Alternate British WW1 Grand Strategy: The Baltic Project

[Mikestone8]

When would the attack have been launched?

Iirc Denmark had started mining the Straits as early as August 5, 1914.

 

[ArtosStark]

Fishers attack in WW1? Likely not until 1916 at least. Fisher only returned in late 1914 and started building the tools he thought he would need. Lambert's thesis is that he would use 1915 to try and clear the Belgian coast basically in preference to Gallipoli. I am not sure what plans he had for that or how successful they would have been. In the meantime the ships and equipment needed would be assembled.

In a hypothetical world where the Navy's plans had been accepted from the off? I would guess sometime in 1915. The Belts would almost certainly have been mined by then, assuming similar diplomatic pressure from the Germans. The British would need to clear them before they could get through the Belts.

 

[McPherson]

The most influential of the military at the key August 5 meeting, Lord Kitchener, was not in favour of the current plan and his philosopy that 'it will take years' would fit well with a Naval buildup of the necessary landing and support craft to force a coastal landing.

At their first meeting, on 5 August, Kitchener, then at the height of his powers, proceeded to condemn the British war plan as utterly inadequate to the demands of the coming campaign, and to demolish their expectations of a short war. ‘We must be prepared,’ he told his shocked colleagues, ‘to put armies of millions in the field and maintain them for several years.’ To defeat Germany, Britain must raise an army of 70 divisions, more than a million men, he advised; they would take years to train and deploy. He condemned the dispatch of the small Regular Army to France, where it would serve no useful purpose, as a mere bolted-on gesture of near-criminal neglect. It denuded Britain of a properly trained force, and of the officers who knew how to raise one. It was too late, however, to change the existing plan, which had been in place for years under Sir Henry Wilson’s guiding hand. Outwardly compelled to accept it, privately Kitchener believed it risked the complete destruction of Britain’s only standing army. The one consoling thought was that the Old Contemptibles, as they would soon call themselves, in a mock-echo of the Kaiser, were the best-trained soldiers in Europe.​

Ham, Paul. 1914: The Year the World Ended . Penguin Random House Australia. Kindle Edition.

For what it's worth, an interesting article on the Navy's response to be frozen out of the strategy by the army:
‘The special service squadron of the Royal Marines’: The Royal Navy and organic amphibious warfare capability before 1914
Matthew S. Seligmann

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2020.1816972

Let me quote from the article...

Hankey argued, would bring about the ‘necessity of an advanced base’, something demonstrated in previous wars such as the blockade of Toulon during the French Revolutionary Wars, which ‘led to the reduction of Corsica’, or, more recently, the Sino-Japanese and Spanish-American Wars, which led to ‘numerous minor operations on the coastline … such as the seizure and occupation of advanced bases for the fleet’.

I laughed when I read that one. Hankey seems to not have appreciated that the operations against Wei Hei Wei, Manila and Santiago de Cuba were deliberately designed to go after main instruments of enemy military power, the Beiyang fleet in the case of the Japanese, the Spanish central naval presence in the Philippine Islands, and the 1st Spanish Cruiser Squadron in the case of the Caribbean Campaign.

What I mean, is that he did not understand, "that these "minor operations" were main force efforts or "schwerpunkt setzen" aimed at the primary enemy effectors in the wars mentioned. Far from being minor, the operations were the Clausewitz version of Mahanic "decisive action" aimed at the enemy ability and means to resist one's own imposed will upon him.

This same misunderstanding crops up when some historians discuss the other great controversial historical revisionist approach to another amphibious warfare controversy, PLAN ORANGE and "the seizure of an advanced base" as the justification for the American navy's own politicized inter-service rivalry with the American army via its own organic Marine Corps. PLAN ORANGE contained amphibious operations as a result of geography and the management of the battlespace to bring the Americans into a blockade and economic strangulation position vis a vis Japan. The British co-contingent planning, at least from the Matthew S. Seligmann article as he writes it, was that Fisher wanted to seize an offshore position off the German coast to mousehole the German fleet and cut German trade off via a close blockade. This would be around 1911. And that means Helgoland Bight and that means we would see the German riposte as being their 1890s Knorr coast defense plans.

I have already given my assessment of the chances of such a concept of operations fulfilling its strategic premise. Zero. I found this curious.

