Kalmyks being bundled into packed trains with a bag of belongings and dumped in Kazakhstan (as opposed to carefully selected Lithuanians and Finns being rounded up by NKVD and sent to GULAG) were - along with Soviet attrocities against Axis nationals, the deaths of a considerable number of German PoWs in GULAG, Partisan attrocities against non-Partisans, and so on and so forth - a fairly direct result of the Nazi invasion or, if you like, "Hitlerite foibles".
So the Stalin comparison isn't very helpful. If the USSR had fallen in 1952... we
wouldn't remember Stalin as a man who managed to kill off 14% of the Soviet population in four short years under wartime conditions.
Also, I do hope that you understand to what extent the Nazis whacky ideas came from lower down in the hierarchy, from officials playing to the prejudices of a Supreme Leader who had little policy initiative, and filtered up. Hitler didn't stamp his will on the Nazis: subordinates, sometimes rather minor functionaries, made suggestions or just took the initiative and got Hitler's approval. That's how the extermination of the disabled started, and this policy, which didn't originate with Hitler or his cronies, was carried on in the face of public opposition and any semblance of common sense. IIRC, they started killing WW1 veterans... then moved on to killing crippled WWII veterans.
Quite true, but that's not the point here. I was arguing against the ASB claim that victorious Nazi would bring Europe to Third World level by early '50s.
Hey, there's really nowhere quite as third-world as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and if we want to witness Congolese scenes such as gangs of soldiers arriving at arbitrary villages, killing the men, systematically raping the women and then killing them, and killing or kidnapping the children, there'll be plenty of that.
Of course not. Still, Britain had a choice in 1939 NOT to throw around guarantees and enlarge the conflict, since Poland had not yet declared its allegiance to the King.
Similarly, the Soviets could have just surrendered in 1941.
I consider any argument that Britain is responsible for what happened because we refused to sit out in 1939 equivelant to the argument that the Soviets had themselves to blame for Leningrad because they could have just surrendered the place.
(Arguments that Britain and the USSR had allowed the situations of 1939 and 1941 to arise by flawed foreign policy are completely valid, but hardly in the same league.)
Full agreement that Hitler made his first really serious diplomatic-strategic blunder by invading Czechia,
Had he a choice?
His first really serious diplomatic blunder was breaking with the policies of Stresemann and moving to a policy of making treaties purely in order to break them, which is the diplomatic equivelant of knife-juggling.
His first really
obvious diplomatic blunder was his Sudetenland policy. Why did he choose a policy of "I DEMAND by the national will of the Greater German People the righ to invade this territory without any figleaf of justification whatsoever and steal the property of the Czech state and all the Czechs and Jews who live there! TEN DAYS! NO DELAYS, YOU BROLLY-TWIRLING WEAKLING!", rather than a policy of "I believe democratic self-determination should be available to all the people resident in the Sudetenland in accordance with the best doctrines of the late peace settlements - doctrines which, properly applied by agreement by vanquished and victor, will truly bring a lasting peace to the European continent. On those grounds, we should work to bring about a plebiscite in the Sudetenland some time within the year"?
Because he was a loony.
especially by doing it before the issue of Poland was settled, and by totally failing to give a plausible casus belli against Warsaw (and ghost of Bismarck, the interwar Polish regime was far from difficult to goad into doing something stupid and rash to paint itself as the guilty party, for a less hamhanded German leadership).
A few secrets of Bismarck's success:
1) Have small ambitions. If you're the dominant power at the centre of Europe, universally admired for both military strength and economic and cultural vitality, keep it that way.
2) Never let what you believe interfere with what you do. Ideals are for cissies. I have the utmost sympathy for the Poles, but we must destroy them, except when we're bluffing to frighten the Russians, obviously. Bismarck wouldn't have hesitated to invoke democracy for the Sudetenland in a completely cynical way.
3) Have a good treaty with Russia, as they say. Good treaties, by the way,
last.
Three things no Nazi regime could ever do, funnily enough.
But yet, the choice not to give Poland guarantees was there.
So was the choice to hand over the Royal Navy and a box of conciliatory chocolates in 1940; let's stick to options that anyone in their right mind would take.
If there was a really good moment for intransigence, it was in 1938, when it would have immediately brought the Nazis down from within, an optimal outcome for the world, not in 1939, when Anglo-French belligerance brought very little positive in the end.
I'd
absolutely agree that war in 1938 was a much better idea, but whether the Nazi regime is brought down from inside means nothing to me compared to millions of lives saved.
Ideally, I'd like Germany to be comphrehensively defeated (which does
not necessitate ethnic cleansing or any of that) and various unhealthy things in German society to be thoroughly squeezed out, but that's a concern very far behind saving lives. It's hardly as if the victorious powers didn't have unhealthy things in their society.
At that point, Britain could just as well wait for Nazi Germany to turn directly against Western Europe, if it was ever going to, which is very doubtful.
That is, Britain could accept German hegemony everywhere east of the Rhine, based on the historically, ah, non-vindicated doctrine of trusting Nazis.
In all likelihood, otherwise Germany and Russia would have exhausted each other into a compromise peace (Russia would have not let itself be caught with its pants down, but neither it would have been able to reap the OTL decisive victory without all the help of the West)
There's only so much that not being caught with your pants down can do when your army is badly disorganised at the end of an ongoing campaign of expansion. My comments about the importance of the Soviet unpreparedness are based on the premise that the Nazis are already at war with Britain in June 1941, and I'm usually talking about the idea of a Barbarossa in 1942, which is a completely differant thing. For the Nazis, there's a lot of factors to consider (strategic bombing, French lorries...) but at worst the Nazis win, and at best they manage to occupy big chunks of Soviet territory for longer.
From a humanitarian standpoint, this is worse, and from a British diplomatic standpoint, this is a lot worse.
and at worst no German or Slav would have died that it did not die IOTL anyway.
Why not? You often say yourself that the Soviets needed LL to pull off the Ten Blows. If they have to win back their territory - even if it's somewhat less of it - by a long hard slog, it's going to kill lots more people. Longer occupation = more starvation, more Partisan fighting, more village-burning. Lots more Soviet military casualties, of course. Soviet military success inherently costs less lives than German military success because 60% of Soviet PoWs died in captivity; the German rate was 30%.
(By the way, Georgians and Armenians and Tatars are people too.)
If German invasion is moved significantly forward, and is able to move through the Baltic States unopposed, there is the possibility that the Soviets just plain lose, and then it gets nasty.
Of course, none of this is plausible because it requires Britain to, as it were, slap Queen Vic on the back and offer her a cigar.
And if anything, Czechoslovakia was much more deserving of help than Poland (against Hitler, anyway; with any other German regime, Munich with a LoN-managed plebiscite in the Sudetenland would have been the proper thing to do and Poland would have deserved no support whatsoever to keep its bullheaded hold on Danzig).
Or "the correct response to making a mistake once is to shrug and make it again"?