An AH Battle: 1st Battle of Midway, 17 - 21 June 1942

[Tangles2]

1ST BATTLE OF MIDWAY -: 17-21 June 1942

Prologue

Greetings all. I originally started to post this on the "Create the Largest Naval Battle you can sometime after the start of WW1" thread, but then had second thoughts and decided to post it as a new thread, hopefully to generate a lot of Battle specific response. It would have fitted the first thread fine due to the large change in force levels involved, but being such a pivotal battle it always seems to generate its own momentum and responses. Look closely and you will see that this includes 26, yes 26 aircraft carriers! Before you collectively blow a raspberry and assume that I've plucked these figures out of my #rs@, the scenario is an amalgam of concepts and force structure from four other timelines to form a logical progression in achieving this, and for AH purposes, plausible AU. I'll do my best to put how we arrived at this force level and show these in context to establish how I arrived at this battle, and hopefully you can look at this and the referenced TL to get a less knee-jerk initial reaction. Trust me I hope you will find it enjoyable and basically interesting exercise to change perspective on a classic conflict when I get it done. Regardless the pleasure is mine in seeing other responses to the scenarios I present, and I look forward to and value your feedback. Tangles.

To put this in context and the shape and structure of the forces involved I'll present other AU TL that shaped the context of this offering and brief synopsis of why they are relevant.

Firstly, there are the works of David Rowe, in particular his Book 3 title 'Holding the line" of the 'Whale has Wings' Series. This is the basis of the inclusion of Allied TF58 into the 'Mare Americanus' of the Pacific Campaign. The combined Allied BB/CV force structure presented and its involvement in Midway is a direct crib of that AU. In his narrative the Atlantic Campaign has developed in the favor of the UK, so that Britain has been able to shake free large force elements for involvement against Japan, changing the shape of the DEI battle and retaining Singapore. His scenario directly sees 3xBB, and 3CV supporting the USN ops in Midway, though with a different Battle structure. Note the reduced threat in the Atlantic means that the USN have the option to free the Wasp and Ranger to be available for employment in the Pacific to face the increased Japanese threat. This is basis for inclusion of these additional elements of the larger force structure.

Secondly, A Moscow Option by David Downing shapes the concept of battle, were the IJN becomes aware that the USN is reading their signals and Yamamoto reshapes the concept of the Midway operation to take advantage of this. The operational changes involved in this result in the changed date of battle, with the deferment resulting in Halsey's medical release and involvement in the conduct of the battle as to be detailed. I could elaborate more here on the importance of this but will save that for presentation of the actual battle thread soon.

Thirdly is the work of John Hardinge and his works on an AU where Australia and NZ are a single Dominion State of Britain and its impacts, which form a basis for my own TL.

This lastly leads to my own Nieustralis AU of which this will be a component chapter. How this shapes the force structure arises from changes to the WNT post WW1, where the BB provisions are detailed with more vigor, but less so for the carriers. Arising from this historic change both the USN and IJN can retain four not two hulls of their existing capital ship hulls under construction. The result is that both forces are starting the Pacific campaign from a higher base line naval aviation force, the USN with four Saratoga's, with the addition of Constellation and Independance, while the IJN have the Tosa and Amagi ITTL. Subsequently for the IJN the Junyo class is actually three vessels with the third vessel Oiyo added ITTL. Also, the WNT Carrier changes mean that both Ranger and Wasp are completed as a single class prior to the Yorktown's, but with the same historic weakness implicit in their original designs. This change also means that the USN will eventually construct five Yorktown class carriers ITTL, thought the last two, Ticonderoga and Bonhomme Richard, are still nearing completion and commissioning ITTL as the battle commences. From these historic alterations there are several knock-on effects. Again, drawing on David Row's work, the British raid on Taranto is a multiple carrier operation, resulting in the extension of the target list to include the tank farms and submarine base, with assistance of RAF Wellingtons from Malta. As IRL the IJN closely studies the British operation leading to their changing the Pearl Harbor attack to reflect this. Also, the impact of an eight carrier Kido Butai for the Pearl Harbor raid is vital. Avoiding the old 'third strike at PH saw" with the additional carrier strength the attack still has only the historic two waves involved. But both as a result of the changes are far stronger, and with the example of the British ITTL, target base facilities resulting in far more infrastructure damage, loss of the fuel storage and Submarine base for example. This has introduced logistical and support issues for the USN leading up to the 1st Midway I am presenting.

The second flow on ITTL regards the Nieustralis navy (RNN). Here the dominion is a separate observer for WNT purposes, with its two BCs ITTL demilitarized and not scrapped as occurred IRL. Post war as a result, it goes down the naval aviation development line in conjunction to the theme developed by David Rowes AU. By getting two Hawkins class carrier conversions as CVLs instead of the acquiring the two County class CAs as occurred IOTL. With the invasion of Manchuria in 1932 they convert their BCs to small CVs (think HMS Furious analog), and after 1937 IOT replace the Hawkins approach Britain for the T-class CV (think something between the Colossus and Illustrious, HMS Indomitable lite, single hanger, much lighter side armor etc.). This means that with the reduced tempo of the Atlantic they agitate to move greater forces to the Pacific campaign. IRL this applied to the infantry forces deployed in the Western Desert, but it is realistic to extend this premise to the RNN carriers ITTL. This will result in a number of smaller carriers also in the Pacific theatre and it will play its part in the scenario developing.

The net result of these changes will lead to a longer and more attritional Pacific campaign in this AU, and this will represent the first of four major carrier battles in the Pacific, and by far the largest naval battle of WW2 to date. First Midway will represent the first and as can be seen by the table tendered, far the largest carrier battle of World War Two to date, where the size and power of the naval aviation represents a major change in the conduct of naval warfare.

This is the logical basis for the evolution of the seemingly outrageous force levels involved in this battle concept. But I hope you will see that there is a progression behind the events leading to the battle detailed. If you are interested, please look at the relevant stories mentioned as a basis, and this can help frame further critique when I get back and present my offering. I hope this preamble isn't too long winded and has whet your appetite for what is to come. There might be some initial delay as I'm going to be coming off a surgical procedure shortly, but still wanted to start this to have something to distract me whan I get back.

Regards T.

 

[Tangles2]

Part One

SUPPLEMENT ONE

DIKIPEDIA
(An Alternate History Factoid by JPD)

The First Battle of Midway​

The First Battle of Midway was a major naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II that took place on 17-21 June 1942, six months after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and one month after the inconclusive Battle of the Coral Sea. An Allied force including U.S., British, Nieustralis, and French elements under Admirals William Halsey, Frank J. Fletcher, Raymond A. Spruance (USN), Arthur Lyster (RN), and John Grace (RNN) were defeated by an attacking fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) under Admirals Isoroku Yamamoto, Tamon Yamaguchi, Jisaburō Ozawa, and Nobutake Kondō near Midway Atoll, inflicting severe damage or sinking the majority of available operational fleet carriers of the USN.

