Bomber Command ends the War by Christmas 1944

[hammo1j]

The intention of Bomber Command under "Bomber" Harris was to bomb the Germans into submission. Ironically an opportunity existed for them to do this, but Harris' own inflexible nature prevented it from happening.

As Germany's territory reduced, no natural oil was available to it within its boundaries or via import. It had to rely on synthetic fuel plants (SFPs) that converted coal to petroleum products. Allied planners quickly realised this and after D day ordered the destruction of SFPs as the number one priority.

After D day the airforces (both RAF and USAAF) were less subjugated to overall command structure. Charles Portal was Harris' Commander and instructed him to carry out the directive. Harris, fixated on the idea that city destruction was the way forward, only partially carried out his instructions through deliberate disobediance and concentrated on the cities.

After the war German economic planners asked the question why the Allied bombing against SFP's was not pressed home. It was so effective that during 1944 a great deal of the army went back to horse transport and people like Speer suggested the whole German Army would have ground to a halt if the bombing had been more intense. Certainly there would have been insufficient fuel for the Battle of the Bulge offensive. There was general consensus in the German Planners that the war could have been over by Christmas.

Certainly we have to consider that:

1. It was not always suitable to attack SFP's all the time since the enemy could be ready and waiting if it knew your target in advance.
2. Troop support was a vital requirement in addition.
3. The effectiveness of SFP attacks could not be judged effectively without fuller knowledge of the German Economy than the Allies had. They would have to keep going on trust until the Wermacht was immobilized.
4. The weather might have not permitted bombing of sufficient precision to hit the SFPs.

In the strikes that were organized, the RAF dropped a similar tonnage to the USAAF in less operations but the larger UK bombs were more effective against the SFP's. The % effort from the RAF was between 6% and 25% of sorties and so could quite easily have been ramped up. It could have been simply achieved if Portal had the guts to fire Harris, but he was reluctant because Harris was an iconic figure to the Public.

Ironically Harris' city bombing policy damned Bomber Command in the eyes of the politicians and as well as a missed opportunity to be the heroes of the day turned Bomber Command into the unacceptable face of total war which was a great shame since the incredible bravery and skill of those who flew the missions was never properly recognised.

That aside how do forum members think things would have turned out on the ground if Harris had been sacked and Portal made probably Cochrane (a more imaginative commander) double BC's effort on the SFP's. Would the Soviets have got more territory if the Wermacht ground to a halt. Would Hitler have been deposed if there was no hope earlier on?

 

[merlin]

You pre-empted me - I was thinking of a sacking option thread for Harris.

There were two opportunities for Harris to go:

Over his intransigence regarding the addition of a dedicated Pathfinder Force, for more accurate bombing.

And as you say over the Point Blank directives. Unfortunately these were fudged, which enabled Harris to drive a 'coach-n-horses' through the get out clause of 'Morale'. Though how you were supposed to break the morale of a totalitarian state is anybodies guess!

Harris had built up Bomber Command during the time when it couldn't hit anything smaller than a city - and then it was better if it was on the coast or on a river. It became though, a force that was at times more accurate than the 8th Air Force was during daytime!

Harris had the idea, perhaps even obsession, that an 'Invasion' wouldn't be necessary - Bomber Command would do the job - wreck Germany.

With a different commander, more co-operation over targets with the US 8th Air Force could have taken place e.g. the ball-bearing factories day & night attacks.

What was important, was to effect the Germans ability to wage war, and defend themselves from attack; in that context it's irrelevent if the Cities are in rubble or not!

 

[Michele]

That aside how do forum members think things would have turned out on the ground if Harris had been sacked and Portal made probably Cochrane (a more imaginative commander) double BC's effort on the SFP's. Would the Soviets have got more territory if the Wermacht ground to a halt. Would Hitler have been deposed if there was no hope earlier on?

By mid-1944, the Soviets were being limited in their efforts at least as much by the German opposition as by logistical constraints and sheer distances. So a much faster outcome on the battlefield is not terribly likely.
A more determined and widespread coup on Hitler might be a possibility, if there's no fuel to go by late 1943, but I doubt that could be achieved.

 

[Michele]

You pre-empted me - I was thinking of a sacking option thread for Harris.

(...)

What was important, was to effect the Germans ability to wage war, and defend themselves from attack; in that context it's irrelevent if the Cities are in rubble or not!

But we should remember that curtailing their war industries' production would also contribute to curb their ability to wage war, and the unavailability of workers did affect that production.

 

[hammo1j]

Thanks for your responses

Merlin, I was actually inspired by re-reading Max "Hitler" Hastings book Bomber Command which is now available in a boxed set in some discount stores.

I agree with you on the low level marking techniques at night with Flares shot from a Mustang or Mosquito were very successful for the RAF and could have been used to great effect. Remember the Americans copied a lot of what Bomber Command did with B29's in the far east.

