An exceedingly long zeppelinwank thread
- Thread starter zoomar
- Start date
Problem is, this wouldn't be an AH, but a pure fantasy. The Soviets never had any sort of rigid airship program to base an AH on. Nor did they have any remote military or naval use for rigid airships. Sorry.
Awesome! Love the civil addition. I wondered while I read it how well the Pan Am Clippers would fare in this Zep-wank world and am glad you touched on them.
I'm assuming that since the Zeps would be direct competition that the Clippers started as OTL in the smaller Sikorsky stuff, perhaps serving routes not covered by the Zeps. Or does Pan Am partner with the GY-Z corp and do "Zeppelin Connectors"?
Eventually the trans-Oceanic stuff will run into head-to-head competition for the luxury traveler, however. Perhaps Pan Am goes more down-scale? Zeps for uber-luxury vacation travel, Flying Boats for business class travel?
If you want I could even write up a section on such things, assuming you don't want to do so yourself (feel free to take my ideas, BTW).
I'm assuming that since the Zeps would be direct competition that the Clippers started as OTL in the smaller Sikorsky stuff, perhaps serving routes not covered by the Zeps. Or does Pan Am partner with the GY-Z corp and do "Zeppelin Connectors"?
Eventually the trans-Oceanic stuff will run into head-to-head competition for the luxury traveler, however. Perhaps Pan Am goes more down-scale? Zeps for uber-luxury vacation travel, Flying Boats for business class travel?
If you want I could even write up a section on such things, assuming you don't want to do so yourself (feel free to take my ideas, BTW).
Please write up a section. I like your idea of the flying boats being used on routes not covered by the zeppelins. The idea as connectors could also be explored (OTL American Airlines ran a short connector hop from NYC to Lakehurst for the Hindenburg - this concept could be expanded in this TL). To put zeps and the clippers in direct competition on the same routes, you'll need to get the "Airship Act" amended in the late 1930's to add Pan Am as a US flag carrier - no problem when we are creating our own reality, right?). I might see the relationship as similar to that between regular airliners and the Concorde in OTL 1970's-80s, the German zeps and the one US ship providing slower and more comfortable crossings for the majority of travellers, with the flying boats providing a very expensive, but less comfortable high-speed option for those few want to pay for the latest technology and get to Tokyo two days earlier.
Need to remember, though, that neither airships nor clippers would be for the regular traveller. Both would be far too expensive for anyone other than the richest people (or those travelling on business/goverenment accounts).
I just re-read this (still enjoyable! 
), but I've decided to decline on the Flying Boats writeup. Since the AZTC and PZTC never really took off (sorry ) any writeup would be pretty much OTL, though I toyed with the idea of Howard Hughes buying the overseas rights of AZTC/PZTC (which he would redesignate "Aztec Airways") as an ATL springboard for his trans-world flights (much as he did with TWA OTL).
BTW, quick nitpick on the aircraft names. The first letter of the naval designation should be the type/subtype, perhaps with a special designation prefix, the second (number) the optional number of such craft for that manufacturer and the third the manufacturer, with later iterations following with a tack ("-2C"). Note also that the same manufacturer could have more than one designation for different manufacturing craft (ergo "O" for Lockheed, but "V" for Lockheed's "Vega" plant). Ergo the "Dauntless" SBD is the first Douglass-made (D) Scout-Bomber (SB) and the "Hellcat" F6F the 7th Grumman-made (F) Fighter (F) [Note: FF, F1F, F2F, etc. for earlier Grumman fighters]. See it here. Confusing, I know! I'm a government worker and this one stumps me!
Therefore, your designations might more appropriately be (optionally assuming a special prefix "Z" for Zeppelin Fighter was developed; likely given the special considerations):
O1X Seafin –> ZOF (the first Grumman-made ("F") Zeppelin-based ("Z") Observation ("O") aircraft) or just OF if no use of a special-duty Zeppelin prefix
F3A Shrike -> ZFA, if you assume the prefix (the 1st Brewster ("A") Zeppelin Fighter ("ZF")), otherwise you're right on with F3A if no prefix (the 4th Brewster ("3A") fighter)
OB1X Attacker – ZOBD or ZSBD or ZBD or even ZOSBD! (1st Douglass ("D") Zeppelin [Observation ("O")/Scout "S")/Observation Scout ("OS")] Bomber ("B")) or SB1D (for the 2nd Douglass ("1D") Scout Bomber ("SB")) if no prefix
PB1X Harrier –> ZPBF (prefix) or PBF (no prefix) (1st Grumman (Zeppelin) Patrol Bomber ("PB")
Hope this helps.
