Holding the Middle: The Indus Valley and Central Asia
West of the Sikh Confederacy, in Rajasthan, Gujarat, and the Indus Valley, there are no greater powers, only a shifting kaleidoscope of petty Rajas and Emirs. The closest thing to a hegemon is Ethiopia, via its enclave centered on Thatta and Hyderabad. Periodic columns combined with a river flotilla make forays up the Indus, forcing tribute from local lords, but the submission lasts exactly as long as the Ethiopians are present and no longer. The Ethiopians lack the resources to force a more durable and widespread authority, much to their annoyance. They had hoped that Thatta could be a major trade port but the chaotic political landscape has brought commerce to a shrieking halt.
Many of the states pay lip service to being vassals of Vijayanagar, but nobody is fooled by the pretensions, including Venkata Raya. It is a cheap source of prestige for everyone involved, but otherwise meaningless. Of a decidedly more tangible nature is the complete collapse of Ottoman power still left in the region after Ibrahim’s defeat at the hands of Venkata Raya.
In 1634 a charismatic Afghan warlord took Kabul from its Ottoman garrison, a devastating blow to Ottoman authority in the eastern marches of the empire. However the division of spoils proved unsatisfactory to some of the warlord’s underlings, including his two brothers, the ensuing quarrel quickly escalating into gunfire. The Afghan infighting, still unresolved two years later, means that they are unable to capitalize on their capture of Kabul.
However Ibrahim is not in a position to take advantage. The war with the Romans has left him practically bankrupt, meaning he can’t pay any army he would send, while the Afghans don’t have the wealth to make a ‘the pay is your loot’ policy practical. Furthermore for the sake of the Ottoman economy and exchequer the Shah needs to demobilize many of his men. The Qizilbash and Janissary infantry all supplement their peacetime pay with side jobs, whether as small merchants, artisans, or growing vegetable plots. The Azabs also are prominent components of the economies of their local areas, with farms and businesses that need to be managed. The mass and long-term mobilization of these men for the war has left a hole in the Ottoman economy and so Ibrahim needs them back at their fields and shops. (His father had faced similar problems, but his victorious and conquering armies brought back plunder which compensated for losses in production.)
With the loss of Kabul, the land route to Ottoman India via the Khyber Pass is cut. The only other land route would be from Kandahar via the Khojak and Bolan Passes, but those deposit the traveler on the lower Indus, far to the south of the Ottoman sliver of the Punjab. There would then be a long march upcountry through unfriendly terrain. Furthermore, a good way to make Venkata Raya care about what’s happening along the Indus would be to send an Ottoman army marching through non-Ottoman Indian territory.
The governor at Bhakkar, the capital of the Ottoman Punjab, is Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. Taking advantage of his newfound isolation and Ibrahim’s inability to project power, he has turned himself from provincial governor to independent warlord. He maintains authority over the former province through a mix of the Ottoman garrison that sides with him, some Afghan mercenaries, and local levies. Controlling the area between the Indus and Chenab Rivers, he is the most significant of the local lords in western India.
North of the mountains, events are proceeding much better from Ibrahim’s perspective. Theodoros I Laskaris, King of Khazaria and Siberia, is dead.
Outside of Russia, Theodoros is mainly remembered for when, as a prince, he seized Vladimir and tried and failed to suborn the Zemsky Sobor, the direct catalyst for the sundering of the Rus. However in his middle-age, when he became King of Khazaria, he proved himself to be an exceptional military commander, although because these exploits took place in Central Asia, people then and now have largely ignored them. Devastating the Uzbeks and Oirats, forcing the cities of the Tarim Basin into vassalage, in just five years he turned Khazaria into the clear titan of the central steppe.
However on January 2, 1634, he died and his steppe empire collapsed with him. The tribes of the steppe and the cities of the basin promptly threw off their vassalage and his son, Basil Laskaris, has been unable to re-impose Khazar hegemony. One reason is that he does not seem to have the military acumen of his father. A second reason is that Theodoros’ victories, while impressive, had also been expensive both in men and money, and it had been a strain even while Theodoros was alive keeping everyone in check.
