Are ASB needed for this British tank spec?

[Sior]

I would assume that new machines mean that new tactics and strategies have been decided on already.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percy_Hobart

In 1934, Hobart became Brigadier of the first permanent armoured brigade in Britain and Inspector Royal Tank Corps. He had to fight for resources for his command because the British Army was still dominated by conservative cavalry officers. German General Heinz Guderian kept abreast of Hobart's writings using, at his own expense, someone to translate all the articles being published in Britain.[4]
In 1937, Hobart was made Deputy Director of Staff Duties (Armoured Fighting Vehicles) and later Director of Military Training. He was promoted to Major-General. In 1938, Hobart was sent to form and train "Mobile Force (Egypt)" although a local general resisted his efforts. While sometimes referred to as the "Mobile Farce" by critics, Mobile Force (Egypt) survived and later became the 7th Armoured Division, famous as the "Desert Rats".[5]

 

[Simon]

I would assume that new machines mean that new tactics and strategies have been decided on already.

Depends, I was reading an article the other day that stated that one of the problems with developing a coherent armoured/mechanised doctrine was that in the annual training exercises after the first couple of years they would often use completely different ideas from year to year depending on who was in charge. Now there's nothing wrong with experimenting, it is after all how you find the best ways of doing things, but if you don't build on previous experience you run the risk of wasting a lot of the effort.

Keeping the Experimental Mechanized Force, which was later renamed the Experimental Armoured Force, around as a permanent formation as Cryhavoc101 said seems like it would have been a good thing. The other missed opportunity I can think of was Major General George Lindsay, unfairly, getting the short end of the stick over the 1934 army exercises considering he was a proper proponent of combined arms unlike some of the more famous writers.

Percy Hobart.

Whilst Hobart does have some good points he also had some personal foibles as well, the largest of which I can think of was his insistence on the idea that tanks should fire on the move rather than stopping to do so. This led to the rather large disadvantage of the tank's gun elevation being controlled by a shoulder pad necessitating that the gun be mounted set back into the turret to try and help balance it with the problems that brought. Meant that it required a lot of time and effort on very complex and expensive training machines to become proficient using the system, great for when you have only a limited number of tank battalions/regiments but not so much when start building proper armoured divisions and completely impractical for mass conscript armies.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Depends, I was reading an article the other day that stated that one of the problems with developing a coherent armoured/mechanised doctrine was that in the annual training exercises after the first couple of years they would often use completely different ideas from year to year depending on who was in charge. Now there's nothing wrong with experimenting, it is after all how you find the best ways of doing things, but if you don't build on previous experience you run the risk of wasting a lot of the effort.

Keeping the Experimental Mechanized Force, which was later renamed the Experimental Armoured Force, around as a permanent formation as Cryhavoc101 said seems like it would have been a good thing. The other missed opportunity I can think of was Major General George Lindsay, unfairly, getting the short end of the stick over the 1934 army exercises considering he was a proper proponent of combined arms unlike some of the more famous writers.



Whilst Hobart does have some good points he also had some personal foibles as well, the largest of which I can think of was his insistence on the idea that tanks should fire on the move rather than stopping to do so. This led to the rather large disadvantage of the tank's gun elevation being controlled by a shoulder pad necessitating that the gun be mounted set back into the turret to try and help balance it with the problems that brought. Meant that it required a lot of time and effort on very complex and expensive training machines to become proficient using the system, great for when you have only a limited number of tank battalions/regiments but not so much when start building proper armoured divisions and completely impractical for mass conscript armies.

I used to have a very interesting document on wartime trials on stopping to shoot vs shooting on the move at Lulworth ranges (near Bovington in Hampshire) and it concluded that shooting at a moving tank was virtually no more difficult than a stationary one - while conversly shooting while stationary was far more accurate than while moving - so the whole reason for having the shoulder balanced gun mounting was called into question.

Had this been 'proven' in the 30s - through operational use in a regular Armoured force and/or a continuation of the post WW1 Tank Design Department then the need for the more intrusive gun mountings would be negated - allowing for 'larger/longer' guns to be mounted on a given turret ring size.

 

[Sior]

I used to have a very interesting document on wartime trials on stopping to shoot vs shooting on the move at Lulworth ranges (near Bovington in Hampshire) and it concluded that shooting at a moving tank was virtually no more difficult than a stationary one - while conversly shooting while stationary was far more accurate than while moving - so the whole reason for having the shoulder balanced gun mounting was called into question.

Had this been 'proven' in the 30s - through operational use in a regular Armoured force and/or a continuation of the post WW1 Tank Design Department then the need for the more intrusive gun mountings would be negated - allowing for 'larger/longer' guns to be mounted on a given turret ring size.

https://books.google.ca/books?id=Ai...ntcover&lr=&rview=1&hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=false

Page 82 gun synchronization, could it be invented sooner?