), but I've decided to decline on the Flying Boats writeup. Since the AZTC and PZTC never really took off (sorry ) any writeup would be pretty much OTL, though I toyed with the idea of Howard Hughes buying the overseas rights of AZTC/PZTC (which he would redesignate "Aztec Airways") as an ATL springboard for his trans-world flights (much as he did with TWA OTL).BTW, quick nitpick on the aircraft names. The first letter of the naval designation should be the type/subtype, perhaps with a special designation prefix, the second (number) the optional number of such craft for that manufacturer and the third the manufacturer, with later iterations following with a tack ("-2C"). Note also that the same manufacturer could have more than one designation for different manufacturing craft (ergo "O" for Lockheed, but "V" for Lockheed's "Vega" plant). Ergo the "Dauntless" SBD is the first Douglass-made (D) Scout-Bomber (SB) and the "Hellcat" F6F the 7th Grumman-made (F) Fighter (F) [Note: FF, F1F, F2F, etc. for earlier Grumman fighters]. See it here. Confusing, I know! I'm a government worker and this one stumps me!
Therefore, your designations might more appropriately be (optionally assuming a special prefix "Z" for Zeppelin Fighter was developed; likely given the special considerations):
O1X Seafin –> ZOF (the first Grumman-made ("F") Zeppelin-based ("Z") Observation ("O") aircraft) or just OF if no use of a special-duty Zeppelin prefix
F3A Shrike -> ZFA, if you assume the prefix (the 1st Brewster ("A") Zeppelin Fighter ("ZF")), otherwise you're right on with F3A if no prefix (the 4th Brewster ("3A") fighter)
OB1X Attacker – ZOBD or ZSBD or ZBD or even ZOSBD! (1st Douglass ("D") Zeppelin [Observation ("O")/Scout "S")/Observation Scout ("OS")] Bomber ("B")) or SB1D (for the 2nd Douglass ("1D") Scout Bomber ("SB")) if no prefix
PB1X Harrier –> ZPBF (prefix) or PBF (no prefix) (1st Grumman (Zeppelin) Patrol Bomber ("PB")
Hope this helps.
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I just re-read this (still enjoyable!
BTW, quick nitpick on the aircraft names. The first letter of the naval designation should be the type/subtype, perhaps with a special designation prefix, the second (number) the optional number of such craft for that manufacturer and the third the manufacturer, with later iterations following with a tack ("-2C"). Note also that the same manufacturer could have more than one designation for different manufacturing craft (ergo "O" for Lockheed, but "V" for Lockheed's "Vega" plant). Ergo the "Dauntless" SBD is the first Douglass-made (D) Scout-Bomber (SB) and the "Hellcat" F6F the 7th Grumman-made (F) Fighter (F) [Note: FF, F1F, F2F, etc. for earlier Grumman fighters]. See it here. Confusing, I know! I'm a government worker and this one stumps me!
Therefore, your designations might more appropriately be (optionally assuming a special prefix "Z" for Zeppelin Fighter was developed; likely given the special considerations):
O1X Seafin –> ZOF (the first Grumman-made ("F") Zeppelin-based ("Z") Observation ("O") aircraft) or just OF if no use of a special-duty Zeppelin prefix
F3A Shrike -> ZFA, if you assume the prefix (the 1st Brewster ("A") Zeppelin Fighter ("ZF")), otherwise you're right on with F3A if no prefix (the 4th Brewster ("3A") fighter)
OB1X Attacker – ZOBD or ZSBD or ZBD or even ZOSBD! (1st Douglass ("D") Zeppelin [Observation ("O")/Scout "S")/Observation Scout ("OS")] Bomber ("B")) or SB1D (for the 2nd Douglass ("1D") Scout Bomber ("SB")) if no prefix
PB1X Harrier –> ZPBF (prefix) or PBF (no prefix) (1st Grumman (Zeppelin) Patrol Bomber ("PB")
Hope this helps.
