Its first meeting was at
Abbeville on 12 September 1939
[1] with Britain represented by the Prime Minister,
Neville Chamberlain, and Lord
Chatfield, the French delegation being headed by their Prime Minister,
Édouard Daladier, and General
Maurice Gamelin.
[2] The next meeting took place at
Hove on 22 September 1939. At both meetings, discussion centred on Italy and whether it would be possible to deploy military force at
Salonika or
Istanbul without provoking
Benito Mussolini. With its huge army mobilised but idle, the French feared an ebbing of military morale and were accordingly bellicose and impatient for action; Britain, on the other hand, shrank from such measures. At the Hove meeting there was also discussion about munitions production and reinforcements to the air and anti-aircraft defences in France. The British party at Hove consisted of
Neville Chamberlain (Prime Minister),
Lord Halifax (Foreign Secretary), Sir
Alexander Cadogan (Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office) and
Edward Bridges (Cabinet Secretary). France was represented by
Édouard Daladier (Prime Minister), General
Maurice Gamelin, Admiral
François Darlan (C-in-C French Navy),
Raoul Dautry (Minister of Munitions), and
Jean Monnet (Chairman of the Franco-British Economic Co-ordination Committee.
[3][4][5][6] Chamberlain stated that the Allies could not prevent a German intervention into
Yugoslavia.
[7] At this and the two further meetings in 1939, on 17 November (in Paris) and 19 December, the French turned down a British scheme to bomb industrial targets in the
Ruhr if the Germans were to invade Belgium. The French view was that such action would not stop the invasion of Belgium, but it would risk retaliation by the
Luftwaffe against Britain and France.
[8]
The meeting of the SWC held in Paris on 5 February 1940 was the first to be attended by Winston Churchill, who, as
First Lord of the Admiralty, had been invited to participate by Neville Chamberlain.
[9] Here the British rejected France’s proposal for an expedition to
Petsamo in
Finland to help the Finns in the
Winter War for fear that this would provoke
Soviet Russia. Sir
Alexander Cadogan, the
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, described it as a ‘silly scheme’. However, a French plan to send forces to
Narvik was approved – this being dependent on agreement from
Norway and
Sweden. The meeting was described by General
Ironside as having been harmonious with ‘everyone purring with pleasure. Wondered if we should all be in the state if we had a little adversity to touch us up.’ In the event, Norway and Sweden, fearful of compromising their neutrality, did not consent to the Narvik plan. The Scandinavian view was interpreted differently by Britain and France – the former taking the view that the operation should be cancelled, but the French maintaining that it had been agreed that the operation should proceed regardless of opposition. However, events overtook the impasse when, on 13 March, the Finns agreed an armistice with the Soviet Union.
[10]
The sixth meeting of the SWC was held in London on 28 March 1940 with Britain represented by the Prime Minister,
Neville Chamberlain,
Lord Halifax,
Winston Churchill,
Oliver Stanley and Sir
Kingsley Wood. This was the first to be attended by
Paul Reynaud, the new French Prime Minister, who was accompanied by
César Campinchi, the Naval Minister, Victor Laurent-Eynac
[11], the Aviation Minister, M.
Charles Corbin (the French Ambassador), M. Alexis Léger
[12], General
Maurice Gamelin,
Admiral Darlan, General Vuillemin and General Koeltz.
[13] The British were firmly opposed to French plans to bomb Russian oil fields in the
Caucasus in order to deprive Germany of Soviet oil supplies. The French agreed to what later became known as
Operation Royal Marine, the floating of mines up the
Rhine to damage bridges and disrupt barge traffic. However, Reynaud was unable to obtain the approval of his cabinet for the mining of the Rhine; accordingly the British refused to go along with the plan to mine the waters off the Norwegian coast at Narvik.
[14] Politically, the main thrust of this meeting was joint communiqué declaring that: 'Both Governments mutually undertake that during the present war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement. They undertake to maintain after conclusion of peace a community of action for so long as may be necessary'.
[15]
In Paris on 5 April, at a meeting which was not of the SWC, Churchill pressed for
Operation Royal Marine but, fearing German reprisals, the French refused to countenance any mining of the Rhine. Churchill therefore decided that Britain alone would undertake the mining off Narvik; this action (
Operation Wilfred) was planned for 8 April.
[16] However, in the meantime, the Germans had launched
Operation Weserübung, the invasion of Norway and Denmark. Paul Reynaud, Édouard Daladier and Admiral Darlan flew to London for an emergency meeting of the SWC on 9 April.
[17] Here it was resolved that an Anglo-French task force would be sent to Norway; but the operation (
Plan R 4) was a failure - not only did it prove impossible to stop the export of iron ore from Scandinavia to Germany, but the troops had to be evacuated in what was known as
Operation Alphabet.
A further meeting of the Council took place in Paris on 22 and 23 April when it was agreed that the Allies would stand fast in Norway;
Trondheim and
Narvik would continue to be the main objectives. It was also decided that the RAF would, without further discussion, bomb the
Ruhr if the Germans were to invade Holland or Belgium.
[18]
When the Supreme War Council met on 27 April, the French hoped that Britain would postpone the evacuation of Norway, but this was not to be. Reynaud was furious, deploring 'the old men [in London] who do not know how to take a risk', and returning to Paris with influenza. There was acrimony on both sides - the French convinced that
Albion was indeed
perfidious and the British stereotyping their ally as 'temperamental'.
[19]
