Biological weapons in the Cold War

[Mike D]

Assuming a non-nuclear world (or at least a non-nuclear war, for whatever reason), how would western Europe/North America have coped with a biological attack in the 1950s/60s?

Looking at Wiki, the USSR apparently weaponised eleven diseases, the most well known of which would appear to be Anthrax, Smallpox and Plague (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_biological_weapons_program).

Plague is apparently very responsive to antibiotic treatment but is famously contagious.

Anthrax isn't contagious but requires early treatment with antibiotics as well as decontamination of anything belonging to the victim which could have been infected with spores.

Smallpox would have been on the decline (wiped out?) in NATO countries by the 1950s and there was (I believe) widespread vaccination against the disease which would succeed in virtually destroying smallpox 'in the wild' by the 1970s so may not have been something that would have been as much of a worry as Plague (which comes with 1,000 years or more of folk memory on top of any genuine medical concerns).

Could an outbreak (especially in one of the major cities) be isolated quickly enough to prevent a major outbreak? Does the modern immune system/diet/lifestyle/healthcare make Plague less of a killer than it was to 14th Century peasants? Would the Soviets have been willing to risk the potential for 'blowback' (ie disease spreading from the west back to the Rodina)?

 

[Crowbar Six]

A biological attack organised by a nation state or well funded terrorist group would be unlikely to start in a single city. More likely would be an attack centred on multiple cities and in particular areas with high footfall such as airports, train and bus stations, public transport etc all occuring within a limited period. I suspect that one of the indicators for such an attack rather than an outbreak is whether it started in a single location or in multiple locations simultaneously.

The Soviet anthrax strains, as I understand it, were deliberately "toughened" to stand up to common antibiotics and many disinfectants. Much the same would happen with any offensive biological, there is no point with using a normal strain of Smallpox if the target population was immunised, it would only make sense as a weapon if vaccinated individuals were vulnerable to the new strain. That in itself would be a likely give away that you were dealing with a weaponised strain. The opposition would need to carry out defensive immunisation, however if a nation state started to suddenly re-vaccinate their populations someone would notice, even the WHO would think something was up and no doubt enemy intelligence agencies would find some way to acquire samples of the new vaccine at which point the game would be up.

 

[marathag]

A non-nuclear world means that WWIII would have started shortly after WWII, so little time for a Soviet Bio program to be developed.

 

[CarribeanViking]

In Paxman and Harris' A Higher Form of Killing, their jointly written history of biological and chemical weapons, they describe tests carried out by Porton Down to find out exactly that- releases of contagious but essentially harmless bacteria to see how far and how fast an infection could spread, and be spread.

Essentially they carried out dummy biological warfare attacks of their own, on the UK; the Americans did similar things to New York- and the results are not encouraging. Plagues spread very rapidly through a mobile population; commuters become disease vectors almost instantly.

Public places, railway stations, airports, subways, use something with an incubation period and most of the population will be affected before anyone even realized there was an attack underway. Early warning none, resistance against cultivated battle strains minimal.

Forensic analysis afterwards would reveal the nature of the attack, though, which is a sufficient reason not to do it- retaliation, likely by nuclear means.

What modern methods exist to monitor and guard such targets, don't know but I hope that there are some, because anyone sufficiently looney not to care about retaliation could do a hell of a lot of damage.

 

[Remitonov]

A non-nuclear world means that WWIII would have started shortly after WWII, so little time for a Soviet Bio program to be developed.

All that while the US debriefs Unit 731... :V

 

[Download]

Generally speaking when you weaponize a disease you want it to be resistant to vaccines and possibly antibiotics.

 

[galveston bay]

I always thought the best way to attack the United States was via Mexico. Start massive pandemics there and let fleeing populations do the rest.

As this is a ruthless total war we are discussing the fact that Mexico is no threat to the Soviet Union is completely irrelevant. A massive biological attack (using agents is the best approach) would not only effectively destroy that nation fairly quickly in terms of effective government, but destroy its economy and eliminate a major oil supplier to the United States, while refugees will almost certainly make into the United States.

Meanwhile the US has a massive potentially catastrophic crisis on its southern border and it is possible it will take a while for the CDC and USAMRID to figure out patient zero (or multiple patient zeroes) delaying effective retaliation

Or perhaps if the Soviets are lucky preventing retaliation at all

Another possible attack strategy is instead of human attack vectors focusing instead on animals

Specifically, Hoof and Mouth disease is not endemic to the US nor is it found in nature. Occasional scares over the last few decades have occurred. For the most part North American cattle and horses are not vaccinated against it. It is highly contigeous and deadly as hell.

Wiping out vast numbers of North American cattle would have a definite impact on the US economy and food supply

 

[CalBear]

Done properly biological weapons are impossible to defend against.

While some of the old stand-bys are readily treatable now, that wasn't the case in the 1950s. As an example the big guns against anthrax are quinolones, specifically Ciprofloxacin (which wasn't developed until the 1980s) and Doxycycline (1967). There was a finite amount of penicillin and Streptomycin available, not enough to treat a mass event.

