Bernadotte — King of the French

portrait-of-jeanbaptistejules-bernadotte-prince-of-pontecorvo-the-of-picture-id164072402.png

Karl Johan (or Jean-Baptiste) Bernadotte — the missed King of the French
In 1814, the troops of the Sixth Coalition entered France and on 31 May they entered Paris. The Emperor Napoleon I, betrayed by his marshals, was forced to abdicate on 6 April and, fifteen days later, left for his first exile on the island of Elba. On 3 May, King Louis XVIII, head of the Bourbon dynasty, returns to the capital — the period of the Restoration begins. However, the restoration of the Bourbons, which at first glance appears to be a natural phenomenon, in the spring of 1814 was by no means predetermined, as the dynasty, known for its conservatism, had enough opponents both in France and abroad. The Emperor of Austria Franz I requested the transfer of the throne to his grandson the King of Rome, at the time still a boy of three years, the viceroy of Italy and adoptive son of Bonaparte Eugène de Beauharnais had many supporters, the French liberals urged Alexander I to support the candidacy of the Duke of Orleans, but Alexander himself was firm in his intention to crown the French crown with his close friend and staunch ally Karl Johan, crown prince of Sweden, who was well known in France as Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte.

Bernadotte, although Crown Prince of Sweden, had every chance of being sovereign of France, which would have had, of course, enormous consequences on the course of French as well as European history. Avoiding the return of the "legitimate" monarch Louis XVIII, who did not consider herself bound by any obligation towards the people, France could obtain in his place a "republican king", more inclined to concessions and compromises. Possessing undeniable talents, Bernadotte could provide the country with the necessary decades of peaceful respite to heal the wounds of the Napoleonic Wars, clean up the economy, create a stable parliamentary system and, in the long term, challenge British hegemony. As a friend of Russia, Bernadotte could build a mutually beneficial alliance with her, without allowing Prussia to become over-strengthened. Let's see the marshal to carry out his ambitious plans and see what the reign of Bernadotte, the king of the French, would have been like.


Bernadotte, who went on a military campaign in May 1813, had a strategy for taking the French throne, but the latter started from a false premise. Believing to have remained popular in France, he thought that the French would call him to the throne, which meant that any encounter between his forces and the French armies had to be avoided, fearing that this would alienate him the support of his potential topics. Bernadotte was unaware, however, of two factors: his membership in the anti-French coalition automatically made the former marshal a traitor, an image fueled by Napoleon's power, and the delays and timid actions in the theater of operation annoyed others monarchs, mainly English, Austrian and Prussian, who eventually became staunch opponents of the transfer of the French crown to the Swedish crown prince. If Austria would hardly have changed its position on the future of France, then with England everything was not so clear — Prince Regent George acted in unconditional support of the Bourbons, while Viscount Castlereagh, representing London at the headquarters of the allies, the interests of the overthrown dynasty were deeply indifferent to him. Prussia had no clear position on the fate of France and in many ways acted in concert with Russia, towards which king Frederick William III had friendly feelings.

Thus, Bernadotte had shown more determination and taken an active part in the defeat of Napoleon (and he had had such an opportunity, as commander-in-chief of 158,000 men, of the army of North composed of Swedes, Russians, Germans and British), then Alexander I would have succeeded with a high degree of probability in persuading Berlin and London to support the Marshal's claim to the royal crown. It was also important to know who would be in Paris sooner — Bernadotte or the Count of Provence, better known to us as Louis XVIII. As a result, the Northern Army, having lost its reputation in the eyes of the Allies, was sent to Hamburg, when it should have crossed Cassel and Cologne to the French capital so that Bernadotte could enter at the same time as Alexander I and take on the leadership of the government and, in the long run, get the crown.

Declaration_of_victory_after_the_Battle_of_Leipzig,_1813_(by_Johann_Peter_Krafft).jpg

Battle of Leipzig — the place where Bernadotte may have missed the French crown

Unfortunately, in Bernadotte's entourage, there was no one to reveal in time the obvious errors of this strategy and urged him to make the right decision. However, there was such a person — General Georg von Döbeln commanded one of the infantry divisions of the Swedish army and, without waiting for order, began hostilities against the French almost immediately after the landing on the mainland, for which he fell to court and was forced to return to Sweden. The old and experienced Döbeln, used to telling others what he thinks in person, could convince Bernadotte of the wrong strategy, if, of course, he stayed with the crown prince longer. Imagine that in May 1813 the general still refrained from an unauthorized attack on Hamburg and escaped a court, after which he managed to prove to his commander that he could only get the crown of France by force of arms and nothing else. On 23 August, at the Battle of Großbeeren the Swedes attacked Marshal Oudinot with all their might, for which they received the highest marks from the Prussian generals, who began to overwhelm Frederick William III with enthusiastic reports regarding Bernadotte's abilities. and will eventually persuade their king to consider supporting Alexander I in his intention not to return the throne of France to the Bourbons. And on 13 October, it is the soldiers of Bernadotte who will decide the outcome of the battle of Leipzig, thus ensuring the election of their commander as king.
 