... Nicholas Lambert published a revisionist study of British war planning. Contrary to the orthodox view, he argued that Fisher never seriously advocated in-shore combined operations.6 In his view, Admiralty proposals for seaborne landings were merely smoke screens aimed at disrupting the military’s continental strategy and moving the war planning agenda towards a more maritime approach. Indeed, Lambert argues that the Admiralty’s real plan was an extreme form of economic warfare designed to exploit the vulnerabilities of the German financial system by bringing down the global economy within months of a war starting, a method of attack that he has on at least one occasion labelled as ‘Brits-Krieg’.7

If true, (Lambert's contention.) that is the height of strategic idiocy and shows gross criminal negligence on the part of the advocates of such an approach. To collapse a global financial system, upon which one's own nation relies for economic activity in the hope that the enemy will yield first under the pressure, is the fundamental misunderstanding of how sea-power and its tools works. One is supposed to conduct stable trade and commerce while one denies the enemy that ability and agility in access and use in finance, resources and geography. That is Mahan: Dennis and Alfred.

I need not remind readers that "use and denial" was at the heart of the British policy against Napoleon's "Continental System" and the British use of international trade interdiction and its own economic activity (in India, South America and Africa) to throttle it? Even British amphibious operations of the era (Corsica used as a base to stop blockade runners, NOT to mousehole the Toulon Armament) and assorted arcane curious financial manipulations (Russia and Sweden) were conjoint in function to isolate the French economy and not to collapse the world trade system upon which the British empire depended.

Anyway, as I dug into the article, the more convinced I was that from Fisher forward (As has been mentioned by others.), the central tussle over British strategic thought in this period, was grounded in the idea, of who would get the larger share of the Treasury assigned defense budget, the British army or the Royal Navy? This is not new to me. Interservice politics as a primary driver of strategic planning and who gets the pounds (dollars or yen) pops up among many militaries and seems to be a common failing of common sense, no matter which nation or era. To give the German example of about the same time; Knorr and later Tirpitz, were creators of schemes to enlarge the German navy at the expense of the German army. The whole Tirpitz idea about the "risk fleet" as a Britain deterrent, as lunatic as the land attack into the Helgoland Bight as Fisher's vision, originated as a "budget gimmick"; so Tirpitz could have a large battleship navy and Kaiser Bill could have his toys to point at and show off when foreign dignitaries showed up. This is the central theme of the contest between a certain Otto von Diederichs and Alfred von Tirpitz. This comes from,

By Order of the Kaiser​

Otto von Diederichs and the Rise of the Imperial German Navy, 1865-1902
By Terrell D. Gottschall

Diederichs seems to have bit the Mahan apple hard and was another advocate of global presence and international trade, especially with regards to China. He conducted an amphibious operation (Kia Chou and Tsingtao) as an opportunity attack upon China to seize a German controlled anchorage from which "fleet presence" in support of German trade with and political influence in China could be exerted. He used his navy to support his nation's economic interests. he used an amphibious operation to execute that mission.

Tirpitz and the Bismarck seem to have been annoyed: Tirpitz, because Diederichs' shenanigans threatened his "risk fleet" and Bismarck, who was a Mackinderist before there was a Mackinder.

Anyway, when personalities and egos drive grand strategy, one gets a botched war, like WWI. The only good news from the above (^^^) is that at least with regards to the Helgoland Bight project, Sir John Jellicoe and crew, seem to have settled some sense into British naval policy, but not before the Salonika Stockade and the Gallipoli disasters happened. One should really have put a minder on Sir Winston Churchill, hid all the Balkan peninsula maps, and sent Sir Julian Corbett off to the nearest insane asylum.

================================================================
I need not point out that strategic planning based on egos and inter-service rivalries is not Otto von Bismarck, Pitt the Elder or Pitt the Younger, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, or Mahan?

 

[Karelian]

Another thing that drew the British to the Baltic was the volume of their prewar trade in the region:

From Seligmann and Nägler: "The Naval Route to the Abyss: The Anglo-German Naval Race 1895-1914

Map of the major regular shipping routes of the area:

 

[Jürgen]

edit: As Fisher focused on the potential of submarines during his later years in office, this plan is not as wacky as it first seems. But a lot depends on the Danes themselves, who were a subject of intense Great Power diplomacy in 1905, when Britain ultimately opted to stick with Paris and write the Danes off with the new North Sea Accord.

