Best leader to succeed McClellan in 1862?

[EnglishCanuck]

So if you could put anyone in charge of the Army of the Potomac in December 1862 who would you choose?

Now I'm not necessarily you have to choose someone from the Eastern theatre but let's try and keep the replacements at least realistic

 

[jahenders]

In general, the sequence of picks they used wasn't too unreasonable -- their flaws weren't known until afterwards.

That being said, I'd be tempted to say Grant, but would leave him in the West for now.

Instead, I'd recommend possibly John Reynolds.

So if you could put anyone in charge of the Army of the Potomac in December 1862 who would you choose?

Now I'm not necessarily you have to choose someone from the Eastern theatre but let's try and keep the replacements at least realistic

 

[Driftless]

If the timeline is the same as OTL...

remove Burnside as the choice.

Hooker is probably a no too. Even without the probable concussion at Chancellorsville, Hooker was maybe promoted one level too far.


Reynolds - more by potential and by reputation that Lincoln offered him the command

Kearney - if only he'd been alive then....

Meade - too soon?

Parke - also too soon?

Until the western generals (Grant, Sherman, Thomas) had racked up more victories, it might be difficult for them to step in

 

[Fordicus]

Lincoln

Perhaps a little out of left field but Lincoln was an excellent commander in chief. He and Chase made a foray on their own and captured a city in Virginia. He also went ashore from his ship on the Potomac and scouted enemy territory. Maybe ASB but to show Lincoln taking the field as a warrior president might make a good read.

 

[Nofix]

Perhaps a little out of left field but Lincoln was an excellent commander in chief. He and Chase made a foray on their own and captured a city in Virginia. He also went ashore from his ship on the Potomac and scouted enemy territory. Maybe ASB but to show Lincoln taking the field as a warrior president might make a good read.

Last President to actually lead troops was Madison during the War of 1812. Despite being a Revolutionary War veteran, he was about several decades away from real action and he got the White House burned down. I really don't think Lincoln, or his Cabinet, or his troops, would want to risk him on the field. But I do agree it would be a badass show of force if he managed to do it. Just imagine the propaganda value.

 

[Darth_Kiryan]

Last President to actually lead troops was Madison during the War of 1812. Despite being a Revolutionary War veteran, he was about several decades away from real action and he got the White House burned down. I really don't think Lincoln, or his Cabinet, or his troops, would want to risk him on the field. But I do agree it would be a badass show of force if he managed to do it. Just imagine the propaganda value.

Thus Shall the Democrats Decry "KING LINCOLN"

 

[Bregil]

If the timeline is the same as OTL...

remove Burnside as the choice.

Hooker is probably a no too. Even without the probable concussion at Chancellorsville, Hooker was maybe promoted one level too far.


Reynolds - more by potential and by reputation that Lincoln offered him the command

Kearny - if only he'd been alive then....

Meade - too soon?

Parke - also too soon?

Until the western generals (Grant, Sherman, Thomas) had racked up more victories, it might be difficult for them to step in

Those would be my sentiments as well. The Western generals are realistically disqualified due to politics (ie: nobody really knows anything about them other than Sherman hates reporters and Halleck has a major problem with Grant).

Burnside was a decent soldier but not a very good commander. (Honestly, he was an inventor first and soldier second and owed his ACW career to his carbine).

Hooker was a brilliant battlefield commander (especially at a division level) and a constant innovator (ie: battlefield telegraph use). His problem was that coordinating an entire army was just a bit too much for him.

Reynolds, definitely one of the great what-ifs of the war. A good solid commander that was willing to get stuck in if needed but also decent at managing large formations. It's possible that his reputation was boosted artificially because of his battlefield death at Gettysburg though he did seem almost universally respected as a general.

Kearny, if we're going from when Little Mac got demoted after the Peninsula Campaign instead of post-Antietam then "Kearney the Magnificent" is still a definite possibility. He was already quite well-known as a skilled and professional soldier, all you need to do is have him do something that catches Lincoln's eye a bit earlier. (And, of course, not throw his life away while Lincoln's making up his mind.)

Meade, I would agree with you that it's probably too soon. Fredericksburg was really the battle that gave him widespread recognition and you would need a replacement for McClellan before then. (Hancock suffers from a similar problem).

