Axis of Andes
- Thread starter DG Valdron
- Start date
- Status
Finally a goddammed butterfly shows up
Ouch!
I can't believe I accidentally screwed this up and deleted the entire passage. Goddam.
I'm going to have to rewrite it.
For those who missed it. The Butterflies have finally landed. In OTL there's a 4 day civil war in August 1932, which results in a massive bloodbath. The Anti-Bonifaz forces win out. The Army stays in its Barracks and sits out the conflict.
In this timeline, the war goes six days. In this timeline, with no incriminating Peruvian passport and more of a history of Ecuadorian Chauvinism, Bonifaz does slightly better, with a few more paramilitary, a bit better motivated, with his enemies less resolute. The big change is that Colonel Alba is persuaded to intervene, and a part of the Army abandons neutrality. Velasaco Ibarra brings the Congress around. Bonifaz takes office, with Colonel Luis Alba and Velasco Ibarra forming an informal triumvirate.
Wacky hijinks will ensue over the next few years.
Ouch!
I can't believe I accidentally screwed this up and deleted the entire passage. Goddam.
I'm going to have to rewrite it.
For those who missed it. The Butterflies have finally landed. In OTL there's a 4 day civil war in August 1932, which results in a massive bloodbath. The Anti-Bonifaz forces win out. The Army stays in its Barracks and sits out the conflict.
In this timeline, the war goes six days. In this timeline, with no incriminating Peruvian passport and more of a history of Ecuadorian Chauvinism, Bonifaz does slightly better, with a few more paramilitary, a bit better motivated, with his enemies less resolute. The big change is that Colonel Alba is persuaded to intervene, and a part of the Army abandons neutrality. Velasaco Ibarra brings the Congress around. Bonifaz takes office, with Colonel Luis Alba and Velasco Ibarra forming an informal triumvirate.
Wacky hijinks will ensue over the next few years.
Last edited:
Very good! I enjoyed the background history of Ecuador. Indeed, the focus on one small country in the background of the world's action is enthralling. The reader knows that this is not the same thing as always, that he is reading something new. Your writing style, which I would desribe as a cross between ironic, academic, and casual banter, is not flowery but goes on at a good clip and holds my attention. Bravo!
And as I said, the background history and overview of Ecuadorian politics is interesting. Don't worry that it doesn't have enough "blood and guts" in it.
And as I said, the background history and overview of Ecuadorian politics is interesting. Don't worry that it doesn't have enough "blood and guts" in it.
The Colombia-Peru War, 1932-1933
"A war without casualties. Nonsense! My friends, this war has had one great victim, it has made a singular casualty. And that casualty is Ecuador!"
Velasco Ibbara, 1933
The Columbia-Peru war comes hot on the heels of Ecuador’s Presidential crisis, and more than anything else shaped the policy and history of the triumvirate.
In 1922, Augusto Leguia, the Dictator of Peru negotiates a secret Treaty, the Salomon-Lopez Treaty. The treaty provides for, among other things, Columbia’s recognition of Peru’s territorial claims against Ecuador, and a flanking corridor of land on Ecuador’s northern side between the Putomayo and Caqueta rivers. In return, the Peruvians concede a ‘corridor to the amazon’ a thin wedge of land deep in the the interior, and the towns of Letitia and Tarapaca.
Letitia and Tarapaca had been settled by Peruvians but claimed by the Colombians. The treaty gave these interior towns to the Colombians, who established their control. But the population remained mostly Peruvian.
In August 1930, Leguia is overthrown by Lieutenant Colonel Sanchez. The treaty becomes public for the first time. The Peruvians saw this as giving away not just land, but their own people, had reacted with outrage and Sanchez had abrogated the treaty. Crying betrayal the Ecuadorians expell the Columbian ambassador and break diplomatic relations. But the weak Arroya government has neither the motivation or the ability to do much about it. Bad feelings all around, but the Colombians hang on to Letitia and Tarapaca.
There’s a lot of uncertain border territory in the Oriente, up and down the Andes. Iit’s not well demarcated, but then again, its thinly populated, inaccessible and of no particular value. So mostly the latin american governments simmer and snip and argue with each other. But really, who wants to go to war over a few acres of jungle?
For the next two years though, nothing much happens.
Until one day on September 1, 1932.
The war starts prosaically enough, with a civilian insurrection in a town called Iquitos, deep in the Peruvian rainforest. Sanchez sends troops to quell the insurrection, and then once that is done... Well, suddenly, he’s got a real force in the area, and the disputed towns of Letitia and Tarapaca are just down the river. So he sends his forces in, expelling Colombian officials and administrators, and interdicting river traffic.
Or perhaps a band of loyal Peruvians invade the town of Letitia, drive out the Colombians and then call for the support of Sanchez, who sends troops in support.
Regardless, Sanchez looks at the situation with cold, cold eyes. The treaty is defunct, the people in these towns are Peruvian by blood, Colombia has no navy and no roads to get into the interior. So why not.
The Colombian government doesn’t respond until September 17, probably because they really don’t want to. These towns are deep in the interior, they’re hard to get to, of little value, and fighting a war there, even sending an army down there, is going to be hideously expensive with little benefit.
But the news gets out. Columbian river traffic gets molested, suddenly the whole nation is up in arms and the government has no choice but to follow along. By September 19 the Columbian newspaper announces 10,000 letters calling for war. The same day thousands of students are on the march. The Colombian Senate authorizes ten million dollars for the war. The nation is seized by a fit of madness, patriotic fervour running rampant.
By the start of October both countries were gearing up for war, building up armies, stockpiling weapons and ammunition. The Colombians purchase a fleet of old river ships from Europe, and refurbish a series of passenger planes into a temporary air force.
Then they head down river. Between waiting for the fleet to arrive, provisioning it, and actually sailing an army down the inland watercourses, they finally reach the Amazon by December, 1932, and are approaching the town of Tarapaca by February of 1933. In one sense, that’s remarkably fast work in another, its slow.
By February 1933, at least three thousand Columbian troops faced off against three thousand Peruvian troops on either side of the Putomayo river. On February 14, 1933, the Peruvian air force attempts to bomb the Colombian fleet. But it misses. The next day, the town of Tarapaca falls without resistance, as the Peruvians retreat.
Then, somehow, nothing much happens, the two sides building their forces, preparing for the conflict, until April 30, 1932, when President Sanchez is assassinated while reviewing troops. His successor, within two weeks calls it all off.
The Salomon-Lopez Treaty is adopted. Everyone kisses and makes up. Medals and parades all around.