The Japanese intent for the battle was luring the American aircraft carriers into a trap and occupying Midway was part of an overall "barrier" strategy to extend Japan's defensive perimeter, particularly in response to the Doolittle air raid on Tokyo. The success of this operation was also considered preparatory for any subsequent offensive operations against Fiji, Samoa, and Hawaii itself. The initial plan of battle was based on faulty Japanese assumptions of the American reaction and assessment of the forces arrayed in opposition.

The USN, which had command of the operation for the allies, also based their plan of battle on several faulty assumptions. Most significantly, American cryptographers were in the belief that they were aware of the date and location of the planned attack, along with the force composition of their opponents. This belief underpinned USN preparations and the disposition of its forces to prepare its ambush.

The subsequent battle would be noted for the unprecedented size and intensity of the aerial conflict, with both sides suffering severe casualties. The faulty assumptions involved on both sides would have a significant impact on the outcome of the battle. The Japanese forces achieved their desired result in successfully occupying Midway, sinking four of the six USN fleet carriers in the Pacific Theatre at the time, and damaging the remaining two. The failure of the IJN to anticipate the presence and size of the RN and Allied elements denied them the opportunity to capitalize on the destruction of the USN carrier force and inflicted severe losses on the aviation forces involved in the battle. It would represent by far the largest naval battle of World War 2 at that stage and was to remain one of the largest to occur during the conflict.

After Midway and its impact on the IJN aviation assets, the subsequent exhausting attrition of the Solomon Islands and Central Pacific campaigns was telling. Japan's capacity to replace its losses in materiel (particularly aircraft carriers) and men (especially well-trained pilots and maintenance crewmen) rapidly became insufficient to cope with mounting casualties, while the United States' massive industrial and training capabilities made losses far easier to replace.

Most historians now consider the Battle of Midway a turning point in the Pacific War, in that it marked the end of the aggressive or expansion phase of Japanese operations in the Pacific Campaign. It represented both the peak of capabilities for the IJN and the nadir of fortune for the USN. It also was the first action that was to incorporate significant Allied forces acting in conjunction with the USN in operations against the IJN in the Central Pacific. Subsequently the size and capabilities of the USN would only increase whilst future IJN deployments, event when offensive, would be largely attritional to support a strategically defensive posture.

Background​

After expanding the war in the Pacific to include Western outposts, the Japanese Empire had attained the majority of its initial strategic goals quickly, taking British Hong Kong, the Philippines, Borneo, and sections of the Dutch East Indies (modern Indonesia). The latter, with its vital oil resources, was particularly important to Japan. Despite these successes, its failure to fully occupy Malaya and capture Singapore, along with the failed assaults on Java, Bali, and East Timor, denied it the opportunity to form a continuous southern island barrier to secure its expansion. Because of this, preliminary planning to try to define revised objectives for the second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1942.

It is interesting to note the degree of institutional blindness that seems to have the blinkered operational analysis of the situation by the IJN. Despite the acknowledgment of the failure to fully secure its southern objectives and some significant losses to those forces involved, the Japanese strategic perspective remained almost entirely focused on countering operations of the USN. Despite the size of the opposition forces involved in the setbacks of the southern operations, the total absence of consideration of how the allied forces involved in inflicting those setbacks might now be employed is inexplicable. The consideration that RN and allied vessels might support USN operations in the central Pacific simply fails to appear in operational planning for the IJN at this time. Where combat had occurred, a culture of automatic acceptance of damage claims and losses inflicted upon allied forces seems endemic and would later be referred to as the ‘victory disease’ by the IJN. This lack of critical analysis of loss figures, and tendency to maximize enemy losses, especially when involving a Japanese failure, also hindered accurate assessment of opposing forces and their likely employment.

Because of strategic disagreements between the Imperial Army (IJA) and Imperial Navy (IJN) and infighting between the Navy's GHQ and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's Combined Fleet, a follow-up strategy was not formed until April 1942. Admiral Yamamoto finally won the bureaucratic struggle with a thinly veiled threat to resign, after which his plan for the Central Pacific was adopted. Yamamoto's primary strategic goal was the elimination of America's carrier forces, which he regarded as the principal threat to the overall Pacific campaign. This concern was acutely heightened by the Doolittle Raid on 18 April 1942, in which 16 United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) B-25 Mitchell bombers launched from USS Hornet bombed targets in Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a shock to the Japanese and showed the existence of a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands as well as the vulnerability of Japanese territory to American bombers.

This, and other successful hit-and-run raids by American carriers in the Central Pacific Theatre, showed that they were still a threat, although seemingly reluctant to be drawn into an all-out battle. Yamamoto reasoned that another air attack on the main U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor would induce all of the American fleets to sail out to fight, including the carriers. However, considering the increased strength of American land-based airpower on the Hawaiian Islands since the 7 December attack the previous year, he judged that it was now too risky to attack Pearl Harbor directly.

Instead, Yamamoto selected Midway, a tiny atoll at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain, approximately 1,300 miles (1,100 nautical miles; 2,100 kilometers) from Oahu. This meant that Midway was outside the effective range of almost all of the American aircraft stationed on the main Hawaiian Islands. Midway was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan's intentions, but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore be compelled to defend it vigorously. The U.S. did consider Midway vital: after the battle, as the establishment of a U.S. submarine base on Midway would allow submarines operating from Pearl Harbor to refuel and re-provision, extending their radius of operations by 1,200 miles (1,900 km). In addition to serving as a seaplane base, Midway's airstrips also served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on Wake Island.

Yamamoto's Initial plan: Operation MI

Typical of much of early Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamoto's initial battle plan for taking Midway (named Operation MI) was exceedingly complex. It required the careful and timely coordination of multiple battle groups over hundreds of miles of the open sea. This design was also predicated on optimistic intelligence and inflated loss reports which understated the available balance of forces the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Finally, much of the planning assumptions, coinciding with the general feeling among the Japanese leadership at the time, was based on a gross misjudgment of American morale, which was believed to be debilitated from the string of Japanese victories in the preceding months. It failed to sufficiently recognize the degree of aggression and anger behind the USN planning decisions that still lingered in the wake of Pearl Harbor.

Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the U.S. fleet into a fatally compromised situation. To this end, he dispersed his forces so that their full extent (particularly his carriers) would be concealed from the Americans before the battle. Critically in this concept, Yamamoto's supporting battleships and cruisers would trail the carrier force by several hundred miles. They were intended to come up and destroy whatever elements of the U.S. fleet might come to Midway's defense once Nagumo's carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun battle. This tactic was doctrine in most major navies of the time.