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Is this based on anything that came close (or even was suggested) in otl? A premise I’ve never even heard of before at any rate. :eek:
 
portrait-of-jeanbaptistejules-bernadotte-prince-of-pontecorvo-the-of-picture-id164072402.png

Karl Johan (or Jean-Baptiste) Bernadotte — the missed King of the French
In 1814, the troops of the Sixth Coalition entered France and on 31 May they entered Paris. The Emperor Napoleon I, betrayed by his marshals, was forced to abdicate on 6 April and, fifteen days later, left for his first exile on the island of Elba. On 3 May, King Louis XVIII, head of the Bourbon dynasty, returns to the capital — the period of the Restoration begins. However, the restoration of the Bourbons, which at first glance appears to be a natural phenomenon, in the spring of 1814 was by no means predetermined, as the dynasty, known for its conservatism, had enough opponents both in France and abroad. The Emperor of Austria Franz I requested the transfer of the throne to his grandson the King of Rome, at the time still a boy of three years, the viceroy of Italy and adoptive son of Bonaparte Eugène de Beauharnais had many supporters, the French liberals urged Alexander I to support the candidacy of the Duke of Orleans, but Alexander himself was firm in his intention to crown the French crown with his close friend and staunch ally Karl Johan, crown prince of Sweden, who was well known in France as Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte.

Bernadotte, although Crown Prince of Sweden, had every chance of being sovereign of France, which would have had, of course, enormous consequences on the course of French as well as European history. Avoiding the return of the "legitimate" monarch Louis XVIII, who did not consider herself bound by any obligation towards the people, France could obtain in his place a "republican king", more inclined to concessions and compromises. Possessing undeniable talents, Bernadotte could provide the country with the necessary decades of peaceful respite to heal the wounds of the Napoleonic Wars, clean up the economy, create a stable parliamentary system and, in the long term, challenge British hegemony. As a friend of Russia, Bernadotte could build a mutually beneficial alliance with her, without allowing Prussia to become over-strengthened. Let's see the marshal to carry out his ambitious plans and see what the reign of Bernadotte, the king of the French, would have been like.


Bernadotte, who went on a military campaign in May 1813, had a strategy for taking the French throne, but the latter started from a false premise. Believing to have remained popular in France, he thought that the French would call him to the throne, which meant that any encounter between his forces and the French armies had to be avoided, fearing that this would alienate him the support of his potential topics. Bernadotte was unaware, however, of two factors: his membership in the anti-French coalition automatically made the former marshal a traitor, an image fueled by Napoleon's power, and the delays and timid actions in the theater of operation annoyed others monarchs, mainly English, Austrian and Prussian, who eventually became staunch opponents of the transfer of the French crown to the Swedish crown prince. If Austria would hardly have changed its position on the future of France, then with England everything was not so clear — Prince Regent George acted in unconditional support of the Bourbons, while Viscount Castlereagh, representing London at the headquarters of the allies, the interests of the overthrown dynasty were deeply indifferent to him. Prussia had no clear position on the fate of France and in many ways acted in concert with Russia, towards which king Frederick William III had friendly feelings.

Thus, Bernadotte had shown more determination and taken an active part in the defeat of Napoleon (and he had had such an opportunity, as commander-in-chief of 158,000 men, of the army of North composed of Swedes, Russians, Germans and British), then Alexander I would have succeeded with a high degree of probability in persuading Berlin and London to support the Marshal's claim to the royal crown. It was also important to know who would be in Paris sooner — Bernadotte or the Count of Provence, better known to us as Louis XVIII. As a result, the Northern Army, having lost its reputation in the eyes of the Allies, was sent to Hamburg, when it should have crossed Cassel and Cologne to the French capital so that Bernadotte could enter at the same time as Alexander I and take on the leadership of the government and, in the long run, get the crown.

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Battle of Leipzig — the place where Bernadotte may have missed the French crown

Unfortunately, in Bernadotte's entourage, there was no one to reveal in time the obvious errors of this strategy and urged him to make the right decision. However, there was such a person — General Georg von Döbeln commanded one of the infantry divisions of the Swedish army and, without waiting for order, began hostilities against the French almost immediately after the landing on the mainland, for which he fell to court and was forced to return to Sweden. The old and experienced Döbeln, used to telling others what he thinks in person, could convince Bernadotte of the wrong strategy, if, of course, he stayed with the crown prince longer. Imagine that in June 1813 the general still refrained from an unauthorized attack on Hamburg and escaped a court, after which he managed to prove to his commander that he could only get the crown of France by force of arms and nothing else. On 23 August, at the Battle of Großbeeren the Swedes attacked Marshal Oudinot with all their might, for which they received the highest marks from the Prussian generals, who began to overwhelm Frederick William III with enthusiastic reports regarding Bernadotte's abilities. and will eventually persuade their king to consider supporting Alexander I in his intention not to return the throne of France to the Bourbons. And on 13 October, it is the soldiers of Bernadotte who will decide the outcome of the battle of Leipzig, thus ensuring the election of their commander as king.
Didn't you notice certain problem with the logic? Why the Swedes want the crown prince, whom they just elected and who became reasonably popular, became a King of France instead of Sweden? 😨