The only Dane who thought it was a good idea was the king and the three biggest parties who completely dominated the lower house were all very republican, the monarchy was hated by the general population.

 

[ArtosStark]

The only Dane who thought it was a good idea was the king and the three biggest parties who completely dominated the lower house were all very republican, the monarchy was hated by the general population.

I cannot speak with any great authority on this, but my impression from another thread covering similar ground (https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ion-of-denmark-at-start-of-ww1.509081/page-14) was that the government was still relatively weak in relation to the King, and that the King and the population tended to be anti-German (which might make them sort of pro-British by default), that the Army was somewhat pro-British, and that the Navy was pro-German (in that they saw no way for Denmark to survive unless it acquiesced to German desires at least).

 

[ferdi254]

Pretty easy outcome:
Germany wins the war and knights Fischer.

That was the short version too tired to type the long one.

 

[Mikestone8]

In a hypothetical world where the Navy's plans had been accepted from the off? I would guess sometime in 1915. The Belts would almost certainly have been mined by then, assuming similar diplomatic pressure from the Germans. The British would need to clear them before they could get through the Belts.

Could the RN clear the mies faster than he Danes (and Germans?) could replace them?

 

[McPherson]

Could the RN clear the mies faster than he Danes (and Germans?) could replace them?

Short answer... No. The minefields were covered by coast artillery.

 

[ferdi254]

So longer answer. That strategy would be exactly what the HSF tried but failed to achieve. It splits the RN into chunks that can be beaten by the whole HSF.

Any RN fleet in the Baltic must be able to beat the whole HSF because if it does not then just that HSF will sortie and sink it.

But such a big fleet in the Baltic would mean that there is no fleet left in the North Sea big enough to stop the HSF from blocking the channel and the estuary of the Thames.

RN blocks Baltic, HSF blocks Channel and Thames, Germany wins. RN moves fleet back big enough to chase HSF away, HSF moves to Baltic clears Baltic unless RN moves fleet big enough to protect Baltic than HSF blocks Channel and Thames. Rinse and repeat.

 

[Mikestone8]

Short answer... No. The minefields were covered by coast artillery.

So longer answer. That strategy would be exactly what the HSF tried but failed to achieve. It splits the RN into chunks that can be beaten by the whole HSF.

Any RN fleet in the Baltic must be able to beat the whole HSF because if it does not then just that HSF will sortie and sink it.

And the gaps between the Danish islands don't look very wide. If RN ships have to come through a few at a time, - and find the HSF waiting on the other side - the results could be unhappy.

 

[ferdi254]

Or simply a dozen subs together with some mines. In the end the RN is split in two and either one or both parts are too weak to beat the HSF.

Champagne will be flowing in the German admirality.

 

[Ultima Ratio]

I'm having some trouble imagining how Germany can be baited to invade Denmark. If the British completely block the Danish straits, Denmark will more likely just join the CP themselves, since this is a violation of their neutrality (even Sweden might rattle their sabers over this).

I also agree on what other have mentioned:
- BEF in Scandinavia means Germans in Paris at worst, or Germans shelling Paris at best
- Fighting a naval campaign in the Danish islands is a nightmare, I think German coastal artillery also comes into play here so the Grand Fleet navigating here is risky at best
- BEF trying to hold the islands is recipe for disaster, it is too close to Germany, supply is a nightmare due to U-boats, mines and coastal artillery
- HSF can deploy into the Baltic and North Sea with full force at their own leisure via the Kiel Canal, while the Grand Fleet is split and constantly at danger when crossing the warzone in the islands

 

[Broek]

It's most likely that Lambert is not a specialist in metallurgy, so let us give him the benefit here. My guess is that he does not understand how bearings in WWI were formed (like round shot in a gravity quench drop tower and then polished down to the appropriate caliber through a sieve drop.)

Did they still use that method in WW1?
I know that was the method used to produce ammunition for muskets in the late 1800's.

 

[KarneeKarnay]

The plan is possible, but only with a very different Royal Navy. The navy was much too focused and insistent on the idea that Big Ships and Big Engagements were the ultimate decider in naval warfare. Everything around them was built towards the idea of one knock out blow, but that just not the case in the years building up to WW1.