And so, we have an almost typical comic opera war. Near as I can tell, there’s a good chance that no one was unlucky enough to actually be killed. There’s lots of flag waving, angry letters, waving fists and patriotic fervour. But somehow the actual forces spend most of their time just finding their way into the theatre. Somehow they manage to avoid actually coming to blows. And then, just as suddenly as it flared up, its over.
But it didn’t have to be that way, and very nearly wasn’t.
Now, the scary thing here is that Sanchez was a genuine badass. According to Wikipedia, he was wounded in five places and lost three fingers during the overthrow of President Billinghurst in 1914. The fingers went when he grabbed a firing machine gun by the barrel with his bare hands and turned it on the enemy. That’s terrifyingly insane. In 1921 he was involved in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow another Peruvian despot, shot, injured, captured and exiled. While in exile, he went abroad he served with the Spanish Foreign Legion in Morocco, where he was wounded yet again. The Spanish legions in Morocco produced General Franco and his bunch of hardcases.. He also served with the Royal Army of Italy in 1925, and took advanced military studies in France in 1926. As late as March 1932, he responded to an assassination attempt by pulling his own gun and trying to shoot his attacker. Here was a man who took war seriously, who studied it as a vocation, who was fearless and aggressive in battle, who had seen combat again and again and didn’t flinch.
Looking at the pictures of Sanchez, you can tell he’s one of those fearless mad bastards who’s just going to get thousands of people killed. Everything we know tells us that this man was brewing up a great big kettle of bad news, and everything we know about this guy tells us he wasn’t going to hesitate to dish it out.
Make no mistake, even if in hindsight the war is a comic opera farce, the combatants were deadly serious. By March, the Peruvians were taking delivery of a new fleet of Douglas Aircraft delivered from the United States. This was no pretend air force. On April 30, when Sanchez was shot, he was reviewing 20,000 new troops recruited for the coming war. Those are serious numbers, those are serious weapons.
So here we have a remarkable point of departure. Because sure as shooting, if Sanchez had lived, there was going to be a real four star dust up. The Columbia Peru war would not have been a months long tussle in the jungle, but a bloodbath on the order of the Chaco war, a history making, border shaking, nation shaping conflict.
But he died. So it just didn’t happen. Instead, the Colombia-Peru War is just a little footnote, in our timeline and in this one.
"A war without casualties. Nonsense! My friends, this war has had one great victim, it has made a singular casualty. And that casualty is Ecuador!"
Velasco Ibbara, 1933
The Columbia-Peru war comes hot on the heels of Ecuador’s Presidential crisis, and more than anything else shaped the policy and history of the triumvirate.
In 1922, Augusto Leguia, the Dictator of Peru negotiates a secret Treaty, the Salomon-Lopez Treaty. The treaty provides for, among other things, Columbia’s recognition of Peru’s territorial claims against Ecuador, and a flanking corridor of land on Ecuador’s northern side between the Putomayo and Caqueta rivers. In return, the Peruvians concede a ‘corridor to the amazon’ a thin wedge of land deep in the the interior, and the towns of Letitia and Tarapaca.
Letitia and Tarapaca had been settled by Peruvians but claimed by the Colombians. The treaty gave these interior towns to the Colombians, who established their control. But the population remained mostly Peruvian.
In August 1930, Leguia is overthrown by Lieutenant Colonel Sanchez. The treaty becomes public for the first time. The Peruvians saw this as giving away not just land, but their own people, had reacted with outrage and Sanchez had abrogated the treaty. Crying betrayal the Ecuadorians expell the Columbian ambassador and break diplomatic relations. But the weak Arroya government has neither the motivation or the ability to do much about it. Bad feelings all around, but the Colombians hang on to Letitia and Tarapaca.
There’s a lot of uncertain border territory in the Oriente, up and down the Andes. Iit’s not well demarcated, but then again, its thinly populated, inaccessible and of no particular value. So mostly the latin american governments simmer and snip and argue with each other. But really, who wants to go to war over a few acres of jungle?
For the next two years though, nothing much happens.
Until one day on September 1, 1932.
The war starts prosaically enough, with a civilian insurrection in a town called Iquitos, deep in the Peruvian rainforest. Sanchez sends troops to quell the insurrection, and then once that is done... Well, suddenly, he’s got a real force in the area, and the disputed towns of Letitia and Tarapaca are just down the river. So he sends his forces in, expelling Colombian officials and administrators, and interdicting river traffic.
Or perhaps a band of loyal Peruvians invade the town of Letitia, drive out the Colombians and then call for the support of Sanchez, who sends troops in support.
Regardless, Sanchez looks at the situation with cold, cold eyes. The treaty is defunct, the people in these towns are Peruvian by blood, Colombia has no navy and no roads to get into the interior. So why not.
The Colombian government doesn’t respond until September 17, probably because they really don’t want to. These towns are deep in the interior, they’re hard to get to, of little value, and fighting a war there, even sending an army down there, is going to be hideously expensive with little benefit.
But the news gets out. Columbian river traffic gets molested, suddenly the whole nation is up in arms and the government has no choice but to follow along. By September 19 the Columbian newspaper announces 10,000 letters calling for war. The same day thousands of students are on the march. The Colombian Senate authorizes ten million dollars for the war. The nation is seized by a fit of madness, patriotic fervour running rampant.
By the start of October both countries were gearing up for war, building up armies, stockpiling weapons and ammunition. The Colombians purchase a fleet of old river ships from Europe, and refurbish a series of passenger planes into a temporary air force.
Then they head down river. Between waiting for the fleet to arrive, provisioning it, and actually sailing an army down the inland watercourses, they finally reach the Amazon by December, 1932, and are approaching the town of Tarapaca by February of 1933. In one sense, that’s remarkably fast work in another, its slow.
By February 1933, at least three thousand Columbian troops faced off against three thousand Peruvian troops on either side of the Putomayo river. On February 14, 1933, the Peruvian air force attempts to bomb the Colombian fleet. But it misses. The next day, the town of Tarapaca falls without resistance, as the Peruvians retreat.
Then, somehow, nothing much happens, the two sides building their forces, preparing for the conflict, until April 30, 1932, when President Sanchez is assassinated while reviewing troops. His successor, within two weeks calls it all off.
The Salomon-Lopez Treaty is adopted. Everyone kisses and makes up. Medals and parades all around.
And so, we have an almost typical comic opera war. Near as I can tell, there’s a good chance that no one was unlucky enough to actually be killed. There’s lots of flag waving, angry letters, waving fists and patriotic fervour. But somehow the actual forces spend most of their time just finding their way into the theatre. Somehow they manage to avoid actually coming to blows. And then, just as suddenly as it flared up, its over.
But it didn’t have to be that way, and very nearly wasn’t.
