Belle Epoque alliance system without the Habsburg Empire

[Eurofed]

This makes me wonder greatly about how Bismarck might choose to govern in any Großdeutschland scenario where he is in power. Aside from adding more Catholics and minorities into the mix of the Second Reich, The acquisition of Austria and Bohemia would certainly empower his Liberal opposition who might a lot in common with the German Liberals of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hell, the National Liberals might find a lot of ground with them, too, even though they were rather pro-Bismarck.

At least in OTL, Bismarck's counterpart in Austria, Taaffe, ended up scrapping the German Liberals from his cabinet and maintained a rather long ministry from 1879 to 1893 (a surprise, since like the Third Republic, Austrian governments were not known for the longevity) through an alliance with the clericals and Slavic Nationalists (primarily the Poles and Czechs).

Bismarck certainly wouldn't pursue Kulturkampf in any Großdeutschland scenario. Certainly he'd co-opt political Catholicism into alliance? He was the master of realpolitik, after all.

This is a definite possibility. Another interesting butterfly is the Pope fleeing to France when Italy occupies Rome, and taking an explicit anti-German-Italian stance during the Vatican I council. This may cause the Old Catholic schism, that occurred in reaction to the proclamation of papal infallibility during that council, to gain critical mass and the allegiance of the German and Italian Catholics. This would occur because Germans and Italians embrace the Old Catholic Church as a show of patriotic allegiance against a Pope openly hostile to their nations, and thanks to government support for the new Church (a different version of Kulturkampf and the anticlerical policies of the liberal Italian governments). The combination of grassroots nationalism and government support is a mix that can quickly overturn the confessional allegiance of a nation (see the Anglican schism). It may or may not happen, but if it does, it would neatly solve most of the difficulties Germany and Italy (and the Junkers) had with political Catholicism.

 

[DrakeRlugia]

This is a definite possibility. Another interesting butterfly is the Pope fleeing to France when Italy occupies Rome, and taking an explicit anti-German-Italian stance during the Vatican I council. This may cause the Old Catholic schism, that occurred in reaction to the proclamation of papal infallibility during that council, to gain critical mass and the allegiance of the German and Italian Catholics. This would occur because Germans and Italians embrace the Old Catholic Church as a show of patriotic allegiance against a Pope openly hostile to their nations, and thanks to government support for the new Church (a different version of Kulturkampf and the anticlerical policies of the liberal Italian governments). The combination of grassroots nationalism and government support is a mix that can quickly overturn the confessional allegiance of a nation (see the Anglican schism). It may or may not happen, but if it does, it would neatly solve most of the difficulties Germany and Italy (and the Junkers) had with political Catholicism.

A possible scenario, but with a lot of ifs. While the Papacy had many issues with Italy and could certainly have a difficult relationship with Bismarck's Germany, I'm not sure the Pope would take an even hardline stance against them. Napoleon III was at best a reluctant defender of the Papacy (probably motivated by the desires of his wife, who was a Legitimist and Ultramontane), and upon the fall of the Empire, the anti-clericals who dominated the Republic would have no desire to house the Pope in exile, even if Avignon would make a good and symbolic place for him. He would be better off to remain sequestered in the Vatican, which makes a much more important statement.

While I'm sure many Germans (and even Italians in this scenario) might embrace the Old Catholics, I don't think it would be en masse. While national and patriotic feeling (especially in Germany, post-1870) was at an all time high, regional feelings were very important too. And especially in Southern Germany, Catholicism was an important part of the identity. I think it's rather too late for anything akin to Anglicanism to arise, I don't think the Junkers will be as hostile to Catholicism in this timeline as they were ATL. They will quickly realize that the clericals are just as conservative as they are, in and many cases espouse the same ideals. Combined with injecting the (possibly) unruly Czechs into the empire along with the already existing Poles, I am certain the Junkers attitudes to Catholics (at least, German Catholics) would be mollified compared to the threats of unruly Slavs and Socialists. If anything, Bismarck might find great support amongst them if he chooses to pursue a a Germanization campaign as he did OTL.