Asymmetrical Warfare was just not something that the leaders of the Royal Navy put much stock in and it's something that would have to change for a plan like this. Submarine warfare was becoming increasingly known and accepted in the build up to WW1. The British lagged in this area, with only the first generations of submarines being ordered in 1900. That's not to say they couldn't have been turned around on the idea, but there just wasn't huge enthusiasm. By sticking steadfast to coal for as long as possible, submarines were just not that good pre-war and during the war our initial forays into this were disastrous to the point of mass murder. See the Battle of May Island for more details on that. Pre-War British subs weren't seen as good investments and during the war that reputations became even worse.

This sort of plan could only work in a TL where the British Navy could support it and that means a lot more subs in a much better state.

 

[Jellico]

The RN had the world's largest submarine fleet in 1914.
The RN ordered and commissioned oil fired battleships before the US, with testing going back to 1899.

Asymmetric warfare is something the RN could and did do, but this misses the point. To achieve sea command (or supremacy) takes big hulls. Cruisers at minimum, at sea, at all times. A 1910 500 ton destroyer can hang around for a few days then has to go home. This is the fundamental problem with a flotilla based force for the first twenty years of the century. The tech isn't there to do the job in all conditions, in all weather. A battleship force is still required, which is why it was built.

 

[Dorknought]

See the Battle of May Island for more details on that.

Norman Friedman is far more complementary of the K Class in his "British Submarines in Two World Wars"

The Origin of the K Class:

The Fast Submarine In July 1913, First Lord Winston Churchill wrote a Minute introducing a third submarine category, which he called the ocean submarine. The overseas submarine would be an effective blockader, but the ocean submarine would be ‘a decisive weapon of battle and as such must count in partial substitution of battleship strength’. Churchill was then finding it more and more difficult to pay for battleships being built to compete with the Germans. He faced further problems as the Germans’ ally Austria was beginning a major naval programme and Italy was nominally also a German ally. Churchill was being forced to pull British battleships out of the Mediterranean to maintain the balance in home waters. He saw big submarines as an affordable way of maintaining British power there.​

​

The ocean submarine had to be fast enough to overhaul a battle fleet so that it could be sure of getting ahead to dive and to attack. He considered 24 knots fast enough. The big submarines would cruise under escort but would fight alone, guided by other ships to the point of attack. Armament would be limited to anti-aircraft guns and torpedoes, including four 21in beam tubes (if possible capable of firing on either side) and at least one bow and one stern tube, with four reloads for each. Churchill imagined organising these craft in flotillas of three or four submarines plus two light cruisers, one set up as a seagoing depot ship and the other carrying three seaplanes for scouting. He wanted four such flotillas created, stationed in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean, the channels from their bases deep enough that they could leave port submerged. Cromarty, Gibraltar and Malta were all suitable. In July, Churchill wrote that one of his flotillas should be considered equal ‘as a decisive fighting unit’ to a first-class battleship or cruiser. If that were true and if the flotilla was really far less expensive than a battleship, he could have the equivalent of the desired 60 per cent margin over the Germans at an affordable price.​

Writing to Fisher on 13 August, Churchill pointed out that any submarine which was considered a partial substitute for battleship strength had to have sufficient strategic (i.e., sustained) speed to overhaul or evade a battle fleet.

The idea of a very fast submarine was not entirely new. Churchill probably got it from Admiral Fisher, who was his main unofficial naval advisor. Fisher in turn may have had it from Admiral Jellicoe, who by 1911 was espousing what he called a Submarine Destroyer. The name indicated a torpedo craft fast enough to participate in a fleet action, having accompanied the fleet to sea. The usual 20 knots was not enough, because although a submarine might steam with the fleet, it could not manoeuvre into position to attack enemy surface ships. At best it could occupy a position position into which the fleet might lead the enemy. Jellicoe’s early interest in fleet submarines helps explain his concern after 1914 that the Germans would lead his fleet over their waiting submarines. The idea seems never to have been tested in manoeuvres, although submarines certainly did show that they could engage capital ships.​

