Rhomania’s General Crisis, part 7.0-The War No One Wants:
Historical accounts tend to focus on the most dramatic and epic moments, on the defiant to-the-death rhetoric and brutal last stands. Those existed in northern Mesopotamia in fall 1660. The Armeniakon tagma’s modus operandi was to move fast and hit hard. It had to. Its logistical reserve was minimal, forcing it to live off on the land, and to do that it needed to keep moving. Furthermore, the whole point of the operation was to seize Mesopotamia quickly before Persian strength could be brought to bear. Resistance from villages is dealt with overwhelming force; there is no time for finesse.
But these are in the minority. Everywhere there is resistance, but it is more subtle. Villagers hide or destroy their foodstuffs, doing their utmost to deny them to the enemy. Many flee south, seeking safety in the only place that seems it might be able to offer it, Baghdad. This is also an act of resistance, for while it is done for safety, it is denying their labor and knowledge to the enemy as well.
Still, the resistance the Armeniakon tagma faces in northern Mesopotamia does not do much to injure or even slow the Romans down. From Mosul to Baghdad is about 400 kilometers and the Romans are within sight of the city on November 5, exactly a month since the start of the campaign. They could not have gotten to the city much faster if this had been an entirely peacetime maneuver in Roman territory.
Two months ago, Baghdad had a population of one hundred thousand. With refugees pouring in from across the north, even with people being moved on south as quickly as possible, that size has now doubled. This imposes immense strain on food resources, living standards, and sanitation, but the speed of the Roman advance means the war arrives before these can move to a critical mass.
Seizing Baghdad is key to the Roman plan. It is the linchpin. The Romans have marched through northern Mesopotamia but one reason the Armeniakon could move so quickly is that it has done precious little to properly secure it. It just doesn’t have the time and numbers to do so. That is for the follow-up forces, which Gyranos started mustering a week before the invasion. (He reasoned that Ottoman spies wouldn’t be able to issue warnings in time with that little notice, and he wanted this process started as quickly as possible.)
Keraunos is to take Baghdad, secure that area, and effectively break any centralized Mesopotamian resistance. Northern Mesopotamia will be secured by follow-up forces from the Syrian and Chaldean tagmata. Southern Mesopotamia can’t be so easily and quickly secured because of the greater distance, but that region is also more distant from Persian reinforcement and the Marsh Arabs are the element most likely to be friendly to the Romans if handled respectively. (Most war hawks envision the southern third of Mesopotamia being a regular vassal of Rhomania, on the lines of Dalmatia and Istria, with perhaps a naval base, as opposed to being annexed directly.)
Baghdad, per the terms of the treaty between Odysseus and Iskandar the Younger, was unfortified at the beginning of the war, its substantial city walls demolished and the stones incorporated into new building projects (many can be identified to this day) such as several large mosques and madrasas in the south of the city. One of the very first things Alexandros did upon the start of the war was to start moving earth around the city, trying to make the city more defensible. In this he was advised by several Ottoman residents who had experience in building earthen defense works, and while Alexandros didn’t have much in the way of shovels, he had many desperate hands due to all the refugees.
When the Romans arrive, the Baghdadi have made some progress but much work remains to be done. The Romans are seriously outnumbered, but have a great advantage in individual firepower. Many of the refugees and city residents have volunteered or been conscripted to defend the city but there is precious little in the way of firearms, especially modern flintlocks, with which to arm them. The majority of the defenders have improvised spears and clubs supplemented by piles of roof tiles. Alexandros only has six cannons, all three-pounders, for artillery. Shortages of gunpowder also cramp an effort to mass produce grenades.
Petros Keraunos is not aware of the specifics, but is aware of the gist. Nevertheless, he offers extremely generous terms for the defenders when he arrives. All the defenders and inhabitants can leave the city if they wish, with all their arms (including artillery) and possessions that they can fit in a cart per family. This includes the royal court. Keraunos just wants the city.
That is because he does not want an urban battle. Baghdad is more than big enough to swallow up his army and in close-quarters his advantage in firepower counts for much less. Furthermore, that firepower advantage isn’t as heavy as he would like. Given the need for quick movement, the heavy guns that would be most useful in the context of an urban battle are still in their depots. He has his field artillery, in much greater numbers than Alexandros, but a good portion of Baghdad’s architecture would be quite resistant to their fire. Additionally, he does not have the numbers to properly invest the city, making it impossible to cut off the defenders from outside support, making the task of reducing them much harder.
