British hold Malaya in 1942?

Astrodragon · Mar 20, 2015

Namayan said:
All of the British assumptions that the British will reallocate but the Japanese will not is counter intuitive. If the British do find ways to counter OTL Japan's moves, JApan certainly won't be doing and allocating the same resource as OTL. Too much British bias going there.

Logistics
Logistics
And yet again, Logistics.

Riain · Mar 20, 2015

Astrodragon said:
Logistics
Logistics
And yet again, Logistics.

Right on!

The reason Japan only used 11 divisions to conquer so much area is because that is the absolute maximum they could transport and sustain in the field in South East Asia, and even that was at the expense of a rigid timetable and breathtakingly daring risks that paid off. Rommel is the same, there is a good reason why PanzerArmeeAfrika was so small and still didn't have the legs to reach the canal.

NOMISYRRUC · Mar 20, 2015

Namayan said:
All of the British assumptions that the British will reallocate but the Japanese will not is counter intuitive. If the British do find ways to counter OTL Japan's moves, JApan certainly won't be doing and allocating the same resource as OTL. Too much British bias going there.

The Japanese are still a one ocean navy. Even with the adjustments made, The British are still split with resources not unless they want to give up the Atlantic to the Germans, thus making British isles vulnerable to invasion/no shipments coming from usa and the Meds to the Italians.

The Japanese invasion force in otl malaya is smaller than its counterparts and is just a token force when you look at what the Japanese total Japanese forces at that time.

With regards to Malaya and the philippines. Any delays in ATl philippines is not that much relevant. in otl Malaya and Singapore fell, It took months after that the Philippines fell to the Japanese. So even in ATl philippines held up its defense as planned, Malaya and Singapore would have still fallen.

You're probably right that Malaya and Singapore would still have fallen. However, it would have taken longer and the Japanese would have lost more men and materiel doing it.

I vaguely remember from reading Morrison that the Japanese Admirals expected the conquest of the East Indies to take about 6 months and they would have lost 30% of the fleet in the process.

If Singapore had held out to the end of June 1942 then it would replace Guadalcanal as the focus of the Pacific War for the rest of the year. The Japanese had to capture Singapore or at least render it hors de combat to prevent the Allies using it as a base to attack the tankers taking the oil back to Japan. That is assuming they were able to bypass Singapore and take the "Malay Barrier" similar to the island hopping strategy the Americans adopted later on.

Redbeard · Mar 20, 2015

It only takes some cheesecake...

IMHO the Japanese success in Malaya/Singapore to a large degree was based on luck and dependent on enemy (in)action - IOW a very vulnerable success.

Most of the interesting and plausible PoDs have already been mentioned in this thread, but I would like to add one: A stronger CIGS earlier! (Chief Imperial General Staff).

In OTL Dill was CIGS from May 1940 until December 1941 when Brooke (later Alanbrooke) replaced him. Dill wasn't a weak character but apparently it demanded an extreme like Brooke to direct (hand-cuff) Churchill into something strategically consistent.

I guess the new "re-inforced" CIGS will have to be in place by late 1940/early 41 latest. Dill had also been AC commander in France but was "withdrawn" already by April 40 to replace Ironside (who didn't get on with Churchill) as CIGS by May. By that time the commander of the BEF Lord Gort saw Brooke as a pessimist and considered replacing him, but when the fighting started he impressed everybody with a very skillful handling of his AC.

Dill's health was fragile however and if we somehow accelerate his health problems (or choke in a cheesecake) the position as CIGS could very well be vacant by late 40. By that time Brooke has his good reputation from France and his (re)organization of Home defence and the worst invasion scare over. IMHO not implausible to have him in office as CIGS by then.

Driftless · Mar 20, 2015

jsb said:
(snip)
3) Not sure that the PI was planed to hold by anyone in the US outside of MacArthur's mind ? (and it would cut the supply lines, as soon as you had working subs based in Manila)