Michele, I agree that flattening cities does reduce the enemy's cabability to wage war. I myself have been de-housed through fire and that period of life was chaotic and not very productive. The argument that area bombing is ineffective is wrong - it meant that German industrial production never increased as rapidly as the allied production did. Effective does not mean decisive though and the Synthetic Oil Plants were an opportunity to bring a decisive end to the war.

I think that in this TL Himmler would have tried to negotiate a deal with the West around about November or so as he realised all was lost. A great deal of the defence in the East relied on the brilliance of the Germans in counter attacking at the right time and the fuel would not have been there for them to do it so the SU would move a lot faster.

 

[Michele]

There are three variables: time, intensity of the attacks, and target classes.

Time
Attacking before 1944 would have been possible, but not really decisive. Then, the first four months of 1944 had to be dedicated to the preparation of Overlord (by hitting the European rail network). The Allies could have kept hitting the oil industry in general, and the synth plants in particular, for longer – but the anti-transportation plan of the last three months of 1944 and early 1945 had its merits, when one considers it was the best way to affect all the German industries at the same time, which by then had begun drawing protection from dispersal and underground siting.
The one variation might have been diverting efforts from the "Battle of Berlin" in its final part, to the oil industry. This could have taken place in the first 2-3 months of 1944, while at the same time dedicating enough resources to the pre-invasion operations.
Extensive attempts in 1943 would have only served to warn the Germans that the Allies had understood the vulnerability of the oil industry and of the synth plants, allowing them to build up ground and air defenses, concentrate repair workers, possibly disperse the plants etc., all the while without doing enough damage that the germans couldn't repair in a short time.
So, as to time, the window of ideal opportunity remains roughly the same, at best it can be advanced two or three months.

Intensity
As you pointed out, Bomber Command could have easily dedicated more effort to these targets. In October-December 1944, with transportation the official priority target, Bomber Command was dropping 15% of the tonnage on those targets, 14% still on oil, and most of the rest on areas.
This is the easiest variable.

Target selection
The synth plants included 8 main hydrogenation plants produced most of the output, followed by 3 smaller hydrogenation plants and by a number of Fischer-Tropsch plants.
However, the Germans also extracted natural oil domestically, and imported more from Hungary and above all Romania; and had refinieries (some of the imported oil arrived refined, but not all; some crude was brought to German refineries).
Now, the OTL experience shows that the hydrogenation plants were the most vulnerable. They were easily discernible and virtually impossible to camouflage; they were few; they were large; they made use of more costly equipment and were thus harder to repair. Each ton of bombs dropped on these plants caused a production loss of 36 tons of production. On the contrary each ton of bombs dropped on crude refining plants caused a loss of 17 tons of production; and each bomb dropped on the Fischer-Tropsch plants caused a loss of 10 tons.
Note the hydrogenation plants were covering about 47% of the oil output available to Germany in may 1944; assuming no air attacks on the oil industry, this figure would have jumped much higher by September 1944, with the loss of Ploesti to ground operations.
So, it would seem the obvious way to go would be to intensify and continue the bombing of these key plants; they were the oil equivalent of the Schweinfurt ball bearings, the exposed bottleneck.
For starters, there is a law of diminishing returns at work. These plants were producing on average 316,000 tons per month in the first four months of 1944; this was already down to 107,000 in June (!), and to a puny 17,000 (!!) in September. More attacks in this time frame might have brought this down to 5,000 in August, maybe, but not much better. It should be pointed out that the decrease in attacks after September allowed this figure to climb up to 72,000 tons in November, so if there is an effort to be done here, it is in continuing the offensive unabated in the fall and winter of 1944.
But there is one more catch; most of what the hydrogenation plants were producing was aviation gas, for the very simple reason that it was easier to produce it with that process (at some of those plants, depending on the raw materials used) than in any other way. So in 1944, the hydrogenation plants produced 996,000 tons of avgas, 318,000 tons of diesel, 293,000 tons of motor gas, and 268,000 tons of other petroleum products.
Note that those 996,000 tons of avgas were about 99% of the total german avgas production.

So a determined, continuing effort against those plants would not have entirely stopped the Heer and Waffen-SS (even though it would have contributed to reducing their fuel stocks); it would have entirely stopped the Luftwaffe – almost (with the exception that jet aircraft did not use avgas).

 

[hammo1j]

The one variation might have been diverting efforts from the "Battle of Berlin" in its final part, to the oil industry. This could have taken place in the first 2-3 months of 1944, while at the same time dedicating enough resources to the pre-invasion operations.
Extensive attempts in 1943 would have only served to warn the Germans that the Allies had understood the vulnerability of the oil industry and of the synth plants, allowing them to build up ground and air defenses, concentrate repair workers, possibly disperse the plants etc., all the while without doing enough damage that the germans couldn't repair in a short time.
So, as to time, the window of ideal opportunity remains roughly the same, at best it can be advanced two or three months.

In Response to your reply, Michele.

We now know that the Battle of Berlin was Harris's vainglorious attempt to win the war on its own costing Bomber command thousands of deaths.