Alexandros rejects the offer. He is aware of the difficulties of the Roman position. While he knows that Baghdad will pay a terrible price in the interim, he expects Persian aid. However, he knows that the initial Persian aid will likely be small. If the Romans can occupy Baghdad, the Persian expedition would face all the same problems currently confronting the Romans. And any delay to bring in more Persian reinforcements would also give the Romans time to bring in their own and further secure their position.
It is extremely unlikely that anyone involved, save for the inevitable idiots, seriously thought that Shahanshah Iskandar the Younger would not intervene. The possibility was mentioned, on the grounds that it was technically possible, but then dismissed as extremely improbable. The surprise plan was adopted, despite its shortcomings, because it assumed a Persian intervention and thus hoped to maximize the Roman position in Mesopotamia before said intervention could arrive in force.
The assumption was most reasonable. Iskandar had established himself as a powerful and capable monarch, but the history of how he came to the throne could always come back to haunt him. Failure to respond to Roman aggression against the historical heartland of the Ottoman realm and allowing the Romans to cut the Persians off from the traditional pilgrimage routes of the hajj would make claims that he was a Roman puppet, or at least too spineless to stand up to Constantinople, substantially more credible.
Iskandar had been doing his best to keep his eye on the Roman situation, which did not please him. The war hawks were too unstable, too unreasonable, too obsessed, to make good neighbors. Still, he had not expected an attack against Mesopotamia. From his analysis, the situation looked quite good from the Roman perspective and the war hawks’ attention was focused mostly westward. He did not expect that the Romans would literally turn ‘perfect’ into the enemy of ‘good’.
But he had not discounted the possibility entirely. Much of 1660 had been spent ensuring depots and reserves in western districts were in good condition, with Qizilbash rolls being audited to ensure they were up to proper strength. That said, if the Romans attacked, Iskandar had expected a more normal mass attack, perhaps in 1661 once Domestikos Doukas had convalesced, and the warning signs would be clear, not these weird alerts about extended tagma exercises. Thus, the surprise plan does succeed in catching Iskandar by surprise.
He reacts promptly, mustering a rapid response of three thousand men and dispatching it with all speed to Baghdad. Due to the rush, there is little logistical support, with riders proceeding ahead of the column demanding supplies and promising payment in the future. While peasants, with good reason, suspect the promises of kings when it comes to repayment, there is little opposition. In Mesopotamia the demands of urgency are recognized.
This is a scratch force, a mix of Shahsevan, the Persian Imperial Guard, and elements of the Hamadan Azab, a militia force but widely considered the best Azab unit in the Ottoman Empire. They are all stationed in the capital and thus can be quickly mustered.
Iskandar then prepares and dispatches a second unit. This force takes longer to assemble but is appreciably more formidable. Mustering thirteen thousand, it is comprised primarily of Qizilbash units drawn from the Khassa (theme equivalent) districts around Hamadan. While still under-supplied, which causes more problems, this is a better-balanced force with units more used to working together and with an artillery component comparable to the Armeniakon tagma.
That is all the Shah can prepare before winter weather makes the mass movement of troops through the Zagros impractical; the second force is cutting things close already. However, he begins making plans to take the field personally next year, with all the might he can muster, far greater than either side has committed thus far.
Keraunos meanwhile is looking at Baghdad and considering his options, none of which he likes. While the defense and defenders of the city have many issues, they are more formidable, particularly to his small and lightly-armed force, than had been expected. He doesn’t have enough men to properly invest and the heavy guns to besiege the city. He could swing south and try to cut off the city from potential support from that direction, letting disease and hunger go to work on the cramped and crowded city inhabitants. But that will take time, does not promise success, and will put a rather large impediment astride his lines of communication and retreat. If Baghdad doesn’t capitulate before a Persian relief arrives, that impediment may well be fatal.
He could retreat and wait to attack Baghdad when the Romans are better equipped, but that means admitting the operation has been a failure in its goal. Mesopotamia has not been swept before the Persians arrive. Keraunos is not willing to accept that. Retreating now, before Persian regulars have arrived, in the face of a mob of barely-armed townsfolk and refugees, would be an utter humiliation and a massive black mark on his career.
Thus, lacking any other ideas, he attacks.