To be honest, I don't really know anything about Parke so I can't comment on him.

From a plausibility standpoint, I'd have to go with either Reynolds or Kearny. I think both of them would have been better suited for the job than any of the OTL Union commanders in 1862. I'd love to see Hancock given a shot but he is even less likely than Meade to get the top spot (Hancock didn't even have a Divisional command until Antietam).

 

[jankmaster98]

All in all do the Union's Western Generals show a higher level of competency than the eastern ones, or is it more a case of other factors, i.e. random things like weather, or not so random like knowledge of geography and skill of enemy commanders?

 

[Darth_Kiryan]

All in all do the Union's Western Generals show a higher level of competency than the eastern ones, or is it more a case of other factors, i.e. random things like weather, or not so random like knowledge of geography and skill of enemy commanders?

Yes, but also you have to also consider the matter of distance and politics. Especially considering that the East has Washington and Richmond. That is not the only reason, but it is a significant one.

 

[TFSmith121]

December of 1862 means McClellan has already been replaced

So if you could put anyone in charge of the Army of the Potomac in December 1862 who would you choose? Now I'm not necessarily you have to choose someone from the Eastern theatre but let's try and keep the replacements at least realistic

December of 1862 means McClellan has already been replaced by Burnside, who has since been found wanting after Fredericksburg and the Mud March.

In addition, a lot of solid Army of the Potomac contenders (Kearny, Mansfield, even Porter) are dead or disqualified, and others are unlikely to agree to serve under Hooker, if chosen (as historically).

So, looking at the army as it was for Chancellorsville in the spring of 1863, and working backwards, the available senior commanders were:

Hooker (historically, CG, Army of the Potomac);
JF Reynolds (CG, I Corps)
Couch (CG, II Corps)
Sickles (CG, III Corps)
Meade (CG, V Corps)
Sedgwick (CG, VI Corps)
Howard (CG, XI Corps)
Slocum (CG, XII Corps)
Stoneman (CG, Cavalry Corps)

going back from there to the Fredericksburg battle, the available senior officers are:

Burnside (CG, Army of the Potomac)
Sumner (CG, Right)
Couch (CG, II Corps)
Willcox (CG, IX Corps)
Center (CG, Hooker)
Stoneman (CG, III Corps)
Butterfield (CG, V Corps)
Franklin (CG, Left)
JF Reynolds (CG, I Corps)
WF Smith (CG, VI Corps)

So, in terms of continuity after Fredericksburg and through to Chancellorsville, Hooker had what amounted to an army in any other name at Frederickburg, while his two peers at Fredericksburg, Sumner and Franklin, had departed. Sumner could have stayed, but declined to serve under Hooker - Hooker, presumably, would have served under Sumner, however.

Of the six corps commanders at Fredericksburg, Reynolds, Couch, and Stoneman were the only three to retain corps command by the time of Chancellorsville, and Stoneman was given the cavalry corps to form, so that presumably takes him out of the running...although an Army of the Potomac with a cavalry commander as senior is an intriguing notion (cf Kearny the Magnificent); whether Stoneman was that cavalry commander is another question, and somebody has to form the Cavalry Corps.

All in all, Hooker was the best available choice in the east in the winter of 1862-63; Sumner, with a solid chief of staff (Humphreys, who was a divisional commander at this time) is one potential alternative. His age would tell against him, but he was a professional to his bones and would be, I expect, above the political questions that had become fairly common in the East by this time. His health would presumably not last, however, which raises the question yet again in 1863.

Other possibilities are Couch, Reynolds, and (of course) Stoneman; all three were capable corps commanders, but Reynolds, apparently, did not accept the command when offered, and it is unclear if Couch and Stoneman were considered for it, historically, and set aside. Reynolds and Stoneman were both regulars in 1861, while Couch was a volunteer.

Halleck, of course, is already GinC, acting as chief of staff, in Washington, by this time.

