IX: On the Shore Dimly Seen
The escalating conflict in Libya combined with the news of the destruction of the Libyan oil infrastructure had been forcing the nations of Western Europe closer and closer into having to do
something. Calls between Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy had been increasing more and more, with the apparent lack of any kind of explicit intervention by the United States, but the news on June 11th merely escalated the calls in terms of what had to be done. Any kind of allies for an intervention in Libya led by France and the United Kingdom were highly limited, with Germany, Italy, and Spain having no wish to find themselves involved in the conflict. With the considerations and restraint placed upon the aspect of 'hard power' for both states, they were primarily focused on exerting what they had in soft power in order to try and bring the conflict to a close as soon as they could.
From where the United Kingdom and France had just started to push more on diplomatic means for a cessation of the conflict, the United States had been engaging in such means since the Russian veto of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970. The veto of the resolution had struck against the general support of intervening in what was still then the 'Libyan Civil War', but Secretary Clinton would continue to push towards influencing what there was for the removal of Gaddafi. The back-to-back Egyptian declarations of intervention combined with the Algerian response, would only cement Clinton's position, and the United States would begin focusing on the removal of Gaddafi by shortening the what was now the 'North African War' as soon as it could be. For Egypt, the case was arguably simple in terms of supporting them, while for Libya and Algeria it was of a more complicated state. Libya was arguably as close as diplomacy could take it, but it was Algeria where the diplomatic efforts of the United States could pay off.
In regards to United States and Algerian foreign relations, it was primarily focused directly on the economic component with slightly less than one-quarter of all total Algerian exports heading to the United States [1]. The total combined trade between the United States and Algeria in 2010 totaled nearly sixteen billion USD [2], of which more than 90% consisted of US imports from Algeria (primarily liquid natural gas (LNG) and crude oil products). In addition to the combined trade, roughly 2.3 billion dollars in American foreign direct investment (FDI) existed in Algeria primarily focused in the hydrocarbon sector. For Algeria, the hydrocarbon sector of its economy made up the engine of the economy, with roughly two thirds of public earnings, more than one third of gross domestic product (GDP), and nearly the entirety of export earning coming from the hydrocarbon sector [3]. The sheer size of the reserves for Algeria were nothing to scoff at, with Algeria ranking tenth in the world for natural gas reserves and sixteenth in the world for crude oil reserves [4].
For the United States, the focal point that would emerge would be the removal of Algeria's forces from Libya and an end to their direct commitment in the war. What would arguably be emphasized in the negotiations was the 'carrot and stick' approach in part because of the US's position. The 'carrot' approach was emphasized toward Algeria's long delayed joining with the World Trade Organization (WTO), which had been underway since 1987 (a record of twenty-four years). The 'stick' approach was emphasized by the use of sanctions against Algeria targeting its petrochemical sector, which arguably would be disastrous if the US halted all imports from Algeria. Throughout April and May, extensive negotiations took place between the United States and Algeria with a slowly growing threat of using the 'stick' as Algeria continued the movement of forces into Libya. The meatgrinder that was the Third Battle of Benghazi, combined with the news of the destruction of the Libyan oil infrastructure had started to drastically shift the expectations within Algeria as you began to see a divide emerge between the military and President Bouteflika. The support for Libya had been pushed by Bouteflika, and with the growing losses suffered by Algeria combined with the issues the war was imposing had started to see the military push back in an earnest for them to withdraw. Combined with the threats of the stick and the 'appeal' of the carrot, would see an eventual announcement by Algeria on June 15th announcing their immediate withdrawal from Libya.
The announcement of Algeria's withdraw caught many off-guard, including the United Kingdom, France, and Egypt. For Algeria, the cost they had suffered in terms of their forces committed had been represented heavily in terms of their ground forces. Of nearly two brigades in the fight, their armored brigade that had been committed had suffered major casualties as a fighting formation, while their infantry brigade suffered less in that; combined, they had suffered nearly 7,800 casualties in all of a total combined strength of nearly 13,000. In terms of air losses, they had lost three MiG-29s and a pair of Su-27s, nearly a third of the aircraft that had been committed to the fight. For President Bouteflika, he did think that the losses did serve the purposes that were needed with the effective destruction of the Libyan oil infrastructure and likely lasting impact for any kind of Egyptian influence upon Libya due to it. For Gaddafi, he found himself in a state of anger at the Algerian withdraw, but that Libya could survive it alone against Egypt. The removal of Algeria from the war had essentially cemented control of the skies to Egypt and the amount of time that Libya had left against Egypt was ticking down.