The Swedish military definitely wanted glory and had been upset with the fact that Bernadotte had been reluctant to use them but (a) he wanted to save troops for conquest of Norway (which the allies kind of promised to him but without any guarantees) and (b) glory was OK but the losses would not be appreciated in Sweden (and, anyway, his personal glory was of a greater importance and he got enough of it at Dennewitz). Actually, by saving Berlin, he became quite popular with the Prussians but he never was too popular with the Brits (see the list of his foreign awards).

Alexander’s support, as well as his friendship or pretty much everything else related to him, was not something one could rely upon. Of course, it looks like Bernadotte liked idea of getting the French crown but it does not look like he was ready to risk the Swedish one by getting it so, in an absence of any guarantees from the Allies (even as far as the Swedish throne was involved, not to mention Norway), he was arranging his priorities correspondingly.

Now, let’s assume that he was more active at Leipzig (actually, he arranged a spectacular change of the sides by the Saxon troops but this was a small potato) and that the grateful allies (“grateful” as applicable to the Brits and Austrians is oxymoron: as soon as Nappy was out, Britain introduced the corn laws targeted against its greatest ally, Russia) are making him a King of France. For how long would he be able to hold the throne? Everybody would be against him starting from his former colleagues and he simply would not have enough time to arrange for any peace and prosperity before there is some kind of a revolution or assassination. Unlike the Bourbons, who had quite repulsive but energetic support base, Bernadotte would have only the enemies (with the potential exception of a part of the Bonaparte family 😂).

If the French of that time had been able to think rationally, they would not had the Napoleon’s cult to start with, not to mention listening to the nonsense like “treason” propaganda to which they stuck for the following decades (and which, rather surprisingly, some British military historians picked up from them): there was no treason because, and this was not a secret, Bernadotte as a precondition for accepting the Swedish offer requested from Napoleon, and got, an official release from any obligations toward France, insisting that as a French citizen he can’t accept a foreign crown and as a future ruler of Sweden he can’t make any binding obligations toward France because this would make him a vassal of the Empire (“Don’t force me to become a greater person than you are by declining a crown”).
 
Didn't you notice certain problem with the logic? Why the Swedes want the crown prince, whom they just elected and who became reasonably popular, became a King of France instead of Sweden? 😨

The Swedish military definitely wanted glory and had been upset with the fact that Bernadotte had been reluctant to use them but (a) he wanted to save troops for conquest of Norway (which the allies kind of promised to him but without any guarantees) and (b) glory was OK but the losses would not be appreciated in Sweden (and, anyway, his personal glory was of a greater importance and he got enough of it at Dennewitz). Actually, by saving Berlin, he became quite popular with the Prussians but he never was too popular with the Brits (see the list of his foreign awards).

Alexander’s support, as well as his friendship or pretty much everything else related to him, was not something one could rely upon. Of course, it looks like Bernadotte liked idea of getting the French crown but it does not look like he was ready to risk the Swedish one by getting it so, in an absence of any guarantees from the Allies (even as far as the Swedish throne was involved, not to mention Norway), he was arranging his priorities correspondingly.

Now, let’s assume that he was more active at Leipzig (actually, he arranged a spectacular change of the sides by the Saxon troops but this was a small potato) and that the grateful allies (“grateful” as applicable to the Brits and Austrians is oxymoron: as soon as Nappy was out, Britain introduced the corn laws targeted against its greatest ally, Russia) are making him a King of France. For how long would he be able to hold the throne? Everybody would be against him starting from his former colleagues and he simply would not have enough time to arrange for any peace and prosperity before there is some kind of a revolution or assassination. Unlike the Bourbons, who had quite repulsive but energetic support base, Bernadotte would have only the enemies (with the potential exception of a part of the Bonaparte family 😂).

If the French of that time had been able to think rationally, they would not had the Napoleon’s cult to start with, not to mention listening to the nonsense like “treason” propaganda to which they stuck for the following decades (and which, rather surprisingly, some British military historians picked up from them): there was no treason because, and this was not a secret, Bernadotte as a precondition for accepting the Swedish offer requested from Napoleon, and got, an official release from any obligations toward France, insisting that as a French citizen he can’t accept a foreign crown and as a future ruler of Sweden he can’t make any binding obligations toward France because this would make him a vassal of the Empire (“Don’t force me to become a greater person than you are by declining a crown”).
Thank you for your critical feedback on the hypothesis I am putting forward.
To answer you on the first points: there will irrevocably be a break between Bernadotte and the Swedes. Seeing that in this TL, he decides to reinvest himself in his homeland of origin in front of his adopted homeland, the occasioned disappointment could manifest itself in different ways. At minimum, resentment against the Prince who abandoned them, at most, rebellion against a traitor. It is worth remembering that Gustav IV and his son Gustav, later Prince of Vasa, were in Baden during the first period of their exile. The second would then be in a good position to succeed Charles XII and, why not, attempt an uprising of Bernadotte's troops (I'm just imagining on this one).