Sniglet from a US Army History document on the Defense of the Philippines

Although the United States had maintained military forces, including a substantial number of indigenous units, in the Philippines since their annexation in 1898, the islands were largely unprepared for hostilities with Japan. This unpreparedness was the result of several factors. As a signatory of the Washington Naval Treaty in 1922, the United States had agreed, in exchange for limitations on Japanese shipbuilding, to halt construction of any new fortifications in its Pacific possessions. For the Philippines this meant that only the islands near the entrance to Manila Bay, principally Corregidor, were well protected. Similarly, the act to grant the Philippines commonwealth status in 1935-with independence scheduled for 1946-meant that the de-fense of the islands had to devolve gradually on the Philippine government despite its limited resources. Reflecting these realities, the U.S. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan ORANGE, last updated in April 1941, limited defense of the islands to Manila Bay and critical adjacent areas. If attacked, the U.S. Army garrison was expected to withdraw to the Bataan Peninsula, a tongue of land on Luzon forming the northwestern boundary of Manila Bay, and to the island of Corregidor. The plan did not envision reinforcement or relief of the Philippine garrison. With a small army committed to continental defense and a general agreement that in the event America went to war it would adopt a defeat-Germany-first strategy, the U.S. military had reluctantly concluded that the Philippines must be sacrificed if the Japanese attacked.

Cryhavoc101 · Mar 20, 2015

I've always thought that if Britain had syphoned off a fraction of the 1000s of Valentines and hundreds of Hurricanes etc that was being sent to Russia it would have payed great dividends to the Commonwealth

150 Valentines and an additional 60 odd Hurricanes and other weapon systems would have been a "Game changer" (yes I hate the term as well) in Malaya - and I dont think that the Russians would have noticed the short fall!

The Japanese however would certainly have noticed!

Saphroneth · Mar 20, 2015

Cryhavoc101 said:
I've always thought that if Britain had syphoned off a fraction of the 1000s of Valentines and hundreds of Hurricanes etc that was being sent to Russia it would have payed great dividends to the Commonwealth

150 Valentines and an additional 60 odd Hurricanes and other weapon systems would have been a "Game changer" (yes I hate the term as well) in Malaya - and I dont think that the Russians would have noticed the short fall!

The Japanese however would certainly have noticed!

I know the Russian attitude to being sent Hurricanes was "Why not Spitfires?"

(The answer is simple - Hurricanes can be crated.)

deathscompanion1 · Mar 20, 2015

Cryhavoc101 said:
I've always thought that if Britain had syphoned off a fraction of the 1000s of Valentines and hundreds of Hurricanes etc that was being sent to Russia it would have payed great dividends to the Commonwealth

150 Valentines and an additional 60 odd Hurricanes and other weapon systems would have been a "Game changer" (yes I hate the term as well) in Malaya - and I dont think that the Russians would have noticed the short fall!

The Japanese however would certainly have noticed!

Not sure the air war in the early period was Japan's to lose. The British had zero respect for Japanese aviators and the Japanese had better planes and better training and quality of pilot (any natural and well trained pilot would be needed to get shot down over France in fighter sweeps) and had a major intelligence advantage.

Honestly the British seemed to be checking off a list of how to ensure a giant ass disaster. Hell Churchill moaned that the Americans at least had the salve that their asskicking had a trace of dignity with the defence of Corregidor and that was without three years of war to learn from. When the leader of the nation has resigned himself to appealing to the local commander to lose less embarrassingly you know just how desperate things have gotten.

Look More Closely Later · Mar 20, 2015

Logistics

Saphroneth said:
I know the Russian attitude to being sent Hurricanes was "Why not Spitfires?"

(The answer is simple - Hurricanes can be crated.)

On that note, how possible would it be to get extra shipments to Malaya into the original timeline shipping movements? Would it be possible to maybe get planes to Africa and then fly them on from there via the Middle-East and India? (I take it extra tanks would need one or more ships to move them the entire way. Would it be possible though on the tank front to maybe put tanks on (otherwise empty?) ships heading across to the USA to collect war-materials, offload the tanks there, and leave it to the USA to deliver them to Malaya via Panama?)
Edit:
If flying planes to Malaya via Africa/Middle-East/India is impracticable, presumably any additional planes that were sent would have to go in crates as with any tanks, unless there was an aircraft carrier or two sitting around not doing much in the original timeline? (The latter seems unlikely to me.)

Just Leo · Mar 20, 2015

Saphroneth said:
I know the Russian attitude to being sent Hurricanes was "Why not Spitfires?"

(The answer is simple - Hurricanes can be crated.)

The Russians didn't care for Hurricanes much because they couldn't keep up with the bombers they were escorting.

There's a rumor that 60 Spitfires were buried in crates in Burma. There might be some who would say that by 1942, the Hurricanes were just crates.

Perky50 · Mar 20, 2015

Here's a possibility for moving Hurricanes and tanks to Singapore.

If the equipment to be sent was coming out of orders for the USSR they could be taken from Canadian production. That would mean a move by rail to the west coast, then trans-shipment to ships at Vancouver or possibly an American port for the completion of their voyage.