Now, the scary thing here is that Sanchez was a genuine badass. According to Wikipedia, he was wounded in five places and lost three fingers during the overthrow of President Billinghurst in 1914. The fingers went when he grabbed a firing machine gun by the barrel with his bare hands and turned it on the enemy. That’s terrifyingly insane. In 1921 he was involved in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow another Peruvian despot, shot, injured, captured and exiled. While in exile, he went abroad he served with the Spanish Foreign Legion in Morocco, where he was wounded yet again. The Spanish legions in Morocco produced General Franco and his bunch of hardcases.. He also served with the Royal Army of Italy in 1925, and took advanced military studies in France in 1926. As late as March 1932, he responded to an assassination attempt by pulling his own gun and trying to shoot his attacker. Here was a man who took war seriously, who studied it as a vocation, who was fearless and aggressive in battle, who had seen combat again and again and didn’t flinch.
Looking at the pictures of Sanchez, you can tell he’s one of those fearless mad bastards who’s just going to get thousands of people killed. Everything we know tells us that this man was brewing up a great big kettle of bad news, and everything we know about this guy tells us he wasn’t going to hesitate to dish it out.
Make no mistake, even if in hindsight the war is a comic opera farce, the combatants were deadly serious. By March, the Peruvians were taking delivery of a new fleet of Douglas Aircraft delivered from the United States. This was no pretend air force. On April 30, when Sanchez was shot, he was reviewing 20,000 new troops recruited for the coming war. Those are serious numbers, those are serious weapons.
So here we have a remarkable point of departure. Because sure as shooting, if Sanchez had lived, there was going to be a real four star dust up. The Columbia Peru war would not have been a months long tussle in the jungle, but a bloodbath on the order of the Chaco war, a history making, border shaking, nation shaping conflict.
But he died. So it just didn’t happen. Instead, the Colombia-Peru War is just a little footnote, in our timeline and in this one.
September 21, 1931
Three days before the Inaugaration of President Bonifaz
Two Days After Columbia Goes to War
It was the week of the swearing in ceremony, and the three men were meeting for the first time, a meeting full of wariness and trepidation. None of them knew each other, though they’d known of each other. There might have been moments in the small circles that were Ecuadoran society that they had encountered each other. Luis Larrea had run the country for a few months, Velasco Ibbara was a famous and well read newspaper columnist, and Bonifaz.... Well Bonifaz had been around a long time, he’d been the steward of the central bank.
So even if they didn’t know each other, they knew of each other and they knew a lot about each other. Their reputations preceded them into the room. What they did not know, was whether they liked each other, whether they could tolerate each other. Instead their minds were full of doubts, of favours owed, of obligations and where they might lead.
There was an initial wariness. The Patrician was full of old world courtesy and grace. The politician full or chatty warmth. The soldier careful and polite. Conversation moved awkwardly, with a strangely ungainly quality. At the end of the meeting, none of the men could honestly admit to liking the others.
But strangely, they found that they worked together.
“So, what of Peru’s invasion of Columbia,” Velasco Ibbara brought the subject up. Since September the 17 it had occupied the front pages of newspapers all over latin America. The whole continent was buzzing. The Bonifaz crisis, the six day war, this was all forgotten. The coming inaugeration barely rated a mention. Velasco himself had written of it in a storming editorial.
“Shocking,” Bonifaz agreed. “Absolutely shocking.”
“What should our position be?” Velasco persisted.
“We have no love for either side,” Luis Alba pointed out. “The Colombians bargain with Peru was a betrayal. They surrendered our territory to the Peruvians? Let them deal with the consequences of their own dishonesty.”
“Still,” Velasco persisted, “Peru is clearly the aggressor. We must choose a side. We must support the Colombians.”
“Do you mean go to war?” Luis Alba asked incredulously. “We’re not prepared to go to war. We don’t have the troops, we don’t have the weapons, we don’t have the money.”
“Obviously,” Bonifaz said, “war is out of the question. We cannot take sides.”
“But your excellency,” Velasco said, “not to take a side, is indeed to take a side. To stay silent on a matter of naked aggression is to countenance it.”
“There’s truth in that,” Bonifaz admitted.
“There is also your own situation,” Velasco pressed. “It would not be good, given your ... lineage, to be seen siding with Peru. It would raise.... questions.”
Bonifaz leaned back in his seat, staring at Ibarra, wondering whether he should be offended.
“You mean because my father was from Peru, people might question my loyalty to Ecuador.”
“People have,” Velasco said bluntly.
Bonifaz nodded slowly.
“So,” he said, “I cannot afford to be seen as to sympathetic to them. Yes, I see your point.”
Bonifaz turned to the soldier.
“Luis,” he said, “I’d have your opinion. Am I too sympathetic to Peru.”
Alba regarded them levelly.
“If you were,” he said carefully, “then you would not be President today. And if you are.... You will not be President next week.”
“Bluntly put,” Bonifaz said.
“My apologies, excellency.”
“No apologies necessary,” Bonifaz replied, “I value plain speach. I must go hard against Peru, or my enemies will undermine me. This seems plain.”
The other men agreed.
“It’s not hard in this case,” Alba said, “Peru’s conduct is criminal, it’s naked aggression.”
“Will the Colombians win?” Bonifaz asked.
“Too early to tell,” Alba said. “They’re at a disadvantage. They have no river navy, no paths. They’ve got their work cut out even to get down there. But their war fever is up.”
“And if Peru wins?”
“Bad for us,” Velasco said. “We have our own border disputes with them. If they attack Colombia like this and win, then we will be next. Both virtue and self interest demands we side with them.”
“But our friend Luis there says we cannot join the fight.”
“There’s other ways,” Alba said. “We can levy a volunteer brigade. We can announce our support and friendship. There are measures.”
“As long as we do not commit troops or money?” Bonifaz said, smiling.
“We have more of a border with Peru than the Colombians. We may need them here first,” Alba joked. “If they become too upset with us.
“Really,” Bonifaz said. “Do you think they’d really attack?”
Alba almost chose to say nothing, he looked thoughtful. “They just did.”
******************
It’s hard to underestimate the formative influence of the Colombia-Peru War on the triumvirate, and the government they lead.
Neptali Bonifaz’s first public speech following his inaugeration was a ringing denunciation of Peruvian aggression. Within a week, the Peruvian ambassador had left, and Ecuador had broken diplomatic relations.
Velasco Ibbara announced the formation of a volunteer brigade to fight on the Colombians side. The Ecuadoran government chartered a ship to ferry them to Bogota where they were met by a parade. Ibbara accompanied the brigade on a diplomatic mission, and spent weeks giving speeches, inspecting Colombian war preparations, and quietly negotiating a diplomatic alliance between the two nations. Back in Quito and Guayquil, Ibarra lead huge anti-Peruvian rallies.