From the west, by the winter of 1862-63, the available senior commanders (this is after Perryville, so Buell is gone) are:

Grant (CG, Army of the Tennessee)
Corps commanders - Parke, McClernand, Ord, WT Sherman, CC Washburn, McPherson, Banks;
Rosecrans (CG, Army of the Cumberland)
Corps commanders - McCook, Thomas, TL Crittenden

Realistically, the only likely choice from the West at this point, in terms of commanding sucessfully and repeatedly at the army-level is Grant, and he is pretty close to indispensible by the winter of 1862-63 in the West. If Grant is sent east, the Army of the Tennessee has to go to Sherman (although McClernand will presumably make things difficult). The other possibility is Rosecrans, which would move Thomas up to the Army of the Cumberland.

It is an interesting exercise.

Given the realities of the winter of 1862-63, based on experience and seniority, after Fredericksburg I would have approached Sumner for the Army of the Potomac, with the proviso that Humphreys is his chief of staff. If he accepts, plan a very conservative limited offensive, with the minor objective of pushing the front line south of the Rappahanock (crossing somewhere other than at Fredericksburg, of course) and the major objective of tying down Lee's army in Virginia; a strong, Sheridan-like operation in the Shenandoah, under (presumably) Reynolds with a beefed up I Corps and Stoneman's cavalry attached would be another option.

Failing that, Reynolds or Hooker are the best choices in the east.

Best,

 

[Deleted member 9338]

Looking over the choices there is not a lot to work with. While Hooker is the best present I would suggest creating two armies, Hooker commanding the A of P and Burnsides one in western Virginia.

Neither side had much luck with organizing and commanding large armies in the field. This helps with the command issues.

 

[TFSmith121]

Except that two armies in the same theater

Looking over the choices there is not a lot to work with. While Hooker is the best present I would suggest creating two armies, Hooker commanding the A of P and Burnsides one in western Virginia. Neither side had much luck with organizing and commanding large armies in the field. This helps with the command issues.

Except that two armies in the same theater did not work well unless there was a theater/army group commander who knew what he was doing.

Compare Pope and McClellan under (allegedly) Halleck vis a vis Grant in the eastern theater in 1864-65 or Sherman in the west in the same period.

Burnside's three "Grand Divisions" were actually a step in the right direction, considering the size the Army of the Potomac had grown to by the end of 1862, but the problem there, again, was the army group/theater commander.

Something similar was shown in the rebel offensive into Kentucky in the summer-autumn of 1862, under Bragg and with Kirby Smith as what amounted to co-commanders.

If one looks at the US order of battle for the Fredericksburg campaign in 1862 as the point of departure, say Burnside is relieved, the IX Corps is detached, and the XI and XII corps are folded into the existing organizations and the following organization is adopted:

Department of the Southeast - Sumner; COS - Humphreys

Army of the Potomac - Hooker (old Center and Right GDs, plus reinforcements)
Couch (CG, II Corps)
Howard (CG, III Corps)
Meade (CG, V Corps)
Sedgwick (CG, VI Corps)

Army of the Shenandoah - JF Reynolds (old "Left" Grand Division)
Slocum (CG, I Corps)
WF Smith (CG, VI Corps)
Stoneman (CG, Cavalry Corps)

One difference is Sickles remains a division commander; the result is that Hooker's army can grind at the Army of Northern Virginia while Reynolds rolls over the Shenandoah, OR Lee has to split his forces.

There's a risk there, but my instinct is Sumner-Hooker-Reynolds will do better than Halleck-McClellan-Pope.

Best,

 

[Bregil]

December of 1862 means McClellan has already been replaced by Burnside, who has since been found wanting after Fredericksburg and the Mud March.

Good catch, I missed the December criteria. That throws a wrench into my suggestions.

 

[Deleted member 9338]

Except that two armies in the same theater did not work well unless there was a theater/army group commander who knew what he was doing.

Compare Pope and McClellan under (allegedly) Halleck vis a vis Grant in the eastern theater in 1864-65 or Sherman in the west in the same period.

Burnside's three "Grand Divisions" were actually a step in the right direction, considering the size the Army of the Potomac had grown to by the end of 1862, but the problem there, again, was the army group/theater commander.

Something similar was shown in the rebel offensive into Kentucky in the summer-autumn of 1862, under Bragg and with Kirby Smith as what amounted to co-commanders.

