This is a proposed POD for the events of 20th May 1941 during the Battle of Maleme during the Battle for Crete when a single flawed decision to abandon the Hill 109 position allowed the German paratroopers to snatch victory when they had been clearly defeated.
During the day the main unit defending Maleme and the Tavronitis bridge, the 22nd New Zealand Infantry Battalion which had fought in the ill fated Greek campaign before being evacuated to Crete and had managed to evacuate with most of its personnel and equipment and ended up on the Island with a final strength as of 20th May 1941 of 644 Officers and men
Unfortunately during the confusion of the evacuating nearly all of its radios where lost due to misunderstanding of orders as well as its motor transport and carriers - this was to have serious repercussions with regards to the units commander Lt Col Leslie Andrew VC DSO decision making during the evening of the 20th May as he only had a single wireless set that was netted into his parent Brigade HQ and many of his phone lines to his Company HQs were cut during the fighting and by air attacks
On the 20th of May Andrews 4 fighting companies were spread out on Hill 109 and around the airfield a composite 5th company made up from the units HQ and echelon troops - more information on his dispositions and supporting troops (10 Bofors guns etc) can be found here (map of the defences shown below) as well as a very good account of the battle and the reasons for Andrews withdrawal and it goes on to discuss his Brigade commanders failure to reinforce him (Brigadier Hargest) was under the impression that his other 2 Battalions (21st and 23rd) were fully engaged despite that fact that they had reported that they were so far unengaged.
Andrews had based his HQ on the hill 109 a feature that dominated the airfield but with his comms dead and runners seemingly unable to reach his fighting companies had concluded that his battalion was overrun and so performed a limited retreat with the expectation of reinforcements from Brigade that would allow him to counter attack in the evening (an action that the Brigade had rehearsed) which did not transpire for a number of reasons - mostly it seems Brigadier Hargest losing his grip and subsequently abandoning the airfield altogether.
Note that none of these decisions where the result of the units involved actually being forced off the locations they held by enemy action but rather a result of poorly made decisions due to the fog of war and I have to be blunt rather poor grip by the Brigade commander and the overall Division commander.
This allowed the Germans to secure the Hill, Bridge and subsequently the airstrip enough to allow an entire regiment (Brigade) of mountain troops (100th Gebirgsjäger Regiment) to be flown in the next day (from 1700 hrs May 21st) tipping the balance into the Germans favour and effectively pushing the New Zealand Brigade away from the airfield to allow it to become an airhead.
So my POD is this - the misunderstanding that led to the loss of 22nd Battalions Wireless sets during their evacuation from Greece 'does not happen' and allows Lt Col Andrews to stay in contact with the majority of his Battalions fighting units during the German assault on Maleme and Tavronitis bridge and fully aware that his sub units are not only not overrun but in fact doing rather well as well as being able to coordinate his Battalion as a single fighting unit more effectively and he subsequently does not order a confused and unnecessary withdrawal from Hill 109 which led to the other 22nd Battalion fighting companies (C and D) also withdrawing later on that night / Morning of the 21st May.
With the German Glider and Paratroopers decimated by the days fighting and virtually out of ammunition - and with better comms with Andrews and his sub units Brigadier Hargest does finally get a grip and send the balance of 2 Infantry Battalions (the 23rd Battalion as planned and likely all or element of the 28th Maori Battalion) to reinforce Andrews in clearing the airfield and Tavronitis Bridge possibly in the early hours of the 21st.
With the Airfield and Bridge still in 'British' hands come dawn on the 21st May and the majority of the first waves Glider and Paratrooper units all but wiped out the Germans are unable and unwilling to reinforce the assault on Maleme.
Does this turn of events doom the entire operation and turn Crete into a defeat for the Germans with the complete loss of the fighting forces of the 7th Flieger Division landed on the 20th May (as well as losses to the various landing flotillas which might be less if the op is called off on the 21st)?
During the day the main unit defending Maleme and the Tavronitis bridge, the 22nd New Zealand Infantry Battalion which had fought in the ill fated Greek campaign before being evacuated to Crete and had managed to evacuate with most of its personnel and equipment and ended up on the Island with a final strength as of 20th May 1941 of 644 Officers and men
Unfortunately during the confusion of the evacuating nearly all of its radios where lost due to misunderstanding of orders as well as its motor transport and carriers - this was to have serious repercussions with regards to the units commander Lt Col Leslie Andrew VC DSO decision making during the evening of the 20th May as he only had a single wireless set that was netted into his parent Brigade HQ and many of his phone lines to his Company HQs were cut during the fighting and by air attacks
On the 20th of May Andrews 4 fighting companies were spread out on Hill 109 and around the airfield a composite 5th company made up from the units HQ and echelon troops - more information on his dispositions and supporting troops (10 Bofors guns etc) can be found here (map of the defences shown below) as well as a very good account of the battle and the reasons for Andrews withdrawal and it goes on to discuss his Brigade commanders failure to reinforce him (Brigadier Hargest) was under the impression that his other 2 Battalions (21st and 23rd) were fully engaged despite that fact that they had reported that they were so far unengaged.
Andrews had based his HQ on the hill 109 a feature that dominated the airfield but with his comms dead and runners seemingly unable to reach his fighting companies had concluded that his battalion was overrun and so performed a limited retreat with the expectation of reinforcements from Brigade that would allow him to counter attack in the evening (an action that the Brigade had rehearsed) which did not transpire for a number of reasons - mostly it seems Brigadier Hargest losing his grip and subsequently abandoning the airfield altogether.
Note that none of these decisions where the result of the units involved actually being forced off the locations they held by enemy action but rather a result of poorly made decisions due to the fog of war and I have to be blunt rather poor grip by the Brigade commander and the overall Division commander.
This allowed the Germans to secure the Hill, Bridge and subsequently the airstrip enough to allow an entire regiment (Brigade) of mountain troops (100th Gebirgsjäger Regiment) to be flown in the next day (from 1700 hrs May 21st) tipping the balance into the Germans favour and effectively pushing the New Zealand Brigade away from the airfield to allow it to become an airhead.
So my POD is this - the misunderstanding that led to the loss of 22nd Battalions Wireless sets during their evacuation from Greece 'does not happen' and allows Lt Col Andrews to stay in contact with the majority of his Battalions fighting units during the German assault on Maleme and Tavronitis bridge and fully aware that his sub units are not only not overrun but in fact doing rather well as well as being able to coordinate his Battalion as a single fighting unit more effectively and he subsequently does not order a confused and unnecessary withdrawal from Hill 109 which led to the other 22nd Battalion fighting companies (C and D) also withdrawing later on that night / Morning of the 21st May.
With the German Glider and Paratroopers decimated by the days fighting and virtually out of ammunition - and with better comms with Andrews and his sub units Brigadier Hargest does finally get a grip and send the balance of 2 Infantry Battalions (the 23rd Battalion as planned and likely all or element of the 28th Maori Battalion) to reinforce Andrews in clearing the airfield and Tavronitis Bridge possibly in the early hours of the 21st.
With the Airfield and Bridge still in 'British' hands come dawn on the 21st May and the majority of the first waves Glider and Paratrooper units all but wiped out the Germans are unable and unwilling to reinforce the assault on Maleme.
Does this turn of events doom the entire operation and turn Crete into a defeat for the Germans with the complete loss of the fighting forces of the 7th Flieger Division landed on the 20th May (as well as losses to the various landing flotillas which might be less if the op is called off on the 21st)?