The effects of the United States to not involve itself militarily in Libya would come to head on June 26th. Carrier Strike Group 12 (CSG) centered around the supercarrier
USS Enterprise, was on its way back to the United States following a deployment to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Nearly two hundred and twelve nautical miles northeast of Tripoli, the CSG maintained a combat air patrol (CAP) of two pairs of F/A-18 Hornets alongside a single E-2 Hawkeye. At 11:21 local time, the E-2C detected four MiG-23 Floggers taking off from airbases nearby Tripoli heading northeast, arguably on an intercept course towards the CSG. It was unknown whether the aircraft were dedicated purely for air superiority and aimed towards the CSG or not. The CAP was moved to hold along the southern axis of the Carrier Strike Group purely as the 'barrier combat air patrol' (BARCAP) before they could move into strike range. By 12:00 local time, the four Floggers reached the maximum engagement range of the CAP; it would only decrease as they closed. By 12:10 local time, transmissions from the CAP were to 'disengage' and turn away. There was no response.
For the CAP, in the event of a threat to the carrier or their aircraft, they were authorized to engage. The question was if the Libyan fighters would break off or not. They continued to close. By 12:24 local time, the four Floggers had lit up their radars as they continued to close. At 12:25:31, the second of the two F/A-18C Hornets from VFA-11 detected a targeting lock by one of the MiG-23 Floggers. After a quick alert sent to the flight lead, he would say at 12:25:57 that the pair of Hornets were engaging the Floggers. Two AIM-120C AMRAAMs ripped away from each aircraft, bound towards the lead MiG-23 Floggers. It was roughly a distance of twenty-four nautical miles, which would take around one minute for an intercept. The lead Flogger would fire a single AA-7 Apex AAM, with the rest of the formation unable to do anything. The lead Flogger found itself struck first, with the first AMRAAM missing and the second hitting directly on, destroying the Flogger; his wingman would be followed with the first AMRAAM hitting home, and the second striking the wreckage. By this time, the follow-on pair of Floggers had fired two AA-7 Apex AAMs each at the Hornets.
The pair of F/A-18C Hornets on CAP with their beyond visual range AAMs expended had reversed course while the second pair of Hornets from VFA-11 closed in for an engagement at near maximum range. Taking nearly two minutes to reach the target, each Hornet would fire two AIM-120C AMRAAMs aimed at the remaining pair of Floggers. For the first pair of the Hornets, they were stuck on the defensive as the Apex missiles closed on them. The first two missed the wingman flying in the number two position, but for the lead, luck was not with him. The first one was successfully evaded, but the second detonated close to the aircraft, tearing through the port engine and wing. The pilot would be forced to eject from his Hornet due to the damage, while the AMRAAMs continued to close on the Libyan fighters. The remaining pair of Libyan Floggers would again meet the same fate as the first pair did.
The engagement in the skies over the Mediterranean had left five fighters destroyed, four Libyan MiG-23 Floggers and a single American F/A-18C Hornet. The attack on American fighters could not stand especially with the death of a serviceman (the shot down pilot would not be found in the Mediterranean and presumed killed in action), would find itself being reported by the White House in a press conference by Press Secretary Jay Carney. It would only take less than a single day as demands for intervention raged within Congress and the American public, nearly three months after the White House had tried to push for the same thing only to find it vetoed in the United Nations...
[1] To be more precise, 24.24% of all Algerian exports were destined towards the United States.
[World Bank]
[2] The total combined trade was at 15,712.3 million USD, of which 1,194.3 million consisted of US exports to Algeria, and 14,518 million consisted of US imports from Algeria.
[Census]
[3] 69% of public earnings, 36% of GDP, and 92% of export earnings came from the hydrocarbon sector.
[FAS]
[4] 707 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 5.7 billion barrels of oil can be recovered.
[EIA]