After the 'battle' of May Island

The ‘K’ class have generally been considered grotesque failures, proofs that the very idea of close support by fast submarines was defective. That is probably why Churchill did not take credit for them the way he did for the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships and the Arethusa-class cruisers in his The World Crisis. The great proof of failure is generally taken as the 31 January 1918 ‘Battle of May Island’, a disastrous fleet exercise in which both K 4 and K 17 were sunk by collision. As nine ‘K’-class submarines proceeded to sea, they encountered minesweepers which had not been informed of the sortie. K 14 jammed her helm trying to evade and K 22 rammed her. She was soon rammed by the battlecruiser Inflexible. In the confusion which followed, the light cruiser Fearless rammed K 17 and K 6 rammed K 4; K 4 was rammed again by K 7. Not surprisingly, K 17 and K 4 sank, although K 14 survived. The total cost was 103 men. K 1 was also sunk by collision on 17 November 1917. K 13 foundered in the Gareloch on 29 January 1917 while running trials.​

​

After the ‘Battle of May Island’ a wag wrote that the ‘K’ class had the speed of a destroyer, the turning circle of a battlecruiser and the bridge control facilities of a picket boat. This was exaggerated, but the lack of bridge facilities – which meant means of maintaining situational awareness – was real. The disaster reflected a wider problem. It does not appear that any officers understood just how difficult it would be to manage a complex fleet without constant communication and also without constant verification of where ships were in relation to each other. In many ways Jutland demonstrated the problem, but it was not well understood until after the war. A fleet running at night without lights and with very little inter-communication invited disaster. It was not that the idea of direct support by submarines was disproven, but rather that a great deal had to be done to make it work. Other major navies were also much interested in direct support or at least in using submarines in conjunction with surface forces, but given a combination of poor situational awareness and poor communication that was impossible at the time. Admiral Jellicoe’s recurring fear that the Germans would lure him into a submarine ambush was another form of the same idea (and the Germans had much the same fear when confronting the British). Without good communications and good shared situational awareness this too was essentially impossible.​

A view of one of the commanders:

​

A contemporary view was given by Captain Little, who commanded the ‘K’-boats in the Grand Fleet, in 1917 in a discussion with a US submarine officer. Little considered the means of handling funnels and ventilation safe and reliable, ‘though it is understood that one submarine of this class sank due to improper closing of some valve’. He considered the boilers and steam plant similar to those of a destroyer, the boilers being enclosed to keep heat from other parts of the boat and also to keep the boiler warm while the submarine submerged, so that as little time as possible would be spent getting up steam again once the submarine surfaced. In view of the large size (i.e., poor manoeuvrability) of the ‘K’ class, Little considered it essential that the boat should be heading parallel with the enemy (using her broadside tubes) when within 2000 yards.​

After the 'battle' more K class were ordered. For the design:

Captain C J C Little (same above) ended a four-page list of proposals with the comment that ‘we [the officers of the flotilla] are all agreed that the present ‘K’ class design having been carried out without practical trial is a great achievement. The slow flooding of the external ballast tanks due to their disposition is their chief drawback. With the present experience embodied the new type will contain enormous possibilities.’ Little’s comments give some idea of experience with the ‘Ks’.​

The post war technical view, note that the RN and other navies kept a strong interest in Fleet Submarines.

The October 1921 Admiralty Technical History of British wartime submarines was very complimentary to the ‘K’ class, pointing out that in September 1918 two ‘K’-boats overtook the Grand Fleet, which was hove-to in a heavy north-west gale by the North Dogger Bank. ‘The boats are undoubtedly better than their designers expected. In P.Z. exercises with the Grand Fleet . . . they were able each time to close within torpedo range of their objects, showing that an action with the High Seas Fleet would have in all probability given them a great opportunity.’ The ‘K’ class ‘showed that we could confidently produce a successful boat of any size and specification asked for and that we have long passed the stage of experimental production’. The requirements quoted were a surface speed of 23 knots, to dive in five minutes, to dive (i.e., to remain submerged) for six hours and to be seaworthy on the high seas. All of these requirements were exceeded.​

 

[ArtosStark]

When would the attack have been launched?

Iirc Denmark had started mining the Straits as early as August 5, 1914.

Fishers attack in WW1? Likely not until 1916 at least. Fisher only returned in late 1914 and started building the tools he thought he would need. Lambert's thesis is that he would use 1915 to try and clear the Belgian coast basically in preference to Gallipoli. I am not sure what plans he had for that or how successful they would have been. In the meantime the ships and equipment needed would be assembled.

In a hypothetical world where the Navy's plans had been accepted from the off? I would guess sometime in 1915. The Belts would almost certainly have been mined by then, assuming similar diplomatic pressure from the Germans. The British would need to clear them before they could get through the Belts.