A benefit of this choice, as far as the Hurricanes went, would be that they wouldn't be equipped with the Vokes Filters, which would give them rather better performance than a lot of the models which did turn up in Malaya and elsewhere in the region historically.

The tanks would be Valentines, more than likely armed with 2 pdrs, but that would still put a dependable tank in place that would be more than able to counter the Japanese armour.

Fill out Force C to a proper Brigade Group formation by adding a further regiment of infantry along with artillery, engineers and the other needed support arms. It would make it easier to fill it out to a division if the need, will or opportunity arose.

Hell, with the Dutch Royal Family being Canada's leading wartime guests, maybe an enhanced Canadian force could be deployed to Sumatra to assist in screening Singapore's southern flank.

While this might all seem rather dubious to some, if the stronger effort was being made by the rest of the Commonwealth it just might be a proper fit.

Locke01 · Mar 20, 2015

Saphroneth said:
Oh, and splat that spy the Japanese had.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrick_Stanley_Vaughan_Heenan
Without him, the air war is much less one-sided.

It's doubtful that Heenan's treachery disclosed very much information to the Japanese that they weren't already aware of. The Japanese had a very extensive HUMINT program going on in Malaya at the time. Heenan's information was really just the icing on the cake for them

Derek Pullem · Mar 20, 2015

Just Leo said:
The Russians didn't care for Hurricanes much because they couldn't keep up with the bombers they were escorting.

Only Pe-2 and the idea is that they don't need escorts?

Cryhavoc101 · Mar 20, 2015

Saphroneth said:
I know the Russian attitude to being sent Hurricanes was "Why not Spitfires?"

(The answer is simple - Hurricanes can be crated.)

Its simpler than that they and their highly trained pilots were busy being squandered over France

Shame really - where ever Spitfire went the Air Battles got better for the Allies.

Add a Kieth Park and Spitfires..........Victory in the Air was assured

deathscompanion1 said:
Not sure the air war in the early period was Japan's to lose. The British had zero respect for Japanese aviators and the Japanese had better planes and better training and quality of pilot (any natural and well trained pilot would be needed to get shot down over France in fighter sweeps) and had a major intelligence advantage.

Honestly the British seemed to be checking off a list of how to ensure a giant ass disaster. Hell Churchill moaned that the Americans at least had the salve that their asskicking had a trace of dignity with the defence of Corregidor and that was without three years of war to learn from. When the leader of the nation has resigned himself to appealing to the local commander to lose less embarrassingly you know just how desperate things have gotten.

It staggers me - its not like the British commonwealth didn't know how to fight - the BEF's intense battles in France, Wavells 30,000 in North Africa, the fighting in East Africa, Fighting in the Middle east, the odd kick up vs Vichi French forces etc all had shown how well a British / Commonwealth army could fight - yet in Malaya we see all the foibles of the Commonwealth military merged in the same place.

I recall reading that the Japanese Commander and his staff prior to attacking across the straights set up his command HQ in a Malay Princes palace knowing that despite being in range of British Artillery and that the British would know he was there that they would not shell the Palace!!!

The book I was reading got violently punched across the room at that point!

Look More Closely Later said:
On that note, how possible would it be to get extra shipments to Malaya into the original timeline shipping movements? Would it be possible to maybe get planes to Africa and then fly them on from there via the Middle-East and India? (I take it extra tanks would need one or more ships to move them the entire way. Would it be possible though on the tank front to maybe put tanks on ships heading across to the USA to collect war-materials, offload the tanks there, and leave it to the USA to deliver them to Malaya via Panama?)

Edit - Ninja'd by perky50

Canada started building Valentines in 1941 (not sure when in 1941 though) and most of these went to Russia via the Pacific in Russian Merchant Ships (Japan had agreed not to attack any Russian Flagged Vessel during the war)

Perhaps a few Hundred of those Canadain Valentine tanks could be sent to the Far East with a tank Brigades worth ending up in Malaya/Singapore? Granted you still need to have units trained to use them etc but moving men is not such an issue.

While the Canadians are about it send C-Force to Singapore not Hong Kong and withdraw the HK garrison (effectively abandoning the place - IMO not worth the bones of a single soldier at that point in the war - Imperial Honor be damned!) - thats got to be worth 2 more Infantry Brigades in Malaya!

Das_Colonel · Mar 20, 2015

Just Leo said:
The Russians didn't care for Hurricanes much because they couldn't keep up with the bombers they were escorting.