The National Compact marched in the streets, saluting Bonifaz portrait, swearing oaths to defend the sacred soil of Ecuador with their last drop of blood, or boasting of forming new volunteer brigades to travel to Bogota when the call came. Some bragged that their volunteer brigades would travel to Lima instead.
Luis Alba, in the meantime, looked to the the state of Ecuador’s army, and made careful assessments of the relative strength of the parties. Ibbara’s reports, the glowing commentaries of a non-military man, were dismissed. But from other sources, Alba charted the progress of Colombia’s river fleet and Peru’s military build up.
Between October and January, the war on their borders created a kind of holiday for the triumvirate. Ecuadorians had found something that brought them together, a common ground had been found. The poor remained poor, the working class discontent, the latifundistas and the business interests in a state of cold war. Everyone it seemed could agree on the Peruvian menace, on the justice of the Colombian cause, on the threat on the southern border and on the sanctity of the Ecuadoran nation.
And within that common ground, the triumvirate found the room to negotiate social compromises, buying a measure of peace between business classes and latifundista. Trading for respect for the latifundista entitlements. Quieting the socialists in exchange for slightly more support for the workers.
Neptali Bonifaz, a man whose position had been so tenuous that Congress had twice split almost down the middle, for and against him, a man whose election had provoked a civil war, had stumbled upon a winning formula, a way to keep the country together, or at least to keep his enemies at bay and maintain himself in power.
Ecuador was a fractured society. Wealth and prosperity could paper over the cracks. But wealth and prosperity had fled. The new unifying force was an enemy, it was fear. And it worked.
From this point on, every time troubles came, a crop blight, a drop in cacao prices, labour unrest, the Peruvian bogeyman was dragged out.
Three days before the Inaugaration of President Bonifaz
Two Days After Columbia Goes to War
It was the week of the swearing in ceremony, and the three men were meeting for the first time, a meeting full of wariness and trepidation. None of them knew each other, though they’d known of each other. There might have been moments in the small circles that were Ecuadoran society that they had encountered each other. Luis Larrea had run the country for a few months, Velasco Ibbara was a famous and well read newspaper columnist, and Bonifaz.... Well Bonifaz had been around a long time, he’d been the steward of the central bank.
So even if they didn’t know each other, they knew of each other and they knew a lot about each other. Their reputations preceded them into the room. What they did not know, was whether they liked each other, whether they could tolerate each other. Instead their minds were full of doubts, of favours owed, of obligations and where they might lead.
There was an initial wariness. The Patrician was full of old world courtesy and grace. The politician full or chatty warmth. The soldier careful and polite. Conversation moved awkwardly, with a strangely ungainly quality. At the end of the meeting, none of the men could honestly admit to liking the others.
But strangely, they found that they worked together.
“So, what of Peru’s invasion of Columbia,” Velasco Ibbara brought the subject up. Since September the 17 it had occupied the front pages of newspapers all over latin America. The whole continent was buzzing. The Bonifaz crisis, the six day war, this was all forgotten. The coming inaugeration barely rated a mention. Velasco himself had written of it in a storming editorial.
“Shocking,” Bonifaz agreed. “Absolutely shocking.”
“What should our position be?” Velasco persisted.
“We have no love for either side,” Luis Alba pointed out. “The Colombians bargain with Peru was a betrayal. They surrendered our territory to the Peruvians? Let them deal with the consequences of their own dishonesty.”
“Still,” Velasco persisted, “Peru is clearly the aggressor. We must choose a side. We must support the Colombians.”
“Do you mean go to war?” Luis Alba asked incredulously. “We’re not prepared to go to war. We don’t have the troops, we don’t have the weapons, we don’t have the money.”
“Obviously,” Bonifaz said, “war is out of the question. We cannot take sides.”
“But your excellency,” Velasco said, “not to take a side, is indeed to take a side. To stay silent on a matter of naked aggression is to countenance it.”
“There’s truth in that,” Bonifaz admitted.
“There is also your own situation,” Velasco pressed. “It would not be good, given your ... lineage, to be seen siding with Peru. It would raise.... questions.”
Bonifaz leaned back in his seat, staring at Ibarra, wondering whether he should be offended.
“You mean because my father was from Peru, people might question my loyalty to Ecuador.”
“People have,” Velasco said bluntly.
Bonifaz nodded slowly.
“So,” he said, “I cannot afford to be seen as to sympathetic to them. Yes, I see your point.”
Bonifaz turned to the soldier.
“Luis,” he said, “I’d have your opinion. Am I too sympathetic to Peru.”
Alba regarded them levelly.
“If you were,” he said carefully, “then you would not be President today. And if you are.... You will not be President next week.”
“Bluntly put,” Bonifaz said.
“My apologies, excellency.”
“No apologies necessary,” Bonifaz replied, “I value plain speach. I must go hard against Peru, or my enemies will undermine me. This seems plain.”
The other men agreed.
“It’s not hard in this case,” Alba said, “Peru’s conduct is criminal, it’s naked aggression.”
“Will the Colombians win?” Bonifaz asked.
“Too early to tell,” Alba said. “They’re at a disadvantage. They have no river navy, no paths. They’ve got their work cut out even to get down there. But their war fever is up.”
“And if Peru wins?”
“Bad for us,” Velasco said. “We have our own border disputes with them. If they attack Colombia like this and win, then we will be next. Both virtue and self interest demands we side with them.”
“But our friend Luis there says we cannot join the fight.”
“There’s other ways,” Alba said. “We can levy a volunteer brigade. We can announce our support and friendship. There are measures.”
“As long as we do not commit troops or money?” Bonifaz said, smiling.
“We have more of a border with Peru than the Colombians. We may need them here first,” Alba joked. “If they become too upset with us.
“Really,” Bonifaz said. “Do you think they’d really attack?”
Alba almost chose to say nothing, he looked thoughtful. “They just did.”
******************
It’s hard to underestimate the formative influence of the Colombia-Peru War on the triumvirate, and the government they lead.
Neptali Bonifaz’s first public speech following his inaugeration was a ringing denunciation of Peruvian aggression. Within a week, the Peruvian ambassador had left, and Ecuador had broken diplomatic relations.
Velasco Ibbara announced the formation of a volunteer brigade to fight on the Colombians side. The Ecuadoran government chartered a ship to ferry them to Bogota where they were met by a parade. Ibbara accompanied the brigade on a diplomatic mission, and spent weeks giving speeches, inspecting Colombian war preparations, and quietly negotiating a diplomatic alliance between the two nations. Back in Quito and Guayquil, Ibarra lead huge anti-Peruvian rallies.
