I remember reading at the time that there was a way to make the bombs arm themselves more quickly when they were in flight - but the American manufacturers withheld that info from Argentina. No doubt at the behest of the govt. American public opinion [outside of the Hispanic community] was very heavily on the side of Britain, there were notable exceptions like Jeanne Kirkpatrick; why she supported the aims of a faschist dictatorship I never could understand.
An alternate Falklands war- what is the fallout?
- Thread starter Archon of Thessaly
- Start date
I was 12, at a British Prep School (boardiing) andjust starting to become politicaally aware. My year were all geared to the TV news for the duration of active hostilities.
In later years as Irad more books on the subject and more on the internet I realised just how close the war was. WhenI studied History and Politics at university I better undestood the consequences had Britain lost within the wider context of the period. I also recall from the time that there were calls for Thatcher to resign after the initial Argentine invasions so, had the war gone other than it did this government, a deeeply unpopular one, mightvery weell have fallen to a No Confidence Vote if Thatcher had not already resigned overa British defeat. In these circumstances I doubt Conservative Government would have lasted verylong, most likely being forced into an early election and going down to a Labour landslide. That in turn could have been disasterous in the wider context of he Cold War.
In later years as Irad more books on the subject and more on the internet I realised just how close the war was. WhenI studied History and Politics at university I better undestood the consequences had Britain lost within the wider context of the period. I also recall from the time that there were calls for Thatcher to resign after the initial Argentine invasions so, had the war gone other than it did this government, a deeeply unpopular one, mightvery weell have fallen to a No Confidence Vote if Thatcher had not already resigned overa British defeat. In these circumstances I doubt Conservative Government would have lasted verylong, most likely being forced into an early election and going down to a Labour landslide. That in turn could have been disasterous in the wider context of he Cold War.
Everybody seems to be forgetting the British had contingency plans for a longer campaign.
First of all, they had a 3rd aircraft carrier, that arrived in theatre immediately after the war ended - Illustrious. And what's more Illustrious had Phalanx CIWS and Sea King AEW, so it's not a soft target for Exocets.
Second, they had a plan for building a "stone aircraft carrier". Basically a landing on West Falkland to build an airstrip for Phantoms and Buccs.
If the initial phase of the campaign had gone badly for the British, they would have used these plans, whereas the Argentines had literally no plans except a static defence of Stanley while their troops got more and more cold and hungry on the hills around the port.
As for the Argentine ASW capabilities, they are basically nil against the British nuclear subs. Don't forget that Belgrano was accompanied by two ASW destroyers, and Conqueror could have quite easily have sank them too - but left them, so they would have the opportunity to pick up survivors. If the gloves were completely off at the time, those destroyers would also be at the bomb of the South Atlantic, as would the Argentine carrier (which was unknowingly being tracked by British SSNs at least twice in the campaign - once before the shooting proper started, and once when moving within the Argentine 12 mile limit later in the campaign).
Hector Bonzo, captain of the Belgrano, himself said the Argentine ASW defence was impossible. The problem was the publicly disclosed speed of the British SSNs (and in fact their top speed was higher but remained secret) was faster than any of the Argentine vessels. That meant they could attack from any angle, including the front (and could overtake), and the Argentines did not have the capability to detect them when they themselves were moving.
First of all, they had a 3rd aircraft carrier, that arrived in theatre immediately after the war ended - Illustrious. And what's more Illustrious had Phalanx CIWS and Sea King AEW, so it's not a soft target for Exocets.
Second, they had a plan for building a "stone aircraft carrier". Basically a landing on West Falkland to build an airstrip for Phantoms and Buccs.
If the initial phase of the campaign had gone badly for the British, they would have used these plans, whereas the Argentines had literally no plans except a static defence of Stanley while their troops got more and more cold and hungry on the hills around the port.
As for the Argentine ASW capabilities, they are basically nil against the British nuclear subs. Don't forget that Belgrano was accompanied by two ASW destroyers, and Conqueror could have quite easily have sank them too - but left them, so they would have the opportunity to pick up survivors. If the gloves were completely off at the time, those destroyers would also be at the bomb of the South Atlantic, as would the Argentine carrier (which was unknowingly being tracked by British SSNs at least twice in the campaign - once before the shooting proper started, and once when moving within the Argentine 12 mile limit later in the campaign).
Hector Bonzo, captain of the Belgrano, himself said the Argentine ASW defence was impossible. The problem was the publicly disclosed speed of the British SSNs (and in fact their top speed was higher but remained secret) was faster than any of the Argentine vessels. That meant they could attack from any angle, including the front (and could overtake), and the Argentines did not have the capability to detect them when they themselves were moving.
The political effects of losing one or both carriers might well have lost the war for Britain as Admiral Woodward himself argues in hisaccount of the campaign (One Hundred Days)
But let us assume for a moment that Britain lost one or both carriers and was somehow able to continue the war. Yes, Ilustrioyus would have been in theatre by mid June. But that is right in the middle of the South Atlantic winter. Not the best time for flight operations from an aircraft carrier. And her normal complement would be 12 harriers out of a total of 22 aircraft. If you ditched the helicopters that make up the rest of the aircraft you could get a few more Harriers on perhaps. but even 22 Harriers is not much tofight the air war with. And you are fighting the war in the midst of the South Atlntic winter by the time she gets there so more aircraft accidents are likely ubtiil/unless you can do that landing on West Falkland.
Which brings us to that problem. Yes you can land in West Falkland. But while you are building your airstip you are going to come under attack from the Argenine airforce who will be targetting both the landing ships as at San Carlos and also the airstrip you are building. This, again during a Falklands winter. Very unpleasent all round at best. And you still have to liberate the Falklands either by blockade or a direct landing. At the same time the government faces mounting political criticism at home owing to mounting costs and casualties. Of course the Argentine land forces would be getting colder and hungrier.