Thanks for the suggestions, Geekhis. I tried to follow what I thought how naval designations for these planes would work, but may have made some incorrect presumptions. Since the Curtiss F9Cs used on the Akron and Macon in the 1930's were not given any special designation based on their "airship-based" mission (even though they were the only operational F9Cs), I assumed none of these planes would have a special "Z" as part of their mission designator. The "X" manufacurer designator was my invention. As described in my TL, except for the F3A, the airship planes were all actually designed (or developed for airship use) by the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics. I used "X" for this. You are right, however, the navy was more concerned with manufacturer than originator, hence the different designations for Wildcats and Corsairs based on manufacurer, so my usage would be highly unlikely. I also was unaware the first plane of a type from a given manufacturer did not use the number "1", and that the numbers were all one off the actual sequence. How wierd! I like the "Z", so I will probably adopt some form of your designations, except for the F3A Shrike.
I have changed the designationsbut rather than put the "Z" first, it is the last letter in the mission designator. Thus the Attacker is now the "SBZD" (scout bomber, airship, first Douglas type) You don't know how it hurt leaving out the "1".
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More stuff
I just stumbled across one last piece of info about US Navy rigid airships in WW2. This might entertain two or three of you.
In addition to their acknowledged ASW role, a number of other uses for rigid airships were proposed and investigated immediately before and during the Second World War. Although basic technological limitations of the airship or military developments eventually rendered these concepts impracticable, they are interesting footnotes in the history of this unusual weapon system.
Stand-off Strategic Bombing As early as 1938, anticipating the possibility that the United States might become involved in a war against Nazi Germany without allies and land bases in Europe or the British Isles, the US Army Air Corps evinced some interest in adapting large ZRCV-type airships as stand-off carriers for their multi-engined heavy bombers. The scheme was violently opposed by the Navy, who considered this as a much less reliable way of extending the range of attack aircraft than by basing them on conventional aircraft carriers. However, the Army Air Corps saw this as an interim method of mounting long range or transatlantic bombing missions pending eventual development of planes such as the B-29, B-32, B-35, and B-36. In 1940, when the fall of Britain seemed likely, the Air Corps commissioned a design study from Goodyear-Zeppelin for a 15,000,000 cubic-foot airship capable of carrying, launching and retrieving up to four Boeing B-17D heavy bombers in flight or up to six North American NA-42B (B-25) medium bombers. Goodyear’s calculations showed that operation of standard four-engine heavy bombers from zeppelin trapeze systems would create unacceptable stresses on the airship’s keel and main frames. However, stripped-down versions of smaller twin-engine bombers such as the B-25 or DB-7 (A-20) could be modified to operate from airships with minimal penalty. As opposed to the standard ZRCV practice, the airship would lift off empty, the fully fueled and bombed up aircraft then flying to the airships and hooking on for the transatlantic flight. The airship would launch its stand-off attack when the intended target was within the bombers’ radius of action (roughly 600-1,000 miles). Just prior to the cancellation of this scheme in 1942, a proposal was floated by the Army to use de Havilland Mosquitoes in the hook-on role. As events proceeded there never was any need to further explore the concept of airships as stand-off strategic bombers. Had the plan been pursued, other problems would almost certainly have been encountered mating such large, high-performance, heavily loaded, multi-engined craft to the lightly constructed and relatively slow airships.
High Speed/Heavy Lift Transport The relatively short-lived effectiveness of GZ Spirit of America as a high-speed heavy hauler between the West Coast and Hawaii in 1941/1942, led to a proposal to refit the obsolescent ZRS-class airships (Akron, Macon, Newark, Wichita, as well as the former Graf Zeppelin, as high-speed, long-distance transports for critical equipment and bulk cargo to US bases throughout the western Pacific. The onboard aircraft hangar and aircraft service spaces would be converted to cargo space and all military equipment and stores would be eliminated. However, it was determined that large floatplanes such as the Martin Mars, and Hughes-Kaiser HK-1, as well as several large multi-engine landplanes under development for the USAAF, would soon be able to fulfill most of the heavy transport roles planned for the airships.