For the question of support in France: this is a question that I also asked myself (and that I continue to question). I believe that Bernadotte would be the champion of the French liberal bourgeoisie, embodied by characters like Constant or Lafayette. This part of the French nation which brought Napoleon to power but ended up getting tired of it and which did not trust the Bourbon solution. To illustrate my point I take the results of the first elections which follow the end of the Empire (and paradoxically are organized under Napoleon's Cent-jours). The results are as follows: out of 630 seats that make up the ephemeral House of Representatives, 510 are held by the Liberals, 40 by the Jacobins and only 80 by the Bonapartists while the Emperor is in power. The election is marked by a strong abstention but the results speak for themselves and this majority was orphan, it was against a Napoleon whom it still considered too authoritarian and a Louis XVIII considered too conservative. Bernadotte then becomes their champion, but of course the contradictions arise as well as political changes and that's what I want to also deal with in this TL.

I forgot to answer on foreign countries. As for Great Britain, I won't be long. The example you gave with Russia proves the strategic opportunism well known to the English. The fact that they support the return of a dynasty in 1814, when 40 years before they were at war on the American continent, so in itself Bernadotte's candidacy would be, from the British point of view, a solution aimed at strengthening the Sixth Coalition , they will then have the opportunity to bite their fingers. For Prussia, the idea is not that he becomes a hero but a man of confidence so that King Frederick William joins Alexander in support of Bernadotte.
 
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Thank you for your critical feedback on the hypothesis I am putting forward.
To answer you on the first points: there will irrevocably be a break between Bernadotte and the Swedes. Seeing that in this TL, he decides to reinvest himself in his homeland of origin in front of his adopted homeland, the occasioned disappointment could manifest itself in different ways. At minimum, resentment against the Prince who abandoned them, at most, rebellion against a traitor. It is worth remembering that Gustav IV and his son Gustav, later Prince of Vasa, were in Baden during the first period of their exile. The second would then be in a good position to succeed Charles XII and, why not, attempt an uprising of Bernadotte's troops (I'm just imagining on this one).

For the question of support in France: this is a question that I also asked myself (and that I continue to question). I believe that Bernadotte would be the champion of the French liberal bourgeoisie, embodied by characters like Constant or Lafayette. This part of the French nation which brought Napoleon to power but ended up getting tired of it and which did not trust the Bourbon solution. To illustrate my point I take the results of the first elections which follow the end of the Empire (and paradoxically are organized under Napoleon's Cent-jours). The results are as follows: out of 630 seats that make up the ephemeral House of Representatives, 510 are held by the Liberals, 40 by the Jacobins and only 80 by the Bonapartists while the Emperor is in power. The election is marked by a strong abstention but the results speak for themselves and this majority was orphan, it was against a Napoleon whom it still considered too authoritarian and a Louis XVIII considered too conservative. Bernadotte then becomes their champion, but of course the contradictions arise as well as political changes and that's what I want to also deal with in this TL.

Well, while all of the above sounds reasonable, the reason (AFAIK) was a dominating trend in the French public opinion of that period and, unlike Louis XVIII, he would be stigmatized by the fact that he was “killing the French” of course, Nappy killed much more of them but this was a “glory” and “when it comes to glory, we are not bargaining”. In OTL, rather ironically (but perhaps, just in case), the “traitor” propaganda continued through the Bourbons regime.
I forgot to answer on foreign countries. As for Great Britain, I won't be long. The example you gave with Russia proves the strategic opportunism well known to the English. The fact that they support the return of a dynasty in 1814, when 40 years before they were at war on the American continent, so in itself Bernadotte's candidacy would be, from the British point of view, a solution aimed at strengthening the Sixth Coalition , they will then have the opportunity to bite their fingers.

I may be totally wrong but it looks like the Brits more or less had been allowing the continental allies to run things on the “Eastern Front”, because they could not contribute any noticeable force to it anyway, in expectation that when the useful fools (of which Alexander was a greatest idiot) will finally deal with Napoleon, the Brits will be able to push through whatever they want by forming the opportunistic coalitions. Bernadotte, in this schema of things, was not critical important to them because there was always a “stick” (restoration of the Vasas) and “carrot” (Norway). Alexander was supporting Bernadotte but mostly as a very convenient neighbor and definitely was not ready to confront the Brits on his behalf. So in OTL Bernadotte, as soon as he figured out that he is being used without any guarantees of any kind, decided to play it safe and minimize the dependencies. Which, BTW, always was his modus operandi in the political issues (in military he was sometimes prone to the extremely risky actions, like the Battle of Halle and following pursuit of the Peussuans).