 

[Eurofed]

A possible scenario, but with a lot of ifs. While the Papacy had many issues with Italy and could certainly have a difficult relationship with Bismarck's Germany, I'm not sure the Pope would take an even hardline stance against them. Napoleon III was at best a reluctant defender of the Papacy (probably motivated by the desires of his wife, who was a Legitimist and Ultramontane), and upon the fall of the Empire, the anti-clericals who dominated the Republic would have no desire to house the Pope in exile, even if Avignon would make a good and symbolic place for him. He would be better off to remain sequestered in the Vatican, which makes a much more important statement.

Eugene mattered little. The really important issue is that French catholics made up his main constituency (especially in the late period of his rule). Never underestimate the capacity of Pius IX to be the bullheaded reactionary-obscurantist extremist. With a bolder TTL Italy (thanks to greater success in 1866) making a more overt bid for Rome, he may flee the city, as he did in 1848-49, and seek the military protection of France, expecting a swift comeback after the Franco-Austrian alliance crushes the Prusso-Italian upstarts. He sets up shop in Avignon (or Andorra), thundering all kinds of anathemas upon Italy and Prussia, blessing French and Austrian flags, and otherwise making himself look as partisan in the war as he could possibly be.

While I'm sure many Germans (and even Italians in this scenario) might embrace the Old Catholics, I don't think it would be en masse. While national and patriotic feeling (especially in Germany, post-1870) was at an all time high, regional feelings were very important too. And especially in Southern Germany, Catholicism was an important part of the identity.

Except now, there are two versions of Catholicism. The Old Catholics are going to say they are the real Catholics, that it is OK to be a Catholic and a German/Italian patriot, and that the Pope is an heretic and a stooge of the French. While the Popists are openly in league with the enemies of Germany and Italy. Popist clergy and lay activists are harassed by police, while Old Catholic clergy and lay activists get government support. Which brand do you think is going to become more popular among German/Italian masses ?

Againn, never underestimate the potential that nationalism may deploy when it is expressed through a religious lens, especially in the age of nationalism.

The doctrinal and organizational evolution of the Old Catholic Church into something akin to a liberal-progressive Anglicanism shall happen relatively quickly but overtime, as they struggle to differentiate from the obscurantist-reactionary Popist Church.

I think it's rather too late for anything akin to Anglicanism to arise, I don't think the Junkers will be as hostile to Catholicism in this timeline as they were ATL. They will quickly realize that the clericals are just as conservative as they are, in and many cases espouse the same ideals. Combined with injecting the (possibly) unruly Czechs into the empire along with the already existing Poles, I am certain the Junkers attitudes to Catholics (at least, German Catholics) would be mollified compared to the threats of unruly Slavs and Socialists. If anything, Bismarck might find great support amongst them if he chooses to pursue a a Germanization campaign as he did OTL.

If the schism doesn't happen, this is quite possible.

 

[DrakeRlugia]

Eugene mattered little. The really important issue is that French catholics made up his main constituency (especially in the late period of his rule). Never underestimate the capacity of Pius IX to be the bullheaded reactionary-obscurantist extremist. With a bolder TTL Italy (thanks to greater success in 1866) making a more overt bid for Rome, he may flee the city, as he did in 1848-49, and seek the military protection of France, expecting a swift comeback after the Franco-Austrian alliance crushes the Prusso-Italian upstarts. He sets up shop in Avignon (or Andorra), thundering all kinds of anathemas upon Italy and Prussia, blessing French and Austrian flags, and otherwise making himself look as partisan in the war as he could possibly be.