When formatting this concept, what Yamamoto did not know was that the U.S. had broken parts of the main Japanese naval code (dubbed JN-25 by the Americans), divulging many details of his plan to the enemy. His emphasis on dispersal also meant none of his formations were in a position to support the others. The carrier force expected to carry out strikes against Midway and bear the brunt of American counterattacks was very light considering the forces available. The only warships in the initial plan larger than the screening force of twelve destroyers were two Kongō-class fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, and one light cruiser. In contrast, the trailing forces had between them two light carriers, five battleships, four heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers, none of which were immediately available to support the carriers if required. The light carriers and battleships of the trailing forces were too slow to keep pace with the carriers of the Kidō Butai and so could not have sailed in company with them. The Kido Butai would sail into range at best speed to increase the chance of surprise and would not have ships spread out across the ocean guiding the enemy toward it. If the other parts of the invasion force needed more defense, the Kido Butai would make the best speed to defend them. Hence the slower ships could not be with the Kido Butai. The distance between forces would have had grave implications if surprise was lost. The invaluable reconnaissance capability of the scout planes carried by the cruisers and carriers, as well as the additional antiaircraft capability of the trailing forces, was unavailable in immediate support.

 

[Tangles2]

Part Two

Inclusion of the Aleutian invasion

To obtain support from the Imperial Japanese Army for the Midway operation, the Imperial Japanese Navy agreed to support their invasion of the United States through the Aleutian Islands of Attu and Kiska, part of the Alaska Territory. In the wake of the Doolittle raid the IJA insistence on the occupation of these islands to place the Japanese home islands out of range of U.S. land-based bombers across Alaska. It also represented a gesture to recover from the loss of face lost incurred by the forces in light of the raid. The inclusion of this concept to the overall plan of battle diverted ships to what could otherwise have augmented the force striking Midway. This operational aspect was intended to be launched simultaneously with the attack on Midway.

The fundamental flaw in this entire plan rested in another unquestioned appreciation of the entire strategic situation. The whole detailed process rested on the one assumption, that the Americans would be surprised. To assume the opposite – something the Japanese refused to do until it was impossible not to – would result in a cascade of very different conclusions. If the Americans were not caught unawares then the Aleutian diversion merely dispersed Japanese strength, and it would be the Americans rather than they who would do the pouncing around Midway, on a carrier force isolated from any possible support.

Some of these fears were expressed when Ugaki put the plan through a series of war games in mid-April. In one exercise several Japanese carriers were sunk by an unexpected American strike, but Ugaki, in his role as umpire, hastened to undo this decision by rewriting the rules. Some of the participating admirals were not so easily put off. Vice-Admiral Kondo, just back from the Java Sea, and Rear-Admiral Yamaguchi, who had commanded carriers at Pearl Harbor, were not impressed by the plan. They disliked the widespread dispersion of forces and argued that at least the carriers should be wielded as a cohesive force. Nagumo’s Air Operations Officer in the Kido Butai, Commander Genda, strongly endorsed their views. The plan should be rooted in a carrier-centric premise. As it now stood a few carriers had merely been appended to a plan rooted in the traditions of the battleship era.

This was perceptive thinking, but Yamamoto, apparently worn by the long struggle of institutional infighting necessary to gain acceptance of the plan, proved uncharacteristically unreceptive to alteration to the plan. He remained adamant; Operation Midway would commence in late May. The die had apparently been cast. However, in late April Yamamoto was reluctantly forced to abandon the entire Operation Mi plan. The reason – the only conceivable reason – was the Japanese discovery that their staff code had been broken by the Americans.

USN possession of Navy Codes

During the first six months of the war there had occurred several strange incidents and coincidences spread throughout the Japanese sphere of operations. In isolation these seemed random but when subject to analysis they presented a worrying trend. Commanders in different theatres failed to notice several similar ‘coincidences. But staff officers in Tokyo, drew the possible connection when sifting through the various reports. Certain circles had suspected as much for several weeks, but in another example of the institutional narrow-mindedness of sections of the IJN, the thought that the code had been broken was inconceivable. But could it have fallen into enemy hands?

Each Japanese warship carried a codebook weighted with lead to take it swiftly to the bottom should disaster strike. Analysis of the record of those Japanese ships sunk since the war’s beginning soon narrowed down attention to one. Submarine I-124 had last broadcast its position on 19 January, as outside Darwin harbor in northern Australia. It had been assumed sunk, but where? Suppose it had been depth-charged either in or just outside the harbor? Examining the available oceanographic charts and found that the water in-harbor was a mere 140 feet at the deepest point, quite within the limits of a thorough salvage operation.

These suspicions were presented to Rear-Admiral Fukudome, the Naval General Staff Chief of Operations in early April. The latter was impressed and, without informing Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet Staff, decided to test this theory. Information was relayed in code by Japanese warships in the Pacific about imaginary problems with the water-distillation plant on Guam. A week later one of Japan’s agents in Hawaii reported that the information had come through. The code had indeed been broken.

Yamamoto was informed of this by Fukudome on 28 April. He had no choice but to accept that the details of the Coral Sea and Midway operations, which had been flooding the Pacific radio waves for several weeks, were now known to the enemy. With much of the operational movements already underway former went ahead but with late modifications in intent relayed to the commanders of the elements involved. The entire structure of the Midway operation would have to be rethought. But, having accepted this fait-accompli, it also offered Yamamoto an entirely new range of strategic options to achieve the original objectives of the Midway operation.

 

[Tangles2]

Part Three

Prelude

American reinforcements

To do battle with an enemy expected to muster a minimum of five or six carriers, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas needed every available flight deck. He effectively had four fleet carriers already available, and with the situation in the Atlantic seemingly stable, and still lacking an effective battle line after the Pearl Harbor losses, he had successfully lobbied the CNO of the USN, Admiral Ernest King, to transfer a significant portion of the available Atlantic forces to the Pacific theatre. As such in late May he was to receive a further two fleet carriers (Ranger and Wasp) and a further eight cruisers, bringing the number available for the operation to fifteen. Despite worries about their fragility and ability to absorb damage, in light of the assessed threat in the theatre, the decision had been made to transfer them to reinforce the existing carrier numbers in the Pacific. With these, he planned to increase both TF16 and TF17 to three carrier groups, each with a screen of six to eight cruisers, rather than create a third two carrier group unfamiliar with operations in the Pacific Theatre.

Despite this increase in force availability, Nimitz remained worried about the potential size of any Japanese attack force. This worry is reflected in Nimitz’s instructions to his carrier admirals on the eve of battle which were cautious enough:

‘… you will be governed by the principles of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to mean avoidance of exposure of your forces to attack by superior enemy forces without the prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage on the enemy.’