If one looks at the US order of battle for the Fredericksburg campaign in 1862 as the point of departure, say Burnside is relieved, the IX Corps is detached, and the XI and XII corps are folded into the existing organizations (as historically) and the following organization is adopted:

Department of the Southeast - Sumner; COS - Humphreys

Army of the Potomac - Hooker (old Center and Right GDs, plus reinforcements)
Couch (CG, II Corps)
Howard (CG, III Corps)
Meade (CG, V Corps)
Sedgwick (CG, VI Corps)

Army of the Shenandoah - JF Reynolds (old "Left" Grand Division)
Slocum (CG, I Corps)
WF Smith (CG, VI Corps)
Stoneman (CG, Cavalry Corps)

One difference is Sickles remains a division commander; the result is that Hooker's army can grind at the Army of Northern Virginia while Reynolds rolls over the Shenandoah, OR Lee has to split his forces.

There's a risk there, but my instinct is Sumner-Hooker-Reynolds will do better than Halleck-McClellan-Pope.

Best,

Will have to look more into Sumner. Don't know that much about him.
Not happy with Sickles staying as a divisional commander. Always liked him.

 

[TFSmith121]

Yeah, it's an interesting point

Good catch, I missed the December criteria. That throws a wrench into my suggestions.

If the time frame is December, 1861, the question is - essentially - replacing Scott as general-in-chief and McDowell as army commander; if it is December, 1862, it is replacing Burnside, who has already replaced GBM.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Sumner was old - early 60s, but he was the last of

Will have to look more into Sumner. Don't know that much about him.
Not happy with Sickles staying as a divisional commander. Always liked him.

Sumner was old, early 60s, but he was the last of the senior prewar officers in active service in the field. The rap on Sumner is he had a couple of good days on the Peninsula and a couple of bad days at Antietam, but:

A) he would fight Lee with whatever he had, and with everything he had;
B) given his Old Army background, he followed orders - no politicking.
C) he was never over-awed by Lee et al;
D) given the above, and a really good chief of staff (AA Humphreys is the obvious candidate), he is a far stronger THEATER-level opponent to Lee than (certainly) Halleck ever was; so, if he is in overall command and has broken the AotP into two field armies (as suggested, with Hooker and Reynolds as their commanders), I think the 1863 campaign would be very challenging for Lee et al.

Sickles reached - probably exceeded - his ability as a general officer at the corps level; certainly brave, but a corps was beyond his abilities.

Best,

 

[tallthinkev]

Wasn't a lot of the trouble being that Lincoln wanted results quickly and just blamed him, and others who followed, for not getting the job done in time? Too much pressure from Washington and so he couldn't have a free hand?

 

[TFSmith121]

Who? McClellan?

Wasn't a lot of the trouble being that Lincoln wanted results quickly and just blamed him, and others who followed, for not getting the job done in time? Too much pressure from Washington and so he couldn't have a free hand?

Who is "him"? McClellan? And a free hand to do what? He received more resources, time, and forbearance from the Administration than any general officer at his level could or would ever expect.

And the only president who was any better as C-in-C was FDR, which is a pretty high bar.

Best,

 

[Gannt the chartist]

Hooker by a long chalk.

Whoever is appointed his first task is to reorganise and restore morale in the AoP generally.

Second is to manage the clique ridden AoP without involving Congress too much.

OTL 10 feet eitheer way on one cannonball and who knows.

Sumner no. Age is a factor given what a general was supposed to do at the time, and what Sumner would himself try to do. He probably knows he is ill and certainly has no stomach for the politics of managing his Corps Commanders. His previous performance is questionable, certainly nothing that would indicate he is the next Army Commander in Waiting and an ability to follow orders implies someone is giving the orders. Giving him an elderly CoS does not help.


Reynolds too junior. He is Major General from November 62 and no real experience at even corps command. One issue with his appointment is the likely resignation of several more senior officers meaning a general reorganisation at several levels. To get him you would have to have him as a division commander much earlier ( and not to doze of in the middle of a battle).

The other Corps Commanders commander’s Post Fredericksburg have the same issue.

Of the Western Generals. Grant is the obvious but, as said, invaluable.

Rosecrans. Always had a soft spot for him, and I think he would have done well but it a) means calling off the liberation of the Unionists in Appalachia and b) means he would have to understand the quirks of the AoP fast enough to reorganise them in time for the campaigning season.