I wouldn't underestimate Eugénie's importance; Napoleon III certainly valued her opinions. He consulted her and she acted as his Regent in 1859, 1865, and 1870. It was her own Catholic and Conservative convictions that countered Napoleon's liberal tendencies, and she even meddled in affairs of state, especially concerning the intervention in Mexico. You are correct that he courted French Catholics, but the periods are wrong: they were important in his election as President and later plebiscites that confirmed him as Emperor, and even played a part of the foreign policy of the Authoritarian Empire (re. Napoleon III sending troops to Rome, intervening in Indochina, and even partially his intervention in Mexico). All were done to satisfy French Catholics. But by the 1860s Napoleon III chose to liberalize the regime, widening the strength of the opposition. It was the Catholics who protested most vigorously against Napoleon's Italian policy that reduced the Pope to Rome--the very people who rose Napoleon to his throne was also those who conducted the first campaign of criticism against him. After that, Napoleon's government was a little less conciliatory: laws were passed against religious orders, exceptional privileges held by the clergy were abolished, and the Catholic press was muzzled.

Really, it isn't surprising: Catholics have always been heavily attached to the rightist movements in France, especially the monarchists, the Legitimists and Orléanists. Napoleon III secured his election on quashing the anarchy of the Second Republic, and to the conservative Catholics, he was the best man to handle the job. As soon as Napoleon displeased them, they quickly moved into the opposition. So even if Italy proves bolder, I think it is more likely for the Pope to remain where he is than flee. After all, Italy finally took Rome in OTL and the Pope was not put to death. Yes, Pius was often bullheaded, but I wouldn't think himself stupid. Even a bolder Italy isn't going to string the Pope up. He'd confine himself, hating the Italian government even more. Even with the troubles that existed between the Pope and the Italian government OTL, it didn't seem to cause huge problems to common Italian Catholic.

Except now, there are two versions of Catholicism. The Old Catholics are going to say they are the real Catholics, that it is OK to be a Catholic and a German/Italian patriot, and that the Pope is an heretic and a stooge of the French. While the Popists are openly in league with the enemies of Germany and Italy. Popist clergy and lay activists are harassed by police, while Old Catholic clergy and lay activists get government support. Which brand do you think is going to become more popular among German/Italian masses ?

Againn, never underestimate the potential that nationalism may deploy when it is expressed through a religious lens, especially in the age of nationalism.

The doctrinal and organizational evolution of the Old Catholic Church into something akin to a liberal-progressive Anglicanism shall happen relatively quickly but overtime, as they struggle to differentiate from the obscurantist-reactionary Popist Church.

Alright. I find it extremely unlikely but it may be possible if Pius acts extremely stupid.

 

[LordKalvan]

I wouldn't underestimate Eugénie's importance; Napoleon III certainly valued her opinions. He consulted her and she acted as his Regent in 1859, 1865, and 1870. It was her own Catholic and Conservative convictions that countered Napoleon's liberal tendencies, and she even meddled in affairs of state, especially concerning the intervention in Mexico. You are correct that he courted French Catholics, but the periods are wrong: they were important in his election as President and later plebiscites that confirmed him as Emperor, and even played a part of the foreign policy of the Authoritarian Empire (re. Napoleon III sending troops to Rome, intervening in Indochina, and even partially his intervention in Mexico). All were done to satisfy French Catholics. But by the 1860s Napoleon III chose to liberalize the regime, widening the strength of the opposition. It was the Catholics who protested most vigorously against Napoleon's Italian policy that reduced the Pope to Rome--the very people who rose Napoleon to his throne was also those who conducted the first campaign of criticism against him. After that, Napoleon's government was a little less conciliatory: laws were passed against religious orders, exceptional privileges held by the clergy were abolished, and the Catholic press was muzzled.

Really, it isn't surprising: Catholics have always been heavily attached to the rightist movements in France, especially the monarchists, the Legitimists and Orléanists. Napoleon III secured his election on quashing the anarchy of the Second Republic, and to the conservative Catholics, he was the best man to handle the job. As soon as Napoleon displeased them, they quickly moved into the opposition. So even if Italy proves bolder, I think it is more likely for the Pope to remain where he is than flee. After all, Italy finally took Rome in OTL and the Pope was not put to death. Yes, Pius was often bullheaded, but I wouldn't think himself stupid. Even a bolder Italy isn't going to string the Pope up. He'd confine himself, hating the Italian government even more. Even with the troubles that existed between the Pope and the Italian government OTL, it didn't seem to cause huge problems to common Italian Catholic.