– but the mere fact of sending six carriers against a potentially far larger enemy force questions the mindset underlying such caution, and suggested a continuing sense of American optimism despite the potential disparity in force levels involved. The mitigating circumstance was the belief that the USN had broken the Japanese naval code. This belief that they ‘had the drop’ on the Japanese provided Nimitz and his colleagues with a large degree of confidence that they could control the conduct of the battle.

On 25th May the light cruiser USS St. Louis arrives at Midway and disembarks Companies "C" and "D," 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, and a 37 mm gun battery of the 3rd defense Battalion. The aircraft ferry USS Kitty Hawk brings Marine reinforcements including a detachment of a 3inch (76.2 mm) antiaircraft group of the 3rd defense Battalion, a light tank platoon, and additional personnel for Marine Air Group Twenty. With the Japanese operation now imminent, these would be the last supplies to reach the island before the Japanese attack. In preparation for the upcoming conflict, the US had significantly increased the aviation forces deployed at Midway By 4 June a total of 126 aircraft were stationed there. This force included four squadrons of PBYs Catalinas for long-range reconnaissance duties, a mixed array of bombers including Grumman TBF Avengers, Douglas SBD Dauntless, Vought SB2U Vindicators, whilst the USAAF contributed a squadron of 17 B-17 Flying Fortresses and four Martin B-26 Marauders equipped with torpedoes. For defense, a total of 28 fighters were available, 21 Brewster Buffalos and seven Grumman Wildcats.

Allied reinforcements

The US decoders based at Pearl warned Admiral Nimitz of a proposed action by the Japanese aimed at the mid-Pacific, with the most likely target to be Midway Island, and the probable suspension of operations in the southwest Pacific until the conclusion of the Midway operation. On 3rd May he, therefore, passes the intelligence on to Admiral Somerville in the day's dispatches, asking him if it will be possible for the Royal Navy either to help by organizing distracting operations in the SE Asia area or sending a force to help.

As a result of this communication, on May 4th an urgent meeting is held in Singapore between Somerville, Alexander, Blamey, Park, and the other available area commanders to discuss Nimitz's intelligence and proposed operations. The arrival of the monsoon now limiting surface force options in the SE Asian theatre and the analysis of the signal traffic has convinced Somerville that a major operation will take place shortly, even if it is not at Midway. The other out of theatre possibility is a continuation of the recent SW Pacific operations. The Solomons/New Guinea area is vulnerable to a large Japanese offensive but would only bring limited gains. They would also put the Japanese navy at the end of a long logistic supply line, and there is nothing immediately critical to the Allies in the area - an invasion of the Solomons or another attempt on New Guinea would have to be countered, but the tying down of the Japanese fleet in support would be to the advantage of the Allies who could concentrate on them from two directions.

Bearing this in mind, Somerville suggests the following. A task force of three fleet carriers plus supporting ships can be sent in 24 hours; it will take some 18-20 days to reach Hawaii. To maintain a high speed the force will need to refuel; this will be done first in Australia and will also allow the force to be halted if it proves necessary. Sending the ships this far is low risk but is best done now while further discussions are made - it would be unwise to wait due to the transit time required. He will still hold two fleet and two light carriers in Singapore. Even if the entire Japanese fleet were to be used, he can always do as he planned in December and fall back to Ceylon while he is reinforced from the Mediterranean but considers this highly unlikely - the IJN would be putting their ships into a noose of his submarines and torpedo planes. To protect the China Sea area, all Allied submarines will be pulled back into defensive positions, and the RAF will use its long-range reconnaissance aircraft to give the maximum warning. By deploying the force, it would also be well placed if the Japanese objective is the SW Pacific option.

As a result, units of the fleet are ordered to make final preparations and sail for northern Australia within 24 hours. This is preparatory to making a final decision as to its destination. While the proposed task force is still a risk, the possibility of a crushing defeat of the Japanese carrier force is felt to make this risk worthwhile. Thus, on May 6th elements of Force Z, consisting of the fleet carriers HMS Implacable, HMS Bulwark, and the new carrier HMS Audacious, supported by the battleships MNS Richelieu, HMS Anson, and HMS King George V, with supporting cruisers and destroyers, leaves Singapore heading east. Somerville has also ordered for a tanker to be sent to Fiji as a matter of urgency; this will allow the force to refuel and so keep up a higher passage speed. On11th May the force reach Darwin during the night to refuel and sails soon after dawn, heading east along the north coast of Australia. On the 18th it arrives at Fiji where it is redesignated as Task Force 58. There several tankers have been sent to provide the force with fuel. The force pauses only to refuel and take on water, then heads north, destination Pearl Harbor.

On 26th May Vice Admiral Lyster, the commander of the newly designated TF58, lands at Pearl Harbor by carrier plane to discuss the operation with Admiral Nimitz and his staff. Given the operation planned, command of the RN force has been given to him due to his experience in multi-carrier operations. The size of the RN force has made discussions of who is to command somewhat delicate (the USN and RN forces are of a similar size), but Somerville has already decided with Nimitz that the American local knowledge and territory mean they should be in overall command. Nimitz has agreed that Lyster will have as free a hand as possible over the use of his ships, particularly if the RN carriers can get off a night strike, something outside of the existing USN capability. The RN Force arrives at Pearl Harbor on 27th May. Overnight the fleet is refueled, and US navy communications personnel and their equipment are hurried on board along with a USN deck landing officer to each carrier each in case any US aircraft need to be recovered (the landing procedures and signals are different in the two navies. Preparations have been made during their voyage to Hawaii to add the US radio equipment to allow them to communicate with the US Task Forces and aircraft. A US light cruiser will also accompany the force to aid in this.

It had been hoped that TF58 would arrive in time to integrate it with the US carrier forces now on their way to Midway, but there was no time before the Japanese sailed. Current intentions are for the TF58 to move east of Midway, to catch the Japanese force between forces. Located south of the US forces this place them in a position to employ the attached battleships in a surface action role in the event the Japanese attempt to bombard Midway. As with the USN ships, flags and markings are painted on the ships to reduce the chance of misidentification and on the evening of the 28th, TF58 departs.

