Bigger British army in France in 1939?

[TriangleUR]

Have seen a lot of good threads on improving a particular aspect of equipment, doctrine etc. But what if the BEF in WW2 was no better, but just bigger. How much bigger would it have to have been to make a difference?

For the sake of argument, some assumptions:

-Due to a few small butterflies flapping by the mid-20s the British political establishment, and to some extent the public, comes to take a slightly more positive view of the army's performance in the first world war. A bit less "Lions lead by donkeys", and a bit more along the lines "they might have cocked it up to start with but by God they got stuck in by the end".

-This doesn't make much difference for a while but somehow keeps the idea of a substantial continental intervention force as a requirement in war-planning, even if it is often not really resourced properly for it for much of the period.

-Then in the 30s the British start building capability to the point of being able to deploy a significantly larger force to France if war breaks out. This comes at the expense of spending a bit less on naval or strategic air assets and perhaps on some civil policy items.

-Assuming that this doesn't spark any fortuitous additional improvements in kit, small-unit tactics or combined arms technique; just a much bigger BEF available as war breaks out.

-Another, and fairly big, assumption is that this buildup is gradual enough not to much change the perception of other powers of relative fighting strengths.

-Also assume that it can't be deployed in time to take part in time to save Poland or Norway, but can be largely ready (no doubt with some minor shortages of particular specialist kit but no more proportionally than the OTL BEF) in time to fight in France.

The question is, how big would this hypothetical BEF have to be to make a difference (if employed in a way that doesn't require hindsight)?

 

[Garrison]

Have seen a lot of good threads on improving a particular aspect of equipment, doctrine etc. But what if the BEF in WW2 was no better, but just bigger. How much bigger would it have to have been to make a difference?

For the sake of argument, some assumptions:

-Due to a few small butterflies flapping by the mid-20s the British political establishment, and to some extent the public, comes to take a slightly more positive view of the army's performance in the first world war. A bit less "Lions lead by donkeys", and a bit more along the lines "they might have cocked it up to start with but by God they got stuck in by the end".

-This doesn't make much difference for a while but somehow keeps the idea of a substantial continental intervention force as a requirement in war-planning, even if it is often not really resourced properly for it for much of the period.

-Then in the 30s the British start building capability to the point of being able to deploy a significantly larger force to France if war breaks out. This comes at the expense of spending a bit less on naval or strategic air assets and perhaps on some civil policy items.

-Assuming that this doesn't spark any fortuitous additional improvements in kit, small-unit tactics or combined arms technique; just a much bigger BEF available as war breaks out.

-Another, and fairly big, assumption is that this buildup is gradual enough not to much change the perception of other powers of relative fighting strengths.

-Also assume that it can't be deployed in time to take part in time to save Poland or Norway, but can be largely ready (no doubt with some minor shortages of particular specialist kit but no more proportionally than the OTL BEF) in time to fight in France.

The question is, how big would this hypothetical BEF have to be to make a difference (if employed in a way that doesn't require hindsight)?

I have a link to the order of battle for the operations in France, helps show just how much bigger the French and German forces were than the BEF. A stronger BEF would certainly be useful though I doubt its going to change the outcome.

Order of battle for the Battle of France - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[marathag]

I could see a larger BEF, but it wouldn't be as motorized.
That may be a good thing, to keep them from going into Belgium

 

[HexWargamer]

...
That may be a good thing, to keep them from going into Belgium

I'm betting that won't be an option. The 'plan' is to go in and that's what will be done (little of the French army is motorised and they managed to march in alongside us). BUT they may well move slower and that could mean the infantry has a chance to dig in at the rear as the motorised divisions run into the Germans ... which has the effect of 'fixing them in place' even more firmly ....

Then a bigger British army = fewer French in Belgium, might still get cut off, might still end up at Dunkirk ... but more of those being taken off will be British (rather than 'free french') ...
HOWEVER it's possible that this means the French will have up to, say 10 divisions 'in reserve' .... this might be enough to launch a counter attack in an effort to cut off the Nazi armored spearhead from their supply chain ... of course as this develops the panzers will be ordered to halt and then swing back south/east ...
That in turn might mean the pressure is off Dunkirk and even more troops get away ..
Other butterflies might be less positive == with a bigger British army, more British aircraft might be sent to be lost in France ....