In your TL he is a much greater risk taker, which, of course, is not unrealistic taking into an account the exoected prize.
For Prussia, the idea is not that he becomes a hero but a man of confidence so that King Frederick William joins Alexander in support of Bernadotte.
Well, his strategy in 1813 saved Berlin, which should be enough to inspire confidence. Also, he was seemingly on the good terms with most of tze Prussian military establishment.

Anyway, it is your TL and so are the decisions.
 
Well, while all of the above sounds reasonable, the reason (AFAIK) was a dominating trend in the French public opinion of that period and, unlike Louis XVIII, he would be stigmatized by the fact that he was “killing the French” of course, Nappy killed much more of them but this was a “glory” and “when it comes to glory, we are not bargaining”. In OTL, rather ironically (but perhaps, just in case), the “traitor” propaganda continued through the Bourbons regime.

I did not answer this in detail. Yes, Bernadotte's image will be scratched from the start of his reign - even if compared with the Bourbons and their royalists, Bern's French victims will be less. However, B is as said in the introduction to my TL, a man of compromise. In exchange for forgetting / diminishing, for his "betrayal", he will be a king "guarantor of freedoms" accepting without difficulty the constitution of the Senate and making France the most liberal and democratic country in a victorious counter-revolutionary Europen, in the first half of his reign. All the more so, Bernadotte will skillfully and effectively fight, the image of traitor with which he is decked out. It's a leader of men, a seducer, an orator, a southerner capable of attracting the friendship of many people.

I may be totally wrong but it looks like the Brits more or less had been allowing the continental allies to run things on the “Eastern Front”, because they could not contribute any noticeable force to it anyway, in expectation that when the useful fools (of which Alexander was a greatest idiot) will finally deal with Napoleon, the Brits will be able to push through whatever they want by forming the opportunistic coalitions. Bernadotte, in this schema of things, was not critical important to them because there was always a “stick” (restoration of the Vasas) and “carrot” (Norway). Alexander was supporting Bernadotte but mostly as a very convenient neighbor and definitely was not ready to confront the Brits on his behalf. So in OTL Bernadotte, as soon as he figured out that he is being used without any guarantees of any kind, decided to play it safe and minimize the dependencies. Which, BTW, always was his modus operandi in the political issues (in military he was sometimes prone to the extremely risky actions, like the Battle of Halle and following pursuit of the Peussuans).

Indeed, the British can legitimately think that Bernadotte with his "French ambitions", would be rejected. They may even think about killing two birds with one stone by getting rid of both Nappy and Bern - or even three with Murat in Naples. But at the moment of truth they will see that they have made a skillful player of him, a player indeed precocious, but determined. More, if Russia is assured of the support of Prussia in the Bernadotte candidacy, this "useful idiot" of the GB would have a "madness of grandeur" more than palpable because it could secure an almost continental domination of Europe. Faced with this, the British could quickly revise their contempt for B in an attempt to attract her to him. In short, many reversals of the situation as in OTL.
 
May 1813 — November 1813

Chapter I: From Stralsund to Leipzig



In May 1813, eastern Germany was the scene of confrontation between the French and their German allies against the Russians and Prussians. Since March 1813, Sweden, led by Charles John (Jean-Baptiste) Bernadotte, former Marshal of Napoleon who became Crown Prince and effective sovereign of Sweden, has formed an alliance with Russia, Great Britain and Prussia without officially declaring war on France. Gathering 30,000 men in Stralsund and Rügen for, he reconquered Pomerania without a fight. On 17 May4 June, a truce was signed between France, Prussia and Russia, temporarily putting an end to Bernadotte's questions, but between these two dates a special event occurred.

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The Baron Georg Carl von Döbeln

While Bernadotte had barely landed in Pomerania was leading the stationed Swedish troops, one of his lieutenant general — newly promoted — Baron Georg Carl von Döbeln was on his way to help the British troops who were defending the important city of Hamburg from the French. Outnumbered, the reinforcement of the Swedes was vital and Döbeln was aware of it. Taking advantage of the indecision of his superior, Count Adlercreutz, he then began to move. A Swedish marshal, von Stedingk, informed, replaced the count and informed the crown prince of the situation. Bernadotte, demands the arrest of the troops wanting to avoid any confrontation with the French, Döbeln received the instructions but after having reflected for an hour in his office, the Prince's order in his hands, the baron obeyed and turned back. If Hamburg ended up pushing back the French, the Swedish officer was angry for breaking his word. Returned to Mecklenburg, Döbeln made his way on horseback to Stralsund to meet the Prince-Regent, obtaining an audience beforehand.