Key Personnel Transport. In 1941, the Navy Department seriously considered refitting ZRN-3 Bismarck (the former Graf Zeppelin) as a dedicated long-distance transport for the President, White House staff, and other key civilian and military personnel. The former passenger spaces would be restored, but configured into a Spartan combination of offices/conference rooms, communication facilities, and private sleeping quarters. Plans called for the retention of two “perches” for emergency fighter escorts. However, the White House was not keen on the plan, and it was soon realized that the concept would result in a compromise: a craft lacking the speed and flexibility of traditional transport aircraft and the security and reliability of large, escorted, warships. A plan and cutaway scale model of this proposal can be seen in the Smithsonian’s Lighter-than-Air Exhibit at Dulles International Airport.
I just stumbled across one last piece of info about US Navy rigid airships in WW2. This might entertain two or three of you.
Experiments and Alternate Missions
1939-1944
1939-1944
In addition to their acknowledged ASW role, a number of other uses for rigid airships were proposed and investigated immediately before and during the Second World War. Although basic technological limitations of the airship or military developments eventually rendered these concepts impracticable, they are interesting footnotes in the history of this unusual weapon system.
Stand-off Strategic Bombing As early as 1938, anticipating the possibility that the United States might become involved in a war against Nazi Germany without allies and land bases in Europe or the British Isles, the US Army Air Corps evinced some interest in adapting large ZRCV-type airships as stand-off carriers for their multi-engined heavy bombers. The scheme was violently opposed by the Navy, who considered this as a much less reliable way of extending the range of attack aircraft than by basing them on conventional aircraft carriers. However, the Army Air Corps saw this as an interim method of mounting long range or transatlantic bombing missions pending eventual development of planes such as the B-29, B-32, B-35, and B-36. In 1940, when the fall of Britain seemed likely, the Air Corps commissioned a design study from Goodyear-Zeppelin for a 15,000,000 cubic-foot airship capable of carrying, launching and retrieving up to four Boeing B-17D heavy bombers in flight or up to six North American NA-42B (B-25) medium bombers. Goodyear’s calculations showed that operation of standard four-engine heavy bombers from zeppelin trapeze systems would create unacceptable stresses on the airship’s keel and main frames. However, stripped-down versions of smaller twin-engine bombers such as the B-25 or DB-7 (A-20) could be modified to operate from airships with minimal penalty. As opposed to the standard ZRCV practice, the airship would lift off empty, the fully fueled and bombed up aircraft then flying to the airships and hooking on for the transatlantic flight. The airship would launch its stand-off attack when the intended target was within the bombers’ radius of action (roughly 600-1,000 miles). Just prior to the cancellation of this scheme in 1942, a proposal was floated by the Army to use de Havilland Mosquitoes in the hook-on role. As events proceeded there never was any need to further explore the concept of airships as stand-off strategic bombers. Had the plan been pursued, other problems would almost certainly have been encountered mating such large, high-performance, heavily loaded, multi-engined craft to the lightly constructed and relatively slow airships.
High Speed/Heavy Lift Transport The relatively short-lived effectiveness of GZ Spirit of America as a high-speed heavy hauler between the West Coast and Hawaii in 1941/1942, led to a proposal to refit the obsolescent ZRS-class airships (Akron, Macon, Newark, Wichita, as well as the former Graf Zeppelin, as high-speed, long-distance transports for critical equipment and bulk cargo to US bases throughout the western Pacific. The onboard aircraft hangar and aircraft service spaces would be converted to cargo space and all military equipment and stores would be eliminated. However, it was determined that large floatplanes such as the Martin Mars, and Hughes-Kaiser HK-1, as well as several large multi-engine landplanes under development for the USAAF, would soon be able to fulfill most of the heavy transport roles planned for the airships.