The National Compact marched in the streets, saluting Bonifaz portrait, swearing oaths to defend the sacred soil of Ecuador with their last drop of blood, or boasting of forming new volunteer brigades to travel to Bogota when the call came. Some bragged that their volunteer brigades would travel to Lima instead.
Luis Alba, in the meantime, looked to the the state of Ecuador’s army, and made careful assessments of the relative strength of the parties. Ibbara’s reports, the glowing commentaries of a non-military man, were dismissed. But from other sources, Alba charted the progress of Colombia’s river fleet and Peru’s military build up.
Between October and January, the war on their borders created a kind of holiday for the triumvirate. Ecuadorians had found something that brought them together, a common ground had been found. The poor remained poor, the working class discontent, the latifundistas and the business interests in a state of cold war. Everyone it seemed could agree on the Peruvian menace, on the justice of the Colombian cause, on the threat on the southern border and on the sanctity of the Ecuadoran nation.
And within that common ground, the triumvirate found the room to negotiate social compromises, buying a measure of peace between business classes and latifundista. Trading for respect for the latifundista entitlements. Quieting the socialists in exchange for slightly more support for the workers.
Neptali Bonifaz, a man whose position had been so tenuous that Congress had twice split almost down the middle, for and against him, a man whose election had provoked a civil war, had stumbled upon a winning formula, a way to keep the country together, or at least to keep his enemies at bay and maintain himself in power.
Ecuador was a fractured society. Wealth and prosperity could paper over the cracks. But wealth and prosperity had fled. The new unifying force was an enemy, it was fear. And it worked.
From this point on, every time troubles came, a crop blight, a drop in cacao prices, labour unrest, the Peruvian bogeyman was dragged out.
Death
Banned
This TL in my opinion certainly opens up the mind a whole new unique and unexplored chapter to the AH of axis Ecuador to South America right under the noses of the the meddling Yankees.
Well done DValdron i have found every movement reading this TL fascinating as i explore the twisted and constantly evolving nature of the waring factions with in Ecuadorian society.
Never a dull moment in this TL i say.
I look forward to more updates from this epic TL.
Well done DValdron i have found every movement reading this TL fascinating as i explore the twisted and constantly evolving nature of the waring factions with in Ecuadorian society.
Never a dull moment in this TL i say.
I look forward to more updates from this epic TL.
Cuāuhtemōc
Banned
Bumped out of the interest of his own country being destroyed in the end by U.S marines. 
Bumped out of the interest of his own country being destroyed in the end by U.S marines.
I actually had something different in mind.
May 21, 1933. End of the Columbia Peru War
The fucking Colombians,” Velasco ranted, “they’ve sold us out again!”
“At least that madman Sanchez is gone,” Alba said easily, “the war is over.”
“Their war is over. But our war has been sealed. They’ve left us on the chopping block. The damnable treaty, that treasonous treaty has been adopted. They recognize Peru’s claims against us? Infamous!”
“But at least,” Bonifaz pointed out, “the war is over. And with almost no bloodshed. That should count for something.”
“Well,” replied Alba. “It’s good that the war did not escalate to a full blown conflict. We would have been a gnat caught between two elephants.”
Alba paused, considering his metaphor. “Or Belgium caught between France and Germany. Had Peru militarized fully and committed to war, there would have been a good chance that we would have been overrun.... Or at least, that the Peruvians would have acted to occupy disputed territories.”
“It’s well then,” Bonifaz said, “for the time being. What of the future?”
“The future,” Velasco began.
“Hush, Ibbara,” Bonifaz said. “We know your opinion. I want to hear the assessment of a military man.”
“My assessment?”
The two men nodded.
“Not good. The Columbian concession of the Putomayo in the north means that the Columbians surround us on three quarters of our border, and to our south, east and north. Our nation is a million and a half, and poor. Theirs is six million and rich. They have modernized their army, purchased aircraft, increased their forces by at least 20,000 men. We could not fight them now and win.”
“You see!” Velasco began. Bonifaz put up his hand.
“They will not fight us now. You see how quick they were to make peace after Sanchez was killed? They do not have the spirit for it, not at the moment.”
Bonifaz gave the matter a little more thought. “The Colombians got the treaty they made, and they got to keep what Peru wanted to take away. It seems to me it can be said that they lost. That concerns me, my friends. The Peruvians are a proud people, they do not take defeat well, and it seems to me that with the Pacific War and the War of the Confederation, the Mapuches, they have been served generous helpings of that meal. Sooner or later, they’ll spoil for a fight and be bent on winning. I know them, that’s how they are.”
Alba and Ibbara glanced at each other, acknowledging the older man’s tacit admission of his father’s heritage. The senior Bonifaz had been a Peruvian diplomat.
“One of the things which has kept the peace is the balance of powers. No nation is willing to see another become too strong at the expense of its neighbors, lest they become the next victim. In the past, we could rely upon Colombia’s support against Peru...”
“Now?”
“Now, they have thrown us to the wolves. They have recognized Peru’s claims against us. They have essentially promised to take no action, to sit and watch, if the Peruvians invade and steal over half our territory.”
“Your diplomatic mission was not fruitful,” Bonifaz asked.
Velasco had spent a month in Bogota, speaking passionately to anyone who would listen about the vital need to repudiate the Salomon-Lozano treaty entirely. The Colombians had been receptive and engaging, everyone had agreed passionately with the justice of his cause. But in the end, they’re reaffirmed the treaty anyway. He took it as a bitter humiliation. He no longer trusted the Colombians.
“No. They got what they wanted, and all they had to do was bargain us away. They have made invasion inevitable.”
Bonifaz nodded.
“What of you, Luis, do you believe that war is inevitable?”
The young soldier considered the matter and then nodded carefully. “I do. Not at the moment, perhaps. But sooner or later, it will come.”
Bonifaz nodded again. “Then we are as one. The question is, what can we do?”
*********************
At issue was the vast interior region of the Orientale, a thinly populated jungle and rain forest zone, traversible only by rivers. With the endorsement of the Salomon Lozano Treaty, in which Columbia recognized Peru's claims to Ecuadorian territory, the last major obstacle to Peru had vanished.
Indeed the territory in dispute comprised between 40% and 65% of the total land area of Ecuador. That it was thinly populated, empty and valueless did not matter. The fact that exploiting it would require greater resources than Ecuador could muster was irrelevant. It was still part of the lands of Ecuador.
This was certainly the way that Ecuador's triumvirate viewed things. The notion of surrendering or negotiating the territory was never seriously considered. Given the relative inequalities between the two countries, such a negotiation would be one sided, with the Peruvians bargaining for what they knew they could take.