Upon further reading I may need to revise my answer to this. Supposedly at one point Fisher states that he would have been ready to descend on Denmark in the Summer of 1915 IOTL. Bearing in mind that this could be BS, if true that would mean he was able to get in place everything he thought he would need in 9 months. That could mean that if the tools were in place beforehand I would guess he would be ready in January or February of 1915.

A major problem with speculating on Fisher's plans for WW1 is that we just do not know. When Fisher was First Sea Lord he believed that the best way to ensure success was to keep things secret, hence in spite of considerable planning for a war with Germany occurring in the early years of the 20th Century the first time anyone outside the Admiralty board and the NID (and probably several within those) knew of it was in 1907. After the troubles with Beresford he doubled down on this. He centralized all authority for war planning in the role of the Service Chief (himself). He was often noted to say that the only way to maintain the surprise necessary was for the true war plan to reside only in the Chief's head. Several times he supported proposals he was completely opposed to and had no intention of going through with, simply to avoid having to reveal his true plans. So we are speculating based on what little he has said, his building plans, and the 1907-1908 war plans that were the starting point for all Baltic and North Sea Planning thereafter.

So, with that in mind:

So longer answer. That strategy would be exactly what the HSF tried but failed to achieve. It splits the RN into chunks that can be beaten by the whole HSF.

Any RN fleet in the Baltic must be able to beat the whole HSF because if it does not then just that HSF will sortie and sink it.

But such a big fleet in the Baltic would mean that there is no fleet left in the North Sea big enough to stop the HSF from blocking the channel and the estuary of the Thames.

RN blocks Baltic, HSF blocks Channel and Thames, Germany wins. RN moves fleet back big enough to chase HSF away, HSF moves to Baltic clears Baltic unless RN moves fleet big enough to protect Baltic than HSF blocks Channel and Thames. Rinse and repeat.

As mentioned earlier, the RN were well aware of the Naval geography of the North Sea. The Germans have two entrances. Therefore there are only three options they considered viable:

1. Possess enough naval superiority to be able to field two fleets, one in the Baltic and one in the North Sea, with each being capable of defeating the entire HSF. This obviously wasn't feasible and was never seriously considered so.

2. Destroy enough of the Enemy Fleet while retaining enough of your own that 1. becomes feasible. This was obviously desirable but was never specifically counted on when the Baltic was discussed.

3. Remove the use of one of the entrances, allowing the RN to safely concentrate their strength against the HSF in the Baltic. This was a central theme in any discussion of a Baltic strategy, and was always considered a required prerequisite. Different methods were suggested for doing this:

a. Blockships across the access channels. This was the most popular method but suffered from the deficiency that hydrographic data said it could not be done. By the time of WW1 they believed that they could overcome this issue by sinking larger ships filled with concrete. Similar to what was done in the Zeebrugge raid. The concern was then that the Germans could dig new channels around the blocks, as also happened after the Zeebrugge raid.

b. An assault on Cuxhaven. Some plans called for this as a prerequisite to the Baltic operation and some as a method to aid France in an of itself. And yes, they all knew it would be a bloodbath. That was why it was always rejected. But they kept studying it to determine how much of a bloodbath it would be and whether the cost would, in certain circumstances, be worth the prize. Most officers came down on No, but the idea came up again as a part of a desperate potential plan to stop the U-boats by assaulting their bases in 1917/1918. Even then it was ruled too costly.

c. Minefields blocking the entrances to the Elbe and Wesser. This was probably the only realistic scenario. And based on comments by Fisher it seems like this was the way he was leaning in 1914-15. I have seen it speculated that the reason he never did enact the Baltic plan during his tenure was a lack of mines, which he thought would be made good by the increased production and new fast minelayers coming into service. These were probably destroyers refitted as minelayers. I am not sure if it was realistic for him to have the mines he needed in place by summer 1915, but that seems to have been his plan. The major downside for the RN of this method is that it requires forces to maintain and defend the minefield. This reduces the effectiveness of closing one of the North Sea exits in the first place. But it was the only method that seems like it may have worked.

Without one of these plans working, then the RN would not be going into the Baltic.

Could the RN clear the mies faster than he Danes (and Germans?) could replace them?

Short answer... No. The minefields were covered by coast artillery.