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I'd vote for a more effective BEF. One that could really bloody Kliests nose at Arras, or actually destroy bridges on the Meause River. Size is good, but whats the point if capability does not improve.

 

[TriangleUR]

Might be worth offering a few scenarios? How about:
1) The BEF is a significantly bigger but not too different, say 6 additional ready (motorised) divisions. These add to the concentration within the OTL British area of operations, with no significant changes to French deployments.

Is this enough to do anything useful?

2) Much bigger BEF. Perhaps about 3x or so more powerful. In addition to the OTL forces, -12 or so additional partially motorised infantry divisions left behind roughly on the Belgian border for final training 90%+ ready for action as a reserve.
-An additional powerful mobile element that can swan off towards Breda in place of the 7th Army, letting that stay in reserve.

It seems like this could be enough to tip the scales, but of course depends if either the much stronger French reserve can do what's needed quickly enough, or if the BEF reserves can possibly be moved into position in time to do something useful.

3. The silly option. All efforts have been devoted to being able to build a big army, aiming to match the scale of the great war. It is felt that part of the problem with ww1 was sending too small a force and not enacting conscription soon enough, (as well as tactical and equipment issues which they feel they have largely fixed..). Including conscription at home and massively increased recruitment across the empire, around 50 divisions of infantry are deployed by spring 1940. This time they aim to do the great war again but better, with the hundred days offensive as their inspiration (with some ideas, not necessarily right, about how to improve this using new technology). They might in part lack for motorisation but they have a lot of numbers, good artillery and a surprising number of infantry tanks (some better than others!). They don't have many bombers but quite a chunk of fighter command is sent over with them.

In this (admittedly silly) case I'd expect they would have a lot of input into Anglo-French strategy. Where would the division of responsibilities be? Would the German attack, coinciding with an agressive allied advance at the same time, bog down and shatter, or would the ungainly mass of extra divisions just end up being completely out-flanked anyway?

 

[Garrison]

I'd vote for a more effective BEF. One that could really bloody Kliests nose at Arras, or actually destroy bridges on the Meause River. Size is good, but whats the point if capability does not improve.

I am currently working on something that includes a better BEF, hopefully coming to a TL near you soon.

 

[Admiral Bloonbeard]

Have seen a lot of good threads on improving a particular aspect of equipment, doctrine etc. But what if the BEF in WW2 was no better, but just bigger. How much bigger would it have to have been to make a difference?

For the sake of argument, some assumptions:

-Due to a few small butterflies flapping by the mid-20s the British political establishment, and to some extent the public, comes to take a slightly more positive view of the army's performance in the first world war. A bit less "Lions lead by donkeys", and a bit more along the lines "they might have cocked it up to start with but by God they got stuck in by the end".

-This doesn't make much difference for a while but somehow keeps the idea of a substantial continental intervention force as a requirement in war-planning, even if it is often not really resourced properly for it for much of the period.

-Then in the 30s the British start building capability to the point of being able to deploy a significantly larger force to France if war breaks out. This comes at the expense of spending a bit less on naval or strategic air assets and perhaps on some civil policy items.

-Assuming that this doesn't spark any fortuitous additional improvements in kit, small-unit tactics or combined arms technique; just a much bigger BEF available as war breaks out.

-Another, and fairly big, assumption is that this buildup is gradual enough not to much change the perception of other powers of relative fighting strengths.

-Also assume that it can't be deployed in time to take part in time to save Poland or Norway, but can be largely ready (no doubt with some minor shortages of particular specialist kit but no more proportionally than the OTL BEF) in time to fight in France.

The question is, how big would this hypothetical BEF have to be to make a difference (if employed in a way that doesn't require hindsight)?

Royal Navy and RAF says no

 

[Garrison]

Royal Navy and RAF says no

But they really don't. There was nothing stopping Britain from arming all its services adequately. The problem was Chamberlain being so reluctant to do anything the prepare the army for war. To my mind this puts the lie to any notion that Chamberlain was playing for time at Munich. It's only after Prague that the Military training Act is passed and any effort is made to reinforce the army. In September 1939 Britain had 2 Matilda II tanks and the Valentine was held up because the MoD didn't like the turret arrangement.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

There was nothing stopping Britain from arming all its services adequately.

