Hi there! This is my, what…fifth attempt at a TL, with the previous four having ended in flaming disasters. Given this not-so-illustrious track record, I thought I’d try my hand at something on a slightly smaller scale. This won’t be a doorstopper epic—just a light and breezy history of a different American politics from about 1860 to 1900, with brief updates on the rest of the world, followed by a flash forward epilogue to look at the whole world in 1970. Enjoy!
Chapter 1: A Big Decision From A Little Giant
From An Empire for Liberty: The Settlement of the American West, 1790-1890 by A.J Thompson. Published 1954, Royal National Press, Toronto.
…By 1858 the Kansas Territory had been through four years of virtual hell. The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 had opened the territory as a new frontier for chattel slavery—a great political victory for the slave power [1], but only at the cost of hundreds of lives and a good portion of the remaining unity of the United States. For years anti-slavery and pro-slavery settlers had engaged in what amounted to open warfare with their neighbors, providing a deep well of atrocity stories that served to push northerners and southerners through an endless, vicious cycle of radicalization. So deep were Kansas’ wounds that the small territory spent most of the 1850s with two fully functional legislatures—a proslavery one based in Lecompton and an antislavery one based in Topeka.
By 1858, though, times were changing. The pro-slavery Missouri settlers that had initially formed the backbone for American settlement of Kansas had been increasingly swamped by anti-slavery men from New England and the Midwest. The Lecompton government had done its absolute best to preserve Kansan slavery, but it was obvious even to the most diehard Missourians that time was not on their side. In desperation, Lecompton came up with a last-ditch ploy—within the space of a few months, the pro-slavery legislators drew up a slave-state constitution, passed by a landslide through a rigged referendum that free-soil men boycotted anyway, and sent it off to Washington for approval.
The response was immediate. The south practically tripped over itself rushing to admit Kansas as a slave state, but most northerners—even many moderates who didn't care overmuch about the expansion of slavery—were outraged at the blatantly undemocratic behavior exhibited by the Lecompton government. The generally proslavery Democrats held large majorities in both houses of Congress, but as debates started many northern Democrats backed away from supporting the Lecompton referendum, fearing political disaster if they were perceived as catspaws for the south.
The question fell upon Stephen Douglas. The diminutive yet highly political savvy leader of the Democrats was the most powerful man in his party, yet his power—and presidential chances—were slipping by 1858. His backing of the Kansas-Nebraska Act (which also made Douglas quite a bit of money due to shenanigans about the construction of the intercontinental railroad) and tepid support of the Dred Scott Decision had turned many northerners against him even as the south celebrated him as one of the few northern politicians who could be “trusted”.
The Lecompton referendum was a breaking point for Douglas. If he ensured its passage—as he easily could by saying the right things to the Democratic caucus—he would be adored in the south, but he would almost certainly lose the Lower Northern support critical for any Democrat to win the White House.
Yet if he opposed it, or supported the rival referendum carried out by the Topeka government that rejected the slave-state constitution, he would lose the south without any assurance of making gains in the north.
In the end, Douglas—ever the canny politician—tried to have it both ways. As a public and private supporter of popular sovereignty [2] Douglas was genuinely opposed to the obviously anti-democratic Lecompton government, and recently discovered documents seem to indicate that Douglas influenced many northern Democrats to vote “no”, ensuring the ultimate rejection of Kansan statehood for the time. Yet in the violent (literally and figuratively) debates preceding the debate, the normally verbose Douglas declined to speak, and abstained from the final tally. [3] The move backfired—many Southerners viewed even Douglas’ inaction as a betrayal, and many saw through the gambit and angrily denounced Douglas as a traitor. Many Northerners, meanwhile, ridiculed Douglas for his apparent inaction. A famous cartoon of the time showed “Douglas’ Plan to Save the Union”—a Republican and a Southern Democrat engaged in a tug of war over a map of the United States with Douglas sitting on top. Douglas’ diaries reveal that it was at this time he figured out what most of the nation already knew: “There is no more room for moderation in this country…” [4]
[1] An old Republican epithet for the influence wielded by the South in the United States that has become a fairly well accepted term for TTL’s historians.
[2] The doctrine that territories should resolve disputes about slavery by themselves through strictly democratic means.
[3] This is the PoD—in OTL Douglas went all out against the Lecompton constitution and made several very long and passionate speeches arguing for its rejection. Here Douglas is a bit less moral and tries a bit harder to save his popularity in the south.