Key Personnel Transport. In 1941, the Navy Department seriously considered refitting ZRN-3 Bismarck (the former Graf Zeppelin) as a dedicated long-distance transport for the President, White House staff, and other key civilian and military personnel. The former passenger spaces would be restored, but configured into a Spartan combination of offices/conference rooms, communication facilities, and private sleeping quarters. Plans called for the retention of two “perches” for emergency fighter escorts. However, the White House was not keen on the plan, and it was soon realized that the concept would result in a compromise: a craft lacking the speed and flexibility of traditional transport aircraft and the security and reliability of large, escorted, warships. A plan and cutaway scale model of this proposal can be seen in the Smithsonian’s Lighter-than-Air Exhibit at Dulles International Airport.
Guess what! I came across yet one more snippet from this interesting corner of the multiverse: The actual article from the Wehrmacht magazine Signal describing the battle between USS Sacramento and U-367. Unfortunately, my LG Executrix 10 transdimensional tricorder is an old model and only captured the raw text from the article, not the actual formatting or illustrations. Oh well, it did manage to link to an editorial comment from a later US-published book, "American Zeppelins-German Submarines", that also contained the article:
In this day of modern warfare the submariner sees many new and wonderful things. They see our U-boats deliver sudden destruction to the enemy while safely hidden under the sea. They see our powerful battleships and cruisers attack his convoys. They see Stukas deliver deadly bombs on the decks of his warships. They see long-ranged flying boats and Condor bombers magically find and destroy fat troopships, and they read about the naval forces of our Japanese allies delivering complete destruction to the American and British navies in the Pacific.
Thus, it is not surprising that we see the United States and Britain using increasingly desperate measures to combat our submariners in the Battle of the Atlantic. Informed Signal readers will remember that in 1939 the German Reich sold the zeppelin passenger airship LZ-130 to the United States as a goodwill gesture to the American people. Now, it seems that the US Navy has become so desperate in its attempt to defeat our U-boats that it has resorted to flying the LZ130 and fragile craft like it far out to sea to as escorts for troopships and transports headed to England. The report below by Kapitanleutnent Klaus Handel of the U-boat U-367 is a first-hand account of what actually happens when such relics from the First World War meet up with a modern ship of the German U-boat service and its well-trained crew.
“We had just completed a very successful mission off the eastern coast of the US and were heading home on the surface to celebrate when we first saw the enemy zeppelin floating at low altitude about 15,000 meters off our port bow. It appears the American commander saw us at about the same time because the airship turned and began heading straight for us. Although the zeppelin was almost 15 kilometers distant and hard to see in the low sun, I was able to discern through my binoculars that it launched two or three small airplanes (it may come as a surprise to most Signal readers, but the American navy is known to hook small attack planes on the LZ-130 and other zeppelins). As the planes neared us, I ordered an emergency dive to 60 meters. The American pilots released their bombs well behind us - we could hear the explosions as muffled crumps on the hydrophones. Several minutes later, we heard a second series of explosions, this time considerably closer to us.
“For over 36 hours, we played “cat-and mouse” with the enemy airship and its airplanes, rising to periscope depth or briefly surfacing to get our bearings and then submerging to easily avoid the inevitable air attack which followed. Unfortunately, the enemy seemed quite determined to follow us all the way to France and our batteries (necessary for travel under the sea) were becoming drained. I was also concerned that the enemy would call a more capable opponent (such as a destroyer) to assist in our pursuit.
“Thus, I determined to battle the airship using one of the oldest weapons in the warrior’s bag of tricks – deception. After the sixth ineffective air attack by the zeppelin, I ordered all of our decoys released and surfaced the boat as if in emergency. Immediately upon reaching the surface, we engaged the diesels and ran extra oil through them, exhausting clouds of dense, black smoke through the conning tower and all other vents. We were very fortunate because favorable breezes blew the smoky haze over ship’s conning tower and deck, hiding my crew as they manned the guns and spotting stations. Through the smoke we could see the American airplanes hooking on to the zeppelin, which was still several kilometers distant. One can only imagine how helpless we appeared to the enemy! A stationary submarine wallowing amidst smears of oil and debris and issuing dense black smoke from all open ports! To assist in the ruse, I ordered several crewmen to inflate life rafts and take to the sea as if abandoning ship.
“After a few minutes, the American zeppelin turned and headed straight for us. Apparently its commander had taken the bait and decided we were so helpless that he could use his fragile gasbag itself to deliver what he must have believed would be the final blow. I ordered the gun crews to aim for the small control car near the giant airship’s bow and hold their fire until I gave the order to engage.