Alright. I find it extremely unlikely but it may be possible if Pius acts extremely stupid.

You're right about Eugenie (whose famous quote was "my son cannot be emperor without a war"), and also about the divide opening between the emperor and the catholics (in particular after the convention with Italy in 1864 brought to a substantial reduction of French troops in Rome). I still believe that Nappy cannot afford to do nothing if Italy denounces the convention and annexes Rome. The empire is less than stable (and the backflips in internal policy during the 1860s are a clear sign of it): both the liberals and the left want a share of the power, and there were incidents in Paris in 1869. Even if the emperor won the referendum of May 1870, it was clear that only some military victory might completely mend the regime: I think there is no way for Nappy short of going to war.

As far as the papacy is going to behave, it's a difficult question, since it depends not only on the pope himsef but also on the different factions in the Curia. IOTL Vatican I and the affirmation of papal infallibility was strongly opposed by the more liberal clergy (and came as bad news to catholic monarchs too: even Austria denounced the Concordat of 1855). The Non Expedit was a clear declaration of war to the Italian unitary state (but also a very dangerous precedent for any other nation with strong catholic presence). I would say it might be quite possible that ITTL the more hard-lined faction of the Curia prevails, and the pope leaves Rome. Given that the Non Expedit produced a significant distortion in Italian politics and social development, I'd say that if the pope leaves and a schism happens (as it happened IOTL: only this time the Old Catholics would have a stronger backing) it is good news for Italy.

 

[Leistungsfähiger Amerikan]

I chose CP-Russian Quadruple Alliance, Anglo-French Dual Entente because without Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia have lost their long term strategic rivalry over the Balkans. Russia will continue to view the Ottomans as her traditional foe, and this will pit Russia against Britain. Britain, on the other hand, will see Germany as the long term rival due to the policy of not letting Europe become dominated by one power. Russia and Germany came very close to allying IOTL, whereas Russia and Britain came very close to war IOTL.

 

[Elfwine]

The problem is that Russia has good reason to be very, very, very, very worried about Teutonia (Greater Germany for those less disrespect of this blob) - for those who have played Paradox games, Prussia will have enormous bad boy.

The idea that a Germany which has just devoured the better part of the Habsburg Empire is a "sated" power will be hard to sell - particularly since the person responsible for the advancement and success of the "sated" argument OTL has been replaced or overridden on a really crucial part of policy.

Interests in the Balkans vs. fears of further Teutonic expansion...assuming Russia isn't as simple mindedly Prussophiliac as assumed by Eurofed, not a hard call.

I'm not saying Anglo-Russian relations will be good, but French-Russian relations are likely to be stronger with an even more threatening Germany, so why does the alliance go away?

Teutonia is more worrisome than Russians threatening the Ottomans, too when it comes to England's decisions.

Italy may cling to Teutonia though.

 

[SavoyTruffle]

The problem is that Russia has good reason to be very, very, very, very worried about Teutonia (Greater Germany for those less disrespect of this blob) - for those who have played Paradox games, Prussia will have enormous bad boy.

The idea that a Germany which has just devoured the better part of the Habsburg Empire is a "sated" power will be hard to sell - particularly since the person responsible for the advancement and success of the "sated" argument OTL has been replaced or overridden on a really crucial part of policy.

Interests in the Balkans vs. fears of further Teutonic expansion...assuming Russia isn't as simple mindedly Prussophiliac as assumed by Eurofed, not a hard call.

I'm not saying Anglo-Russian relations will be good, but French-Russian relations are likely to be stronger with an even more threatening Germany, so why does the alliance go away?

Teutonia is more worrisome than Russians threatening the Ottomans, too when it comes to England's decisions.

Italy may cling to Teutonia though.