Inclusion of Task Force 44

The formation of the last element of forces involved at Midway resulted due to the fortunate coincidence of several ship movements. With the increased Japanese threat in the Pacific in February the RNN carrier HMNS Terra Australis was detached from service with Force H in Gibraltar to return to home waters at Nieustralis request. Returned via Durban where it was docked and completed an overdue boiler clean before continuing to Freemantle with a RN escort of two cruisers and two destroyers. No longer with the immediate need for them in the Indian Ocean theatre, they were routed to Melbourne and joined by the light carrier Pacifica, which had just finished repairs from damage received in operations around Java. At Sydney, the carrier Australia was just leaving dock after repairs to collision damage sustained after ramming and sinking the destroyer Voyager in night landing exercises in February. Originally tasked to provide air cover for the four RNN cruisers of Task Group 44 in the Coral Sea Operation, the carrier had missed the Coral Sea Operation but now rejoined TG44. These two groups were merged under the command of Admiral Jack Grace and renamed TF44 and dispatched to Fiji to be available for operations in the SW or Central Pacific as required. The intent initially was that with carrier forces available at Hawaii and Singapore the allies were positioned to respond to threats in the China Sea or Central Pacific. The other possible operational threat was a thrust towards the SW Pacific/ Solomons and placing carrier assets, though of weaker strength, in Fiji waters would be well placed to counter this possibility.

Employment of the three-carrier TF44 in the Midway operation was initially considered unfeasible due to the priority given to the rapid transit of TF58 for tanker support and the initial date given for the Japanese move. Moving the TF to Fiji was considered a prudent option in event that the Japanese forces had some other target other than Midway. The sinking of the replenishment oiler Sepulga (AO-20) by submarine on 21 May meant the high-speed transit option was unavailable and initially that TF44 would arrive too late to participate in the Midway Operation. However, as signals intelligence indicated a delay in the anticipated arrival date of the Japanese forces, cruising at economical speed allowed arrival at Pearl Harbor on late 4 June. As before with TF58 the group was urgently refueled and restocked whilst taking on USN personnel and left Pearl Harbor early on June 6th, accompanied by a USN light cruiser and three destroyers. These represented the last available USN surface forces available in the Central Pacific.

Arriving almost as an add-on late to the operation, little consideration appears to have been given to specific operational employment of TF44 before its arrival. On 11 June Admiral Grace flew from Terra Australis to confer with Admiral Lyster onboard Audacious to confirm the roles envisioned for TF44 in the upcoming conflict. At this meeting, he had inquired if he should marry up with TF58 and consolidate the two commonwealth groups into one. Admiral Lyster confirmed that whilst tactical control of the RN/RNN elements remained with him, operational command rested with Halsey. He indicated that Halsey wished to preserve the limited logistic support available for the offensive operations, to the two USN task groups and TF58, with the intent of destroying the Kido Butai if possible. As such TF44 was to continue to close with the balance of the allied forces but do so in a manner to maximize the endurance of the group and to be prepared to operate as directed. He clarified Halsey’s intent to target the fleet carriers of the IJN as a priority, including prosecuting a vigorous pursuit if possible, and that TF44 role in this plan would be to cover Midway Island to free the balance of the allied forces to pursue this action. If possible TF44 would be involved in prosecuting attacks on the Invasion Force and Occupation Group vessels once the IJN covering forces had been driven off or destroyed. This was considered an operational possibility to free USN forces to pursue or destroy the carriers of the Kido Butai in detail if the opportunity was presented. It was with this understanding that Admiral Grace returned to TF44 and continued to close with the balance of allied forces at an economical 15 knots. In many ways its employment in the upcoming battle and given the overall weaker air element, was to largely act as a backup contingency force available to respond to unforeseen changes to the overall operation. As such TF44 was still about 90 miles to the SE of TF58 and closing slowly as the initial stages of the engagement opened.

The arrival of TF44 represented the final available reinforcements in the Central Pacific for the upcoming battle. The disposition of the Allied force was a total of 12 carriers in four operational groups, each of three carriers with screen, deployed in a rough arc to the north and east of Midway.

 

[Tangles2]

Part Four

Yamamoto's Adjustments to Operation MI

The news of the US code-breaking success forced a fundamental reassessment of the plan as it existed. It invalidated a number of the critical assumptions used to base the structure and disposition of the forces as originally deployed. In the absence of surprise, the dispersal of strength as planned simply offered the USN an opportunity to engage and destroy the forces in isolation. With this knowledge, Yamamoto amended the plan to reflect more on the ‘double-bluff aspect rather than surprise. The original plan would serve as a feint for the new one, and to this end, the broken code was continued in use throughout May. Naturally, the information transmitted was somewhat selective. The Americans would expect Nagumo’s carriers north-east of Midway, and dispositions would be altered to take advantage of this expectation. The Americans would also expect a diversion in the Aleutians. With the original maneuvering to get IJA approval for the plan, Yamamoto still had to honor that commitment, but now with an entirely changed force allocation.

At the urging of Ugaki, Genda, and several other officers, the plan became much more carrier-based. With the loss of the battleship Ise and damage to the Hyuga as a result of operations against the Allied forces in the South China Sea, nine operational battleships were immediately available for the IJN. The Aleutians operation would still proceed, but now with the two oldest of those ships Fuso and Yamashiro, and two light carriers Hosho and Ryuho in support, and with orders to proceed only after the decisive naval engagement had been fought. The three carriers Oiyo, Junyo, and Ryujo and the cruiser elements of their screen would now be part of the main Midway operation.

Emergency repairs enabled the availability of Amagi (damaged on a grounding at Truk), and Shokaku (flight deck damage after the Coral Sea Operation) and restored the Kido Butai to its available operational strength of seven fleet carriers. With the three Aleutian carriers and four light carriers he had a total of fourteen operational carriers available, virtually the entire naval aviation capability of the IJN at this time, and certainly the largest ever assembly of carriers in an operation in the war to date. Too many to operate as a single group, the Ryujo (36 aircraft) and Zuiho (30 aircraft) were allocated to support the main force for the assault on Midway itself. The remaining twelve, carrying over 800 aircraft were to operate in three air fleets, each of four carriers, and these would be the main offensive weapon used in the destruction of the US Pacific Fleet. For the first time since Pearl Harbor, the Kido Butai would be restored to eight carriers split into two operational four carrier elements, each carrying over 320 aircraft. The 1st Air Fleet under Admiral Kondo, with Kaga, Amagi, Akagi, and the smaller Junyo. The 2nd Air Fleet under Admiral Yamaguchi with Zuikaku, Shokaku, Hiryu, and Soryu. The last element was the newly formed 5th Air Fleet with 160 aircraft in the four smaller carriers, Oiyo, Hiyo, Chitose, and Chiyoda, and under the command of Admiral Ozawa.

The Main Carrier striking force was the eight carriers of the first and second air fleets. Recognizing that this was too unwieldy to operate as a single entity, each air fleet would operate independently, though remaining within close proximity of each other to provide support if required. Each fleet would include a significantly larger escort force than originally planned. Each fleet had attached a division of two of the fast Kongo-class battleships, a squadron of four heavy cruisers, and a scout plane cruiser in addition to a destroyer squadron screen. Trailing the carrier striking force, but much more closely than the previous plan, would be the main body of the invasion fleet. This would include the remaining three battleships, Yamato, Mutsu, and Nagato, with Yamamoto flying his flag on the Yamato, the carrier group of Ryujo and Zuiho, and screening forces. These covered the trailing occupation force, and support and supply groups each with its own screen.