“Finally, when the nose of the zeppelin was so close we could make out the faces on the enemy airmen in the control gondola, I gave the order. Our well-trained gunners scored immediate hits on the gondola, tearing it to pieces and ripping huge gashes in the fabric hull above it. Apparently this blow killed or crippled the American commander and other officers, because the zeppelin floated right over us without dropping any bombs. Our machine gunners then peppered its soft bottom as it flew overhead, and I could see small fires starting through rips in the hull fabric. Initially, we all thought the huge ship would explode in a ball of fire like the zeppelins of yore, but then I remembered that the Americans used non-flammable helium in their airships.
“After passing over us, the enemy began a slow turn to starboard and I ordered the gun crews to fire on the two large engine cars extending from the side of the ship. Again the range was very close, and we scored immediate hits. Our main 88mm deck cannon destroyed the starboard aft engine car with a single well-placed high explosive round, while the other engine was disabled by repeated light cannon and machine gun hits. Knowing the enemy was fatally crippled, I ordered the ship to flank speed to complete our escape. With its only power now coming from the undamaged portside engines, the enemy zeppelin entered into a sharper starboard turn on course to bring it just behind us. This gave my men one further opportunity to fire at the other side of the ship as it flew by. They made good use of the target practice, destroying or disabling both portside engines and putting many huge holes in the fragile hull. Countless pieces of debris fell into the sea, barely 100 meters below the 300 meter-long leviathan. The enemy was now drifting powerless and headed nose-down toward the Atlantic Ocean. As we cruised away from the battle site, we could see even more large pieces falling from many places on the doomed enemy craft. Knowing that it might still take several hours for the slowly descending hulk to actually strike the sea, and aware that enemy destroyers were probably heading our way, I decided it would be wiser to complete our escape as quickly as possible rather than stay on station and attempt to render assistance to the enemy crew as they abandoned their dying zeppelin for the waves. We resumed an easterly course and lost sight of the enemy as the sun began to set.”
Signal is proud to report that, before returning to sea, Kapitanleutnent Handel and his brave crew were invited to dinner with Grandadmiral Doenitz himself at the Grand Hotel Nauticus in Berlin where they all received special awards for their skill and bravery in this unusual and successful combat with a flying monster ten times their size.
Editor’s note: In many respects this article is a fairly accurate portrayal of the engagement between USS Sacramento and U-367. However, as might be expected, Handel (or the Signal writer ghost-writing his report) misinterprets or exaggerates the damage to the airship. While it is true the initial salvo from U-367 virtually destroyed the control car and killed all officers present, damage to the surrounding hull was substantially less than Handel believed was the case. Handel was also incorrect in mentioning “fires” within the hull. There were no such fires. It is possible the German commander was seeing muzzle flashes from .50 calibre machine guns being fired ineffectually at the U-boat from positions on the lower keel gangways. Handel is also incorrect in reporting damage to Sacramento’s portside engines. In fact, neither portside engine was damaged in the engagement. He saw them cease operation because they were deliberately stopped on orders from Lieutenant Micah Barnes, who had by this time assumed command of the airship from the emergency control station on the lower fin. Also, despite Handel’s belief the airship was going to crash, it was never in serious danger of being lost during the engagement. The many rips and holes he describes in the exterior envelope, although large, had little effect on the ship’s overall buoyancy since they were on the bottom quarter of the ship. The ship had assumed a strong nose-down attitude due to gas loss in the forward gas cells, but never came closer than 200 feet to hitting the surface. In fact, the pieces of “debris” the German captain describes falling from the ship were slip tanks for water and sand bag ballast being released on orders from Lt. Barnes to help her reach equilibrium. Sacramento did face serious danger of crashing several times during her heroic struggle to reach home, but this would not have been witnessed from the German submarine. Unfortunately, the Navy never had the chance to interview Kapitanleutnent Handel and his crew after the war because U-367 was sunk with all hands by the Canadian destroyer HMS Ojibwa on June 12, 1943.
Reproduction of December 1942 Signal article allegedly authored by KM Kapitanleutnent Klaus Handel of the U-367.