And C) which applies to everyone, manage the politics of the Eastern Theatre. You are a a few hours from Washington. One of Grant’s advantages is that he is the only West Point Graduate from Elihu Washburne’s District and has the protection of one of the Radical Republican leaders and Indirectly John Sherman as well.

The problem with the notion of splitting the AoP operationally is that its not that much bigger than the ANVa. There is the continual risk of being defeated in detail, which arguably is what happens at Chancellorsville.

 

[usertron2020]

If the timeline is the same as OTL...

remove Burnside as the choice. (1)

Hooker is probably a no too. Even without the probable concussion at Chancellorsville, Hooker was maybe promoted one level too far. (2)


Reynolds - more by potential and by reputation that Lincoln offered him the command (3)

Meade - too soon? (4)

Parke - also too soon? (5)

Until the western generals (Grant, Sherman, Thomas) had racked up more victories, it might be difficult for them to step in (6)

1) YES. Burnside himself told Lincoln that at best he felt he could only command a corps. Turns out, he was right. Lincoln should have listened to the man.

2) Certainly his decisions of how to place his army showed poor judgement. But not sure how to avoid his promotion.

3) Reynolds refused because Lincoln wouldn't promise to leave him to his command undisturbed. But considering the history of the AotP up to that point, Reynolds was in no position to make such a presumptuous demand.

4) Maybe. But Meade came from the McClellan School himself, so his quicker elevation might have ruffled less feathers, in the lower ranks particularly.

Long after he was gone, McClellan's negative influence of promoting senior-command level insubordination carried on. It took men like Meade (once he'd gotten some experience at army command), Grant, and Sheridan to knock enough heads together to finally get the AotP to work together with any sense of mutual support at the corps level (ironically, even as corps level command started to break down in the AoNV due to casualties).

5) Quite

Those would be my sentiments as well. The Western generals are realistically disqualified due to politics (ie: nobody really knows anything about them other than Sherman hates reporters and Halleck has a major problem with Grant).

Lincoln had long since clipped Halleck's wings regarding trying to rubbish Grant. When at one point Halleck removed Grant from command, he got a blistering cable from Lincoln demanding to know exactly the what, where, how, why, which, and WTF(!?) were the nature of his charges against Grant. Essentially telling him: "Put up or shut up, because if its a choice between Grant and you...!" So after that, Halleck sent a cable of his own cravenly apologizing to Grant "for any misunderstanding or miscommunication over your being promoted to second-in-command for all Union western theater forces"

Grant, thoroughly confused, just let the matter drop.

All in all do the Union's Western Generals show a higher level of competency than the eastern ones, or is it more a case of other factors, i.e. random things like weather, or not so random like knowledge of geography and skill of enemy commanders?

a) Much wider terrain in the west, more room to maneuver. The CSA really didn't have the forces needed to defend the Mississippi, and it ultimate showed.

b) Politics. As seen OTL, the Confederacy seemed to be determined to wage war in Virginia with enough resources to win victory after victory, while letting the West go hang.

c) Best Union generals in the West (except for a handful of political generals, like McClernand)

d) Worst CSA generals in the West (except for Forrest)

e) Worst Union generals in the East (where most of the worst political generals were to be found)

f) Best CSA generals to be found in the East (tho command casualties affected this later on)

g) Virginia is all but invincible from any invader (interior lines everywhere) unless they are coming from a southern direction. Even the British seemed to understand this in the ARW. If the AoNV had held out until Billy Sherman got there, defeating the AoNV would have been as easy as scooping up ice cream.

h) Maryland and Pennsylvania offer the interior lines to the Union, so woe be to any Southron invader.

i) Weather did determine when different areas of the South could be campaigned in. There were no all year round sectors.

j) Knowledge of the ground was a constant for the Southerns. The only time the Union Army had it while the CS forces didn't was at Gettysburg. Boy did it ever cost Lee.

k) The difference in command skills between the two theaters and on different sides was startling.