Due to the importance and size of the operation, Yamamoto elected to command the operation himself, particularly after Nagumo’s hesitant performance at the recent Coral Sea Operation. In the amended plan his carriers would approach southwest of Midway Island, in the general direction of the Hawaiian group. This was partly to avoid any American submarines deployed to cover the original planned approach, and partly to pull the American carriers south, towards the surprise element of the new plan. This was the second carrier force of the 5th Air Fleet under Admiral Ozawa moving northwards on an interception course in complete radio silence. If the American carriers retreated to the east rather than seek battle with the Japanese force, then Ozawa’s force would be in a position to cut them off. Whatever happened the US carriers would find themselves outnumbered and outmaneuvered, and swiftly dispatched to the ocean floor. The plan secured both Yamamoto’s strategic goals, eliminating America's carrier forces and establishing an outpost at Midway to extend the Japanese security perimeter in the Central Pacific. Only once these objectives were attained could the Imperial Navy possibly consider future plans for raids on the West Coast of America or Panama, or an assault on Fiji to cut the US/Nieustralis lines of supply.

For the assault, both the 1st and 2nd air fleets were reinforced with additional screening elements and to remain within 40 miles of each other whilst the slower invasion force, thanks to the additional time by the delayed starting date, was also to be in trailing much more closely than the previous plan so that all elements could move to support each other in a shorter timeframe if required. But both invasion groups were now under strict orders to assault their objectives only after the decisive naval engagement had been fought. This time, however, the main battle fleet would be in close attendance with severely limited objectives for the convoy of troopships for the seizure of Midway. Lastly, due to the requirement for the 5th Air Fleet to approach from the south, and to allow the full deployment of a Japanese submarine screen for the operation, the invasion date was deferred back from the 5th of June to the 11th. From22 May the array of Japanese forces commence moving from Truk in the Carolines and Saipan and on 24 May Yamamoto’s Main Fleet had upped anchor in Hiroshima Bay and threaded its way in single file down the Bungo Channel to the ocean.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Yamamoto was informed of this by Fukudome on 28 April. He had no choice but to accept that the details of the Coral Sea and Midway operations, which had been flooding the Pacific radio waves for several weeks, were now known to the enemy. With much of the operational movements already underway former went ahead but with late modifications in intent relayed to the commanders of the elements involved. The entire structure of the Midway operation would have to be rethought. But, having accepted this fait-accompli, it also offered Yamamoto an entirely new range of strategic options to achieve the original objectives of the Midway operation.

Trivia note: It was the Japanese Navy habit to change the keys for their 'admirals code' the JN25 in USN nomenclature, either every 90 days, or when starting execution of a major operation. OTL the key was changed in late March, shutting USN intelligence out of the traffic until late April. The break or assist came from the aftermath of the Tokyo raid. From the moment the bombs started falling the Home Fleet went crazy on the radio waves, generating huge amount of traffic for the USN codebreakers to analyze. The urgency of the radio messages caused the Japanese communications sections to make a number of errors, such as duplicate messages. Its not clear if the USN would have broken back into the JN25 code soon enough to anticipate the Midway operation.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

1ST BATTLE OF MIDWAY -: 17-21 June 1942

View attachment 902165



This lastly leads to my own Nieustralis AU of which this will be a component chapter. How this shapes the force structure arises from changes to the WNT post WW1, where the BB provisions are detailed with more vigor, but less so for the carriers. Arising from this historic change both the USN and IJN can retain four not two hulls of their existing capital ship hulls under construction. The result is that both forces are starting the Pacific campaign from a higher base line naval aviation force, the USN with four Saratoga's, with the addition of Constellation and Independance, while the IJN have the Tosa and Amagi ITTL. Subsequently for the IJN the Junyo class is actually three vessels with the third vessel Oiyo added ITTL. Also, the WNT Carrier changes mean that both Ranger and Wasp are completed as a single class prior to the Yorktown's, but with the same historic weakness implicit in their original designs. This change also means that the USN will eventually construct five Yorktown class carriers ITTL, thought the last two, Ticonderoga and Bonhomme Richard, are still nearing completion and commissioning ITTL as the battle commences. From these historic alterations there are several knock-on effects. Again, drawing on David Row's work, the British raid on Taranto is a multiple carrier operation, resulting in the extension of the target list to include the tank farms and submarine base, with assistance of RAF Wellingtons from Malta. As IRL the IJN closely studies the British operation leading to their changing the Pearl Harbor attack to reflect this. Also, the impact of an eight carrier Kido Butai for the Pearl Harbor raid is vital. Avoiding the old 'third strike at PH saw" with the additional carrier strength the attack still has only the historic two waves involved. But both as a result of the changes are far stronger, and with the example of the British ITTL, target base facilities resulting in far more infrastructure damage, loss of the fuel storage and Submarine base for example. This has introduced logistical and support issues for the USN leading up to the 1st Midway I am presenting.

Im confused about the carrier forces. Some of the carriers referred to in the text seem to be missing from the above chart.

The air wings of the Zuikaku and Shōkaku took severe losses in the Coral sea battle. They were considered not operational and retained in Japan awaiting new aircraft and pilots. Are those losses waived away here, by a different outcome of the previous battle?

 

[Tangles2]

Im confused about the carrier forces. Some of the carriers referred to in the text seem to be missing from the above chart.

The air wings of the Zuikaku and Shōkaku took severe losses in the Coral sea battle. They were considered not operational and retained in Japan awaiting new aircraft and pilots. Are those losses waived away here, by a different outcome of the previous battle?

Note that this is a different AU, and the Coral Sea Battle is different to that of our timeline and more inconclusive, affected by the weather and command issues. The Shoho was still lost, but far lower aircrew losses were incurred by the IJN and note that the Lady Lex is still operational and included in the USN order of battle, not sunk as IRL. While to a degree the operational dynamics that triggered it remained historically the same, it was less pivotal in its impact. One of the most significant effects of the Coral Sea battle IRL, was the temporary loss of Shōkaku and Zuikaku to Yamamoto's planned battle against the U.S. carriers at Midway, which is not the case ITTL. From the chart top to bottom, the first four are Ist Airfleet, 2nd four 2nd airfleet and last four are 5th airfleet, with the other two CVL in the invasion force. On the allied side top to bottom, its four three ship groups, TF16, TF17, TF58 and TF44.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

It might be worth making a note of the differences regarding this time lines carriers and aircraft for those readers not familiar with the source novels or like me who have not read them for a while.