 

[merlin]

I think to answer the original question, to get to such a design so early on, is IMHO not feasible.
And as has been already been mentioned - the Valentine could've been available much earlier.
OTL the Matilda I came about because of the Treasury - it wasn't how good it was that counted, but how cheap!
So maybe you could have less Matilda Is, no Matilda IIs, but Valentines available, as a reliable Infantry tank.

The alternative to that option, is for the Infantry category to be filled with - self-propelled artillery - Birch Gun continued, followed on with an improved (bigger calibre) vehicle. While, the turreted tank continues - with less infantry support to worry about, it can be fast - but still with an armour requirement. It shouldn't be a 'modern' Whippet'!

 

[MattII]

The problem with the Liberty isn't that it's drastically underpowered for 1940 - it's fine - it's that it is a terrible, terrible engine; absolute bloody murder to maintain, especially if it's not totally accessible (e.g. under a shedload of armour plate), never designed to be run for extended periods of time, fiddly as anything, and a right bastard to cool. Pretty good for 1917, but look how well the Renault FT-17 tank (a bloody brilliant design for its day) performed in combat in 1940...

It still only got used on Cruiser tanks, of while many were lost to enemy AT guns, which unless the engines crapped out at exactly the wrong moment, meant their losses were no fault of the Libertys. And don't blame Nuffield anyway, blame whichever dimwit at the MOD kept accepting his tanks.

 

[Sior]

It still only got used on Cruiser tanks, of while many were lost to enemy AT guns, which unless the engines crapped out at exactly the wrong moment, meant their losses were no fault of the Libertys. And don't blame Nuffield anyway, blame whichever dimwit at the MOD kept accepting his tanks.

They were a maintenence nightmare, difficult to work on in place and took half a day to get out according to my uncle. A couple of hundred miles and they had to be rebuilt.

 

[MattII]

And yet the MoD still accepted them.

 

[Sior]

And yet the MoD still accepted them.

It Was Lord Nuffield after all and he did help out various members of parliment with loans (backhanders).

 

[Cryhavoc101]

https://books.google.ca/books?id=Ai...ntcover&lr=&rview=1&hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=false

Page 82 gun synchronization, could it be invented sooner?

Didn't the crews use to turn them off?

In Steven J. Zaloga book on the Sherman it talks about how most crews didn't bother with it or train enough with it and even those that could use it effectively usually turned it off as it was a maintenance hog.

So I think that in the context of this thread its not going to be robust enough for a late 30s tanks design.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Whilst Hobart does have some good points he also had some personal foibles as well, the largest of which I can think of was his insistence on the idea that tanks should fire on the move rather than stopping to do so.

Outside of ASB intervention, what technical hurdles must we leap to get elevational gun stabilization into our 1939 British tank?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Outside of ASB intervention, what technical hurdles must we leap to get elevational gun stabilization into our 1939 British tank?

I would far rather they dropped the whole idea and focused instead on getting a better bigger gun on the thing

 

[marathag]

Outside of ASB intervention, what technical hurdles must we leap to get elevational gun stabilization into our 1939 British tank?

Not quite ASB, but swap Lucas or Marconi with Westinghouse as the leading electronic company if you really have to have it.

from old UK report
WO 291/1202 Tank armament stabilisation: User experience and the present situation Westinghouse hydro-electric stabilisation on the Stuart, Lee and Sherman stabilised the main turret armament and co-ax in elevation only.
"Owing to the limitations inherent in the system, it was used very little operationally. It gave slightly better results when shooting on the move than could be obtained with a shoulder-controlled gun; but the chances of hitting when using it on the move were so small, compared with firing from the halt, that users preferred to engage their targets from the halt rather than on the move with the stabiliser working."
In Italy, the stabiliser was used as a shock-absorber on 76mm Shermans, as the big gun subjected the elevating mechanism to large shock loadings when moving cross-country.
"The Westinghouse stabiliser was so little used during the campaign in NW Europe, that servicing and repair of the equipment ceased after the liberation of Belgium. Replacement vehicles were sent forward classified as "fit", regardless of whether the stabiliser was in working order or not."
Trials with the Metrovick electrical two-axis stabiliser on 20-pr Centurions at Lulworth showed accuracy with AP 70–75% as good as at the halt, and with HE very nearly as good as at the halt. A second trial produced results slightly less favourable.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I would far rather they dropped the whole idea and focused instead on getting a better bigger gun on the thing

But the Brits needs to have their bitter delivered unsplit.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gCW-2_qPlQw

 

[Cryhavoc101]

But the Brits needs to have their bitter delivered unsplit.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gCW-2_qPlQw

Ahh the true purpose of the West German Army - beer delivery to the BOAR