The triumvirate viewed war as all but inevitable. This came to underly every aspect of both foreign and domestic policy.
The fucking Colombians,” Velasco ranted, “they’ve sold us out again!”
“At least that madman Sanchez is gone,” Alba said easily, “the war is over.”
“Their war is over. But our war has been sealed. They’ve left us on the chopping block. The damnable treaty, that treasonous treaty has been adopted. They recognize Peru’s claims against us? Infamous!”
“But at least,” Bonifaz pointed out, “the war is over. And with almost no bloodshed. That should count for something.”
“Well,” replied Alba. “It’s good that the war did not escalate to a full blown conflict. We would have been a gnat caught between two elephants.”
Alba paused, considering his metaphor. “Or Belgium caught between France and Germany. Had Peru militarized fully and committed to war, there would have been a good chance that we would have been overrun.... Or at least, that the Peruvians would have acted to occupy disputed territories.”
“It’s well then,” Bonifaz said, “for the time being. What of the future?”
“The future,” Velasco began.
“Hush, Ibbara,” Bonifaz said. “We know your opinion. I want to hear the assessment of a military man.”
“My assessment?”
The two men nodded.
“Not good. The Columbian concession of the Putomayo in the north means that the Columbians surround us on three quarters of our border, and to our south, east and north. Our nation is a million and a half, and poor. Theirs is six million and rich. They have modernized their army, purchased aircraft, increased their forces by at least 20,000 men. We could not fight them now and win.”
“You see!” Velasco began. Bonifaz put up his hand.
“They will not fight us now. You see how quick they were to make peace after Sanchez was killed? They do not have the spirit for it, not at the moment.”
Bonifaz gave the matter a little more thought. “The Colombians got the treaty they made, and they got to keep what Peru wanted to take away. It seems to me it can be said that they lost. That concerns me, my friends. The Peruvians are a proud people, they do not take defeat well, and it seems to me that with the Pacific War and the War of the Confederation, the Mapuches, they have been served generous helpings of that meal. Sooner or later, they’ll spoil for a fight and be bent on winning. I know them, that’s how they are.”
Alba and Ibbara glanced at each other, acknowledging the older man’s tacit admission of his father’s heritage. The senior Bonifaz had been a Peruvian diplomat.
“One of the things which has kept the peace is the balance of powers. No nation is willing to see another become too strong at the expense of its neighbors, lest they become the next victim. In the past, we could rely upon Colombia’s support against Peru...”
“Now?”
“Now, they have thrown us to the wolves. They have recognized Peru’s claims against us. They have essentially promised to take no action, to sit and watch, if the Peruvians invade and steal over half our territory.”
“Your diplomatic mission was not fruitful,” Bonifaz asked.
Velasco had spent a month in Bogota, speaking passionately to anyone who would listen about the vital need to repudiate the Salomon-Lozano treaty entirely. The Colombians had been receptive and engaging, everyone had agreed passionately with the justice of his cause. But in the end, they’re reaffirmed the treaty anyway. He took it as a bitter humiliation. He no longer trusted the Colombians.
“No. They got what they wanted, and all they had to do was bargain us away. They have made invasion inevitable.”
Bonifaz nodded.
“What of you, Luis, do you believe that war is inevitable?”
The young soldier considered the matter and then nodded carefully. “I do. Not at the moment, perhaps. But sooner or later, it will come.”
Bonifaz nodded again. “Then we are as one. The question is, what can we do?”
*********************
At issue was the vast interior region of the Orientale, a thinly populated jungle and rain forest zone, traversible only by rivers. With the endorsement of the Salomon Lozano Treaty, in which Columbia recognized Peru's claims to Ecuadorian territory, the last major obstacle to Peru had vanished.
Indeed the territory in dispute comprised between 40% and 65% of the total land area of Ecuador. That it was thinly populated, empty and valueless did not matter. The fact that exploiting it would require greater resources than Ecuador could muster was irrelevant. It was still part of the lands of Ecuador.
This was certainly the way that Ecuador's triumvirate viewed things. The notion of surrendering or negotiating the territory was never seriously considered. Given the relative inequalities between the two countries, such a negotiation would be one sided, with the Peruvians bargaining for what they knew they could take.
The triumvirate viewed war as all but inevitable. This came to underly every aspect of both foreign and domestic policy.
Cuāuhtemōc
Banned
Oh God....the thought of Ecuadorians giving US Marines hell. It disgusts me yet it turns me on so much.
Cuāuhtemōc
Banned
A volunteer brigade of Ecuadorian soldiers to Spain? Sounds very interesting. Four thousand to five thousand is a lot. I imagine they would be put under the Condor Legion sent by the Germans?
Latin America and the Great Depression, 1929-1942, Case Studies. Cambridge Press
Like most other Latin American economies, Ecuador which had moved smoothly from pseudo-feudalism to neo-colonialism was ill prepared for the great depression which began with the American stock market crash of 1929.
Ecuador’s economy was based almost entirely on the export of a principal cash crop, in this case a luxury item, cacao, and the import of key products and luxury goods. Ecuador’s economy was relatively unindustrialized, with only scattered local or indigenous manufacturing for portions of a small domestic market. It’s chief strength, in terms of the depression, was the resilience of widespread and deeply rooted local subsistence economies which allowed many rural peoples to maintain diets and standards of living in the face of collapse.
The Arroyo Regime, as with most western governments, was utterly unprepared for the depression. It’s technocratic policies of reform and reorganization were ineffective in the face of a contraction of the worldwide economy. Fundamentally conservative, the collapse of cacao prices meant a collapse of corresponding government revenues, and a retreat of government programs and functions. The Arroyo regime thus committed to doing less and less because of financial restraint and budget balancing, at a time when more and more was being required of it.
One can have some sympathy for the Arroyo regime. Not only was the necessary response completely beyond their ability to conceive, but it was essentially beyond their ability to implement in any case. Even with full scale implementation of Keynesian economics, a relatively tiny economy like Ecuador was not going to make a significant impact.
After a few years of floundering, Arroyo was overthrown by a military junta with socialist inclinations. Lacking any kind of broad support, this junta quickly gave way. The succeeding Bonifaz regime ruled for over a decade.
One of the first, and most unremarked aspects of the Bonifaz regime’s economic policies were stability. At first this seems counterintuitive as Bonifaz’ approach to depression conditions were evolving,erratic and at times frankly experimental. But the fact remained that between 1933 and 1945, Ecuador remained under a single coherent government which had the luxury to formulate and implement long term policies, and to maintain those policies for extended periods of time.