David's the Whale has Wings series rests upon a bedrock of the RN drastically improving it Fleet Air Arm and carrier force pre war over OTL so the carriers and aircraft are significantly different to the Ark Royal/Illustrious class of OTL.

I cannot recall if that included the USN improving its carrier forces as well as I note the air groups given in post 1 on the Yorktown's are larger than OTL - which OTL were roughly 75 aircraft (IIRC included spares).

 

[Astrodragon]

given the ability of the FAA to do evil things to you at night, Japanese losses seem light.
I agree that it would be sensible to define aircraft types and numbers (be careful here, there is a lot of divergence between carried and operational aircraft)

 

[Tangles2]

Guys, as I said at the impulse arose from the "largest post WW1 battle thread, that I then elected to present as a stand-alone post. It's really just a single chapter. Book one that I began is already nearly 50 chapters and 250,000 words, defining the AU up to the outbreak of WW2, so it's a bit hard to go into the detail of that broad a scope of base and specifically reached a point. If you're aware of TWHW you can get a good idea of the broadbrush picture, whereas I've used it and David Hardinge's works to shape an AU were the RNN has snuck in at the very beginning of the FAA and leveraged this early start in naval aviation, to punch above its weight to a degree, without drastically altering the historical realities too far. My liberties taken have tried to be in line with ideas or context presented by others that I've liked and wanted to expand upon. Hence battles like this and PH are still intrinsic in the Pacific theatre, just massaged. One thing you can see is the roll on from the WNT changes, more carriers and their wider impact, which was implicit in David Rowe's work, just now expanded to include not just the RN having increased aviation abilities. T

 

[Tangles2]

G

given the ability of the FAA to do evil things to you at night, Japanese losses seem light.
I agree that it would be sensible to define aircraft types and numbers (be careful here, there is a lot of divergence between carried and operational aircraft)

Greetings Astrodragon, I've just clicked who you are. Sorry for my obtuseness. I've tried to get a response from you a couple of times since the WHW was so instrumental in triggering my own attempt at trying an AU work. Not trying to be a fanboy but is there a contact for you to discuss my desire to work further from your AU> Sincerely T

 

[Tangles2]

given the ability of the FAA to do evil things to you at night, Japanese losses seem light.
I agree that it would be sensible to define aircraft types and numbers (be careful here, there is a lot of divergence between carried and operational aircraft)

Concur with the night action comment, but in this scenario the action commences with the Japanese dawn attack on Midway, By the end of the day, both sides will have pretty much shot their bolt, and though Lyster will consider the night attack option, by that point the aircraft losses will be such that discretion will be considered the better part of valor, as the remaining Airgroup numbers are too low to promise the reward if the Allies risk further exposure of their carriers. Watch this space in other words. T

 

[Tangles2]

It might be worth making a note of the differences regarding this time lines carriers and aircraft for those readers not familiar with the source novels or like me who have not read them for a while.

David's the Whale has Wings series rests upon a bedrock of the RN drastically improving it Fleet Air Arm and carrier force pre war over OTL so the carriers and aircraft are significantly different to the Ark Royal/Illustrious class of OTL.

I cannot recall if that included the USN improving its carrier forces as well as I note the air groups given in post 1 on the Yorktown's are larger than OTL - which OTL were roughly 75 aircraft (IIRC included spares).

It might be worth making a note of the differences regarding this time lines carriers and aircraft for those readers not familiar with the source novels or like me who have not read them for a while.

David's the Whale has Wings series rests upon a bedrock of the RN drastically improving it Fleet Air Arm and carrier force pre war over OTL so the carriers and aircraft are significantly different to the Ark Royal/Illustrious class of OTL.

I cannot recall if that included the USN improving its carrier forces as well as I note the air groups given in post 1 on the Yorktown's are larger than OTL - which OTL were roughly 75 aircraft (IIRC included spares).

An indication of the different airframes for this AU is my own contribution, the Dragonfly fighter for the FAA, inspired by the idea from Gerald Hall. Voila! Joint manufactured by Miles Aviation and the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation, the Dragonfly Mk-1 1933!

 

[sonofpegasus]

Can I assume the dragonfly has a RR Kestrel engine or something similar?

 

[Tangles2]

Can I assume the dragonfly has a RR Kestrel engine or something similar?

Hadn't gone into the engine detail to that degree to be certain. I think that if it was the frontline engine of the Bulldog, then it was the plant used in the proof-of-concept pre-production model in the plot. The engine supply issue and MAP hindrance will be one of the reasons Nieustralis will elevate the dispute to ministerial level with the UK and plays a part in the RN/RAF war which is implicit in TWHW and return of the FAAA to RN control and my own TL. T

 

[Astrodragon]

Why on earth will Lyster fight a day battle rather than a night one? Especially beforehand

 

[Tangles2]

As detailed in part four:

On 26th May Vice Admiral Lyster, the commander of the newly designated TF58, lands at Pearl Harbor by carrier plane to discuss the operation with Admiral Nimitz and his staff. Given the operation planned, command of the RN force has been given to him due to his experience in multi-carrier operations. The size of the RN force has made discussions of who is to command somewhat delicate (the USN and RN forces are of a similar size), but Somerville has already decided with Nimitz that the American local knowledge and territory mean they should be in overall command. Nimitz has agreed that Lyster will have as free a hand as possible over the use of his ships, particularly if the RN carriers can get off a night strike, something outside of the existing USN capability.

In this scenario the Allies are playing with the home team and passed command to the USN. Halsey will shortly be in command of TF16, but has deployed them and the battle will escalate to involve all elements. He won't get a chance to be selective and defer his employment.

 

[Tangles2]

Part Five

Allied Deployments

Initially unaware of the deferred date, much of the preparation and arrangement for deployment was rushed in expectation of the anticipated 4th June start date. Task Force 16, centered round the carriers Lexington and Enterprise and the newly arrived Ranger, with seven cruisers and screen, was placed under the command of Rear-Admiral Spruance, originally the screen commander, due to the hospitalization of Admiral William ‘Bull’ Halsey, the senior American carrier admiral, due to a debilitating skin disease. Rear-Admiral Frank Fletcher led the other Task Force 17, comprising the carriers Hornet and Yorktown and the other transferred carrier Wasp, with eight cruisers and destroyer support out to sea on 23 May. These represent nearly the totality of available USN surface combatants available in the Central Pacific at this time. 16 of the 19 available submarines would be deployed in two patrol lines in an arc to cover the northwestern approaches to Midway. With the Allied TF58 departing Pearl Harbor on the 28th of May followed by the final element TF44 departing on 6 June.