Meeting the "hero with the bandon", the Prince Regent thought he had to make a courtesy call on the part of the officer to see an apology for his action, it was quite the opposite. When Döbeln introduced himself he made a short, sharp and quick reverence to speak directly to Bernadotte. The baron defends his action and especially the need to have left Hamburg defenseless, he was astonished at Charles John's leniency towards the French, implying that he had remained attached to his former compatriots and warned that if the opportunity arises he will not hesitate this time, even if it guarantees his death. This attitude was not surprising, Döbeln who was of a calm nature and measured on the battlefield was quite the opposite in civil and human relations, being a hot-tempered, scathing honesty ignored the etiquette to get right to its goal. The reaction of those around the prince present in the interview room was unequivocal, indignation and anger, but the most surprising is that of Bernadotte. If he was surprised by Dolben's words, the character of the Swede recalled his own, seeing in the mocking attitude of the Nordic his own southern temperament. Recalling the direct and singling honesty of low-ranking soldiers, where Bernadotte had started. The interview ended with a hug from the prince to the baron, surprised in turn, like the rest of the witnesses, by such a gesture and Bernadotte concluded with these words: "You are the soldier I need. You will make my fortune and yours." Dolben unwittingly became close to Bernadotte.

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Europe in August 1813:
French Empire and allies
Sixth Coalition and allies


The Truce of Pläswitz signed in June and agreed to be discontinued to 20 July. Surprised by this truce because he was not warned by the diplomatic initiative, Bernadotte became angry with Alexander's messenger, General Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo, accusing his allies of conspiring against him. Pozzo di Borgo nevertheless managed to convince him that this truce was only a tactical maneuver in order to give Prussia the time necessary to reorganize its forces and to negotiate with Austria to bring the latter into the coalition. Meanwhile, Karl Johan received the news of the failure of negotiations with Napoleon, and developed the idea that he could replace his former ruler on the throne of France. Meeting in July Alexander and the King of Prussia Frederick William III in Trachemberg, Silesia, to discuss a strategy of struggle against France, Bernadotte mentioned to the Tsar his views on the French throne who welcomed the idea positively but nonetheless, Alexander, always thought he could negociate with Napoleon. Bernadotte, reporting this acquiescence to his entourage, however expressed his desire to be called by the French, that his coming to the throne be a popular desire. Dolben would then have answered him, "Did you ask the Swedes or Napoleon, the agreement to be king of Sweden?" and ending with these words "To the first Swedish king of France!" A campaign plan, called "Trachemberg Plan", is constructed by Bernadotte, whose main idea was to create three independent armies with the aim of avoiding direct confrontation with Napoleon and of attacking his marshals and generals as a priority; once the Napoleonic forces sufficiently weakened, the troops of the coalition would then effect their junction to deliver the coup de grace to the French emperor. Crown Prince Charles John personally commanded the Army of the North, composed mainly of Swedes but which also included Russian and Prussian units, for a total strength of about 120,000 men.

The armistice was however extended by the opening of the Prague Congress by Austria, still neutral. Austrian Chancellor Matternich representing the interests of Prussia and Russia then proposed to France a general peace if it accepted the dismemberment of the Duchy of Warsaw, the independence of the Hanseatic cities, Spain and Holland, the cession from the Illyrian provinces. Likewise, they want Napoleon to renounce his titles as protector of the Confederation of the Rhine and mediator of the Swiss Confederation. Napoleon judges them unacceptable and partially rejects them, despite the pleas of his plenipotentiary ministers Colaincourt and Narbonne. In the meantime Russia, Prussia, Austria and Sweden come to an agreement with England to sign the Reichenbach treaties to impose very strict peace conditions on France and to place on her the responsibility of a resumption of the war. On 10 August, at midnight, Metternich announced the closing of the congress, despite a last attempt at conciliation on the part of Caulaincourt, two days later, on 12 August, Austria declared war on France marking the resumption of war of the Sixth Coalition. Napoleon's refusal to negotiate peace destroys the last chances of his staying on the throne. Tsar Alexander now takes Bernadotte's claims to the French throne seriously.


Großbeeren_1813.jpg

Battle of Großbeeren (left)
Battle of Dennewitz (right)​

The start of the German campaign seemed to the advantage of Napoleon who won an impressive victory despite a numerical inferiority — 135,000 Franco-Saxons against 215,000 coalition — in Dresden on 26-27 August , but it was not sufficiently exploited and on 29 August, the General Vandamme was defeated in Kunlz. At the same time, Bernadotte succeeded in pushing back two times the French forces which aimed to take Berlin. In first, he facing 60,000 men led by Oudinot, the Crown Prince assisted by the Prussian general Von Bulow was at the head of 80,000 Swedish-Prussians at Großbeeren on 23 August. An event occurred during the debacle, where Dolbein pursued the French when Bernadotte had not authorized it. Angry at the time, however, he noticed the joy of the Prussian officers who thanked him, thinking they had given the order. The pursuit movement, fortunately, was not followed by the other officers and Dolben captured a few hundred French. Reported testimonies mention a word that the baron would have said to his commander when he reported his catch: "This is how we take the French!" And the second time against the 40,000 Ney's men, on 6 September at Dennewitz. Bernadotte obtained the praises of the Prussian officers, who directly reported Frederick William III, which allows him to gain credibility within the coalition and to obtain diplomatic support. These three victories over French marshals — plus MacDonald's defeat at Katzbach on 26 August — resulted in the cancellation of the effects of the Emperor's victory in Dresden, the "Crown Prince's plan" working perfectly. Napoleon then decides to fall back towards Leipzig, because it is the only place where he can still hold out.