So, looking at the army as it was for Chancellorsville in the spring of 1863, and working backwards, the available senior commanders were:

Hooker (historically, CG, Army of the Potomac);
Meade (CG, V Corps)
Sedgwick (CG, VI Corps)

All in all, Hooker was the best available choice in the east in the winter of 1862-63; Sumner, with a solid chief of staff (Humphreys, who was a divisional commander at this time) is one potential alternative. His age would tell against him, but he was a professional to his bones and would be, I expect, above the political questions that had become fairly common in the East by this time. His health would presumably not last, however, which raises the question yet again in 1863.

From the west, by the winter of 1862-63, the available senior commanders (this is after Perryville, so Buell is gone) are:

Grant (CG, Army of the Tennessee)
Corps commanders - WT Sherman, McPherson
Rosecrans (CG, Army of the Cumberland)
Corps commanders - Thomas

Realistically, the only likely choice from the West at this point, in terms of commanding sucessfully and repeatedly at the army-level is Grant, and he is pretty close to indispensible by the winter of 1862-63 in the West. If Grant is sent east, the Army of the Tennessee has to go to Sherman. The other possibility is Rosecrans, which would move Thomas up to the Army of the Cumberland.

Agreed with all, save IIRC Rosecrans would be next in line, not Billy Sherman. As far as anyone knows at this point, Sherman is still thought of by some as "insane", while Rosecrans' record appears unblemished.

Will have to look more into Sumner. Don't know that much about him.
Not happy with Sickles staying as a divisional commander. Always liked him.

Sumner was shattered after Antietam. Sickles was no one I would trust as a commander. What he did on Day Two of Gettysburg may have seemed tactically wise, but only in the most limited sense. In terms of the operations going on in the Confederate assault, it was madness.

Wasn't a lot of the trouble being that Lincoln wanted results quickly and just blamed him, and others who followed, for not getting the job done in time? Too much pressure from Washington and so he couldn't have a free hand?

True, but Lincoln himself suffered from the experience of dealing with McClellan. Other than Grant and any officer Grant approved of, Lincoln had come to mistrust anyone who commanded the AotP AND showed ambition. But lack of ambition can also equate to lack of drive.

Whoever is appointed his first task is to reorganise and restore morale in the AoP generally.

Which can't be done while the army is in the field, and why Meade had so many command difficulties during Gettysburg.

Second is to manage the clique ridden AoP without involving Congress too much.

Which requires the abolition of some three corps in the AotP.

OTL 10 feet either way on one cannonball and who knows.

Meh, you could say the same for some bullets marked for Jackson, Longstreet, Stuart, and McPherson. IMHO Hooker was too much the man to ignore advice.

Rosecrans. Always had a soft spot for him, and I think he would have done well but it a) means calling off the liberation of the Unionists in Appalachia and b) means he would have to understand the quirks of the AoP fast enough to reorganise them in time for the campaigning season.

And C) which applies to everyone, manage the politics of the Eastern Theatre. You are a a few hours from Washington. One of Grant’s advantages is that he is the only West Point Graduate from Elihu Washburne’s District and has the protection of one of the Radical Republican leaders and Indirectly John Sherman as well.

Rosecrans IMO was probably the best expert the Union Army had in terms of operational maneuver. The North's Rommel/Jackson in fact. That said, he would advance-advance-advance outflanking the enemy all the way (would have LOVED to see what he would have done in Virginia with all the geographical barriers there). BUT! Eventually the enemy will be backed up SO much that they will have their army up and concentrated while Rosecrans' army is over-extended protecting supply depots feeding his army.

Another problem Rosecrans had was EGO. He wouldn't subordinate himself. Also, while he could move like a greased pig, he would generally try to avoid a battle he was less qualified to actually fight.

This cost him at Stones River, but he got away with it due to a weak opposing commander. At Chickamauga, against Longstreet's veterans, he didn't get away with it.

The problem with the notion of splitting the AoP operationally is that its not that much bigger than the ANV. There is the continual risk of being defeated in detail, which arguably is what happens at Chancellorsville.

Remember tho that Lee took a similar risk, and Jackson took so long to get his forces around to launch his surprise attack that he was forced to try to continue on into the night. Which cost him his life. The CSA at Chancellorsville didn't do half the damage that they wanted to or could have precisely because of the level of surprise was due to the lateness of the day when they attacked. They just ran out of time.