You're telling me; even if I do the Vicky Kleindeutschland unification chain I still end up with enormous badboy, let alone if I did a Großdeutschland!

 

[Douglas]

Where are the Austrian going to find 300,000 soldiers to send to Italy while still keeping troops on the German border and in Galicia?

Custoza was less a decisive victory than the KuK propaganda made of it: you don't often see the victor retreating from the field and refusing any other engagement.

The border between Austria and Italy is WW1 border at this point. Even with numerical advantage, a decisive Austrian invasion is very hard to believe. Are they attacking on the Isonzo or on the Asiago highlands?

At Caporetto, the Austrian had some 10 German divisions in support, IIRC; even so, they were unable to force the crossing of the Piave. In case you are under some wrong impression, I'll add that the French and British troops sent to Italy after Caporetto arrived after the end of the offensive, and were positioned as reserve.

I noticed you didn't bother to check anything I wrote before this.

 

[Elfwine]

You're telling me; even if I do the Vicky Kleindeutschland unification chain I still end up with enormous badboy, let alone if I did a Großdeutschland!

Kudos to Paradox for acknowledging the historical reality that Prussia was a massive blob with no "cores" on most of Germany.



There are ways this scenario could happen - though it may take stupidity on the part of Austria f'instance. But all of them run roughshod over cherished assumptions and ideas of the day, and end badly.

 

[SavoyTruffle]

Kudos to Paradox for acknowledging the historical reality that Prussia was a massive blob with no "cores" on most of Germany.



There are ways this scenario could happen - though it may take stupidity on the part of Austria f'instance. But all of them run roughshod over cherished assumptions and ideas of the day, and end badly.

Not really - it does have cores on Kleindeutschland, but given that numerous event annexations happen the badboy will still pile up regardless.

 

[Elfwine]

Not really - it does have cores on Kleindeutschland, but given that numerous event annexations happen the badboy will still pile up regardless.

Interesting. But the effects in this regard (badboy) are similar - Prussia is aggressively expanding in the ways Paradox games penalize you for. And for that matter, real history. No one likes hegemons. As Wilhelm II found out the hard way and whoever is in charge in this timeline will find out even faster.

This is kind of off topic, but does this happen regardless of what path you pick for German unification?

 

[LordKalvan]

I noticed you didn't bother to check anything I wrote before this.

Oh, but I did.
I think you are missing the point here, though.

It is quite obvious that there will be no real Austrian intervention if they wait 6 weeks before intervening: even without Sedan, the French did not win a single engagement.
It would be even more funny if they wait, then declare war and immediately set up on the defensive.
If I can make a nitpick, Italy's estimate looks on the low side: in 1866 there were 120,000 men with Lamarmora at Custoza and another 85,000 with Cialdini on the lower Po. This is exactly the amount that your source extrapolates from 1861. Unlikely, isn't it?

I answered to your subsequent "edit post", which at least proposed the Austrians doing something. I'm still waiting your answers to my questions. BTW, July would already be almost late to start a campaign across the Isonzo or on the Asiago plains; September is obviously worse, giving just a couple of months of reasonable weather. Are they going to wait until next spring?

 

[LordKalvan]

It's interesting to note that Prussia in 1807 was at its lowest ebb, and at the Congress of Vienna their position was always supported by Russia (which apparently did not look with too much fear on an aggrandisement of Prussia).

With regards to Austria, Russia was unpleasantly surprised when they did not receive any Austrian support during the Crimea. The KuK aspiration in the Balkans were also considered with alarm.

Is it so surprising that Russia (or at least Russia's prime minister) feels supportive of Prussian ambition in 1868 and 1870?

 

[Douglas]

Oh, but I did.
I think you are missing the point here, though.

It is quite obvious that there will be no real Austrian intervention if they wait 6 weeks before intervening: even without Sedan, the French did not win a single engagement.
It would be even more funny if they wait, then declare war and immediately set up on the defensive.
If I can make a nitpick, Italy's estimate looks on the low side: in 1866 there were 120,000 men with Lamarmora at Custoza and another 85,000 with Cialdini on the lower Po. This is exactly the amount that your source extrapolates from 1861. Unlikely, isn't it?

