Any hope of rescue of more U.S./allied troops from Philippines 1942

[maxs]

Just mulling over that I don't recall this theme being addressed by any parties up here. Was trying to recall a few alternate ideas I'd heard mentioned such as some type of difference in activity and accomplishments by Japanese in the early days at Mindanao, Jolo Island, and perhaps such things as greater U.S. emphasis on troop rescues from the islands using submarines and available aircraft. If this were given some higher level of priority than OTL, without jeopardizing the mission of slowing Japanese imperial expansion, what could have been available to do so?
Would this involve such things as a temporary seizure or increased occupation temporarily of places such as Davao or Jolo, or perhaps of MacArthur placing an emphasis on jumping to Jolo Island and temporarily bypassing Hollandia, not for strategic reasons but for tactical purposes of retrieving more military personnel.
Alternatively, could this have been turned into some exercise in which MacArthur is assuaged somewhat from trying to fully recapture the Phils in return for a capture of Jolo Island early on and an allocation of rescue craft (of various types) and communications equipment (earlier on) for personnel still trapped in the Phils. This would allow him to still save his reputation as a general by an earlier capture of the extreme southernmost Philippine island, while possibly freeing up some equipment/personnel from the campaign to recapture the entire archipelago (of OTL) in favor of a more limited recapture in the short run.
It may have been impossible to retain Jolo more than a short while, would be one possible complication. But how much would MacArthur have been swayed by the chance to save more of his military people in the shorter run, combined with this more limited--but earlier-- success, to postpone a larger campaign to recapture Luzon for a later stage?

 

[maxs]

In the earlier stages, when the IJ forces were taking Jolo and Davao, any complications for them in those operations, on top of having possible positive effects on Allied rescue of personnel from Luzon, the Visayans and Mindanao, would also have some impact on IJ efforts against Allies in DEI.

 

[maxs]

MacA would have to be very quick to react to the success at Coral Sea/Port Moresby as a hopeful sign and an opportunity to exploit an improved New Guinea situation, for one thing. If we were to wait until Coral Sea, there would still be a few people on Mindanao that could be gotten off, possibly. But what I was trying to think out, is the potential for the very early stages, when Davao and Jolo were first captured: would allocation of more resources and/or some successful (OTL unsuccessful) moves against those earlier IJ successes, buy some time for rescues, and perhaps for some temporary rescue path? (And perhaps some impact against IJ efforts against Singapore, Borneo, and DEI that could be of some interest to those involved with threads related to those).

 

[maxs]

Could there be a possible two time-frame potential. One would be the early days, the December 1941 time-frame, when IJ operations to capture Davao on Mindanao and Jolo Island, would be the possible target, and when there could be opened some temporary --perhaps submarine-- interisland rescue route southward from Luzon down to Jolo, and from there to New Guinea and some variation on a forward base there for rescue purposes; the other would be the late-stage, post-Bataan period, when personnel from Corregidor, Visayans and Mindanao would be the targets for rescue. The early days period would have some potential to impact on the DEI area campaigns, while the later post-Bataan period would impact relatively little except possibly providing some blowback effect for the campaign in New Guinea. Some things go right that went wrong before; some targets are hit, or hit more successfully by the Allies than were before, while IJ targets are missed where before they were hit...I think the results could be rewarding, in the very least, at the humanitarian level.

 

[maxs]

Manchester and others have referred to the upper classes in Manila and their interest in a return to some increase in Spanish influence in the Islands. I wonder if there could be anything done with that. There was also the interest MacArthur and others had expressed, in the months before Pearl Harbor, in a neutral Philippines. Perhaps they couldn't achieve that, but could achieve some Spanish influence on the ultimate set of events in the Phils, such as some humanitarian intervention to spare U.S. forces' lives.
But then, why should Spain care? After all, we'd pretty rudely forced them the accede their control to us in 1898, after a more or less trumped up war and an aggressive attack.
Also, Spain was leaning Axis, though officially neutral, and was under considerable pressure from Germany to repay them in some way for their assistance in Franco's victory before WW2.
But, having noted the problems, could MacA's diplomacy have produced more for the troops once it was clear the military situation was hopeless and only some intervention could work?
The US never declared war on Spain, although Spanish volunteers were shooting at the USSR. Would we be endangering our alliance with the USSR at that point, against the Axis, if we worked with Spain?
Also, how could Spain actually intervene geographically? How could they blunt Japanese barbarism in the mentality then prevailing in Imperial Japan?
Barring very much diplomatic activity, how could the US and Allies allot more subs and other vehicles for personnel rescue, and better utilize the multiple islands to create some escape route to New Guinea, Jolo, and points south, early in the campaign, while the DEI was still Allied, as wella northern New Guinea. Could a few lucky breaks here and there in the Japanese campaign have saved a few mor Allied troops to be in the position to be rescued.
OTL a few Americans did make it to New Guinea in a scraped together boat, and joined up with the Dutch in the interior guerrilla campaign. They ultimately did die, and it took several decades of cross-referencing Dutch and American records to determine that the two or three US personnel who took a small boat and made it out to New Guinea, did live awhile, on the run and under heavy Japanese military pressure but allied with the Dutch interior guerrillas. Could that scenario be expanded ATL, to include the large number of US personnel in the Visayans and Mindanao.
Could a sub or two more be spared than otl, for these rescues? Given that even more possible military personnel were available as a result, especially given their familiarity with the terrain in some instances: could have been helpful on any reoccupation of the Islands later in the War.