At the beginning of October, the allies tightened their pincers: prussian general Blücher and Bernadotte crossed the Elbe in the north to march on Leipzig, the austrian general Schwarzenberg did the same in the southwest. On 8 October, by the Treaty of Ried concluded in secret with Austria, the Kingdom of Bavaria put an end to its alliance with Napoleon; on 14 October, he declared war on France; his army, 36,000 strong, is preparing to join the coalition forces. The Battle of Leipzig began on 16 October, the scene of the largest armed confrontation in history, in total the French aligned around 190,000 men, some of whom were Saxon allies, against around 330,000 for the allies, each of the camps having a significant artillery. Bernadotte is late, however, he refused to outflank the French from the rear, to leave no chance of escape, for fear of being himself surrounded and attacked separately from his allies, ending up arriving on 18 October. on the field of battle. His reinforcement made it possible to fill a gap between the armies of Blucher and Schwarzenberg, where the Prince-Regent distinguished himself in the fights and the maneuvers and his participation allowed an important and famous turning point in the battle The Saxon division, force of King Frederic Auguste of Saxony, last great ally of Napoleon in Germany, changes sides and passes to the allied side when the Swedish troops come and turn their guns against the French, then followed by the other German corps of the Great Army. The fighting continued until the next day, 19 October, ending in a decisive victory for the allies over the French.

However, the post-battle is marked by an event which will impress the victorious Bernadotte in his mind; while a column of French prisoners passed near the camps of the army of the North, the Crown Prince wanted to meet them, and was greeted by howls and harsh words: "Death to Bernadotte!", "Bernadotte at the pole!", "Death to the traitor!" Thus were confirmed his fears, he was no longer loved by the French but for all that he did not resign himself to abandoned his ambitions for the throne of France. Napoleon's defeat in Leipzig marks the end of the German campaign, leaving Saxony, passing through Frankfurt, the Emperor crosses the Rhine on 2 November to return to France in order to organize the defense of the country. The allies stop on the river with a view to planning the invasion of France but also to discuss the policy to be adopted. Bernadotte, at this time, reached the highest levels of glory within the coalition, becoming in the eyes of the European monarchies a real prince.
 
November - December 1813

Chapter II: Frankfurt couches and Amsterdam cheers


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Klemens von Metternich

The end of the German campaign marks for Bernadotte the beginning of his campaign with the allies for the throne of France. Few days after the Battle of Leipzig, on 21 October, Bernadotte, Alexander I and Frederick William III met in Altenburg. A secret agreement is signed between the three sovereigns, on the basis of a mutual alliance; Prussia and Russia support the Prince-Regent in his claims to the French throne. The latter undertakes to support the ambitions of the Russo-Prussian in the sharing of conquests — in particular Saxony and Poland. In the peace negotiations, France must retain its borders along the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees and the maintain of the transfer from Norway to Sweden. The mention of Norway is there to appease Swedish opinion, notably the army, when Bernadotte's “French ambitions” will be revealed and because this annexation was the condition for Sweden's entry into the war. Meanwhile, the Army of the North takes part in the pursuit of the French troops retreating towards the Rhine. On 26 October, King Jerome Bonaparte had to hastily evacuate Cassel, where the Russians from Vorontsov entered two days later. Other detachments of the army of the North take part in the siege of Torgau, Wittenberg and Magdeburg. Bennigsen's corps encircles Magdeburg, those of Wintzingerode and Saint-Priest occupy the Grand Duchy of Berg; Bülow is in Münster on 5 November, Bernadotte in Hanover on 6 November.

In Frankfurt, a conference of heads of state and military of the Coalition opened. Bernadotte appeared there in this dual capacity, attending a meeting on 7 November at Schwazenberg to draw up a strategic plan of attack where he compared his vision with that of the others, but the meeting was adjourned. While he was about to leave the city to join his army — in order to put pressure on Denmark still allied to Napoleon. Bernadotte was invited by Alexander to join the talks of peace with France. Bernadotte was invited by Alexander to join the talks of peace with France. Because alongside the discussions aimed at continuing the war, diplomacy was in action, led by Klemens von Metternich Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Austria on the approach of Napoleon's defeat, fearing Russian hegemonic ambitions in Europe. Metternich, talks with Auguste de Saint-Aignan, a French diplomat captive close to Colaincourt, in order to transmit to Napoleon a proposal for "general peace", it guaranteeing to France the conservation of its "natural borders" and the throne for Bonaparte. The memorandum was sent on 9 November. Founded on bases, knowingly, "ill-defined" the idea of the Austrian was to create discord in France in order to push the French to turn against Napoleon, in order to push him to abdicate after the failure, that Metternich judged certain, negotiations and placed at the head of a French Empire shrunk his young son under the regency of his mother Marie Louise of Austria, daughter of the Emperor of Austria Francis, to ultimately place France under the bosom of Vienna.