So. lets say the British manage to pull it off. The costs of the war likely inrease the Thatcher government's unpopularity evem though they won a victory widely regarded as Pyhrric. This likely costs them the next election in 1983 or 1984
But let us assume for a moment that Britain lost one or both carriers and was somehow able to continue the war. Yes, Ilustrioyus would have been in theatre by mid June. But that is right in the middle of the South Atlantic winter. Not the best time for flight operations from an aircraft carrier. And her normal complement would be 12 harriers out of a total of 22 aircraft. If you ditched the helicopters that make up the rest of the aircraft you could get a few more Harriers on perhaps. but even 22 Harriers is not much tofight the air war with. And you are fighting the war in the midst of the South Atlntic winter by the time she gets there so more aircraft accidents are likely ubtiil/unless you can do that landing on West Falkland.
Which brings us to that problem. Yes you can land in West Falkland. But while you are building your airstip you are going to come under attack from the Argenine airforce who will be targetting both the landing ships as at San Carlos and also the airstrip you are building. This, again during a Falklands winter. Very unpleasent all round at best. And you still have to liberate the Falklands either by blockade or a direct landing. At the same time the government faces mounting political criticism at home owing to mounting costs and casualties. Of course the Argentine land forces would be getting colder and hungrier.
So. lets say the British manage to pull it off. The costs of the war likely inrease the Thatcher government's unpopularity evem though they won a victory widely regarded as Pyhrric. This likely costs them the next election in 1983 or 1984
You do seem to have believed the strident left-wing post propaganda though.
The Thatcher government was unpolular with the unions and the left wing. It was no more unpopular among the typical voter than any other mid-term government (if it had been, it wouldn't have been elected in the first place).
The idea that there would have been some sort of no confidence vots is completely unrealistic. What would be the basis for it? The only one that is believable is that the government failed to win the war, in which case the suggestion that Labour (stridently and fervently anti-defence spending) would somehow benefit is simply unfathomable.
Despite the 20 years of anti-Thatcher propaganda by the media and left wing (yes, I was around then, it disgusts me to see how they are rewriting history), she wasn't unpopular at the time. She was seen as someone who was making hard decisions, but it had to be done. Her boost in popularity due to the war was because she was doing what the country wanted, which was to beat the living c**p out of Argentina. No matter what the bleeding heart liberal intelligensia bleated, that was what the man in the street wanted. In fact, they wree a lot less restrained than the government.
The war wasn't ever that close, because Argentina hadn't made plans as to what to do to defend the islands after they got there (one wonders if the planners had ever read about Barbarossa...
). They had assumed that Britain would fune a bit, maybe do some sanctions, but in the end agree to a settlement.While the actual campaign did go better than expected on the ground, the naval war was quite close to predictions. In fact the naval losses were less than those estimated. The main difference was that higher Argentina losses were expected because no-one realised they'd sit tight in port.
If the initial naval battles had gone worse (the invasion wasnt going anywhere until they were won), the fleet would simply have withdrawn (except for the subs) and waited to reinforce and get better AA defence. In the longer run, Argentina doesn't have a chance. She can't build replacement aircraft, ships or missiles; she cant buy them (UN sanctions, remember). Russia isnt going to help (all that would do is REALLY piss off the USA by mucking about in her percieved backyard). The RN can if it wishes blockade Argentina by sea. While Britain can build all the replacement it needs, can buy more (the Argentine economy was moribund, Britain funded the whole war (AND replaced lost units) out of its sluch fund), and was getting a lot of help from the US (a lot more went on than was 'official').
The suggestion Britian would for some reason give up after an initial loss is also simply wrong. Given the mood of the country the main reaction would be to hit Argentina even harder, not give up. To emphasise this, the day after the invasion Thatcher asked her senior colleagues what would happen if the government didnt respond with military action. She was told quite firmly that in that case a new government would be in power in a week which would take it. This is not 2012 and a fuzzy war somewhere in the Middle East. This is 1982 and military action taken against British citizens.
Hmm, yes, Woodwards memoirs. They are a bit...of a personal view...
I'm still curious how Britain loses two carriers unless to bat-bombs. Woodward was a submariner, and indeed seen as too cautious with his carriers by the carrier commanders, who felt the air defence situation was such that they should be much CLOSER to the enemy.
And a pyhrric victory? Hardly. Yes, a victory means losing ships, planes men. The British know this - real wars arent Hollywood. Would the government be blamed? No. They WOULD be blamed for not being prepared enough, but since the opposition had been cutting defence for years and was deeply and passionatelt committed to slashing it , just how does this result in more votes for them???
Bit in bold doesn't make sense - plenty of governments have won an election only to be loathed within two years (aka now). The unemployment figures doubled in 1979-1981 and Thatcher was suffering rumbles in the Cabinet by the wets. Post-Falklands until the Poll Tax she was Churchill incarnate, prior I'm not too sure.
Also if we're dealing with historical propaganda, a third of trade unionists in the 80s voted Conservative, if leftist crap deserves a kicking so does the rightist view of unionists as Trotskyite provocateurs.
But which government had decided to withdraw Endurance with no replacement and had put in place legislation (The British Nationality Act of 1981) that would strip the right of abode from a large proportion of Falkland Islanders?
Honestly, does anyone seriously think that Argentina could have defeated the UK and gotten it to surrender its own territory? If it didn't actually happen, I would have thought the whole war was just some outlandish backdrop to a 007 movie.
No, because of technological and training gaps. If Argentina had training parity? Yes, they could've seized the Falklands, however it would've cost more resources than the Junta wanted to spend with it.