In contrast, other Latin American regimes which responded to the depression with a series of short lived governments did far worse. Short lived governments found it almost impossible to plan or evaluate, they had difficulty developing policies and programs, and what they did attempt was often undermined or entirely abandoned by radical changes of direction or political disagreement by succeeding regimes. Even successful programs were readily abandoned by succeeding governments for ideological or political reasons. As a result, transient short term governments were completely ineffective in coping with the depression.
Long lasting governments while not wholly successful in coping with the depression, at least had the luxury to study, experiment and evolve effective policies, and the potential longevity to maintain those policies. For this reason, Ecuador was among the most successful Latin American states of its size and population.
As with other states, the Bonifaz government experimented with a fairly non-ideological grab bag of measures to combat the depression, with varying levels of success. Bonifaz himself was a technocrat and traditional landowner of conservative bent. After Bonifaz, the principal members of the Ecuador triumvirate were a middle class populist and a socialist military officer. The landowner class, for much of Ecuador’s history were opposed to the coastal business elites who had over the preceding century come to dominate Ecuador. With the depression, that business elite lost much of its influence, and for the first time found itself out of power in Ecuador. Nevertheless, the business class was essential to the economic lifeblood of the country, and the truth of the Bonifaz government was that while it appeared outwardly powerful, it had come into power by the narrowest of margins and survived on a knife edge. It was, after all, a government in the midst of a worldwide depression in a fractured society, and to its credit, it never forgot that.
Administration therefore represented a continuing negotiation and compromise between the interests and wishes of a powerful but out of power business class, and other constituencies and communities within Ecuador. A variety of initiatives were employed, four of which were of particular significance.
The Government took over and centralized Cacao marketing in an effort to stabilize cacao price fluctuations. This was driven by a coalition of socialists and landowners, eventually co-opting business interests with a public/private marketing corporation. Among other effects, this allowed the Ecuador government to stockpile Cacao surpluses, the sale of which eventually provided a revenue stream during the war years.
Import substitution. Attempting to replace imports with domestic manufactures was a common theme for small and medium sized nations attempting to cope with the depression. Overall, the record of such efforts was usually spotty, and import substitution measures were often counterproductive, as domestic substitutes were often more costly and inferior than imports. Purchasing preferences generally continued to favour imports over domestics. In the long run, import substitution efforts reduced international trade and tended to contribute to the depression. In Ecuador’s case, import substitution worked better than usual, in part because Ecuador’s reliance on imports as a neo-colonial economy was excessive, and in part because substitution was not simply an economic policy, but a social policy driven by neo-fascist ideology. Local purchasing was not merely an economic decision, but a nationalist political statement in a society which mandated such statements.
Import substitution measures had a collateral effect during the war years in providing Ecuador with the rudiments of a diversified and industrial economy which was able to sustain a war effort to a far greater degree and longer period than one might initially have thought.
Military Keynesianism was another common latin American initiative. A number of south american states attempted to cope with the depression with military spending. Such spending was often controversial in times of economic reversal, particularly given the military propensity for becoming involved in politics. Latin countries walked a tightrope, both too little and too much military spending could be dangerous to political stability. Nevertheless, several countries spent significantly in this area. Peru was notable among these, spending extensively to modernize and upgrade the army, policies that were initiated by President Sanchez before his assassination but which continued after his death throughout the depression.
In part, driven by fears of Peruvian aggression, Ecuador’s triumvirate were able to justify and sustain a far greater degree of military spending than would otherwise have been possible. In some ways, Ecuador, with its decidedly fascistic government, came closest to the universal conscription and armament policies of late 19th century European states, although financial limitations constrained this.
Related somewhat to military keynesian was a variety of infrastructure and economic development projects, ranging from infrastructure commitments to roads, hydro-electric dams, and small business financing and state driven contracts. Other economic development activities included government sponsored chocolate processing and manufacture, in an attempt to move to value added refining, and economic partnerships with Henry Ford to attempt to develop a Latin American based truck and auto manufacturing operation, an effort between 1937 and 1940, that was at best only partly successful. At the same time, there were a number of labour protection measures, including working hours and safe conditions, which were aquiesced to by the business community in return for a quiescent labour force and prohibition of unions.
The economic reforms and initiatives did not happen overnight, nor was the path smooth. The Cacao marketing corporation came about during a crisis, and even then, it did not command a significant enough market share internationally to fully shield against price fluctuations.
Military spending was erratic, and often a response to transient events and conflicts, frequently taking place outside normal budgeting. Many initiatives were tried often on an erratic basis, and there were frequent reversals, although progress was overall forward. Government expenditures continually outstripped revenues, resulting in inflation and accumulating foreign debt. And of course, no matter what it did, Ecuador could not fully escape the depression which had the whole world in its grip.
Nevertheless, the Bonifaz regime managed to cope with the depression as or more effectively than most of its peers. By 1940, Ecuador was being touted as one of the most robust economies in the region. But there were downsides.
Like most other Latin American economies, Ecuador which had moved smoothly from pseudo-feudalism to neo-colonialism was ill prepared for the great depression which began with the American stock market crash of 1929.
Ecuador’s economy was based almost entirely on the export of a principal cash crop, in this case a luxury item, cacao, and the import of key products and luxury goods. Ecuador’s economy was relatively unindustrialized, with only scattered local or indigenous manufacturing for portions of a small domestic market. It’s chief strength, in terms of the depression, was the resilience of widespread and deeply rooted local subsistence economies which allowed many rural peoples to maintain diets and standards of living in the face of collapse.
The Arroyo Regime, as with most western governments, was utterly unprepared for the depression. It’s technocratic policies of reform and reorganization were ineffective in the face of a contraction of the worldwide economy. Fundamentally conservative, the collapse of cacao prices meant a collapse of corresponding government revenues, and a retreat of government programs and functions. The Arroyo regime thus committed to doing less and less because of financial restraint and budget balancing, at a time when more and more was being required of it.
One can have some sympathy for the Arroyo regime. Not only was the necessary response completely beyond their ability to conceive, but it was essentially beyond their ability to implement in any case. Even with full scale implementation of Keynesian economics, a relatively tiny economy like Ecuador was not going to make a significant impact.
After a few years of floundering, Arroyo was overthrown by a military junta with socialist inclinations. Lacking any kind of broad support, this junta quickly gave way. The succeeding Bonifaz regime ruled for over a decade.
One of the first, and most unremarked aspects of the Bonifaz regime’s economic policies were stability. At first this seems counterintuitive as Bonifaz’ approach to depression conditions were evolving,erratic and at times frankly experimental. But the fact remained that between 1933 and 1945, Ecuador remained under a single coherent government which had the luxury to formulate and implement long term policies, and to maintain those policies for extended periods of time.