All extrapolations were done by me. Anything unmarked with an asterisk, well, you provide the source for!

I answered to your subsequent "edit post", which at least proposed the Austrians doing something. I'm still waiting your answers to my questions. BTW, July would already be almost late to start a campaign across the Isonzo or on the Asiago plains; September is obviously worse, giving just a couple of months of reasonable weather. Are they going to wait until next spring?

I don't really care; the point was subsidiary as a counter to any possible quibbling about the scenario I discussed.

Frankly, debating this is rather tiring and I'll let my points and those of others who disagree with fanciful partitions stand on their own merits.

 

[LordKalvan]

Good idea. For myself, I'll admit at being less than impressed by your brilliance and your extrapolating power. Tough, I know, but that's life. Isn't it?

 

[I Blame Communism]

It's interesting to note that Prussia in 1807 was at its lowest ebb, and at the Congress of Vienna their position was always supported by Russia (which apparently did not look with too much fear on an aggrandisement of Prussia).

With regards to Austria, Russia was unpleasantly surprised when they did not receive any Austrian support during the Crimea. The KuK aspiration in the Balkans were also considered with alarm.

Is it so surprising that Russia (or at least Russia's prime minister) feels supportive of Prussian ambition in 1868 and 1870?

Is it really necessary to point out the difference between helping a country which if not for a distinguished (Hanoverian) military organiser would be as important a coalition member as Sweden lift itself up to being the least of great powers, and helping Europe's best land army and most promising industrial economy establish its complete dominance of the centre of the continent?

Diplomats aren't betting at the races, they don't just put all their money on their favourite. If an ally gets too strong, they worry.

 

[LordKalvan]

Is it really necessary to point out the difference between helping a country which if not for a distinguished (Hanoverian) military organiser would be as important a coalition member as Sweden lift itself up to being the least of great powers, and helping Europe's best land army and most promising industrial economy establish its complete dominance of the centre of the continent?

Diplomats aren't betting at the races, they don't just put all their money on their favourite. If an ally gets too strong, they worry.

well, considering that a couple of generations before that Prussia had created a lot of havoc...but then Russians appears to have a love/hate relation with Prussia. And it is a fact that Gorkhacov signed an anti-Austrian (and indirectly anti-French agreement). The other fact is that no one knows if (and what) Bismarck promised out-of-the-record. After all Nappy was sure that Bismarck had promised him a free hand in Luxembourg.

The quip about diplomats and their worries explains why Prussia/Germany should stay away from any long-term alliance with Russia.

 

[Eurofed]

well, considering that a couple of generations before that Prussia had created a lot of havoc...but then Russians appears to have a love/hate relation with Prussia. And it is a fact that Gorkhacov signed an anti-Austrian (and indirectly anti-French agreement). The other fact is that no one knows if (and what) Bismarck promised out-of-the-record. After all Nappy was sure that Bismarck had promised him a free hand in Luxembourg.

The quip about diplomats and their worries explains why Prussia/Germany should stay away from any long-term alliance with Russia.

This is actually a very interesting point. We actually don't know if and which additional compensations were promised off-the-record by OvB to Gorkhacov when they signed their secret alliance, and moreso, we don't know what compensations (besides the obvious gain of Galicia-Bukovina, and the indirect strategic benefits from the disappearance of A-H) OvB would give to Russia at the peace table when they draft and finalize the partition plan. My best bet is about some kind German support for Russian expansion against the Ottomans. By the way, I'm also going to assume that Italy follows the lead of Otto on this, since they have the same interest in the alliance and partition to succeed.

A necessary aside: I kindly ask the 4/5 persons who have been strong naysayers for the scenario not to take this point as an excuse to rehash their "Bismarck/Russia would never do this, the scenario would never happen" obstructionist argument. You have been most vocal about it already. I also notice that you apparently are a small minority in comparison to the people who voted in the poll.