There is also the rather depressing ease that resistant strains of many mass infectious diseases can be developed. The very rapid life cycle of bacteria allows for selective breeding that can result in resistance to antibiotics, even ALL antibiotics. This was possible by the late 1940s, with major programs in place in most major countries by the mid-1950s. By the mid 1960s there are pretty reliable open source investigative reports indicating that the Soviets had a weaponized version of Smallpox that differed sufficiently from the natural specimen that available immunizations would be entirely ineffective (and that was just one of the witch's brew that came out of the active weapons programs).

They are incredibly inexpensive (some open source figures back in the 1980s put the price-tag per fatality with a bio-weapon are under $0.02 meaning you could kill hypothetically every single human in North America for under $25 million dollars (adjusting for inflation) or, for those who like to think big, around $500 million for the entire human species once you had a program set up.

What prevents some small state (say the DPRK since they are usually used as the example of Madman in charge) from going all in with biological weapons is the reality that nuclear retribution would be swift and unstoppable, probably including attacks from countries that were not directly impacted, just to mark every future madman's calendar.

Now, for the REALLY fun thought. Tech has advanced so far that a small team of experts, working for a NGO like Da'esh or AQAP, could engineer something really nasty in a could years. There is a non-zero possibility that one or two individuals working in a wildcat lab, using off the shelf equipment could pull it off...

Ya.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Now, for the REALLY fun thought. Tech has advanced so far that a small team of experts, working for a NGO like Da'esh or AQAP, could engineer something really nasty in a could years. There is a non-zero possibility that one or two individuals working in a wildcat lab, using off the shelf equipment could pull it off...

Heck, there are persistent rumors that Biopreparat managed too, in the 1970s or 80s, cook up something that can best be described as "Ebolapox". According to the rumors, it's exactly what it sounds like.

 

[ltdanjuly10]

Heck, there are persistent rumors that Biopreparat managed too, in the 1970s or 80s, cook up something that can best be described as "Ebolapox". According to the rumors, it's exactly what it sounds like.

I've read that they tried to aerosolize AIDS but were unsuccessful. If that is true, then it is indicative of institutional insanity on their part.

Then there is this den of nightmares: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_bioweapon

 

[CalBear]

Heck, there are persistent rumors that Biopreparat managed too, in the 1970s or 80s, cook up something that can best be described as "Ebolapox". According to the rumors, it's exactly what it sounds like.

Of course they were backed by the Soviet government, with its vast resources.

What is seriously worrisome is that one no longer requires the entire Soviet state, or any real national infrastructure to speak of, to play in this game. Need a few really clever folks with Master's in the right subject and some money (and not all that much). Also, as noted, there is a non zero chance that a couple individuals, working on their own, could cook something up in the garage.

 

[elektro]

Was it the Soviet doctrine to use biologicals in isolation? I had always thought they were designed to heap on the death and suffering when the nukes fly (you would think 20x overkill would be enough...). I mean, dealing with a bio agent is bad enough, but if you are trying to do it when >90% of your medical facilities, health care staff and pharmaceutical manufacturing/storage are atomized then it rapidly becomes untenable.

The big problem with bio warfare is the lack of control. Developing "ebolapox" as a state actor is all fine and good but you aren't going to be able to limit it spread to just your targets; its going to come back around to bite you. I agree with Calbear that the real concern is from non state actors. I'd argue that the really scary techniques, like building a synthetic viral genome, aren't quite at the DYI/garage level yet but certainly within the next couple decades. A lot scarier than nuclear proliferation IMO.

 

[Unalist]

In the 50-60s the Soviets had not developed all of those agents. An in depth history of the Soviet program goes very far back but actually doesn't expand much until after the treaty in 72.

In the 50-60s the undisputed King of Biological Warfare is the United States.

 

[marathag]

In the 50-60s the Soviets had not developed all of those agents. An in depth history of the Soviet program goes very far back but actually doesn't expand much until after the treaty in 72.

In the 50-60s the undisputed King of Biological Warfare is the United States.

handwave away the Bomb, some of that two Billion for the Manhattan Project gets spent at Camp Detrick and the plant at Terre Haute

 

[RamscoopRaider]

Of course they were backed by the Soviet government, with its vast resources.

What is seriously worrisome is that one no longer requires the entire Soviet state, or any real national infrastructure to speak of, to play in this game. Need a few really clever folks with Master's in the right subject and some money (and not all that much). Also, as noted, there is a non zero chance that a couple individuals, working on their own, could cook something up in the garage.

It might already be here. I think a journalist with no real training in the field was able to essentially replicate the Spanish Flu a few years back

I've also heard a possibly apocryphal story a few years back. Supposedly at a conference a group from a small lab presented on how to make a disease that ignores the human immune system. When they finished teams from larger labs said essentially "We knew how to do that for two years but we weren't dumb enough to tell anyone about it."