Another reason is that China is once again a major player in the geopolitics of Central Asia. United under the Zeng dynasty, the conquests by the Yuan and the Tieh, as well as the serious damage done by the Later Yuan, have made it absolutely clear to the Chinese that managing the steppe is an absolutely key priority. (Admittedly, earlier Chinese history made that a clear lesson already, but events over the past few centuries have made it especially explicit.)
Therefore any rebel against Khazar dominion can count on Chinese clandestine support, the Zeng providing both money and military equipment. The Chinese have nothing against the Khazars personally, but the Chinese will not, if they have anything to say about it, tolerate any one power dominating all of the steppe. Khazaria, on the death of Theodoros I, is the power closest to fitting the bill and thus Khazaria must be humbled.
Chinese forces have pushed as far west as the Jade Gate, establishing a garrison there. The cities of the Tarim Basin have all asserted their independence, with the Chinese supporting them all while simultaneously making sure each stays small. It would not be ideal for Khazar dominion to be replaced by another hegemon.
North of the Tien Shan events do not proceed as ideally from the Zeng’s perspective, the humbled Dzungar Khanate promptly regaining the ground lost to Theodoros. However the Khans, who often encamp at the ruins of fallen Urumqi, lack the other dominions held by the Khazars, so even so they are much less of a threat than Theodoros was in his prime.
Basil Laskaris survives these humiliations, although he seeks compensation in other areas. Siberian expansion has been proceeding at a steady pace, although slowed during his father’s reign by his Central Asian focus. He invests more into these efforts, financing exploratory missions as traders and trappers proceed across the vast reaches of the north. They will bear impressive fruit in just a few years, reaching the Pacific Ocean in 1640 and establishing Okhotsk eleven years later.
In the opposite direction, Basil is immediately supportive of the new Zemsky Sobor, his father’s death being a godsend in this regard. The other principalities have not forgotten the actions of then Prince Theodoros, but do not hold the sins of the father against the son.
One consequence of the collapse of Khazar power in Central Asia is the first contact between China and the Ottoman Empire since the days of the Tieh. Emissaries from both polities meet at Yarkand in the Tarim Basin, with an Ottoman delegation later traveling overland all the way to the Chinese capital of Luoyang. It is a most fruitful meeting for both parties as they share common interests. Both seek to keep the steppe fragmented and weak.
Both also consider the Romans to be enemies. The Ottoman rationale is obvious. Meanwhile the Chinese have many grievances with the Romans and seek to weaken their power in eastern waters. The most obvious means of doing so would be to attack and destroy Pyrgos. However the trade there, particularly with the steadily growing flow of Mexican silver, has already grown to be too lucrative for the Zeng to wish to destroy. Well aware of the geopolitics of western Eurasia, the Chinese see supporting the Ottomans as an excellent means of siphoning Roman strength away from East Asia.
The Ottomans present gifts which the Chinese style as tribute, then presenting counter-gifts of greater value. This is the start of an overland trade between Persia and China using the old Silk Road route, a valuable boost to the Ottoman economy especially in its current strained state. The volume and speed of trade is low due to the transportation difficulties, but unlike the maritime routes dominated by other powers, Persia and China control the narrative to the benefit of both. The staggeringly impressive fortifications of Mosul erected in the last years of the 1630s would not have been possible without the revenue derived from this overland trade.
The development of the overland trade is a blow to Triune merchants working in the Ottoman Empire, who ferry goods from China via the maritime routes. This doesn’t bother Ibrahim all that much. The performance of the Triune-developed Ottoman navy did not match up to the promises he was given, significantly cooling the Shah’s opinion of the Triple Monarchy. That said, it does not destroy the Triune-Ottoman alliance. Both parties still have need for each other.