Yes there is ££££££££££££££££££££ Lack of. You'd need WWI to cause a wholesale modernization of British industry to pay for it.

 

[Garrison]

Yes there is ££££££££££££££££££££ Lack of. You'd need WWI to cause a wholesale modernization of British industry to pay for it.

Ah by 38 the money could have been found, it was just a few months later after all. British industry was perfectly capable of producing the necessary, it just needed time to gear up to full production. We are not talking about creating an army on the scale of the French, just creating the means to deploy a more effective BEF.

 

[Bougnas]

Ah by 38 the money could have been found, it was just a few months later after all. British industry was perfectly capable of producing the necessary, it just needed time to gear up to full production. We are not talking about creating an army on the scale of the French, just creating the means to deploy a more effective BEF.

Besides, France was not really in a better economic situation (less industrial activity but more gold reserves), yet they started ramping up funding massively in 1936 already. Even the British Treasury isn't god-like enough to stop the Prime Minister if he decides to react properly to growing threats.

 

[Garrison]

Besides, France was not really in a better economic situation (less industrial activity but more gold reserves), yet they started ramping up funding massively in 1936 already. Even the British Treasury isn't god-like enough to stop the Prime Minister if he decides to react properly to growing threats.

Exactly, and by 1938 even former supporters of appeasement like Halifax had reached their limit, he was not happy about the concessions Chamberlain was offering at Munich. Had Chamberlain seriously proposed using Munich to buy time while rearming he would have been able to get whatever measures he wanted through.

 

[Bougnas]

Exactly, and by 1938 even former supporters of appeasement like Halifax had reached their limit, he was not happy about the concessions Chamberlain was offering at Munich. Had Chamberlain seriously proposed using Munich to buy time while rearming he would have been able to get whatever measures he wanted through.

So...a whopping 8 months before the OTL Military Act? Damn...That's more time than from the OTL Act to the declaration of war...

 

[Garrison]

So...a whopping 8 months before the OTL Military Act? Damn...That's more time than from the OTL Act to the declaration of war...

Indeed, point is there was no radical change in economic circumstances between the Autumn of 38 and the Spring of 39. Most of the measures taken in 1939 could have been taken in 1938. If Chamberlain had taken a line of 'peace for the moment' rather than 'peace in our time' I think he could probably have sold building up the army as a deterrent against any further aggrandizement by the Fascist powers, essentially a defensive measure like building up the RAF and the Navy. Again this gets into the territory of the TL I'm writing.

 

[CB13]

I was thinking same as marathag.....

1. Less motorization which keeps the allies from straying too far into Belgium allowing them to get outflanked.

2. Money from motorization invested in more artillery and antitank guns.

...then dig in with the RAF overhead.

 

[Bougnas]

Again this gets into the territory of the TL I'm writing.

Off topic here, but did this TL already start getting posted?

 

[Garrison]

Off topic here, but did this TL already start getting posted?

Not yet. Firm believer in having the ending written before posting so you don't end up with a half finished TL. I get so frustrated when a TL I'm enjoying just fizzles out.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

I was thinking same as marathag.....

1. Less motorization which keeps the allies from straying too far into Belgium allowing them to get outflanked.

2. Money from motorization invested in more artillery and antitank guns.

...then dig in with the RAF overhead.

Not going to happen. The pre war exercises had shown the vulnerability of non motorised forces and the planning prioritised for the army plant to produce a 30 odd div army including ammunition supplies. The Cabinet papers are available online and give a comprehensive picture. Incidentally one of the reasons for the delay in introducing conscription was opposition from the pacificst wing of the labour party. Which disappears after Munich.

You could certainly advance the decision making by a year that would give a field force of around 26 divisions and 20 armoured Bde with 7 infantry Bde Group and 4 Motorised Brigades, The armoured Brigades would be a mix of those in the very very few armoured divisions and those attached to Inf Div.

 

[CB13]

Gannt,

Is it possible you could briefly describe the perceived vulnerabilities and point us in direction of those documents?

Thanks so much, Matthew.