If the story is true, it suggests that people in the business are worried about this

 

[sloreck]

Let me just say that bio is way scarier than chemicals or nukes. The ability to use even standard unmodified diseases is pretty scary. The readily available technology now makes this even worse. I can state authoritatively that dealing with this nightmare made senior military medical planners scared shitless - and as far as I know still is that lingering nightmare in the back of the mind.

I can give you scenarios where a particularly nasty disease with ready human to human transmission (no need for vectors or close contact like HIV) could be introduced to the USA or any western country without the finger being pointed to anyone in particular.

The thing about biowarfare is how to keep it from rebounding on yourself, especially if you use it tactically.

 

[Just a Rube]

The big strategic problem with bioweapons is that they essentially have no use other than genocide.

Whereas a nuke will wipe out essentially anything it hits right away (so you could launch a decapitation strike, or target a military formation and take immediate advantage), and a chemical weapon on an unprepared enemy formation can likewise incapacitate them almost instantly, a bioweapon with any utility has an incubation period (since if it acts right away, you only hit the people immediately exposed, who you could target just as easily with a vanilla bomb in the same spot).

Add in that you presumably don't want to infect your own troops/people (so you can't just drop it on something like the Atlantic Wall, wait a week for it to work, and then invade), thus you can't really use it tactically at all. It's worth noting that the Japanese bioattacks killed quite a few people, but affected the military situation not one bit.

So, they probably get developed, maybe used as a deterrent in a MAD-like scenario, but probably don't get used.

 

[elektro]

I've also heard a possibly apocryphal story a few years back. Supposedly at a conference a group from a small lab presented on how to make a disease that ignores the human immune system. When they finished teams from larger labs said essentially "We knew how to do that for two years but we weren't dumb enough to tell anyone about it."

If the story is true, it suggests that people in the business are worried about this

I don't think there is anyway to mask an infectious agent completely from the immune system; its been around a long time and its whole raison d'etre is to catalogue and respond to non-self agents. That being said, the process takes time and if the agent is virulent enough the organism dies before immunity occurs. Confusing or impairing the immune system is fairly easy; shifting the viral surface proteins of something like influenza is doable and basically you're replicating the process by which pandemics arise.

Silver lining is that there is a lot of variability in the immune system and some proportion of the population will be immune. Even something like HIV, where a single virion is enough to infect someone, has a group of people with innate immunity due to a CCR5 mutation.

Let me just say that bio is way scarier than chemicals or nukes. The ability to use even standard unmodified diseases is pretty scary. The readily available technology now makes this even worse. I can state authoritatively that dealing with this nightmare made senior military medical planners scared shitless - and as far as I know still is that lingering nightmare in the back of the mind.

I can give you scenarios where a particularly nasty disease with ready human to human transmission (no need for vectors or close contact like HIV) could be introduced to the USA or any western country without the finger being pointed to anyone in particular.

The thing about biowarfare is how to keep it from rebounding on yourself, especially if you use it tactically.

Agreed. Honestly, there isn't really a way to defend against it in anyway that is socially or economically feasible.

Interestingly, I'd argue that we are more susceptible to a BW attack now than back in the 50-60s with the ease of travel and availability of advanced genetic and molecular tools.

 

[RamscoopRaider]

I don't think there is anyway to mask an infectious agent completely from the immune system; its been around a long time and its whole raison d'etre is to catalogue and respond to non-self agents. That being said, the process takes time and if the agent is virulent enough the organism dies before immunity occurs. Confusing or impairing the immune system is fairly easy; shifting the viral surface proteins of something like influenza is doable and basically you're replicating the process by which pandemics arise.

Silver lining is that there is a lot of variability in the immune system and some proportion of the population will be immune. Even something like HIV, where a single virion is enough to infect someone, has a group of people with innate immunity due to a CCR5 mutation.

Agreed. Honestly, there isn't really a way to defend against it in anyway that is socially or economically feasible.

Interestingly, I'd argue that we are more susceptible to a BW attack now than back in the 50-60s with the ease of travel and availability of advanced genetic and molecular tools.

From what little I recall the idea of masking the Viral agent from the immune system by modifying the protien coat so that absent mutations not taken into account, the immune system coulld not recognize the virus as foreign

 

[ppaul16]

The big strategic problem with bioweapons is that they essentially have no use other than genocide.

Whereas a nuke will wipe out essentially anything it hits right away (so you could launch a decapitation strike, or target a military formation and take immediate advantage), and a chemical weapon on an unprepared enemy formation can likewise incapacitate them almost instantly, a bioweapon with any utility has an incubation period (since if it acts right away, you only hit the people immediately exposed, who you could target just as easily with a vanilla bomb in the same spot).

Add in that you presumably don't want to infect your own troops/people (so you can't just drop it on something like the Atlantic Wall, wait a week for it to work, and then invade), thus you can't really use it tactically at all. It's worth noting that the Japanese bioattacks killed quite a few people, but affected the military situation not one bit.

So, they probably get developed, maybe used as a deterrent in a MAD-like scenario, but probably don't get used.

MAD only works when both parties have something to lose. Bio-weapons are much scarier than nuclear weapons in my opinion. It is more feasible for terrorist groups to develop and use them.