In contrast, other Latin American regimes which responded to the depression with a series of short lived governments did far worse. Short lived governments found it almost impossible to plan or evaluate, they had difficulty developing policies and programs, and what they did attempt was often undermined or entirely abandoned by radical changes of direction or political disagreement by succeeding regimes. Even successful programs were readily abandoned by succeeding governments for ideological or political reasons. As a result, transient short term governments were completely ineffective in coping with the depression.
Long lasting governments while not wholly successful in coping with the depression, at least had the luxury to study, experiment and evolve effective policies, and the potential longevity to maintain those policies. For this reason, Ecuador was among the most successful Latin American states of its size and population.
As with other states, the Bonifaz government experimented with a fairly non-ideological grab bag of measures to combat the depression, with varying levels of success. Bonifaz himself was a technocrat and traditional landowner of conservative bent. After Bonifaz, the principal members of the Ecuador triumvirate were a middle class populist and a socialist military officer. The landowner class, for much of Ecuador’s history were opposed to the coastal business elites who had over the preceding century come to dominate Ecuador. With the depression, that business elite lost much of its influence, and for the first time found itself out of power in Ecuador. Nevertheless, the business class was essential to the economic lifeblood of the country, and the truth of the Bonifaz government was that while it appeared outwardly powerful, it had come into power by the narrowest of margins and survived on a knife edge. It was, after all, a government in the midst of a worldwide depression in a fractured society, and to its credit, it never forgot that.
Administration therefore represented a continuing negotiation and compromise between the interests and wishes of a powerful but out of power business class, and other constituencies and communities within Ecuador. A variety of initiatives were employed, four of which were of particular significance.
The Government took over and centralized Cacao marketing in an effort to stabilize cacao price fluctuations. This was driven by a coalition of socialists and landowners, eventually co-opting business interests with a public/private marketing corporation. Among other effects, this allowed the Ecuador government to stockpile Cacao surpluses, the sale of which eventually provided a revenue stream during the war years.
Import substitution. Attempting to replace imports with domestic manufactures was a common theme for small and medium sized nations attempting to cope with the depression. Overall, the record of such efforts was usually spotty, and import substitution measures were often counterproductive, as domestic substitutes were often more costly and inferior than imports. Purchasing preferences generally continued to favour imports over domestics. In the long run, import substitution efforts reduced international trade and tended to contribute to the depression. In Ecuador’s case, import substitution worked better than usual, in part because Ecuador’s reliance on imports as a neo-colonial economy was excessive, and in part because substitution was not simply an economic policy, but a social policy driven by neo-fascist ideology. Local purchasing was not merely an economic decision, but a nationalist political statement in a society which mandated such statements.
Import substitution measures had a collateral effect during the war years in providing Ecuador with the rudiments of a diversified and industrial economy which was able to sustain a war effort to a far greater degree and longer period than one might initially have thought.
Military Keynesianism was another common latin American initiative. A number of south american states attempted to cope with the depression with military spending. Such spending was often controversial in times of economic reversal, particularly given the military propensity for becoming involved in politics. Latin countries walked a tightrope, both too little and too much military spending could be dangerous to political stability. Nevertheless, several countries spent significantly in this area. Peru was notable among these, spending extensively to modernize and upgrade the army, policies that were initiated by President Sanchez before his assassination but which continued after his death throughout the depression.
In part, driven by fears of Peruvian aggression, Ecuador’s triumvirate were able to justify and sustain a far greater degree of military spending than would otherwise have been possible. In some ways, Ecuador, with its decidedly fascistic government, came closest to the universal conscription and armament policies of late 19th century European states, although financial limitations constrained this.
Related somewhat to military keynesian was a variety of infrastructure and economic development projects, ranging from infrastructure commitments to roads, hydro-electric dams, and small business financing and state driven contracts. Other economic development activities included government sponsored chocolate processing and manufacture, in an attempt to move to value added refining, and economic partnerships with Henry Ford to attempt to develop a Latin American based truck and auto manufacturing operation, an effort between 1937 and 1940, that was at best only partly successful. At the same time, there were a number of labour protection measures, including working hours and safe conditions, which were aquiesced to by the business community in return for a quiescent labour force and prohibition of unions.
The economic reforms and initiatives did not happen overnight, nor was the path smooth. The Cacao marketing corporation came about during a crisis, and even then, it did not command a significant enough market share internationally to fully shield against price fluctuations.
Military spending was erratic, and often a response to transient events and conflicts, frequently taking place outside normal budgeting. Many initiatives were tried often on an erratic basis, and there were frequent reversals, although progress was overall forward. Government expenditures continually outstripped revenues, resulting in inflation and accumulating foreign debt. And of course, no matter what it did, Ecuador could not fully escape the depression which had the whole world in its grip.
Nevertheless, the Bonifaz regime managed to cope with the depression as or more effectively than most of its peers. By 1940, Ecuador was being touted as one of the most robust economies in the region. But there were downsides.
Well, that's why I've been at such pains to demonstrate Ecuador's real history and the points of departure.
DValdron
Continues to be interesting but you're given one very useful insight in saying the Bonifaz regime lasted until 45. That means, unless major butterflies in the US and wider world it wasn't seen as pro-Nazi by the US else there's no way it would last much beyond a US entry into WWII. The fact it lasted the same 12 years as Hitler's regime does suggest that possibly the end of WWII [presuming that still ends in 45].
I notice also mentions of war years but unclear whether that relates to the global WWII or to a local conflict, or possibly the two become combined. Most people, including myself, were presuming a conflict in the Andes with a pro-Axis bloc which probably fairly quickly get stomped by the US. However it could even be that no war in the region occurs but you get some equivalent of the European axis with two or more powers with fascist type regimes allied against a common enemy. Going to be interesting to see how this develops.
Steve
Continues to be interesting but you're given one very useful insight in saying the Bonifaz regime lasted until 45. That means, unless major butterflies in the US and wider world it wasn't seen as pro-Nazi by the US else there's no way it would last much beyond a US entry into WWII. The fact it lasted the same 12 years as Hitler's regime does suggest that possibly the end of WWII [presuming that still ends in 45].
I notice also mentions of war years but unclear whether that relates to the global WWII or to a local conflict, or possibly the two become combined. Most people, including myself, were presuming a conflict in the Andes with a pro-Axis bloc which probably fairly quickly get stomped by the US. However it could even be that no war in the region occurs but you get some equivalent of the European axis with two or more powers with fascist type regimes allied against a common enemy. Going to be interesting to see how this develops.
Steve
- Status