[4] Douglas comes out of this affair a bit better than in OTL, where he lost all southern support yet in 1860 failed to win even a single northern state. Tune in next week to see how this will affect the Election of 1860…
Chapter 1: A Big Decision From A Little Giant
From An Empire for Liberty: The Settlement of the American West, 1790-1890 by A.J Thompson. Published 1954, Royal National Press, Toronto.
…By 1858 the Kansas Territory had been through four years of virtual hell. The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 had opened the territory as a new frontier for chattel slavery—a great political victory for the slave power [1], but only at the cost of hundreds of lives and a good portion of the remaining unity of the United States. For years anti-slavery and pro-slavery settlers had engaged in what amounted to open warfare with their neighbors, providing a deep well of atrocity stories that served to push northerners and southerners through an endless, vicious cycle of radicalization. So deep were Kansas’ wounds that the small territory spent most of the 1850s with two fully functional legislatures—a proslavery one based in Lecompton and an antislavery one based in Topeka.
By 1858, though, times were changing. The pro-slavery Missouri settlers that had initially formed the backbone for American settlement of Kansas had been increasingly swamped by anti-slavery men from New England and the Midwest. The Lecompton government had done its absolute best to preserve Kansan slavery, but it was obvious even to the most diehard Missourians that time was not on their side. In desperation, Lecompton came up with a last-ditch ploy—within the space of a few months, the pro-slavery legislators drew up a slave-state constitution, passed by a landslide through a rigged referendum that free-soil men boycotted anyway, and sent it off to Washington for approval.
The response was immediate. The south practically tripped over itself rushing to admit Kansas as a slave state, but most northerners—even many moderates who didn't care overmuch about the expansion of slavery—were outraged at the blatantly undemocratic behavior exhibited by the Lecompton government. The generally proslavery Democrats held large majorities in both houses of Congress, but as debates started many northern Democrats backed away from supporting the Lecompton referendum, fearing political disaster if they were perceived as catspaws for the south.
The question fell upon Stephen Douglas. The diminutive yet highly political savvy leader of the Democrats was the most powerful man in his party, yet his power—and presidential chances—were slipping by 1858. His backing of the Kansas-Nebraska Act (which also made Douglas quite a bit of money due to shenanigans about the construction of the intercontinental railroad) and tepid support of the Dred Scott Decision had turned many northerners against him even as the south celebrated him as one of the few northern politicians who could be “trusted”.
The Lecompton referendum was a breaking point for Douglas. If he ensured its passage—as he easily could by saying the right things to the Democratic caucus—he would be adored in the south, but he would almost certainly lose the Lower Northern support critical for any Democrat to win the White House.
Yet if he opposed it, or supported the rival referendum carried out by the Topeka government that rejected the slave-state constitution, he would lose the south without any assurance of making gains in the north.
In the end, Douglas—ever the canny politician—tried to have it both ways. As a public and private supporter of popular sovereignty [2] Douglas was genuinely opposed to the obviously anti-democratic Lecompton government, and recently discovered documents seem to indicate that Douglas influenced many northern Democrats to vote “no”, ensuring the ultimate rejection of Kansan statehood for the time. Yet in the violent (literally and figuratively) debates preceding the debate, the normally verbose Douglas declined to speak, and abstained from the final tally. [3] The move backfired—many Southerners viewed even Douglas’ inaction as a betrayal, and many saw through the gambit and angrily denounced Douglas as a traitor. Many Northerners, meanwhile, ridiculed Douglas for his apparent inaction. A famous cartoon of the time showed “Douglas’ Plan to Save the Union”—a Republican and a Southern Democrat engaged in a tug of war over a map of the United States with Douglas sitting on top. Douglas’ diaries reveal that it was at this time he figured out what most of the nation already knew: “There is no more room for moderation in this country…” [4]
[1] An old Republican epithet for the influence wielded by the South in the United States that has become a fairly well accepted term for TTL’s historians.
[2] The doctrine that territories should resolve disputes about slavery by themselves through strictly democratic means.
[3] This is the PoD—in OTL Douglas went all out against the Lecompton constitution and made several very long and passionate speeches arguing for its rejection. Here Douglas is a bit less moral and tries a bit harder to save his popularity in the south.
[4] Douglas comes out of this affair a bit better than in OTL, where he lost all southern support yet in 1860 failed to win even a single northern state. Tune in next week to see how this will affect the Election of 1860…