We Destroy an Enemy Zeppelin
In this day of modern warfare the submariner sees many new and wonderful things. They see our U-boats deliver sudden destruction to the enemy while safely hidden under the sea. They see our powerful battleships and cruisers attack his convoys. They see Stukas deliver deadly bombs on the decks of his warships. They see long-ranged flying boats and Condor bombers magically find and destroy fat troopships, and they read about the naval forces of our Japanese allies delivering complete destruction to the American and British navies in the Pacific.
Thus, it is not surprising that we see the United States and Britain using increasingly desperate measures to combat our submariners in the Battle of the Atlantic. Informed Signal readers will remember that in 1939 the German Reich sold the zeppelin passenger airship LZ-130 to the United States as a goodwill gesture to the American people. Now, it seems that the US Navy has become so desperate in its attempt to defeat our U-boats that it has resorted to flying the LZ130 and fragile craft like it far out to sea to as escorts for troopships and transports headed to England. The report below by Kapitanleutnent Klaus Handel of the U-boat U-367 is a first-hand account of what actually happens when such relics from the First World War meet up with a modern ship of the German U-boat service and its well-trained crew.
“We had just completed a very successful mission off the eastern coast of the US and were heading home on the surface to celebrate when we first saw the enemy zeppelin floating at low altitude about 15,000 meters off our port bow. It appears the American commander saw us at about the same time because the airship turned and began heading straight for us. Although the zeppelin was almost 15 kilometers distant and hard to see in the low sun, I was able to discern through my binoculars that it launched two or three small airplanes (it may come as a surprise to most Signal readers, but the American navy is known to hook small attack planes on the LZ-130 and other zeppelins). As the planes neared us, I ordered an emergency dive to 60 meters. The American pilots released their bombs well behind us - we could hear the explosions as muffled crumps on the hydrophones. Several minutes later, we heard a second series of explosions, this time considerably closer to us.
“For over 36 hours, we played “cat-and mouse” with the enemy airship and its airplanes, rising to periscope depth or briefly surfacing to get our bearings and then submerging to easily avoid the inevitable air attack which followed. Unfortunately, the enemy seemed quite determined to follow us all the way to France and our batteries (necessary for travel under the sea) were becoming drained. I was also concerned that the enemy would call a more capable opponent (such as a destroyer) to assist in our pursuit.
“Thus, I determined to battle the airship using one of the oldest weapons in the warrior’s bag of tricks – deception. After the sixth ineffective air attack by the zeppelin, I ordered all of our decoys released and surfaced the boat as if in emergency. Immediately upon reaching the surface, we engaged the diesels and ran extra oil through them, exhausting clouds of dense, black smoke through the conning tower and all other vents. We were very fortunate because favorable breezes blew the smoky haze over ship’s conning tower and deck, hiding my crew as they manned the guns and spotting stations. Through the smoke we could see the American airplanes hooking on to the zeppelin, which was still several kilometers distant. One can only imagine how helpless we appeared to the enemy! A stationary submarine wallowing amidst smears of oil and debris and issuing dense black smoke from all open ports! To assist in the ruse, I ordered several crewmen to inflate life rafts and take to the sea as if abandoning ship.
“After a few minutes, the American zeppelin turned and headed straight for us. Apparently its commander had taken the bait and decided we were so helpless that he could use his fragile gasbag itself to deliver what he must have believed would be the final blow. I ordered the gun crews to aim for the small control car near the giant airship’s bow and hold their fire until I gave the order to engage.
“Finally, when the nose of the zeppelin was so close we could make out the faces on the enemy airmen in the control gondola, I gave the order. Our well-trained gunners scored immediate hits on the gondola, tearing it to pieces and ripping huge gashes in the fabric hull above it. Apparently this blow killed or crippled the American commander and other officers, because the zeppelin floated right over us without dropping any bombs. Our machine gunners then peppered its soft bottom as it flew overhead, and I could see small fires starting through rips in the hull fabric. Initially, we all thought the huge ship would explode in a ball of fire like the zeppelins of yore, but then I remembered that the Americans used non-flammable helium in their airships.