The tactic worked thanks to the ignorance and good will of the allies. Because among the great powers with the exception of Austria, all wanted the fall of Bonaparte to place their own candidate there and for border issues, England made it a sine qua non for peace. But Matternich took advantage of the absence of an official position on the internal future of France as well as of the youthfulness and candor of the English representative in Frankfurt, the Earl of Aberdeen, to be able to dangle "generous" conditions of peace for France. The dissemination of the notes provoked many reactions within the allied as well as the French. Metternich succeeded in creating popular hope in France for peace, prompting Napoleon to maintain a correspondence with Frankfurt, although he simply did not believe in the promises of the allies. Within the allies even a suspicion is created against the Austrian, Viscount Castlereagh, English Minister for Foreign Affairs, reprimands Aberdeen and sends a note which rejects all peace on the basis of the notes given to Saint-Aignan. In the meantime, Bernadotte, through Alexander, talks with Aberdeen and the two men develop a friendship — friendships which will manifest itself in the years to come. By this means, Bernadotte advances his candidacy over England starting a correspondence with London.

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Marshal Laurent de Gouvion-Saint-Cyr


While the front has moved across the Rhine, fighting remains inside Germany. In his retreat, Napoleon abandoned 100,000 men dispersed in several strongholds in Poland and Germany. These places besieged by allied troops fell quickly for the most part even if some resist, like that of Hamburg and Mainz which surrendered only to the abdication of Napoleon in May 1814. On 13 November, the place of Dresden held by Marshal Laurent de Gouvion-Saint-Cy capitulates, totally isolated and unable to hope to be rescued. Destined to be interned in Baden, in Karlsbad, he was stoped on the way to Offenbach on night of 14 November. This interception is organized, in secret, by Bernadotte in person in order to meet with the marshal. Charles John achieved the feat, by his eloquence and his arguments, of breaking through the taciturn and cold Saint-Cyr. Relying on the character moderation of his interlocutor, he convinces him that he is the lesser evil in the face of the excesses of the Empire or the Bourbons and foreign appetites. Saint-Cyr, in disgrace for two years with Napoleon, nods coldly, which Bernadotte expected. He needs a collaborator, not a supporter. The "Owl", nickname of Saint-Cyr, joined the new eagle, but by mutual agreement the rallying will be officially at the end of the Empire.


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Landing of William of Orange in Scheveningen

After the interview in Offenbach, Bernadotte left to join the army of the North. The absence of the commander-in-chief is felt, his three corps chiefs quarrel and fails to disrupt the command: Stedingk for the Swedes, Wallmoden for the Russians and Bülow for the Prussians. The army placed between the Netherlands and Denmark is pulled by the interests of each. The Swedes want to go north to besieged Hamburg, held by the French and defeat the Danes. The Prussians want to enter Holland, with the ambition of annexing it. Only the Russians act in the interest of Bernadotte but Wallmoden is absent, directing the siege of Hamburg. Camped in Wiesel, Bernadotte sees clearly that he risks losing the loyalty of his troops. Nevertheless the events will offer him a way out. When the vanguard of the Army of the North entered Groningen and East Frisia on 15 November, the Netherlands rose up against the French occupier. On 16 November, Amsterdam, evacuated by the small garrison of General Molitor, rebels, soon followed by The Hague, Leyden, Haarlem, Dordrecht and proclaims the restoration of Dutch independence and on 19 November Rotterdam finally rose up where a provisional government was formed.

Bernadotte wanted to seize the opportunity to strengthen the cohesion of his troops but waited for the approval of London, which arrived quickly. Castlereagh enjoins Charles John to invade the Netherlands in order to ensure the seizure of power of the Prince of Orange, in exchange England is ready to support, subject to reservations, the royal claims of Bernadotte. On 19 November , the Prussian, Russian and Swedish corps crossed the IJssel at Zwoll and spread into Holland, avoiding the small French garrisons. On 20 November, William of Orange, heir to the stadtholders of the United Provinces, landed in Scheveningen while; the same day, 40,000 Swedish-Prussian-Russians entered Amsterdam with the prince-regent at their head, the notables of the city proclaim William "sovereign prince of the Netherlands". Bülow sent Oppen's detachment forward, which entered Doesburg on 23 November; Bülow's main body takes Arnhem on 29 November and enters Utrecht on 2 December. On 3 December, the Prussian cavalry entered Rotterdam. The French retreated towards North Brabant, south of the Waal, and only kept a few fortresses north of the river. On 9 December, the Cossacks entered Breda, abandoned by its defenders, and on 10 December, Geertruidenberg; the same day, the British under General Graham landed in Willemstad. The rest of December, sees the encirclement of the remaining French garrisons, the retreat of the armies of Marshal MacDonald in Nimegue and the preparation of the entry of the Army of the North in Belgium.
 
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