If they can avoid being under fire, probably. If not, probably not. That said, when the initial minesweeping effort at Gallipoli failed (and I do not dispute that this operation has the potential to turn into a larger Gallipoli if badly handled) the British began work on minesweeping destroyers. They probably could have better weathered the fire for long enough to sweep the mines. Though whether that would have gotten the fleet through the narrows, is still an open question. A further complication in the Baltic is that the Germans would be swarming torpedo boats and submarines, as others have mentioned.

Fisher did not really say anything about the Baltic portion of his plan in WW1. Several officers involved in operational planning expressed anxiety about whether he had considered the challenges of crossing the Belts. As mentioned above he tended to keep things very close to the chest, so maybe he had a plan for it, but I don't know what it was. The only thing I can offer is that he was quite interested in the Oresund Sound as well prior to the war. Several times he supported a proposal to partner with the Swedes in deepening the Sound. It is possible he considered violating Swedish neutrality to get into the Baltic with shallower draft vessels. If so (and this is purely speculation on my part, I don't know if he ever considered this) I am not sure that the diplomatic fall out would be worth the price. Britain used a lot of Swedish iron ore as well.

Absent any idea of Fisher's plan for the WW1 crossing I have to fall back on the 1907 plans. These were considered very feasible in 1907, but they were not written with the technology of 1914 in mind. Nonetheless they are what I have to work with. The plan in 1907 involved landing between Ise Fiord and Siero Bay, on the north of Zealand to defeat any German forces on Zealand. This can be accomplished without going through the Belts, though I am not sure what forces were supposed to be available for it. I assume, but do not know, that securing Zealand, or at least much of it would be required before transiting the Belts with the main force. That said, a blockade of Zealand was necessary to keep German reinforcements from reaching the island. This would likely require at least light forces to get through to the Baltic, hence my wondering about the Oresund. In 1915 perhaps this would have been a job for submarines, but that is a guess on my part.

Before the fleet could transit the Belts, the 1907 plans called for Sprongo, Omo and Albue peninsula (all in or on the edge of the Great Belt) would have to have been taken to keep German artillery from impeding the fleet from entering the Baltic. I would assume that with the increase of artillery power the number of locations to be taken would have increased by 1914.



I mentioned earlier that I think if Fisher thought he could do it, his acumen is great enough that the idea is at least worth consideration. That said, without knowing what strategy he actually intended to use it is difficult to see how he would have overcome the challenges involved. I do, however, feel confident in saying that he, and RN thinkers at large, were well aware of what those challenges were, or at least as much as they could be without actually trying it.

However, the 1907 plans effectively gave the government two possible (though not mutually exclusive) options for dealing with Germany's internal line of communication in the form of the Kiel canal. One was Plan C/D with D simply being C but with the added complication of invading Zealand. The other was Plan A, which involved a distant blockade across the English Channel and the Gap between Britain and Norway. Both were continually considered, revised and different methods of meeting their challenges were proposed in the intervening years. And in the end Plan A, distant blockade, was chosen.

It is, to me, telling that basically every officer involved in the preparation of these plans (Ottley. Ballard and Hankey being the most prominent) along with the majority of senior officers in the RN at the time, came down on the side of Plan A, and Plan C/D was considered less and less seriously as time went on. Fisher and a few others were the exception, and even Fisher said that a Baltic expedition should only be a recourse to be considered if economic blockade was not working (though he contradicted that at other times, so I am not sure if he was serious).

Therefore, though I think that people do the plan a disservice by rejecting it as half baked and insane without considering its details, absent some angle I have not thought of from Fisher, I find myself agreeing that it is not a practical use of resources for the war as it was.

 

[KarneeKarnay]

Norman Friedman is far more complementary of the K Class in his "British Submarines in Two World Wars"

I'm going off what I've read in Allan Mallinson's "Fight to the Finish". He takes the approach that K Class was conceived with the best of intentions, built by the inexperienced and used poorly by the RN. He mentions mechanical faults being a common problem and leading to only one confirmed kill of another U-Boat prior to he Battle of May Island. I'm interested in learning more though, because to me the idea of trying to move a massive number of ships through fog and not experienced with submarines flotillas, was a disaster waiting to happen.

 

[McPherson]

Did they still use that method in WW1?
I know that was the method used to produce ammunition for muskets in the late 1800's.

It still works.