Now, assuming that OvB makes some secret, off-the-record promise about Russia getting some kind of free hand against the Ottomans in the Balkans as far as Germany (and Italy) are concerned, what happens in the near future ? The anti-Ottoman revolts in the Balkans and the Russo-Turkish war loom close, and with a victorious Russia in the war of 1870, the demise of A-H, and Russia getting such a "greenlight", they seem even more likely to happen than OTL.

Of course, there is the distinct possibility that Russia would have financially exhausted itself in the war against Austria (as it happened at the end of the Russo-Turkish war) that it cannot make a second war against the Ottoman Empire so soon, and in such a case, I suppose the crisis is somehow defused, but Russia shall still want to put its check in receveirship sooner or later.

But assuming this is not the case, what is Germany (and Italy) going to do ? To be true to its promises keeps Russia happy, and in all likelihood reasonably content as an ally in the near future, but it pisses off Britain, and requires the Santo Stefano deal to get largely ratified, laying the groundwork for prevailing Russian influence in the Balkans (at least as long as Russia is able to keep Bulgaria on a leash). To renege the promises with one pretext or another PO and alienates Russia, which is going to feel cheated, and turn hostile. It limits Russian influence in the Balkans, and it makes Britain (and the Ottomans) a little happier with Germany (and Italy).

 

[Elfwine]

This is actually a very interesting point. We actually don't know if and which additional compensations were promised off-the-record by OvB to Gorkhacov when they signed their secret alliance, and moreso, we don't know what compensations (besides the obvious gain of Galicia-Bukovina, and the indirect strategic benefits from the disappearance of A-H) OvB would give to Russia at the peace table when they draft and finalize the partition plan. My best bet is about some kind German support for Russian expansion against the Ottomans. By the way, I'm also going to assume that Italy follows the lead of Otto on this, since they have the same interest in the alliance and partition to succeed.

A necessary aside: I kindly ask the 4/5 persons who have been strong naysayers not to take this point as an excuse to rehash their "Bismarck/Russia would never do this, the scenario would never happen" obstructionist argument. You have been most vocal about it already. I also notice that you apparently are a small minority in comparison to the people who voted in the poll. You have been most vocal about it. I also notice that you are a small minority of the people who voted in the poll.

And you have been most determined to ignore any obstacles that get in the way of the scenario ever occurring, including a lack of desire to the point of opposition to it occurring on at least one of the main player's parts.

Can't really get a realistic set up of alliances and decisions if you just ignore the problems in the way of this annexation as you've been doing.

If you're going to have for instance Bismarck drop his concerns about the importance of AH and Russia assume a stronger Germany is a good neighbor because Germany makes some promise about the Balkans, why not have the British abandon their concerns with the balance of power while you're at it?

Speaking as one of the naysayers, that's my problem.

1) Could a scenario be constructed where the Habsburg Empire collapses? Indisputably.

2) Is this particular method of that likely? Doubtful.

3) Could one be constructed where Germany is larger than OTL? Assuredly.

4) Could the two go together? Definitely.

5) Would Bismarck oppose Germany destroying the Habsburg Empire every step of the way? Certainly.

6) Would something or someone overriding him on this mean that he (Bismarck) is able to do what he did OTL to convince Europe that Germany was a sated power and not out to further disrupt the balance of power than the existence of the nonGreater Germany already did by definition? Absolutely not.

7) Would the individual or forces at work that make Germany absorb Bohemia and Austria seek even further expansion and do the damage Wilhelm II did OTL only earlier? In all probability.

8) Would this mean Russia sees Germany as an ally? Not a chance.

9) Have you just upset the situation in the Balkans? Definitely.

10) Does the average voter in the poll understand any of the political issues of the 19th century, including how even Russia wanted to preserve the Habsburg Empire for its own reasons, issues with the Balkans not negating that? Evidently not.