“After passing over us, the enemy began a slow turn to starboard and I ordered the gun crews to fire on the two large engine cars extending from the side of the ship. Again the range was very close, and we scored immediate hits. Our main 88mm deck cannon destroyed the starboard aft engine car with a single well-placed high explosive round, while the other engine was disabled by repeated light cannon and machine gun hits. Knowing the enemy was fatally crippled, I ordered the ship to flank speed to complete our escape. With its only power now coming from the undamaged portside engines, the enemy zeppelin entered into a sharper starboard turn on course to bring it just behind us. This gave my men one further opportunity to fire at the other side of the ship as it flew by. They made good use of the target practice, destroying or disabling both portside engines and putting many huge holes in the fragile hull. Countless pieces of debris fell into the sea, barely 100 meters below the 300 meter-long leviathan. The enemy was now drifting powerless and headed nose-down toward the Atlantic Ocean. As we cruised away from the battle site, we could see even more large pieces falling from many places on the doomed enemy craft. Knowing that it might still take several hours for the slowly descending hulk to actually strike the sea, and aware that enemy destroyers were probably heading our way, I decided it would be wiser to complete our escape as quickly as possible rather than stay on station and attempt to render assistance to the enemy crew as they abandoned their dying zeppelin for the waves. We resumed an easterly course and lost sight of the enemy as the sun began to set.”
Signal is proud to report that, before returning to sea, Kapitanleutnent Handel and his brave crew were invited to dinner with Grandadmiral Doenitz himself at the Grand Hotel Nauticus in Berlin where they all received special awards for their skill and bravery in this unusual and successful combat with a flying monster ten times their size.
Editor’s note: In many respects this article is a fairly accurate portrayal of the engagement between USS Sacramento and U-367. However, as might be expected, Handel (or the Signal writer ghost-writing his report) misinterprets or exaggerates the damage to the airship. While it is true the initial salvo from U-367 virtually destroyed the control car and killed all officers present, damage to the surrounding hull was substantially less than Handel believed was the case. Handel was also incorrect in mentioning “fires” within the hull. There were no such fires. It is possible the German commander was seeing muzzle flashes from .50 calibre machine guns being fired ineffectually at the U-boat from positions on the lower keel gangways. Handel is also incorrect in reporting damage to Sacramento’s portside engines. In fact, neither portside engine was damaged in the engagement. He saw them cease operation because they were deliberately stopped on orders from Lieutenant Micah Barnes, who had by this time assumed command of the airship from the emergency control station on the lower fin. Also, despite Handel’s belief the airship was going to crash, it was never in serious danger of being lost during the engagement. The many rips and holes he describes in the exterior envelope, although large, had little effect on the ship’s overall buoyancy since they were on the bottom quarter of the ship. The ship had assumed a strong nose-down attitude due to gas loss in the forward gas cells, but never came closer than 200 feet to hitting the surface. In fact, the pieces of “debris” the German captain describes falling from the ship were slip tanks for water and sand bag ballast being released on orders from Lt. Barnes to help her reach equilibrium. Sacramento did face serious danger of crashing several times during her heroic struggle to reach home, but this would not have been witnessed from the German submarine. Unfortunately, the Navy never had the chance to interview Kapitanleutnent Handel and his crew after the war because U-367 was sunk with all hands by the Canadian destroyer HMS Ojibwa on June 12, 1943.
Nice addition!
Glad to see more from this TL.
Any plans to put it up in its entirety on the TL board?
Glad to see more from this TL.
Any plans to put it up in its entirety on the TL board?
Absolutely wonderful!
What I now have is an overwhelming desire to integrate this with the USNAF thread's TL. Thoughts?
What I now have is an overwhelming desire to integrate this with the USNAF thread's TL. Thoughts?
I like the idea, but there will be something in the way of butterflies. Zoomar managed to avoid causing many in his version of WW2, but even without ZRCVs the USNAF timeline is starting to accumulate a fair quantity of lepidoptera. Alt-WW2 could look quite different if the two timelines are integrated.
It seems that a key point in both TL's is Moffett continuing to be involved in airship experimentation. I can buy that, but in the USNAF timeline there's the influence of the USAAC bomber advocates to contend with as well. How would you marry the two up?