Receiving news from the US code breakers that the arrival of the invasion force would be delayed to ‘army movement issues’, and despite his persisting skin issues, Halsey left hospital and was flown to the Enterprise on the 7th of June and assumed command of the US and Allied carrier forces. During the handover brief before resuming command of the TF 16 screen Spruance and discussed the deployment of the available force. The three task forces were deployed in a general north-south line to the NE of Midway to engage the Japanese approach from the NW. Separated by about 40 miles each, TF16 was central with TF17 to its north, whilst TF58 occupied the southern-most position, about 90 miles NE of Midway Island. This was due to the Allied battleship component of TF58 and in the event, Japanese forces attempted bombardment of Midway then it was in the best position to be employed in a surface action. The vitally important refueling group of tankers and escort was some 70 miles to the east of TF16 to support any pursuit options that may develop. This deployment indicated the confidence and Halsey's aggressive mindset leading up to the engagement. Such confidence was also much evident aboard the ships, with sailors and fliers buoyant and eager to get a crack at the despised enemy. As the weakest of the task forces, TF44 with three smaller carriers figured little in the deployment discussions as there were insufficient fueling resources for it to be involved in any subsequent pursuit, which by default had evolved into being included as a primary operational objective for the planned battle. When discussed, it was given the general task of covering Midway to free up the other task forces for offensive and pursuit operations. The only offensive task nominated was a generic observation to “engage the invasion element if the opportunity presents itself.” It was to maximize endurance and operate economically as possible concerning this task. As such the TF44 closed on the balance of the Allied forces at an economical cruise and as the action commenced it was still some 90 miles ESE of Midway and over 100 miles separated from TF58, the southernmost of the carrier groups.

Operational Issues in the Prelude

Much of the confidence of Admirals Nimitz and Halsey rested in their belief that they had one critical advantage. Since early 1942, the U.S. had been decoding messages stating that there would soon be an operation at objective "AF", subsequently determined to be Midway Island. With the amount of message traffic, it was also able to determine the date of the attack as either 4 or 5 June and to provide Nimitz with a complete IJN order of battle. As a result, the Americans entered the battle believing they possessed a good picture of where, when, and in what strength the Japanese would appear. This belief strongly influenced both the deployment of the carrier forces and the available US submarines. These submarines, deployed in two picket lines to interdict the anticipated approach from the NW, would be largely nullified by the actual SW approach, and only three would eventually be in a position to engage Japanese forces. Japanese radio intercepts did notice an increase in both American submarine activity and message traffic. This information was in Yamamoto's hands before the battle, Japanese plans were not changed as it removed a potentially significant threat without any action on their behalf.

The Japanese, in contrast, remained largely unaware of their opponent's true strength and dispositions even after the battle began. Japanese strategic scouting arrangements before the battle were also in disarray. A picket line of Japanese submarines was late getting into position (despite the deferred start date), which let the American carriers reach their assembly point northeast of Midway (known as "Point Luck") without being detected. A second attempt at reconnaissance, using four-engine H8K "Emily" flying boats to scout Pearl Harbor before the battle and detect whether the American carriers were present, part of Operation K, was thwarted when Japanese submarines assigned to refuel the search aircraft discovered that the intended refueling point—a hitherto deserted bay off French Frigate Shoals—was now occupied by American warships because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March.

Thus, Japan was deprived of any knowledge concerning the movements of the American carriers immediately before the battle. Though missing the US carrier forces transit, nevertheless a force of some nine IJN submarines had been deployed to detect such movements. In place, before the subsequent movements of both TF58 and TF44, they failed to detect the movement of either force. This remains perhaps the critical scouting failure of the operation for the IJN and to this day no logical explanation has been determined as to why this lapse occurred. If the movement of either of these forces and their structure had been detected, then the entire prosecution of the IJN plan would have been markedly different.

Both sides at this time still employed the pre-war antiaircraft fit out which had disadvantages. Japanese carrier anti-aircraft guns and associated fire control systems had several design and configuration deficiencies that limited their effectiveness. They would later develop the Model 98 100mm gun which was an excellent weapon but the standard 25mm gun lacked range and stopping power which limited its effectiveness at repelling US air attacks. Similarly, the US 1.1-inch gun also was inadequate for its intended role, and it would only be later that the more effective 20mm Oerlikon and 40mm Bofors mounts proliferate and prove a much more effective air defense.

In terms of aircraft, the main Japanese carrier-borne strike aircraft was the "Val" dive bomber and the "Kate", which was predominantly employed as a torpedo bomber. The main carrier fighter was the fast and highly maneuverable A6M "Zero". For a variety of reasons, production of the "Val" had been drastically reduced, while that of the "Kate" had been stopped completely and, as a consequence, there were none available to replace losses. In addition, many of the aircraft being used during the June 1942 operations had been operational since late November 1941 and, although they were well-maintained, many were almost worn out and had become increasingly unreliable.

The US strike aircraft were the Dauntless dive bomber and Devastator in the torpedo bombing role. The Devastator was already obsolescent, though it was not realized at this time, and it would suffer fearsome losses in this battle highlighting that fact. The main fighter was the F4F Wildcat, a sturdy design that lacked the maneuverability of the Zero. Despite the provision of information from the British experience combating the Zero in the DEI which had been freely provided, there persisted a general lack of appreciation of this fact in the USN fighter groups. With few exceptions (VF-6 aboard Hornet, with Lieutenant Commander John S. "Jimmy" Thach in command), the fighter groups would readily engage in turning dogfights to their great disadvantage in the coming battles and suffer serious losses. Another factor limiting the effectiveness of the embarked carrier air groups was the small size of the fighter groups at this time. Pre-war doctrine emphasized offensive action and larger torpedo and bomber groups. The smaller fighter numbers resulted in limited numbers available for fighter support to air strikes or limiting the size of CAP retained for carrier defense. Both issues would be highlighted in the upcoming battle.

The Allied carrier aircraft employed a range of British designs, from the obsolescent Swordfish biplane, still carried in limited numbers in TF44 and employed in the ASW role, to the exceptional Dragonfly fighter. This was not only the only current allied aircraft capable of equal or better performance than the Zero in a turning fight, but it also possessed a secondary capability in the dive-bomber role which was unknown at this time to the IJN. The Martin-Baker Cormorant was carried on TF58 in the dive-bomber role, with adequate performance and roughly equal to the US Dauntless. TF58 and TF44 both carried the Fairy Seabattle in the torpedo bomber role and a squadron of the very capable Bolton Paul SeaLance were also embarked aboard the Audacious. Both TBR types possessed better performance than the Devastator, with that of the new SeaLance, in particular, being outstanding.

 

[Crazyduck156]

An indication of the different airframes for this AU is my own contribution, the Dragonfly fighter for the FAA, inspired by the idea from Gerald Hall. Voila! Joint manufactured by Miles Aviation and the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation, the Dragonfly Mk-1 1933!View attachment 902809

Thats... quite something

It certainly wont be winning any beauty contests