There's a rumor that 60 Spitfires were buried in crates in Burma. There might be some who would say that by 1942, the Hurricanes were just crates.

The crated spirfires story looks to be bunkum now. Sadly.

Google 'buried Burma spitfires + wargaming.net'.

Garrison · Mar 20, 2015

Astrodragon said:
The easiest PoD is for the British to clear (or at least advance further) in Africa before sending forces to Greece. Clearing NA allows much more to be sent east (even with deliveries to Russia), and more importantly allows better troops and leaders to be sent.

Even as it was, the Japanese assault on Malaya barely succeeded. With more modern aircraft, better led (and a reorganisation may well butterfly the spy into ineffectiveness), the RAF will survive long enough to develop a working set of tactics. The Japanese air production in 1942 was pitiful, the Empire can replace aircraft at a far greater rate.

On the ground, even with better troops the Japanese will advance, but it will be a lot more difficult and they will run out of supply (they almost did in OTL). With NA cleared, Malta becomes easier to support, so more naval forces go east. The big problem for Japan was that all their attacks were marginal, so any failure cascades. Since the Allies can then reinforce faster, the Japanese plans come apart.

Holding Singapore requires Sumatra, but given some extra time reinforcements can be sent.

If only someone was writing a TL that covered that very topic...

Athelstane · Mar 20, 2015

Astrodragon said:
The easiest PoD is for the British to clear (or at least advance further) in Africa before sending forces to Greece. Clearing NA allows much more to be sent east (even with deliveries to Russia), and more importantly allows better troops and leaders to be sent.

Even as it was, the Japanese assault on Malaya barely succeeded. With more modern aircraft, better led (and a reorganisation may well butterfly the spy into ineffectiveness), the RAF will survive long enough to develop a working set of tactics. The Japanese air production in 1942 was pitiful, the Empire can replace aircraft at a far greater rate.

On the ground, even with better troops the Japanese will advance, but it will be a lot more difficult and they will run out of supply (they almost did in OTL). With NA cleared, Malta becomes easier to support, so more naval forces go east. The big problem for Japan was that all their attacks were marginal, so any failure cascades. Since the Allies can then reinforce faster, the Japanese plans come apart.

Holding Singapore requires Sumatra, but given some extra time reinforcements can be sent.

Amen to all of this. And if there's anyone who knows what he's talking about on this...

Air power is key. Even a modest RAF presence in Malaya can make a world of difference. Because, as Astro and others point out, the Japanese were already at max capacity on logistics.

Look More Closely Later · Mar 20, 2015

Leadership?

Here's a possibility that has just occurred to me; what if in the summer of 1940 Lieutenant-General Percival goes down with something nasty (malaria, some other tropical condition/disease, attacked by a crocodile or jellyfish) that renders him unable to execute his duties, and Bernard Montgomery is sent out to replace him having said one wrong thing too many to the wrong person in the UK, and being effectively shuffled out to Malaya/Singapore to get him out of the way?
Would replacing Percival with Montgomery in autumn of 1940, without any notably large increases in men or equipment assigned to the theatre, be enough to ensure a more effective defence of Malaya than in the original timeline?

Zheng He · Mar 20, 2015

Astrodragon said:
Logistics
Logistics
And yet again, Logistics.

Logistics matter for the Allies as well and that is a huge problem from the standpoint of airpower. Too many people simply count airframes or look at the differences between the capabilities of the airframes instead of looking at the Allies' air defense system as a whole.

The Allies simply did not have the built up infrastructure in December 1941 to properly defend their exposed possessions in places like Malaya and the Philippines. Now, have a POD where Allied construction efforts are advanced about six to eight months and you probably have something going. Add in proper warning and air defenses. Maybe even have another POD where Dowding gets exiled to Malaya after the Battle of Britain and he sets about doing what he can establish a proper air defense system in Malaya.

I highly recommend this book - http://www.amazon.com/Fortnight-Inf...426887461&sr=8-1&keywords=fortnight+of+infamy it's not perfect and the author IMWO has too much man love for the supposedly superior capabilities of Japanese aircraft but overall he does an excellent job of highlighting just how infrastructure poor Allied air forces were in late 1941.

Zheng He · Mar 20, 2015

I recall reading that the Japanese Commander and his staff prior to attacking across the straights set up his command HQ in a Malay Princes palace knowing that despite being in range of British Artillery and that the British would know he was there that they would not shell the Palace!!!

I also read somewhere that British soldiers were forbidden from digging trenches on a golf course.