It is interesting to compare to LeMays assault on Tokyo employing the same tactics of incendiaries against civilian populations for which he is now lauded.

 

[jlckansas]

Hitting the electrical grid is easier and affects all of the industries, military and civilian related industries. Without power they cannot run any of the industries including the SFP units at any level that helps them.

 

[Bougnas]

Over his intransigence regarding the addition of a dedicated Pathfinder Force, for more accurate bombing.

Eg the Mosquito spam proposals?

 

[hammo1j]

Hitting the electrical grid is easier and affects all of the industries, military and civilian related industries. Without power they cannot run any of the industries including the SFP units at any level that helps them.

Interesting as this is what Putin tried against Ukraine, but he has not succeeded.

I suppose the difference might be Nazi Germany was the aggressor nation.

 

[jlckansas]

Interesting as this is what Putin tried against Ukraine, but he has not succeeded.

I suppose the difference might be Nazi Germany was the aggressor nation.

There is no comparison between Bomber Command and the 8th and 15th Air Forces hitting Germany and what the Russians are attacking the Ukraine with. IIRC one good days bombing by the US in day and UK at night is way more than the Russians have attacked the Ukraine with so far.

 

[hammo1j]

Another point of interest was the LeMay made his decision to fire bomb Tokyo a month after bomber command destroyed Dresden in February 1945.

His bombing of Tokyo in in March, 1945 is regarded as one of the significant acts in defeating Japan, yet the bombing of Dresden is regarded as an act of unparalleled savagery.

It's well known that the B29s flying low over Tokyo could smell burning pork.

 

[hammo1j]

There is no comparison between Bomber Command and the 8th and 15th Air Forces hitting Germany and what the Russians are attacking the Ukraine with. IIRC one good days bombing by the US in day and UK at night is way more than the Russians have attacked the Ukraine with so far.

The Russians can't hit the Ukrainian military and it's well known. They have gone after civilian targets and civilian infrastructure.

Also remember the 8th Air Force in Europe were not always attacking precision targets indeed because of the bad weather there was more terror bombing than they wanted.

In March 1945 over a thousand US bombers attacked Berlin with the pure intention of using terror to stop the war.

Strange that in Japan Lemay's b29s carried out a similar terror attack in March 1945 against Toyko killing 150,000 civilians.

This can't be a coincidence. Surely there must have been orders from the top that the war should be prosecuted in order to save American lives.

But none of this is ever mentioned in history. It's purely that Bomber command was responsible for indiscriminately attacking civilians

 

[merlin]

Strange that in Japan Lemay's b29s carried out a similar terror attack in March 1945 against Toyko killing 150,000 civilians.

Lemay's B-29s had big problems bombing as per their design, because of the high winds at altitude - bomb aiming with any accuracy was well nigh impossible. The next problem was that in Japan, so much manufacturing was sub-contracted to small workshops. They already had the example of what was happening over Germany where bombing with incendiaries burnt out areas.
In Japan there was a two-fold difference - 1st - the houses were not so robust and very flammable, and 2nd the B-29s didn't just use incendiaries - they used napalm!

 

[Garrison]

Bomber Command can cripple Germany by targeting the synthetic oil and transport infrastructure, but I doubt they can deliver a true knock out blow.

 

[ric350]

Also remember that the real success of the US daylight bombing wasn’t destruction of factories, it was the destruction of the Luftwaffe as a fighting force (especially loss of pilots).

ric350

 

[hammo1j]

The Russians can't hit the Ukrainian military and it's well known. They have gone after civilian targets and civilian infrastructure.

Lemay's B-29s had big problems bombing as per their design, because of the high winds at altitude - bomb aiming with any accuracy was well nigh impossible. The next problem was that in Japan, so much manufacturing was sub-contracted to small workshops. They already had the example of what was happening over Germany where bombing with incendiaries burnt out areas.
In Japan there was a two-fold difference - 1st - the houses were not so robust and very flammable, and 2nd the B-29s didn't just use incendiaries - they used napalm!

Don't you think in Germany most of manufacturing was contracted out to small businesses?

Yes, they used the M69 cluster which was full of napalm. Much better than the magnesium the RAF used

 

[hammo1j]

Bomber Command can cripple Germany by targeting the synthetic oil and transport infrastructure, but I doubt they can deliver a true knock out blow.

And roundabout October 1945. They did go after the synthetic oil.

Bomber commands bigger bombs started to make a big difference at that point, but the advantage was never pushed.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

One small change I have seen proposed (and actually trailed in the Wing that Cheshire Commanded with statistical success) was to remove some or all of the turrets.

This made the Lancaster now lighter marginally faster meaning it spent less time in enemy airspace and was therefore marginally less likely to be detected and intercepted

And in the hard and cruel grotesque math of WW2 having fewer crew on the aircraft meant fewer casualties when one was lost.

 

[hammo1j]

I think that may be Freeman Dyson too, though his friend made a contribution that he successfully introduced a bigger forward escape hatch on the Lancaster.